# S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors

- **Citation:** 2024 INSC 544
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2024-07-22
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 7920-7921 of 2024
- **Bench:** Sanjiv Khanna, Dipankar Dutta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s-tirupathi-rao-v-m-lingamaiah-ors-37969
- **Pages:** 47

## Headnote

1. Whether the High Court has, in the impugned judgment, exercised
the jurisdiction of review in accordance with the parameters set
out in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure?
2. Whether the High Court has, in the impugned judgment,
erroneously entertained contempt petition which was barred by
limitation?
Headnotes†
Civil Procedure Code - Order XLVII Rule 1 - Power to review,
not an inherent power, it has to be specifically conferred by
law - Contours and extent of review jurisdiction - Explained:
Held: The exercise of review jurisdiction is not an inherent power
given to the court; the power to review has to be specifically
conferred by law - In civil proceedings, review jurisdiction is
governed by Section 114 read in conjunction with Order XLVII
of the CPC and the court has to be certain that the elements
prescribed therein are satisfied before exercising such power -
The provisions therein relating to review of an order or decree
are mandatory in nature and any petition for review not satisfying
the rigours therein cannot be entertained ex debito justitiae, by a
court of law. [Paras 11, 12]
Civil Procedure Code - Order XLVII Rule 1 - Order cannot be
reviewed merely because it is erroneous on merits - An error
apparent on the face of the record has to be self-evident:
Held: A decision cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous
on merits, since that would fall squarely within the province of a
court exercising appellate jurisdiction - To succeed in a motion for
review, viewed through the prism of 'error apparent on the face
of the record', it does neither require long-drawn arguments nor
* Author
1078
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
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an elaborate process of reasoning as these may be required, in a
given case, when exercising the power of merit review - An error
apparent on the face of the record has to be self-evident - Where,
conceivably, two opinions can be formed in a given set of facts
and circumstances and one opinion of the two has been formed,
there is no error apparent on the face of the record. [Paras 20, 25]
Constitution of India - Article 129 & 215 - Inherent power of
contempt - Explained:
Held: The purpose of the law of contempt is to secure public
respect and confidence in the judicial process - The power of the
Supreme Court and a High Court to punish for breach of its orders
is expressly recognised by Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution,
respectively - It is an inherent power, distinguishable from a power
derived from a statute. [Paras 28, 29]
Contempt of Courts Act - Bounden duty on the contemnor to
comply with the court's order without any delay - Punishment
for proved contempt must be in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the Contempt of Courts Act:
Held: There lies a bounden duty on the contemnor to comply
with the court's order without any delay, in a case where legal
recourse has not been taken to set aside/review/vacate the order
which is alleged to have been breached - A public official against
whom an allegation of contempt is levelled, upon being noticed
either by issuance of a rule for contempt or by court notice, must
work out his remedy in accordance with law if he wishes not to
comply with the court's direction - Not only any order imposing
punishment for proved contempt must be in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by the Act but initiation of the proceedings
too has to be in accordance with the three modes that the Act
envisages. [Paras 39, 40]
Contempt of Courts Act - Role of contempt petitioner is only as
an informer - The endeavour of the court in contempt petition
is to uphold the majesty, dignity and prestige of the courts:
Held: The role of a party, who brings a petition for contempt and
activates the court's machinery, is merely that of an informer -
Whether or not to take the assistance of the petitioning informer is
a question which invariably must be left entirely to the discretion of
the court seized of the proceedings - In exercising its

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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1077 : 2024 INSC 544
S. Tirupathi Rao
v.
M. Lingamaiah & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 7920-7921 of 2024)
22 July 2024
[Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Dutta,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
1. Whether the High Court has, in the impugned judgment, exercised
the jurisdiction of review in accordance with the parameters set
out in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure?
2. Whether the High Court has, in the impugned judgment,
erroneously entertained contempt petition which was barred by
limitation?
Headnotes†
Civil Procedure Code - Order XLVII Rule 1 - Power to review,
not an inherent power, it has to be specifically conferred by
law - Contours and extent of review jurisdiction - Explained:
Held: The exercise of review jurisdiction is not an inherent power
given to the court; the power to review has to be specifically
conferred by law - In civil proceedings, review jurisdiction is
governed by Section 114 read in conjunction with Order XLVII
of the CPC and the court has to be certain that the elements
prescribed therein are satisfied before exercising such power -
The provisions therein relating to review of an order or decree
are mandatory in nature and any petition for review not satisfying
the rigours therein cannot be entertained ex debito justitiae, by a
court of law. [Paras 11, 12]
Civil Procedure Code - Order XLVII Rule 1 - Order cannot be
reviewed merely because it is erroneous on merits - An error
apparent on the face of the record has to be self-evident:
Held: A decision cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous
on merits, since that would fall squarely within the province of a
court exercising appellate jurisdiction - To succeed in a motion for
review, viewed through the prism of 'error apparent on the face
of the record', it does neither require long-drawn arguments nor
* Author
1078
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
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an elaborate process of reasoning as these may be required, in a
given case, when exercising the power of merit review - An error
apparent on the face of the record has to be self-evident - Where,
conceivably, two opinions can be formed in a given set of facts
and circumstances and one opinion of the two has been formed,
there is no error apparent on the face of the record. [Paras 20, 25]
Constitution of India - Article 129 & 215 - Inherent power of
contempt - Explained:
Held: The purpose of the law of contempt is to secure public
respect and confidence in the judicial process - The power of the
Supreme Court and a High Court to punish for breach of its orders
is expressly recognised by Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution,
respectively - It is an inherent power, distinguishable from a power
derived from a statute. [Paras 28, 29]
Contempt of Courts Act - Bounden duty on the contemnor to
comply with the court's order without any delay - Punishment
for proved contempt must be in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the Contempt of Courts Act:
Held: There lies a bounden duty on the contemnor to comply
with the court's order without any delay, in a case where legal
recourse has not been taken to set aside/review/vacate the order
which is alleged to have been breached - A public official against
whom an allegation of contempt is levelled, upon being noticed
either by issuance of a rule for contempt or by court notice, must
work out his remedy in accordance with law if he wishes not to
comply with the court's direction - Not only any order imposing
punishment for proved contempt must be in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by the Act but initiation of the proceedings
too has to be in accordance with the three modes that the Act
envisages. [Paras 39, 40]
Contempt of Courts Act - Role of contempt petitioner is only as
an informer - The endeavour of the court in contempt petition
is to uphold the majesty, dignity and prestige of the courts:
Held: The role of a party, who brings a petition for contempt and
activates the court's machinery, is merely that of an informer -
Whether or not to take the assistance of the petitioning informer is
a question which invariably must be left entirely to the discretion of
the court seized of the proceedings - In exercising its jurisdiction
to punish for contempt, the courts in India do keep in mind the
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
1079
S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.
benefit that could accrue to the petitioning informer (if he is a party
to the parent proceedings out of which the contempt arises) upon
implementation of the order alleged to have been wilfully disobeyed;
but more than anything else, the endeavour is to uphold the majesty,
dignity and prestige of the courts. [Paras 45, 46]
Contempt of Courts Act - Section 20 - Civil Procedure Code -
Order VII Rule 6 - Condonation of Delay in approaching the
High Court for contempt - The contempt petitioner cannot
choose a time convenient to him to approach the Court:
Held: Even in case of a petition disclosing facts constituting
contempt, which is civil in nature, the petitioner cannot choose a
time convenient to him to approach the Court - The statute refers to
a specific time limit of one year from the date of alleged contempt
for proceedings to be initiated; meaning thereby, that the action
should be brought within a year, and not beyond, irrespective of
when the proceedings to punish for contempt are actually initiated
by the High Court - In an appropriate case, it would be open to
the party who has not petitioned the court within the period of one
year, as stipulated in Section 20 of the Act, to seek exemption
from the law of limitation in line with the principle flowing from
Order VII Rule 6, CPC, by showing the ground upon which such
exemption is claimed - Applicability of the principle underlying
Order VII Rule 6, CPC for granting exemption would only be just
and proper having regard to the object and purpose for which the
jurisdiction to punish for contempt is exercised by the courts if,
of course, the court is satisfied that benefit of such an exemption
ought to be extended in a given case. [Para 55]
Contempt of Courts Act - Section 20 - Limitation period for
filing contempt petition - Interpretation thereof - Explained:
Held: Stale claims of contempt, camouflaged as a "continuing
wrong/breach/offence" ought not to be entertained, having regard to
the legislative intent for introducing section 20 in the Act which has
been noticed above - Contempt being a personal action directed
against a particular person alleged to be in contempt, much of the
efficacy of the proceedings would be lost by passage of time - Even
if a contempt is committed and within the stipulated period of one
year from such commission no action is brought before the court
on the specious ground that the contempt has been continuing,
no party should be encouraged to wait indefinitely to choose his
own time to approach the court. [Para 56]
1080
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
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Single & Continuing cause of action - Difference explained:
Held: When an act is final and complete and becomes a cause
of action for injury to the plaintiff, it is single, and the plaintiff is
entitled to sue, for the wrongful act - But if there is repetition of
a wrongful act or omission, it will comprise a continuing cause of
action - Neither do repeated breaches of continuing obligations
constitute a continuing wrong nor intermittent breaches of a
continuing obligation; rather there has to be present an element of
continuance in both, the breach and the obligation. [Paras 74,75]
Legal Maxim - Secundum allegata et probate - Court can arrive
at its decision only on the basis of the claims and proof led
by the parties - Even if a point of "continuing wrong/breach/
offence" is traceable in the pleadings, the court ought not to
accept it mechanically:
Held: The court cannot traverse beyond the pleadings and make out
a case which was never pleaded, such principle having originated
from the fundamental legal maxim secundum allegata et probate,
i.e., the court will arrive at its decision on the basis of the claims
and proof led by the parties - The assertion of the contumacious
conduct being in the nature of a "continuing wrong/breach/offence"
is factual and has to be borne from the pleadings on record - Law
is well-settled that when a point is not traceable in the pleas set out
either in a plaint or a written statement, findings rendered on such
point by the court would be unsustainable as that would amount
to an altogether new case being made out for the party - Even
if a point of "continuing wrong/breach/offence" is traceable in the
pleadings, the court ought not to accept it mechanically; particularly,
in entertaining an action for contempt, which is quasi-criminal in
nature, the court should be slow and circumspect and be fully
satisfied that there has indeed been a "continuing wrong/breach/
offence". [Paras 71, 72]
Case Law Cited
Pallav Seth v. Custodian [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 387 : (2001) 7 SCC
549; Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati [2013] 11 SCR 25 : (2013) 8
SCC 320; Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and another v. Most
Rev. Mar Paulose Athanasius [1955] 1 SCR 520 : AIR 1954
SC 526; State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd. [2024] 5
SCR 949 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1090; State of West Bengal v.
Kamal Sengupta [2008] 10 SCR 4 : (2008) 8 SCC 612; Aribam
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
1081
S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.
Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma (1979) 4 SCC 389;
Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [1994] Supp. 5 SCR
503 : (1995) 1 SCC 170; R.L. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu [1972]
3 SCR 417 : (1972) 1 SCC 651; Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka
Tonga Mazdoor Union (1970) 3 SCC 98; Jhareswar Prasad Paul
v. Tarak Nath Ganguly [2002] 3 SCR 913 : (2002) 5 SCC 352; In
Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra [1995] 2 SCR 638 : (1995) 2 SCC 584;
L.P. Misra (Dr.) v. State of U.P. (1998) 7 SCC 379; Ashok Kumar
Aggarwal v. Neeraj Kumar [2013] 12 SCR 457 : (2014) 3 SCC
602; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Supreme
Court & High Court Judges [2024] 1 SCR 211 : (2024) 3 SCC 1;
Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal [2000] 1 SCR 1064 : (2000) 3
SCC 171; Advocate General v. A.V. Koteswara Rao, 1984 Cri. LJ.
1171; High Court of Karnataka v. Y.K. Subanna, 1989 SCC OnLine
Kar 404; Arthur Branwell & Company Ltd. v. Indian Fibres Ltd.,
1993 (2) CLJ 182; Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C.
Muddaiah [2007] 9 SCR 784 : (2007) 7 SCC 689; Hadkinson v.
Hadkinson, 1952 (2) All ER 567; X Ltd. v. Morgan Grampian Ltd.,
1990 (2) All ER 1; In the Matter of Anil Panjwani [2003] 3 SCR
1179 : (2003) 7 SCC 375; High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
v. Raj Kishore Yadav [1997] 2 SCR 429 : (1997) 3 SCC 11; State
of West Bengal v. Kartick Chandra Das [1996] Supp. 2 SCR 373 :
(1996) 5 SCC 342; Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh,
AIR 1935 PC 85; National Coal Board v. Galley [1958] 1 All ER
9; Balkrishna Savalram Pujari v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj
Sansthan [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 476 : AIR 1959 SC 798; M. Siddiq
v. Suresh Das (2020) 1 SCC 1; Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy
[2010] 10 SCR 47 : (2010) 8 SCC 383; K. Jayaram v. BDA (2022)
12 SCC 815 - referred to.
Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram [1989] Supp. 1 SCR
223 : (1989) Supp. 2 SCC 418 - distinguished.
S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [1993] Supp. 3 SCR 422:
(1994) 1 SCC 1 - relied on.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Civil Procedure
Code, 1908.
List of Keywords
Review; Review jurisdiction; Contempt of court; Contempt
jurisdiction; Continuing wrong.
1082
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Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7920-7921 of
2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.04.2022 of the High Court
for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in RIA Nos. 1 and 3 of 2020
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 7922-7923 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
C. S. Vaidhyanathan, Sr. Adv., M/s. Venkat Palwai Law Associates,
Vinayak Goel, Gunnalan, Nitish Raj, Vineet George, Ms. Devina
Sehgal, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ranjit Kumar, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Vipin Singhi, C A Sundaram, R
Anand Padmanabhan, Sr. Advs., S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Ms. Bina
Madhavan, Krishna Kumar Singh, Tushar Singh, Praseena Elizabeth
Joseph, Rajiv Kumar Choudhry , E Venkata Siddhartha, A.V.V.
Bhaskar, Ms. Ruchi Arya, Adith Memon, R. Sharath, Ms. Ruchi,
Shwetank Sailakwal, Mayank Suryan, Shashi Bhushan Kumar, G.
Seshagiri Rao, Gaichangpou Gangmei, Ms. Nisha Pandey, Maitreya
Mahaley, Yimyanger Longkumar, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dipankar Datta, J.
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. ___________ OF 2024
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 19647-48 OF 2022]
Leave granted.
2.
These appeals assail the common judgment and order dated 27th April,
20221 of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad2
allowing Review I.A. No. 1/2020 in LPA 1/2018 and Review I.A. No.
3/2020 in CA 33/20173 preferred by the first respondent. The impugned
1
impugned order, hereafter
2
High Court, hereafter
3
review petitions, hereafter
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
1083
S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.
order of the High Court recalled the order under review and dismissed
a contempt appeal as well as a letters patent appeal of the appellant.
3.
The present dispute emerges from a complex and interwoven set of
legal proceedings, involving myriad parties and decisions rendered
by both judicial and quasi-judicial authorities. The factual matrix, to
the extent relevant for adjudication of these civil appeals, is noticed
hereunder:
I.
Ms. Sultana Jahan Begum, daughter of Nawab Moin-ud-Dowla
Bahadur, instituted Original Suit 130/19534 (since renumbered
as Civil Suit 07/1958 upon its transfer to the High Court) before
the City Civil Court, Andhra Pradesh, seeking partition of her
father's properties known as 'Asman Jahi Paigah'.
II.
On 06th April, 1959, a preliminary decree was passed by the
High Court on the basis of a compromise entered into by and
between the parties to the civil suit. The schedule of properties
included within it Raidurg village.5
III.
Notably, it is recorded therein that the plaintiff chose to withdraw
her claim against, inter alia, the defendant no. 48 in the suit,
i.e., the Secretary, Finance Department of the Government of
Andhra Pradesh. Resultantly, the suit stood dismissed against
the State unconditionally.
IV.
During the pendency of the civil suit, Nawab Zaheer Yar Jung,
son of Nawab Moin-ud-Dowla Bahadur, filed a claim petition
before the Nazim-e-Atiyat, claiming the subject land as jagir
land. This claim was negatived by the Nazim-e-Atiyat vide
an order dated 28th October, 1968 upon verification of sanad,
which revealed that there did not exist any document granting
paigah with respect to the subject land to the claimant's father.
V.
The order passed by the Nazim-e-Atiyat, upon appeal, was
confirmed by the Board of Revenue vide an order dated
29th December, 1976, which held that the subject land stood
escheated to the Government.
4
civil suit, hereafter
5
subject land, hereafter
1084
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
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VI. Meanwhile, on 01st October, 2003, the decree holders in the
civil suit executed a deed of assignment in favour of the first
respondent herein in respect of land measuring more or less
Ac 143.00 guntas forming part of certain survey numbers of
the subject land.
VII. On 26th December, 2003, the High Court passed the final decree
and judgment in the civil suit in favour of the first respondent,
with respect to land measuring more or less acres 84.30 guntas6
forming part of Survey No. 46 of the subject land.
VIII. Pursuant thereto, the first respondent had approached the
Tahsildar with a prayer for mutation of his name in respect of the
decretal property in the revenue records which proved abortive.
Consequently, the first respondent invoked the writ jurisdiction of
the High Court by preferring Writ Petition 1729/2009,7 seeking
direction for effecting mutation in terms of the final decree in
the civil suit. The respondent's writ petition was heard with a
connected matter being Writ Petition 581/2009.
IX. On 05th March, 2009, a Single Judge of the High Court vide
a common order disposed of both the writ petitions at the
admission stage itself, with the following order:
"A partial final decree was passed by this Court on
26.12.2003 in Application No.1409 of 2003 in C.S. No.
7 of 1958, directing several steps. One of the steps
is that the names of the decree holders be mutated
in respect of the property mentioned in the decree.
It appears that the persons, who have purchased
part of the property from the parties to the decree,
have also approached the respondents for mutation
of their names. Having regard to the fact that there
was a specific direction in the decree, Acviving (sic,
requiring) authorities first to implement the decree
by effecting mutation in the only (sic) after the initial
step is complied with.
6
decretal property
7
writ petition, hereafter
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
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S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.
Hence, the writ petitions are disposed of, directing
that the Deputy Collector / Tahsildar, Serilingampally
Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, shall effect necessary
mutations in the revenue records strictly in accordance
with the decree, dated 26.12.2003, in Application
No.1409 of 2003 in C.S.No.7 of 1958 passed by this
Court, after issuing notices to the affected parties.
The subsequent purchasers, if any, shall be entitled
to pursue their remedies after this step. There shall
be no order as to costs."
X.
Thereafter, one Syed Azizulla Husaini challenged only the
decision in Writ Petition 581/2009. In exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, a Division Bench of the High Court, vide order
dated 18th August 2009, modified the order dated 05th March,
2009 as follows:
"Heard the learned advocates. The learned advocates
appearing for the respondents have no objection if
the objections which have been filed by the appellant
before the Deputy Collector / Tahsildar, Srilingampally
Mandal, Ranga Reddy District are also considered
along with the other objections which have been filed
by the affected parties.
In the circumstances, the order dated 05-03-2009
passed in Writ Petition No. 581 of 2009 is modified
to the effect that while considering the objections of
the affected parties, the Deputy Collector / Tahsildar,
Srilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District shall also
consider the objections which have already been filed
by the present appellant viz. Syed Azizullah Hussaini."
XI. However, the appellant (the Tahsildar) did not carry the order
of disposal of the writ petition of the first respondent in appeal
and, thus, between the appellant and the first respondent, the
order dated 05th March, 2009 became final and binding.
XII. In view of the Tahsildar's inaction in effecting mutation, as
ordered, the first respondent instituted Contempt Case 217/20148
before the High Court on 10th February, 2014.
8
contempt petition, hereafter
1086
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XIII. The Single Judge, vide order dated 04th October, 2017, allowed
the contempt petition. The State's contention that the petition
was barred by limitation was rejected on the ground that the
Tahsildar's failure to obey the order of the Court, till mutation was
effected, would constitute a continuing wrong. Consequently, the
Tahsildar was directed to mutate the name of the first respondent
in terms of the final decree, and was also sentenced to simple
imprisonment for a term of two months, together with a fine of
Rs 1500/- (Rupees fifteen hundred only).
XIV. This decision of the Single Judge was challenged by the appellant
in two separate appeals - (i) Contempt Appeal 33/2017,9
presented against the punishment imposed on the appellant
and (ii) Letters Patent Appeal 01/2018,10 presented against the
direction for mutation of the name of the first respondent in the
revenue records qua the decretal property.
XV. A Division Bench of the High Court,11 vide a detailed judgment
and order dated 16th August, 2018, allowed both the appeals
and set aside the order under challenge for two primary
reasons - (i) the contempt petition was barred by limitation,
the failure of the Tahsildar to effect the mutation constituting a
single act and not a continuing wrong; and (ii) the preliminary
decree recorded that the civil suit was withdrawn as against the
State Government. Thus, there did not exist any decree which
could have been executed against the Government by the civil
court. Thus, as a legal and logical corollary, the State could not
be bound to effect mutation in the revenue records in terms of
a decree which was unenforceable against it. Consequently,
the first respondent's attempt to seek a direction of mutation
against the State, on the strength of such a decree, was held
to be fraudulent in nature.
XVI. Challenge laid by the first respondent to the judgment and order
dated 16th August, 2018 by presenting special leave petitions12
before this Court was not entertained resulting in its dismissal
9
contempt appeal, hereafter
10
letters patent appeal, hereafter
11
Division Bench (original), hereafter
12
SLP (C) 24646-24647/2018
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
1087
S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.
vide order dated 29th October, 2018. A petition seeking review13
of such order of dismissal was also dismissed by this Court vide
order dated 08th January, 2019.
XVII. This Court having spurned his aforesaid challenges, the first
respondent knocked the doors of the High Court once again by
filing review petitions against the common judgment and order
dated 16th August, 2018 (allowing the letters patent appeal and
the contempt appeal).
XVIII. As noted at the beginning of this judgment, vide the impugned
order, another Division Bench14 of the High Court allowed the
review petitions.
IMPUGNED ORDER
4.
The Division Bench (review) noted at the outset that the merits of
the matter need not be looked into, and then went on to undertake
an exhaustive examination of precisely the same.
4.1 The High Court adversely observed that the State had not
yet obtained any decree against the first respondent or his
predecessors-in-interest to the effect that the subject land
belonged to it. The State was noted to have filed OSA (Sr) No.
2116/2011, challenging the final decree proceedings dated 26th
December, 2003 but the same stood dismissed vide order dated
24th August, 2011, with an observation that the State ought to
initiate separate proceedings in accordance with law. However,
no such proceedings were thereafter initiated by the State.
4.2 The High Court further observed that the State sought to set up
title to the subject land based on the concept of escheat without
invoking the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Escheats and
Bona Vacantia Act, 1974. This led to admonition of the State
authorities for taking mutually inconsistent pleas of 'absolute
title' and 'right by escheat'.
4.3 The State was further held to have suppressed material
information and approached the Court with unclean hands
inasmuch as the stand taken by them was not supported by
any documentary evidence.
13
R.P. (C) 3973/2018
14
Division Bench (review), hereafter
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[2024] 7 S.C.R.
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4.4 The State, on its part, had argued that the contempt action was
itself barred by limitation, as per section 20 of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 197115 read with rule 21 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977.16 Such argument
was rejected by the Division Bench (review) by relying on the
decision in Pallav Seth v. Custodian,17 wherein it was held
that the period of limitation would only commence upon the
date from the discovery of fraud played by the party on the
Court/opposite party; the State having acted fraudulently by
suppressing information, the contempt petition would not be
barred by limitation.
4.5 With respect to the contempt alleged, the Division Bench (review)
examined the conduct of the State in remaining silent on the
matter of mutation and held that such silence could not be
interpreted to be a refusal on the part of the State to act upon
the representations. In view thereof, coupled with the State's
periodic representations made before the Court that they would
implement the direction for mutation, it was held that such acts
constituted a continuing wrong so as to ensconce the contempt
petition within the ambit of the period of limitation.
4.6 In such review proceedings, the first respondent had brought on
record additional documents in the nature of sale deeds, orders by
revenue authorities and governmental memos, to which allegedly
access was obtained only after the disposal of the contempt
appeal, to argue that the subject land was the self-acquired
private property of the first respondent's predecessor-in-interest.
The Division Bench (review) undertook a detailed examination
of the same to definitively conclude, with the aid of section 79
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that the property belonged to
the predecessor-in-interest of the first respondent. The State's
objection to such documents was overruled as the same were
held to come within the purview of "new and important matter
or evidence" as provided in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.18
15
the Act, hereafter
16
the Writ Rules, hereafter
17
[2001] Supp. 1 SCR 387 : (2001) 7 SCC 549
18
CPC, hereafter
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
1089
S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.
4.7 In summation, the Division Bench (review) reviewed and reversed
the judgment and order dated 16th August, 2018 and confirmed
the order dated 04th October, 2017 of the Single Judge passed
on the writ petition. The appellant's sentence of imprisonment
was modified to four months, and a direction was issued to
implement the order passed in the writ petition within a period
of four weeks.
SUBMISSIONS
5.
Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, while
seeking our interference with the impugned order, submitted as under:
a)
The Division Bench (review) of the High Court erred in allowing
the review petitions, without affording a hearing to the appellant
on merits.
b)
The Division Bench (review) set aside the reasoned judgment
of the Division Bench (original) in the contempt appeal and
while substituting its own reasoning for that in the order under
review, did not disclose the error that was apparent on the
record; instead, it proceeded to decide the review as if it were
sitting in appeal over the earlier decision.
c)
The Division Bench (review) placed undue reliance on the
additional documents produced by the first respondent, which
were accepted on face value, without giving an opportunity to
the appellant to rebut the same.
d)
The Division Bench (review), in exercise of its review jurisdiction,
went beyond the order of the Single Judge passed in the writ
petition. It is settled law that a writ court cannot adjudicate on
title, since the same falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a
civil court.
e)
The Division Bench (original) had rightly set aside the order of
the Single Judge, as the order had been obtained by playing
fraud on the Court and the proceedings in the suit were itself
fraudulent in nature.
f)
The civil suit was dismissed as against the State Government
and, thus, there could not have been an executable decree as
against the State.
g)
The Division Bench (original) had rightly allowed the appellant's
appeal on the ground that the failure to mutate the names of
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[2024] 7 S.C.R.
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the first respondent was not a continuing wrong and, therefore,
the contempt petition was barred by limitation.
6.
Mr. C. A. Sundaram, learned senior counsel appearing for an
intervenor, who disputed the title of the first respondent, adopted the
submissions of Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan. In addition, he contended that
there cannot be a more egregious mistake as the one committed by
the Division Bench (review) in exercise of its review jurisdiction. He
invited our attention to the grounds of review forming part of the review
petition and contended that none of the grounds can be said to be
within the parameters of section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of
the CPC; hence, the Division Bench (review) assumed a jurisdiction
which it could not have more particularly after the unsuccessful
misadventures of the first respondent before this Court.
7.
Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Mr. Vipin Sanghi and Mr.
R. Anand Padmanabhan, learned senior counsel appearing for the
various respondents, in support of upholding the impugned order,
submitted as under:
a)
The appellant had not approached this Court with clean hands
since the Government Pleader, during the pendency of the
contempt proceedings, had avowed that the process of mutation
had already commenced, while the counter affidavit filed in the
same proceedings stated that the contempt petition itself was
barred by limitation.
b)
The State had submitted in the contempt proceedings that there
was serious dispute with respect to the question of title which
could only be adjudicated in a civil suit; however, during the
course of the review proceedings, the senior counsel appearing
for the State categorically stated that no civil suit had been filed
till date.
c)
During the period 1968 to 2022, the appellant had consistently
taken the plea of absolute title having been escheated to the
Government, but in course of consideration of the review petitions,
undertook a mutually inconsistent plea of the subject land being
Government land on the basis of revenue entries.
d)
The appellant did not raise objections with respect to fraud and
fabrication when the additional documents were produced by the
first respondent before the High Court; having acquiesced to the
same, the appellant was now estopped from raising such pleas.
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
1091
S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.
e)
The first respondent relied on a multitude of orders by both
judicial and administrative authorities to prove that the subject
land was privately purchased, and constituted self-acquired lands
of the first respondent's predecessor in interest.
ANALYSIS
8.
The present lis confronts us primarily with two inter-related legal
issues. The first one requires us to examine whether the parameters
set out in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC for exercising the power of
review, as interpreted by this Court in its numerous judgments, were
at all satisfied for the High Court to embark on an exercise of review.
The second issue requiring our consideration is the terminus a quo
for commencement of the point of limitation in matters of contempt,
in the light of provisions of section 20 of the Act read with Article
215 of the Constitution and rule 21 of the Writ Rules. This would, in
turn, require us to examine whether the contempt petition could have
been held to be maintainable by the High Court on the ground of the
appellant having continued to observe the order (directing mutation
to be effected) in the breach; in other words, whether there was a
continuing wilful breach of the order of the Single Judge dated 5th
March, 2009, amounting to civil contempt. These being preliminary
legal issues are proposed to be dealt with at the outset. Needless to
observe, hardly any other issue would survive for decision should any
of these issues be answered in favour of the appellant and against
the first respondent.
9.
We are not too inclined to examine the contention raised on behalf
of the appellant that he was not extended reasonable and adequate
opportunity of hearing, once the Division Bench (review) allowed the
review petitions and proceeded to reverse the decision of the Division
Bench (original) on merits. There are other formidable grounds of
challenge, which would necessarily fall for our examination and
succeeding on one of such grounds would render the contention
raised redundant.
10. The Division Bench (review) extensively discussed the grounds
which need to exist so as to validate the invocation and exercise of
the Court's power of review. In the impugned order, it held that the
State suppressed certain title documents, which were for the first
time produced before the Court by the first respondent as additional
documents. The additional documents constituted, inter alia, an order
of the Board of Revenue, Andhra Pradesh dated 19th November, 1959,
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[2024] 7 S.C.R.
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which confirmed that the subject land is private land and not inam
or Government land. The first respondent justified the production of
these documents on the ground that access to such documents was
obtained only after the Division Bench (original) had rendered the
judgment and order dated 16th August, 2018. It was argued that if
the Division Bench (original) had the benefit of examination of such
additional documents, it would not have set aside the order dated 04th
October, 2017 passed on the contempt petition. The Division Bench
(review) held that since the first respondent had discovered new
evidence which was unavailable at the earlier stage of proceedings,
the threshold for maintainability of a review petition was satisfied.
11. While proceeding to determine the correctness of the impugned
order vis-à-vis the exercise of review jurisdiction, we ought to remind
ourselves of certain cardinal principles. The exercise of review
jurisdiction is not an inherent power given to the court; the power to
review has to be specifically conferred by law. In civil proceedings,
review jurisdiction is governed by section 114 read in conjunction
with order XLVII of the CPC and the court has to be certain that
the elements prescribed therein are satisfied before exercising such
power. This Court in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati 19 has succinctly
observed that:
"19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and
have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order
47 Rule 1 CPC."
(emphasis ours)
12. That the provisions contained in section 114 and Order XLVII of the
CPC relating to review of an order or decree are mandatory in nature
and any petition for review not satisfying the rigours therein cannot
be entertained ex debito justitiae, by a court of law, is trite.
13. There is a plethora of decisions analysing the statutory provisions
governing the exercise of review jurisdiction; however, we would be
referring to a few of them for the purpose of the present exercise.
Suffice it to note that despite legal proceedings having commenced with
institution of the civil suit as far back as in 1953, the present controversy
has, as its source, a writ petition between the first respondent and
the Tahsildar preferred in 2009. Although the explanation to section
19
[2013] 11 SCR 25 : (2013) 8 SCC 320
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
1093
S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.
141 of the CPC makes it clear that provisions of the CPC would not
apply to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, there is
authority in abundance that the principles flowing from the CPC may
safely be taken as a guide to decide writ proceedings but to the extent
the same can be made applicable.
14. To put it plainly, Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC provides three
grounds for review:
1)
discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after
the exercise of due diligence was not within the applicant's
knowledge or could not be produced by the applicant at the
time when the decree was passed, or order made; or
2)
mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
3)
for any other sufficient reason, which must be analogous to
either of the aforesaid grounds.
15. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and another v. Most Rev. Mar
Paulose Athanasius,20 this Court approved the view that the third
ground - "any other sufficient cause" must mean a reason sufficient
on grounds, at least analogous to the first two grounds. The same
view has been reiterated in a recent decision of this Court in State
(NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd.21 This Court affirmed that
the scope of the third ground had to be narrowly construed so as to
not traverse beyond the orbit of the first two grounds.
16. Since the Division Bench (review) invoked the first clause, we hasten
to emphasize that an applicant seeking review on the basis of
discovery of new evidence has to demonstrate: first, that there has
been discovery of new evidence, of which he had no prior knowledge
or that it could not be produced at the time the decree was passed
or the order made despite due diligence; and secondly, that the new
evidence is material to the order/decree being reviewed in the sense
that if the evidence were produced in court when the decree was
passed or the order made, the decision of the court would have been
otherwise. Ultimately, it is for the court to decide whether a review
sought for by an applicant, if granted, would prevent abuse of the
process of law and/or miscarriage of justice.
20
[1955] 1 SCR 520 : AIR 1954 SC 526
21
[2024] 5 SCR 949 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1090
1094
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
17. When the ground for review sought is that of discovery of new evidence,
this Court in State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta 22 has clarified
that the same must be evidence which should be materially important
to the decision taken. The following passage is instructive:
"21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a
review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter
or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and
must be of such a character that if the same had been
produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words,
mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is
not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only
this, the party seeking review has also to show that such
additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge
and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same
could not be produced before the court earlier."
(emphasis ours)
18. In the light of the legal position crystalised by the above discussion,
we proceed to discern the rationale of the High Court in allowing the
review petition.
19. The proceedings of these civil appeals, as noted, have the writ
petition as its genesis and not the civil suit, which was decreed in
2003. It is of utmost importance to bear in mind that the Division
Bench (review) was called upon to review the judgment and order
dated 16th August, 2018 of the Division Bench (original), which
allowed the contempt appeal and the letters patent appeal and not
any other final decree or order. The Division Bench (review), in our
opinion, has fundamentally confused both its remit and the subject
matter of the review; whilst passing the impugned order, it has
merged the two proceedings (the civil suit and the writ petition) into
one to ostensibly create necessary grounds of review. The additional
documents discovered by the first respondent could have constituted
a ground to review any other decree/order but, most certainly, were
of no consequence for the purpose of the review petitions, which
were decided by the impugned order. This, we hold, for the reasons
that follow.
22
[2008] 10 SCR 4 : (2008) 8 SCC 612
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
1095
S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah & Ors.
20. This Court in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma 23
while clarifying the ambit of the review jurisdiction has categorically
held that a decision cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous
on merits, since that would fall squarely within the province of a court
exercising appellate jurisdiction.
21. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury,24 this Court
affirmed the ratio in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (supra) and further
expounded that review proceedings were not by way of an appeal,
and would have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of
Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC.