# S14·, of Uttar Pratk1h v. Abdul Samad

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 934
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961-01-17
- **Bench:** P.R. Gajendhagadkar, K. ~. Wa~Ciioo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/s14-of-uttar-pratk1h-v-abdul-samad-2517
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

I11dustrial
DispMle-Reference
b11
Stau Gol'emmenlr alidity-"A1)1)ropriate Goi·ern1nent
1
i -''Industrial dispute'',
in relation to 1ni·ne-l'onstrur.tion of-1'J(ine"-DefinilionbidMslrial Dispuf.fs Ar.t, 1947 (J4of 1947), ss. 2(a), 2(a)(i),
2(j), 2(k)-Jfinr., Act, 1962 {-~··;of 19o2), "·'· 2(j), 2(k). 2(h).
/\. <lisp:.Ite covering clain1s n1adc by the employees \Yas
referred for adjudication to rhc tribunal by the State Government of \Vest Bengal. The appellant r:iisecl a preliminary
objection against the validity of the refcrencr and urged th<Lc
uncler s. 2(a) the appropriate Govcrnmrnt \Yhich could make
a valid reference in relation to the present dispute was the
Central Govr.r11mcnt and not the Govcrn1nent of lVest Bengal
and so, the refr.rcnce "''as unauthorised and
inconlpet~nt and
the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal v.:ith it. The Tribunal over-ruled this objection an<l the case was set do\vn for
hearing on the merit:;.
Against th_is finding, the appellant
prei'errc<l the present appeal hy special leave and the only
point raised \\·as that the hr.ad office of the appellant at
Calcutta hcing an inte~ral part of the mine, any industrial
dispute bet\vccn the said office and its ernployces is an
industrial dispute concerning a 111ine under s. 2(a)(i) and so
the appropriate Governn1cnt 1nust be the Central Government
and not the State Go,·ernmcnt. 'fhc q11cstion for decision \Vas
\Vhcther the present dispute can h<· said to he an industrial
dispute
concrrnin~ a 1nine
It \Vas argur.cl that the \\'ord
''industry" is wide enough to include the Head Office of a
mining company though, it may be situate<l a\\'ay from the
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
935
place \vher·e the mining operations are actually carried on and
it is in the light of the said definition of the word "industry"
contained ins. 2(j) that the words "in relation to a mine"
mtist be construed.
Held, that in construing the words "an industrial dispute"
in relation to a mine, it must first be deterinined what a mine
means and it must be done without reference to the broad
definition of industry prescribed by s. 2(j). In the absence
of a definition of the word "mine" in the Act itself, what has
to be taken into account is the dictionary meaning of the wor<l
"mine" or as is contained in the Mines Act and judged in
that light, there can be no difficulty in holding that an
industrial dispute between the employees engaged in the Head
Office at Calcutta and the employer is not an 'industrial dispute concerning a mine. The Head Office is not a mine and
so, an industria! dispute raised by the employees engaged in
the head office is not a.n industrial dispute concerning a mine.
The rights conferred on the lessee under a mining lease
can have no direct bearing on the construction of s. 2(a) and
therefore, the tribunal rightly held, that the present dispute
between the appellant and its employees at its Head Office
at Calcutta, is not a dispute in relation to a mine.
If el d, further that all industrial disputes which are
outsides. 2(a)(i) are the concern of the State Government
under s. 2(a)(ii); in other words, the g~neral rule .is that an
industrial
dispute arising between a employer and his
employees would be referred for adjudication by the State
0overnment except in cases falling under s. 2(a)(i); and so it
Is the extent of one o~ the . exception mentioned i.n s. 2(a) (i)
that has to be determined in the present case, and in determining the extent of the said exception, it \vould not be irrelevant
to bear in mind the scope of the provisions of the Mines Act
itself.
That is why the fact !hat an office of a mine is
outside the definition of a mine is of so1ne assistance in
interpreting the word "mine" under s. 2(a)(l) and therefore
the tribunal rightly came.to the conclusion that in the present
~ase th~ reference by the State GoverI1ment of West Bengal
was vahd.
CrvIL APPELLA'f}J JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
.'fo. 35.5 of 1961.
·
Appeal by special leave from the order No.

## Text

1962
S14·, of Uttar
Pratk1h
v.
Abdul Samad
Sribja Rao J.
1902
March I'
934 SUPREME COC'RT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
arrest of the respondents was illegal and that the
High Court rightly ordered their release.
In the result, the appeal fuils and is dismissed.
BY Cov1a. In accordance with the opinion
of the majority, the appeal is allowed.
M/S. SERAJUDDIN & CO.
1;.
THEIR WORKMEN
(P.R. GAJENDHAGADKAR and K. ~. WA~CIIOO, JJ.)
I11dustrial
DispMle-Reference
b11
Stau Gol'emmenlr alidity-"A1)1)ropriate Goi·ern1nent
1
i -''Industrial dispute'',
in relation to 1ni·ne-l'onstrur.tion of-1'J(ine"-DefinilionbidMslrial Dispuf.fs Ar.t, 1947 (J4of 1947), ss. 2(a), 2(a)(i),
2(j), 2(k)-Jfinr., Act, 1962 {-~··;of 19o2), "·'· 2(j), 2(k). 2(h).
/\. <lisp:.Ite covering clain1s n1adc by the employees \Yas
referred for adjudication to rhc tribunal by the State Government of \Vest Bengal. The appellant r:iisecl a preliminary
objection against the validity of the refcrencr and urged th<Lc
uncler s. 2(a) the appropriate Govcrnmrnt \Yhich could make
a valid reference in relation to the present dispute was the
Central Govr.r11mcnt and not the Govcrn1nent of lVest Bengal
and so, the refr.rcnce "''as unauthorised and
inconlpet~nt and
the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal v.:ith it. The Tribunal over-ruled this objection an<l the case was set do\vn for
hearing on the merit:;.
Against th_is finding, the appellant
prei'errc<l the present appeal hy special leave and the only
point raised \\·as that the hr.ad office of the appellant at
Calcutta hcing an inte~ral part of the mine, any industrial
dispute bet\vccn the said office and its ernployces is an
industrial dispute concerning a 111ine under s. 2(a)(i) and so
the appropriate Governn1cnt 1nust be the Central Government
and not the State Go,·ernmcnt. 'fhc q11cstion for decision \Vas
\Vhcther the present dispute can h<· said to he an industrial
dispute
concrrnin~ a 1nine
It \Vas argur.cl that the \\'ord
''industry" is wide enough to include the Head Office of a
mining company though, it may be situate<l a\\'ay from the
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
935
place \vher·e the mining operations are actually carried on and
it is in the light of the said definition of the word "industry"
contained ins. 2(j) that the words "in relation to a mine"
mtist be construed.
Held, that in construing the words "an industrial dispute"
in relation to a mine, it must first be deterinined what a mine
means and it must be done without reference to the broad
definition of industry prescribed by s. 2(j). In the absence
of a definition of the word "mine" in the Act itself, what has
to be taken into account is the dictionary meaning of the wor<l
"mine" or as is contained in the Mines Act and judged in
that light, there can be no difficulty in holding that an
industrial dispute between the employees engaged in the Head
Office at Calcutta and the employer is not an 'industrial dispute concerning a mine. The Head Office is not a mine and
so, an industria! dispute raised by the employees engaged in
the head office is not a.n industrial dispute concerning a mine.
The rights conferred on the lessee under a mining lease
can have no direct bearing on the construction of s. 2(a) and
therefore, the tribunal rightly held, that the present dispute
between the appellant and its employees at its Head Office
at Calcutta, is not a dispute in relation to a mine.
If el d, further that all industrial disputes which are
outsides. 2(a)(i) are the concern of the State Government
under s. 2(a)(ii); in other words, the g~neral rule .is that an
industrial
dispute arising between a employer and his
employees would be referred for adjudication by the State
0overnment except in cases falling under s. 2(a)(i); and so it
Is the extent of one o~ the . exception mentioned i.n s. 2(a) (i)
that has to be determined in the present case, and in determining the extent of the said exception, it \vould not be irrelevant
to bear in mind the scope of the provisions of the Mines Act
itself.
That is why the fact !hat an office of a mine is
outside the definition of a mine is of so1ne assistance in
interpreting the word "mine" under s. 2(a)(l) and therefore
the tribunal rightly came.to the conclusion that in the present
~ase th~ reference by the State GoverI1ment of West Bengal
was vahd.
CrvIL APPELLA'f}J JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
.'fo. 35.5 of 1961.
·
Appeal by special leave from the order No. :?8
dated January 17, 1961, of the fourth Industrial
Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No. VIII-71.
1962
Se,ajuddin d:J Co.
v.
Their W?Jrkmen
1962
StrajiJdin 1(· Co.
v.
Their JJ'orkmtn
G11j:ndr1i.aadkar J,
•
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
P. K. Sanyal and D. N. Muklwrjee, for the
appellants.
Janardan Shai·ma, for the respondents.
1962. March, 19. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
GA.JE:'>DRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special
leavefraises a very short question about the construction or a part of section 2( a) of the Industrial
Disputes Act (14of1947)(bereinafter called the Act).
That question arises in this \vav. On the 14th
·March, 1960, the Government of West Bengal referred for adjudication to the Fourth Industrial Tribunal six items of dispute between four employers
and their respective employees. Amongst the employers was the appellant M/s. Serajuddin & Co.,p-16,
Bentinck Street, Calcutta-I. and tho items of dispute covered claims made by the employees for
grade aud scale, Dearness Allowance, House rent,
leave and holidays, Provident Fund and Gratuity,
and condition of service. It appears that all tht'l
workmen employed in the tbreo other industrial
concerns filed affidavits before the Tribunal intimating to it that they did not want to proceed with
tbe case because the dispute between them and
their respective employers had been settled. That
is bow the only dispute which waR loft before tho
Tribunal for its adjudication was tho dispute between the appellant and its workmen.
On behalf of the appellant, a preliminary
objection was rais<ld against the validity of the
reference itself. It was urged that under s.2(a),
tho appropriate Government which could make a
valid reference in relation to the present dispute
between the parties was the Central Government
and not the State Govt. of West Bengal and so, tho
reference made by the latter Government was unauthorised and incompetent and the Tribunal bad,
thereforo no jurisdiction to deal with it.
Thi R
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
937
objection has been over.ruled by the Tribunal and
the case has been set down for hea.ring on the
merits. It is against this finding that the a ppel·
!ant has come t.o this Court by special leave and
so the only point which has been raised by Mr.
Sanyal on behalf of the appellant is that the appropriate Government under s. 2(a) '.is the Central
Government and not the State Government of West
Bengal.
Before dealing with this point, it is necessary
to refer to the relevant and material facts in regard
to the work which is carried on by the workmen at
the appellant's office.
The appellant's office at
Calcutta generally manages the work of the mines
and looks after the sale of its mine products. The
mining operations of the appellant are, however,
carried on the State of Orissa, under a lease executed in favour of the appellant by the said State.
These operations. relate to the work of chromite
and manganese. The function of the Calcutta office
is merely to exercise general control over the mining
operations and look after the sale of the minerals
produced in the said mines. It appears that the
staff engaged in the Head Office at Calcutta can be
·transferred to the office in Orissa where the mines
are situated. For the purpose of exercising direct
supervisory control over the mining operabions,
the appellant employs staff at the site of the mines.
Mr. Sanyal contends that the Head Office of the
appellant at Calcutta being an integral pl)>rt of the
mine, any industrial dispute between the said
Office and its employees .is an industrial dispute
concerning a mine under s. 2(a)(i), and so the
appropriate Government must be the Central
Government and not the State Government.
Section 2( a) ( i) provides, inter aila, that unlesA
there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, "appropriate Government" means -
in relation to an industrial dispute concerning a mine tqe ·
1962
Serajuddin ~ Co.
v.
Their Workmen
Gajendr6gadkar J.
Snajuddi" d.• Cn.
v.
Tlvir lfor!mtr1
Gajrndragod/r.Gr J.
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19!i2) S"GPP.
Central GO\·ernmont.
The question which ariseB
for our decision is whether the present dispute can .
be said to be an industrial dispute concerning
a
mine.
Mr. Sanyal'a argument
is
that the
word "industry" is wide enough to include the
Head Office of a mining company, though it may
be situatod away from the place where the mining
operations are actually carried on; and it is in the
light of the said ddinition 0f the word "industry"
contained ins. 2(j) tha1 the words "in relation to
a mine" must be construed. An "industrial dispute"
under s. 2(k) m<•ans inter a/ui any dispute between
employers and workmrn and the expression "work·
man" means any person employed in any industry
to do any skilled or uuskilled work of the type
described by section 2 (H).
Therefore, th1• words
"industrial dispute" used in s. 2(a)(i) necessarily
take us to the definition of the word "industn"' in
s. 2(j) because au industrial dispute takes us to tho
definition of the workman and the definition of a
workman inevitably brings in the c;Jefinition of
"industry" in s. 2(j).
That is how in construing
the clause "an
indu~trial dispute concerning a
mine" we cannot iwoid hringing in the wide 1.fofi·
nition of tho worrl "in<luHtry" in s. ?. (j) and
in the light of the said definition, a mine mu~t
mean the indw;try of mining and that woul<l include the Head Office which exercise~ gi·neral supervision over the mining operations of a company
though it may be bituatcd far away from the place
where the en.id ope mt ions arn cunduotod. That,
in brief, ia the arg11mP11t urge<l in support of 1he
appeal.
On tho other hand, if we look at the definition
in s.2(a)(i), it would be noticed that where it was
intended to refer to an industry <is such, the defini·
tion uses the wurd industry as for instance, it refer"
to industrial disputn concerning any such controlled
industry as may he spoeified in this behalf by tho
Central Government, wheread iii referring to the
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
939
dispute in regard to a mine the definition does not
refer to an industrial dispute concerning a mining
industry but it merely says an industrial dispute concerning a mine. In the context, a mine is referred
to just as a banking or an insurance company is
referred to or an oil-field or a major port is referred.
Therefore, in construing the words "an industrial
dispute" in relation to a mine, we must first determine what a mine means and this .must be done
without reference to the broad definition of
industry prescribed by section 2(j).
In the absence of any definition of the word
"mine" in the Act, we may take into account the
dictionary meaning as excavation in earth for
metal, coal, salt etc.
The mines Act (:'15 of 1952)
also contains a definition of "mine" in s. 2(j).
The said definition shows, inter
aUa, that a
"mine" means any excavation where any operation
for the purpose of searching for
or obtaining
minerals has been or is being carried on. It is
significant that the definition of mine under s.2(j)
excludes an office of a mine which is separately
defined by s.2(k) as meaning an office at the surface
of the mine concerned so th:it there is no doubt that
the office of the mine, though it may bt1 situated at
the surface of the mine itself, is not within the definition of mine. This position is further clarified when
we consider the definition of the person employed in
a mine which is prescribed by s. 2(h).
A person
is said to .be employed in a mine who works under
appointment by or with the knowledgo
of the
manager, whether for wages or not, in any mining
operation, or in cleaning or oiling any part of any
machinery used in or about the mine, or in any other
kind of work whatsoever incidental to, or connected
with, mining operations. It is obvio11s that the
persons employed in the Head Office wherever it may
be situated cannot be said to do the mi11ing operation within the first part of the definition. In our
opinion, they cannot be said to be
ordinarily
1962
Serajuddin & Co.
v.
Their .1 orkm1n
Go.jendragadkar J.
Illf2
SuojudJlri d~ C:o.
v.
Tluir JV 0rl:111tn
Oojrndragadkor J.
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
engaged in any other kind of work which is incidental to or connected with mining operations either.
Th'3 work which is incidental to or connected with
mining operations must have some connection with
or relation to the mining operations themselves.
The work that is carried on in the Head Office which
consists principally of the sale operations really
begins after the minerals are ready and all opern.-
tions incidental to or connected with them are over.
This position is not disputed. Therefore, there can
be no doubt that under the ~lines Act, office of tho
mine, though sit1mtcd at the surface of tho mine, is
not necessarily a mine and the employees in the said
office cannot 1wcessarily be Raid to be
1mr~ons
employed in a mine and so, the regulatory provi·
sions of the i\IineH Act would not necessarily apply
to the offi"" and would not go,·crn the conditions
of service of the cmployN•s in the said office.
It is in the light of the dictionary meaning of
the word "mine" or. in the light. of the definition of
the word "min"" co11t11in<•d in the ~lines Act that
we have to rlenirle what an industrial
diRput~i ecmcerning a min,-, moans unrl11r s.:!(a)(i). Judged in that
way, there criu be no <lifficulty in holdi11g thnt nu
industrial rlispute het.\\·rr·n the employees engage< I in
the Hea{l Office at Cakut,tn and t.hn employer iR not
an industri:il dispute '1onc!'rning a mine. The Head
Offico is not. a mine and SP, an industrial disput<•
raiRed by the <!mployoes c11gagod in the Head Office
is not an inrlustrial dispute coneerning 11 mine.
It is, however, urg<'d by ~Tr. Sunyal on hehalf
of the appellant that a mining l"ase unrler tho
l\Iines and Mi11orals (Regulation and Development)
Act (53 of l 048) means a lease granted for tho purpose of searching for, winning, working, getting making mcrchant:iblc, carrying away or dis1~osing of
minerals or for purposes connected therewith, and
includes an exploring or 11. prospecting license. This
Act 4as been substantially amended in 1957. But_ for
.,t
3 . S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
941
the purpose of the argument urged on the definition
of the "mining lease" contained in s.3( d), it is not
necess&ry to refer to the subsequent amendments
made in the Act or in the said definition
itself. The argument is that a mining lease contains
a provision which enables the lessee to carry away
or dispose of the minerals and so, the process of
disposal of the minerals being covered by the mining
lease must be held to be integrally connected with
the mining operations and since sales of minerals
are looked after in the Head Office, the Head Office
itself is a part of the mine. In our opinion, there
is no substance in this argument. The purpose of
granting a mining lease obviously is to enable the
Jessee to search for and win minerals and make
them merchantable. The said purpose must necessarily include the right of the lessee to carry a way
the minerals and to dispose of them in the
market. But the rights conferred on the lessee
under a mining lea8e can have no direct bearing on
the question of the construction of s. 2(a) with
which we are concerned. As we have already pointed out, in the absence of a definition of the word
"mine" in the Act itself, we have to take either the
dictionary meaning of the word or the definition of
the word "mine" in the Mines Act. The rights conferred on the lessee in whose favour a mining lease is
executed can he of no assistance in interpreting the
word "mine" in section 2(a)(i).
Therefore, we are
satisfied that the Tribunal was right in holding that
the present dispute between the appellant and its
employees at its Head Office at Calcutta is not a
dispute in relation to a mine.
On general considerations also, the conclusion
of the Tribunal appears to be right. The Central
Government would be interested in industrial disputes in relation to a mine and so, in regard to
such disputes, the Central Government is made the
appropriate Government by s.(2)(a). In this con- .
nection, it would not be unreasonable to assume
1962
ScrojuJdin &: Co.
••
Their Wor~m~A
Gajendragodkar J.
Snajucldin &: Co.
v.
l"hth Workmrn
-
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
that the Central Government would be int(lrested in
industrial disputes relating to mines as defined by
the mines Act. 'fhe relevant provisions of the mines
Act are intencicd to regulate labour in mine~ and as
tho scheme of the Act showH, several provisions
havo been m11.de by the Act fur t.he health and
safety of the persoIJs working in the mines and
provisions have also
~een made for hours and
limitation of employment in that behalf. If the
scheme of the Act shows that office of the mine is
outside the purview of the Act and the employees
engaged in the office would, therefore, not ordinarily be governed by tho major provisions of the Act,
it would not be unreasonable to hold that an industrial dispute between such employees of the office
of the mine and the omμloyer iH not a dispute in ·
which the Central Government would be interested.
It may be that some of the work done in the office of
the mine situated at the surface of the mine may be
incidental to or connected ~ ith ·the mining operations, al!, e.g., keeping muster roll of workmen or
payment register
maintained for them. Clerks
engaged in such type of work may be said to be
persons omployed in a mine; but the work in the
Hoad Office with which we are directly concerned
in this a.ppeal is wholly unconnected with mining
operatiom.
All industrial dispuw,s which are outside s. 2(a)(i) are the eo11cern of the St.ato Government under section :l(a)( ii); in othor words, the
genera.I rule is that an industrial dispute arising between a employer and his employ<'es would be
ruforred for adjudication by the State Government,
except in cases falling under section 2(a)(i); and so
it is t.hc ext.out of one of the exceptions mentioned
ins. 2(a)(i) that we have t<! detorminc in the prcMent case. In determining the oxtent of the said
exooption, it would not be irrelevant to bear in
mind the scope nf the provisions of the Mines Act
itself. That is why we think the fact that an office
of a mine is outside the definition of a mine is of
-
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
943
some assistance in interpreting the word "mine"
under section 2(a)(i).
1962
Serajuddin &:: Co •.
••
T!ieir Workmen
We must, therefore, hold that the Tribunal
was right in coming to the conclusion that the
reference by the State Govemment of West Bengal
in the present case was valid.
The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs,
Gajtndragodk11r J.
Appeal dismissed.
THE STATE OF KERALA
v.
NARAYAN! AMMA KAMALA DEVI
(J. L. KAPUR·, K. C. DAs GUPTA and
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Conviction-Death of ·accused-Revision
ta High Court, after the death of the accused if maintainableAppellate and Revisianal jurisdiction-Distinction betweenCade of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), ss. 481, 439.
One N, a cashier of a bank, was convicted of an · offence
under s. 381 of the Indian Penal Code on a charge of theft of
a certain amount belonging to the Bank and was convicted
to one year's rigorous imprisonment.
His appeal to the
Sessions Court was unsuccessful.
On that very date within
few hours after the pronouncement of the judgment by the
Sessions Court he died. A revision petition was filed in the
High Court by his wife and his fwo minor sons under s. 439
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The High Court of
Kerala set aside the conviction of the deceased accused. The
State of Kerala came up in an appeal to the Supreme Court
by a certificate granted by the High Court.
The question is
whether an application for revision under s. 439 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure could be entertained by the High Court
after the death of the accused person against whom the order
was made.
Held, that in a proper case the High Court can exercise
its power of revision of an order made against an accused
person even after hi• death, and the High C@urt was right in
1962
March 19.