# S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION COMMISSION & ORS

- **Citation:** [2022] 12 S.C.R. 1
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2022-09-14
- **Case number:** ELECTION COMMISSION & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 6576 of 2022
- **Bench:** Uday Umesh Lalit, Indira Banerjee, Ajay Rastogi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-rukmini-madegowda-v-the-state-election-commission-ors-35722
- **Pages:** 30

## Headnote

Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 - ss.27, 3335, 39 - Karnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979
- Representation of People Act, 1951 - s.123(2) - Conduct of
Elections Rules, 1961 - Election Petition filed by respondent no.4
was allowed, election of the appellant to the Mysore Municipal
Corporation as Councillor was set aside - On appeal, held: A false
declaration w.r.t the assets of a candidate, his/her spouse or
dependents, constitutes corrupt practice irrespective of the impact
of such a false declaration on the election of the candidate - It is
undisputed that the appellant suppressed information w.r.t the assets
of her husband - Corrupt Practices have been defined in s.39(2),
KMC Act to include 'undue influence' as defined in s.123(2), 1951
RP Act - s.123(2) of the 1951 RP Act came up for interpretation by
this Court in Lok Prahari case, wherein it was held that the nondisclosure would amount to 'undue influence' as defined under the
1951 RP Act - Definition of 'undue influence' as used in s.123(2)
of 1951 RP Act is also adopted by s.39(2) of the KMC Act -
Therefore, the non-disclosure of assets in the municipal elections
would also amount to 'undue influence' and consequently to 'corrupt
practice'- Further, the notifications issued by the State Election
Commission were not questioned by the appellant- Rather, she
accepted them as binding on her, and accordingly filed an affidavitThus, the appellant is estopped from questioning the validity of the
notifications or the power of the State Election Commission to issue
the same - Also, there is no legal or normative impediment for the
State Election Commission to issue directions requiring disclosure
of assets of the candidate, his/her spouse and dependent associates
by way of affidavit - In issuing the notification, the Election
Commission has not encroached into the legislative domain of the
Karnataka State Legislature- No ground to interfere with the
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judgment of the High Court affirming the order setting aside the
election of appellant.
Constitution of India - Article 243-ZA(1), 324(1) - Held: The
language and tenor of Article 243-ZA(1) is in pari materia with Article
324(1) - Interpretation of Article 324(1) to confer wide powers on
the Election Commission to issue directions in respect of elections
to Parliament and State legislatures would apply to Article 243ZA(1) which has to be construed to confer powers on the State
Election Commission to issue directions related to superintendence,
direction and control of the preparation of electoral roles or for
conduct of elections to municipalities - State Election Commission
has the same powers u/Article 243-K and 243-ZA(1) as the Election
Commission has u/Article 324(1).
Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 - Karnataka
Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979 - Representation of
People Act, 1951 - Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 - Held: A
hypertechnical view of the omission to incorporate any specific
provision in the KMC Election Rules, similar to the 1961 Rules,
expressly requiring disclosure of assets, to condone dishonesty and
corrupt practice would be against the spirit of the Constitution and
public interest.
Precedent - Held: A judgment is a precedent for the issue of
law raised and decided - Judgment has to be construed in the
backdrop of the facts and circumstances in which it has been
rendered.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The election of the Appellant is governed by
the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, and the
Karnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979 framed
thereunder. A false declaration with regard to the assets of a
candidate, his/her spouse or dependents, constitutes corrupt
practice irrespective of the impact of such a false declaration on
the election of the candidate. It may be presumed that a false
declaration impacts the election. [Para 16, 38][10-E-F; 17-A-B]
1.2 A judgment is a

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[2022] 12 S.C.R. 1
1
S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA
v.
THE STATE ELECTION COMMISSION & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6576 of 2022)
SEPTEMBER 14, 2022
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, CJI, INDIRA BANERJEE AND
AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 - ss.27, 3335, 39 - Karnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979
- Representation of People Act, 1951 - s.123(2) - Conduct of
Elections Rules, 1961 - Election Petition filed by respondent no.4
was allowed, election of the appellant to the Mysore Municipal
Corporation as Councillor was set aside - On appeal, held: A false
declaration w.r.t the assets of a candidate, his/her spouse or
dependents, constitutes corrupt practice irrespective of the impact
of such a false declaration on the election of the candidate - It is
undisputed that the appellant suppressed information w.r.t the assets
of her husband - Corrupt Practices have been defined in s.39(2),
KMC Act to include 'undue influence' as defined in s.123(2), 1951
RP Act - s.123(2) of the 1951 RP Act came up for interpretation by
this Court in Lok Prahari case, wherein it was held that the nondisclosure would amount to 'undue influence' as defined under the
1951 RP Act - Definition of 'undue influence' as used in s.123(2)
of 1951 RP Act is also adopted by s.39(2) of the KMC Act -
Therefore, the non-disclosure of assets in the municipal elections
would also amount to 'undue influence' and consequently to 'corrupt
practice'- Further, the notifications issued by the State Election
Commission were not questioned by the appellant- Rather, she
accepted them as binding on her, and accordingly filed an affidavitThus, the appellant is estopped from questioning the validity of the
notifications or the power of the State Election Commission to issue
the same - Also, there is no legal or normative impediment for the
State Election Commission to issue directions requiring disclosure
of assets of the candidate, his/her spouse and dependent associates
by way of affidavit - In issuing the notification, the Election
Commission has not encroached into the legislative domain of the
Karnataka State Legislature- No ground to interfere with the
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judgment of the High Court affirming the order setting aside the
election of appellant.
Constitution of India - Article 243-ZA(1), 324(1) - Held: The
language and tenor of Article 243-ZA(1) is in pari materia with Article
324(1) - Interpretation of Article 324(1) to confer wide powers on
the Election Commission to issue directions in respect of elections
to Parliament and State legislatures would apply to Article 243ZA(1) which has to be construed to confer powers on the State
Election Commission to issue directions related to superintendence,
direction and control of the preparation of electoral roles or for
conduct of elections to municipalities - State Election Commission
has the same powers u/Article 243-K and 243-ZA(1) as the Election
Commission has u/Article 324(1).
Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 - Karnataka
Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979 - Representation of
People Act, 1951 - Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 - Held: A
hypertechnical view of the omission to incorporate any specific
provision in the KMC Election Rules, similar to the 1961 Rules,
expressly requiring disclosure of assets, to condone dishonesty and
corrupt practice would be against the spirit of the Constitution and
public interest.
Precedent - Held: A judgment is a precedent for the issue of
law raised and decided - Judgment has to be construed in the
backdrop of the facts and circumstances in which it has been
rendered.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The election of the Appellant is governed by
the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, and the
Karnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979 framed
thereunder. A false declaration with regard to the assets of a
candidate, his/her spouse or dependents, constitutes corrupt
practice irrespective of the impact of such a false declaration on
the election of the candidate. It may be presumed that a false
declaration impacts the election. [Para 16, 38][10-E-F; 17-A-B]
1.2 A judgment is a precedent for the issue of law that is
raised and decided. The judgment has to be construed in the
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backdrop of the facts and circumstances in which the judgment
has been rendered. Words, phrases and sentences in a judgment,
cannot be read out of context. Nor is a judgment to be read and
interpreted in the manner of a statute. It is only the law as
interpreted by Court in an earlier judgment, which constitutes a
binding precedent, and not everything that the Judges say. [Para
41][18-B-D]
State of M. P. v. Centre for Environment Protection
Research & Development (2020) 9 SCC 781 : 2020
(8) JT 353 - distinguished.
1.3 Under Section 39 of the KMC Act, corrupt practices
include undue influence. The definition of undue influence in
Clause 2 of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act
1951, ("the 1951 RP Act") has been incorporated in Section 39(2)
of the KMC Act. Under Section 27 of the KMC Act corrupt
practices defined in Section 39(2) which includes "undue
influence' entails disqualification from being a Councillor, for six
years. [Para 45, 47][22-D-E; 23-D]
1.4 Corrupt Practices have been defined in Section 39(2)
of the KMC Act to include 'undue influence' as defined in Section
123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. Section 123(2) of the 1951 RP Act
came up for interpretation by this Court in Lok Prahari, where
this Court held that the non-disclosure would amount to 'undue
influence' as defined under the Representation of People Act.
The definition of 'undue influence' as used in Section 123(2) of
1951 RP Act is also adopted by Section 39(2) of the KMC Act.
Therefore, the non- disclosure of assets in the municipal elections
would also amount to 'undue influence' and consequently to
'corrupt practice'. As argued, the notifications dated 14th July
2003 and 19th June 2018 issued by the State Election Commission,
have never been questioned by the Appellant. Rather, the
Petitioner accepted the notifications as binding on her, and
accordingly filed an affidavit. The Appellant is, therefore, estopped
from questioning the validity of the notifications or the power of
the State Election Commission to issue the same. That nondisclosure of assets would amount to 'corrupt practices', entailing
disqualification, is evident from Sections 35 and 39(ii) of the KMC
Act, read with Section 123(2) of the Representation of People
S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION
COMMISSION & ORS.
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Act 1951, as interpreted by this Court in Lok Prahari. It is not in
dispute that the Appellant had suppressed information with regard
to the assets of her husband. Section 35(1)(b) of the KMC Act
provides that if the Court is of the opinion that a party has
committed a 'corrupt practice', that would result in the election
being declared void. Section 35 of the KMC Act enumerates the
grounds on which Courts could declare the election of the
returned candidate to be void. Section 35(1)(b) mentions corrupt
practice by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any
other person, either with the consent of a returned candidate or
his election agent, as one of the grounds for declaring the election
to be void. Section 39 of the KMC Act enumerates the acts/
practices, which are to be deemed to be corrupt practices. Corrupt
practices include 'undue influence'. This is specified in Section
39(2) of the KMC Act. The definition of undue influence in Section
123(2) of the 1951 RP Act has expressly been incorporated in
the definition of undue influence in Section 39(2) of the KMC
Act. Further, having regard to the tenor of Section 39(3) of the
KMC Act, any false statement relating to a candidate would be
corrupt practice. At the cost of repetition, it is emphasized that
KMC Act incorporates the definition of undue influence in Section
123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. The judgments of this Court
interpreting 'undue influence' in Section 123(2) of the 1951, RP
Act, would squarely apply to the interpretation of undue influence
under Section 39(2) of the KMC Act. Section 123(2) of the
Representation of People Act, 1951 had been interpreted by this
Court in Lok Prahari where this Court held that non-disclosure
would amount to 'undue influence' as defined in the
Representation of People Act, 1951. The non-disclosure of assets
would therefore, also amount to 'undue influence' and
consequently to 'corrupt practices' under the KMC Act. Mr. Patil
argued that the Notifications dated 14th July 2003 and in particular
19th June 2018 issued by the State Election Commission made it
mandatory for the candidates to file affidavits, disclosing the assets
of their spouses. [Paras 55-62][24-H; 25-A-B, C, F-H; 26-A-G]
Lok Prahari v. Union of India (2018) 4 SCC 699 : [2018]
2 SCR 892 - relied on.
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1.5 The question of whether the Election Commission had
power to issue directions to the candidates to file affidavits
disclosing the assets of their spouses, in the absence of any
specific provision under the KMC Act or the Rules framed
thereunder is no longer res integra. The question is squarely
covered by the law laid down by this Court in Union of India v.
Association for Democratic Reforms and Ors., where this Court
had directed the Election Commission to secure to voters, inter
alia, information pertaining to assets not only of the candidates
but also of their spouse and dependents. The Election Commission
has to act within the four corners of law made by the Parliament
and/or the concerned State legislature, as the case may be. The
notification dated 14th July 2003 was issued pursuant to the
judgment of this Court in Association for Democratic Reforms,
where this Court held that "the Constitution has made
comprehensive provision under Article 324 to take care of
surprise situations and it operates in areas left unoccupied by
legislation." The interpretation given by this Court of Article 324
of the Constitution of India is binding on all courts. [Paras 6365][26-G-H; 27-A-C]
Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms
(2002) 5 SCC 294 : [2002] 3 SCR 696 - relied on.
1.6 The language and tenor of Article 243-ZA(1) is in pari
materia with Article 324(1) of the Constitution. The language and
tenor of Section 243-ZA(1) is identical to that of Article 324(1).
This Court has interpreted Article 324(1) to confer wide powers
on the Election Commission relating to superintendence,
direction and control of preparation of electoral roles and/or the
conduct of elections to Parliament and to the legislature of every
State provided, of course, that the directions are not contrary to
law. The interpretation of Article 324(1) to confer wide powers
on the Election Commission to issue directions in respect of
elections to Parliament and State legislatures would apply to
Article 243-ZA(1). Article 243-ZA(1) has to be construed to confer
powers on the State Election Commission to issue directions
related to superintendence, direction and control of the
preparation of electoral roles or for conduct of elections to
municipalities. The Election Commission has wide powers under
S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION
COMMISSION & ORS.
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Article 324(1) of the Constitution of India to issue directions
necessary for conducting free and fair elections, subject to the
contours of law. The power of the Election Commission includes
the power to issue directions where the law is silent. The State
Election Commission has the same powers under Article 243-K
and 243-ZA(1) as the Election Commission of India has under
Article 324(1) of the Constitution of India. In Association for
Democratic Reforms and in Lok Prahari, this Court held that for
effective exercise of his fundamental right under Article 19(1)((a),
the voter is entitled to have all relevant information about
candidates at an election which would include criminal
antecedents, if any, of the candidate, his/her assets and liabilities,
educational qualifications, etc. It may be true that amendment of
the 1951 RP Act is within the exclusive domain of the Union
Parliament as observed in Lok Prahari and amendment of the
KMC Act is exclusively within the domain of the Karnataka State
Legislature. However, in light of the law declared by this Court
in Association for Democratic Reforms, there is no legal or
normative impediment for the State Election Commission to issue
directions requiring disclosure of assets of the candidate, his/
her spouse and dependent associates by way of affidavit. In issuing
the notification dated 14th July 2003, the Election Commission
has not encroached into the legislative domain of the Karnataka
State Legislature. The direction, as contained in the notification
dated 14th July 2003 had been accepted by the Appellant. Having
affirmed a false affidavit, it does not lie in the mouth of the
Appellant to contend that her election should not be set aside on
the ground of corrupt practice under Section 35(1) of the KMC
Act. [Paras 66-70][27-C-D, G-H; 28-A-G]
1.7 The Election Commission has issued the notification
dated 14th July 2003 within the contours of law. Purity of election
at all levels, be it election to the Union Parliament or a State
Legislature or a Municipal Corporation or a Panchayat is a matter
of national importance in which a uniform policy is desirable in
the interest of all the States. A hypertechnical view of the omission
to incorporate any specific provision in the KMC Election Rules,
similar to the 1961 Rules, expressly requiring disclosure of
assets, to condone dishonesty and corrupt practice would be
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against the spirit of the Constitution and public interest. There
are no grounds to interfere with or set aside the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court, affirming the judgment
and order of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mysuru,
allowing Election Petition and setting aside the election of the
Appellant. [Paras 72, 74 and 75][29-C, F-G; 30-A-B]
Shrikant v. Vasantrao and Others (2006) 2 SCC 682 :
[2006] 1 SCR 496; Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal (1982) 1
SCC 691 : [1982] 3 SCR 318 - distinguished.
Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar & Ors. (2015) 3 SCC
467 : [2015] 4 SCR 987; State Bank of India v. Santosh
Gupta (2017) 2 SCC 538 : [2016] 9 SCR 985; State of
West Bengal v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1963 -
relied on.
Srikant v. Vasant Rao and Others; Shailesh Manubhai
Parmar v. Election Commission of India (2018) 9 SCC
100 : [2018] 10 SCR 76; Tolaram Relumal and Another
v. State of Bombay [1955] 1 SCR 158; Bipinchandra
Parshottamdas Patel v. State of Gujarat (2003) 4 SCC
642: [2003] 3 SCR 533 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2002] 3 SCR 696
relied on
Para 9
[2018] 2 SCR 892
relied on
Para 9
[2006] 1 SCR 496
distinguished
Para 19
[1982] 3 SCR 318
distinguished
Para 19
[2018] 10 SCR 76
referred to
Para 25
[2003] 3 SCR 533
referred to
Para 43
[2015] 4 SCR 987
relied on
Para 57
[2016] 9 SCR 985
relied on
Para 73
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6576
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Orders dated 26.05.2021 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in M.F.A. No.49 of 2021.
S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION
COMMISSION & ORS.
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[2022] 12 S.C.R.
Shyam Diwan, Sr. Adv., Darpan KM., Hemanth Raj, Rajit
Jonathan Shaw, Ms. Amrita Sharma, Ms. Rashi Bansal, Advs. for the
Appellant.
Basava Prabhu S. Patil. Sr. Adv., Shailesh Madiyal, Manmohan
P.N., Sudhanshu Prakash, Geet Ahuja, Ms. Rakhi M., Advs. for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
INDIRA BANERJEE, J.
Leave granted.
2. This Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India is against a judgment and order dated 26th May 2021 passed by
the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, upholding the
judgment and order dated 14th December 2020 of the Principal District
and Sessions Judge, Mysuru, allowing Election Petition No.4 of 2018
and setting aside the election of the Appellant to the Mysore Municipal
Corporation as Councillor from Ward No.36-Yeraganahalli, Karnataka.
3. Sometime in 2018, the Appellant filed her nomination for election
to the Mysore Municipal Corporation, as Councillor from Ward No.36Yeraganahalli in Karnataka, which was reserved for Backward ClassB (Women), along with a declaration by way of an affidavit, furnishing
details of the movable and immovable properties held by the Appellant
as well as her spouse and dependents, which is hereinafter referred to
as the "Affidavit of Assets".
4. In August 2018, elections to the Mysore Municipal Corporation
were held. On 3rd September 2018, the results of said elections were
declared. The Appellant was declared as successfully elected Councillor
from the said Ward No.36, that is Yeraganahalli.
5. The Respondent No.4, an unsuccessful candidate, filed Election
Petition No.4 of 2018 in the Court of Principal District and Sessions
Judge, Mysuru under Sections 33 and 34 of the Karnataka Municipal
Corporations Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the "KMC Act".
6. In the said Election Petition, the Respondent No.4 alleged that
the Appellant had, in her Affidavit of Assets, falsely declared that her
husband did not possess any immovable property, and that by giving
such false declaration, the Appellant had indulged in corrupt practices to
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get the benefit of reservation under the Category of Backward Class-B
(Women).
7. By a judgment and order dated 16th April 2019, the Principal
District and Sessions Judge, Mysuru (Trial Court) rejected the said
Election Petition No.4 of 2018 filed by the Respondent No.4.
8. The Respondent No.4 filed an appeal being Miscellaneous First
Appeal No.4023 of 2019 in the High Court of Karnataka, challenging
the said judgment and order dated 16th April 2019 passed by the Trial
Court.
9. By an order dated 28th April 2020, the High Court remanded
Election Petition No.4 of 2018 back to the Trial Court, for reconsideration,
in the light of the judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Association
for Democratic Reforms1 and in Lok Prahari v. Union of India2. The
High Court observed:
"...This Court is of the considered opinion that for complete
adjudication of the lis the trial court should have considered
such question with reference to the relevant provisions of the
KMC Act and the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms People's
Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and another vs Union of
India and in Lok Prahari Vs. Union of India and Others."
10. Thereafter, by a judgment and order dated 14th December
2020, the Trial Court allowed the Election Petition No.4 of 2018 and set
aside the election of the Appellant.
11. On or about 23rd December 2020, the Appellant filed an appeal
in the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, under Section 38 of the
KMC Act, which was admitted and registered as MFA No.49 of 2021.
The High Court has dismissed the Appeal, being MFA No.49 of 2021 by
the judgment and order dated 26th May 2021, impugned in this appeal.
12. Mr. Shyam Diwan, appearing on behalf of the Appellant,
submitted that the Appellant was successful in the Municipal election
for Ward No.36, Yeraganahalli in the Mysore City Corporation, and was
accordingly chosen as the Mayor of the Mysore City Corporation and
she continues to be the sitting Mayor.
S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION
COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
1 (2002) 5 SCC 294
2 (2018) 4 SCC 699
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13. Mr. Diwan argued that while the Respondent No.4 secured
2902 votes, the Appellant secured 3295 votes. Mr. Diwan emphasized
on the fact that the Election Petition had initially been dismissed, but the
High Court had, by an order dated 28th April 2020 in appeal, remanded
the matter back for reconsideration of the learned Trial Court.
14. Mr. Diwan submitted that the High Court had erred in law, in
passing the impugned order dated 26th May 2021, upholding the order
dated 14th December 2020 of the Trial Court in Election Petition No.4 of
2018, setting aside the election of the Appellant as Councillor for Ward
No.36-Yeraganahalli, Karnataka.
15. Mr. Diwan raised the following questions of law for
consideration of this Court:-
(i)
Whether a duly elected candidate, serving as the Mayor,
Mysore City Corporation after election, could be unseated, in
the absence of any statutory provision requiring disclosure of
assets in the affidavit filed with the nomination form?
(ii) Whether non-disclosure of assets would constitute corrupt
practice, in the absence of any statutory provision requiring
disclosure of assets?
16. The election of the Appellant is governed by the Karnataka
Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the "KMC
Act", and the Karnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979
framed thereunder, which is hereinafter referred to as the "KMC Election
Rules".
17. Mr. Diwan emphatically argued that there was no requirement
of any disclosure under the KMC Act or under the KMC Election Rules.
Having recognized and proceeded on the basis that elections were being
held in terms of the KMC Act read with the KMC Election Rules, the
High Court should not have dismissed the Appeal of the Appellant.
18. Mr. Diwan submitted that the Election Law which governs
the election, is a self-contained statutory law which has to be strictly
adhered to. In the absence of any specific provision in the law, which
requires a candidate to disclose, by way of affidavit, the assets of his/
her spouse, a candidate intending to contest an election cannot be
compelled to make such disclosure by adoption of a policy decision or
through action at common law.
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19. In support of his submission, Mr. Diwan cited Shrikant v.
Vasantrao and Others3, where this Court quoted with approval its earlier
decision in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal4 and held:-
"...Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be
elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations
they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An
election petition is not an action at common law, nor in equity.
It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law
nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which
the statute makes and applies. It is a special jurisdiction, and
a special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance
with the statute creating it. Concepts familiar to common law
and equity must remain strangers to election law unless
statutorily embodied. A court has no right to resort to them
on considerations of alleged policy because policy in such
matters as those, relating to the trial of election disputes, is
what the statute lays down. In the trial of election disputes,
court is put in a straitjacket."
20. In Srikant v. Vasant Rao & Others (supra) this Court held :-
"11. A person cannot, therefore, be disqualified unless he
suffers a disqualification laid down in Article 191 of the
Constitution or under Sections 8, 8-A, 9, 9-A, 10 or 10-A of
the Act. It is not possible to add to or subtract from the
disqualifications, either on the ground of convenience, or on
the grounds of equity or logic or perceived legislative intention.
A combined reading of Article 191 of the Constitution of India
and Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
makes it clear that a person can be held to be disqualified
for being chosen as, and for being, a Member of the
Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State only
on the following, and no other, grounds :
Disqualifications under the Constitution of India :
...............
...............
S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION
COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
3 (2006) 2 SCC 682
4 (1982) 1 SCC 691
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(viii) if he is a person having a subsisting contract with the
State Government for the supply of goods to or for the
execution of any works undertaken by that Government, vide
section 9-A of the Act; ..."
21. The judgment of this Court in Srikant v. Vasant Rao and
Others, was rendered in the context of Chapter III of the Representation
of the People Act 1951, in terms whereof a person could be held to be
disqualified from being a Member of the Legislative Assembly only on
the grounds stipulated, and no other, which included a person having a
subsisting contract with the State Government for supply of goods.
22. This Court found on facts that the concerned candidate did
not have any subsisting contracts with the State Government, but with
entities under the control of the State Government. This Court, thus
observed and held that the State Government was different from legal
or other authorities under its control.
23. The proposition of law noted by this Court in Jyoti Basu v.
Debi Ghosal (supra) that except in accordance with Statute, there is no
right to elect, be elected or to dispute an election, as approved and
reiterated in Srikant v. Vasant Rao & Others (supra) is well settled. An
Election Petition is indisputably a statutory proceeding governed by the
statute under which the Election Petition is filed, or the Statutory Rules
framed under that statute.
24. The observations of this Court in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal
(supra), referred to above have been made in the context of the issue of
whether the appellant could be impleaded in an election petition and held
guilty of corrupt practice, when he was not a candidate contesting the
election, which had been challenged. The judgments in Srikant v. Vasant
Rao & Others (supra) and Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal (supra) are
distinguishable on facts.
25. In Shailesh Manubhai Parmar v. Election Commission of
India5, also cited by Mr. Diwan, this Court held, in effect, that even
though Article 324 of the Constitution confers wide powers on the Election
Commission to take action with a view to ensure a free and fair election,
even by assuming the role of an adviser, the power to make law vests in
the Parliament under Article 327 of the Constitution. The Parliament is
5 (2018) 9 SCC 100
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supreme and, therefore, not bound by any advice of the Election
Commission.
26. This Court held:-
"26. Interpreting the said Article, the Constitution Bench in Kuldip
Nayar [Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1] held
: (SCC p. 139, para 427)
"427. In this context, we would say that where the law on
the subject is silent, Article 324 is a reservoir of power for
the Election Commission to act for the avowed purpose of
pursuing the goal of a free and fair election, and in this
view it also assumes the role of an adviser. But the power
to make law under Article 327 vests in Parliament, which
is supreme and so, not bound by such advice. We would
reject the argument by referring to what this Court has
already said in Mohinder Singh Gill [Mohinder Singh
Gill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405] and what
bears reiteration here is that the limitations on the exercise
of "plenary character" of the Election Commission include
one to the effect that 'when Parliament or any State
Legislature has made valid law relating to or in connection
with elections, the Commission, shall act in conformity with,
not in violation of, such provisions' [SCC p. 452, para
92(2)(b)]."
27. Relying on Shailesh Manubhai Parmar (supra), Mr. Diwan
argued that the Election Commission has to act within the four corners
of law made by Parliament. That apart, if any direction is issued by this
Court, interpreting a provision for furtherance of purity of election, it will
be obligatory on the part of the Commission to act in accordance with
the same. The Commission cannot introduce concepts or ideas or
dimensions which would not fit into the legal framework. There can be
no dispute with the aforesaid proposition.
28. Mr. Diwan questioned the authority of the Election Commission
to issue the notification dated 14th July 2003 requiring candidates
contesting elections to disclose their assets and the assets of their spouses
and dependents by filing an affidavit. He argued that there was no vacuum
in the KMC Act, which was required to be filled up by issuance of a
notification.
S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION
COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
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29. The notification dated 14th July 2003, was issued pursuant to
the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Association for
Democratic Reforms (supra). The relevant part of the judgment is
extracted hereinbelow:-
"48. The Election Commission is directed to call for
information on affidavit by issuing necessary order in exercise
of its power under Article 324 of the Constitution of India
from each candidate seeking election to Parliament or a State
Legislature as a necessary part of his nomination paper,
furnishing therein, information on the following aspects in
relation to his/her candidature:
(1) Whether the candidate is convicted/acquitted/
discharged of any criminal offence in the past - if any,
whether he is punished with imprisonment or fine.
(2) Prior to six months of filing of nomination, whether the
candidate is accused in any pending case, of any offence
punishable with imprisonment for two years or more, and
in which charge is framed or cognizance is taken by the
court of law. If so, the details thereof.
(3) The assets (immovable, movable, bank balance, etc.)
of a candidate and of his/her spouse and that of
dependants.
(4) Liabilities, if any, particularly whether there are any
overdues of any public financial institution or government
dues.
(5) The educational qualifications of the candidate."
30. In Lok Prahari (supra), this Court held:-
"68. In the light of the law declared by this Court in ADR
case [Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms, (2002)
5 SCC 294 : AIR 2002 SC 2112] and PUCL case [PUCL v.
Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399 : AIR 2003 SC 2363], we
do not see any legal or normative impediment nor has any
tenable legal objection been raised before us by any one of
the respondents, for issuance of the direction relating to the
changes in Form 26 (declaration by the candidates). On the
other hand, the 2nd respondent in his counter stated:
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"7. It is submitted that so far as the first prayer in the
captioned writ petition is concerned, the information about
source(s) of income of candidates, their spouses and
dependants will be a step in the direction of enhancing
transparency and should form part of the declaration in
Col. (9) of Form 26. The Answering Respondent
Commission vide its Letter No. 3/4/ECI/LET/FUNC/JUD/
SDR/Vol.I/2016 dated 7-9-2016 has already requested the
Ministry of Law and Justice to consider the proposed
amendments made in Column (3) and Column (9) of Form
26 and in total affirmation with the prayer made by the
petitioner."
Therefore, we are of the opinion that Prayer 1(1) should be
granted and is accordingly granted. We direct that Rule 4-A
of the Rules and Form 26 appended to the Rules shall be
suitably amended, requiring candidates and their associates
to declare their sources of income."
31. Mr. Diwan argued that in Lok Prahari (supra), this Court
directed that Rule 4A and Form 26 appended to the Conduct of Elections
Rules, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the "1961 Rules" framed under
the Representation of People Act shall be suitably amended requiring
candidates and their associates to declare their sources of income. This
Court further observed:
"81. For the very same logic as adopted by this Court
in Krishnamoorthy [Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar, (2015) 3
SCC 467 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 359 : AIR 2015 SC 1921] , we
are also of the opinion that the non-disclosure of assets and
sources of income of the candidates and their associates
would constitute a corrupt practice falling under heading
"undue influence" as defined under Section 123(2) of the
1951 RP Act. We, therefore, allow Prayer 2."
32. Mr. Diwan argued that, in this case, the elections were being
held under the KMC Act read with the KMC Rules. Neither the KMC
Act, nor any Rules framed thereunder require disclosure of the assets
of a candidate intending to contest elections or his/her spouse. The High
Court has in its impugned order recorded that the statutory Form No. 2
under the KMC Rules does not require a candidate to file any affidavit
of assets and liabilities of the candidate or the candidate's spouse.
S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION
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33. Mr. Diwan emphasized on the difference between elections
conducted by the Election Commission of India and an election governed
by the KMC Act and/or the KMC Rules. He argued that the elections
conducted by the Election Commission of India are governed by the
Representation of People Act, 1951 and the 1961 Rules. Mr. Diwan
submitted that there is a statutory form and express statutory requirement
in terms of Rule 4A of the 1961 Rules mandating disclosures. The form
of affidavit which is required to be filed in respect of elections conducted
by the Election Commission of India, must contain details of spouse's
income, property etc. However, the requirement to make disclosures
cannot be imported into the KMC Rules, without an appropriate
amendment of the said rules as also the statutory form thereunder.
34. Mr. Diwan submitted that the High Court erred in placing
reliance on the order of the State Election Commission dated 14th July
2003. Mr. Diwan argued that the absence of statutory requirement could
not be overcome by an order of the State Commission. The operative
order of the Notification dated 14th July 2003 cannot amount to amending
provisions of the KMC Act or any rules framed thereunder.
35. Mr. Diwan argued that it is the duty of the Election Commission
to conduct fair elections in accordance with the statutory provisions. It
is not for the Election Commission to legislate. Furthermore, if an
administrative direction as the one issued by the State Election
Commission by the Notification dated 14th July 2003 were adequate,
there would be no need to amend the Central Rules for the conduct of
elections.
36. Mr. Diwan submitted that the High Court erred in arriving at
the finding that the Appellant had indulged in corrupt practices. The
consequences of such finding is that the Appellant stands disqualified
from being a Councillor for a period of six years in terms of Section 27
of the KMC Act. At the highest, the action impugned would amount to
improper acceptance of nomination under Section 35(1)(d)(i).
37. Mr. Diwan submitted that the election could, at best, have
been set aside under Section 35(1)(d)(i) and not on the ground of corrupt
practices. The High Court has not arrived at any specific finding with
regard to material impact of improper acceptance of the Appellant's
nomination or election, to constitute corrupt practice.
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38. In our considered view, a false declaration with regard to the
assets of a candidate, his/her spouse or dependents, constitutes corrupt
practice irrespective of the impact of such a false declaration on the
election of the candidate. It may be presumed that a false declaration
impacts the election.
39. Mr. Diwan finally argued that penal measures can only be
imposed in accordance with statutory provisions and/or rules. In the
context of his submission, Mr. Diwan cited State of M. P. v. Centre for
Environment Protection Research & Development6, authored by one
of us (Indira Banerjee, J.), where this Court held:-
"54. It is well settled that when a statute or statutory rules
prescribed a penalty for any act or omission, no other penalty
not contemplated in the statute or statutory rules can be
imposed. It is well settled that when statute requires a thing to
be done in a particular manner, it is to be done only in that
manner.
55. There can be no doubt that strong measures must be taken
to protect the environment and improve the air quality
whenever there is contravention of statutory rules causing
environmental pollution. Stringent action has to be taken, but
in accordance with law.
56. Stoppage of supply of fuel to vehicles not complying with
the requirement to have and/or display a valid PUC certificate
is not contemplated either in the 1989 Rules or in the NGT
Act. Motor vehicles not complying with the requirement of
possessing and/or displaying a valid PUC certificate cannot
be debarred from being supplied fuel.
...
58. This Court is, therefore, constrained to hold that the
learned Tribunal had no power and/or authority and/or
jurisdiction to pass orders directing the appellant State
Government to issue orders, instructions or directions on
dealers, outlets and petrol pumps not to supply fuel to vehicles
without PUC certificate. The first two questions are answered
accordingly."
S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTION
COMMISSION & ORS. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
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40. As submitted by Mr. Diwan candidly, the aforesaid order of
this Court was passed in the context of an order of the National Green
Tribunal, directing that supply of fuel to vehicles be stopped for noncompliance with the requirement to display a valid PUC (Pollution Under
Control) Certificate, even though there were specific provisions in the
statute for dealing with the contravention. The observations of this Court
extracted above were made in an altogether different context, where
penalty not contemplated by statute had been imposed.
41. It is well settled that, a judgment is a precedent for the issue
of law that is raised and decided. The judgment has to be construed in
the backdrop of the facts and circumstances in which the judgment has
been rendered. Words, phrases and sentences in a judgment, cannot be
read out of context. Nor is a judgment to be read and interpreted in the
manner of a statute. It is only the law as interpreted by Court in an
earlier judgment, which constitutes a binding precedent, and not
everything that the Judges say.
42. Emphasizing on the well settled principle of strict construction
of penal statutes, Mr. Diwan submitted that the impugned judgment and
order was incorrect. In the context of his submission, Mr. Diwan cited a
five-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Tolaram Relumal and
Another v. State of Bombay7, where this Court dealing with the penal
provision in the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1947, held:-
" ... It may be here observed that the provisions of Section
18(1) are penal in nature and it is a well-settled rule of
construction of penal statutes that if two possible and
reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision,
the court must lean towards that construction which exempts
the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes
penalty. It is not competent to the court to stretch the meaning
of an expression used by the legislature in order to carry out
the intention of the legislature. As pointed out by Lord
Macmillan in London and North Eastern Railway
Co. v. Berriman [1946 AC 278, 295] "where penalties for
infringement are imposed it is not legitimate to stretch the
language of a rule, however, beneficent its intention, beyond
the fair and ordinary meaning of its language".
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43. In Bipinchandra Parshottamdas Patel v. State of Gujarat8,
cited by Mr. Diwan, this Court held:-
"31.