# • SAHIB SINGH DUGAL v. UNION OF INDIA

- **Citation:** [1966] 1 S.C.R. 313
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-07-30
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sahib-singh-dugal-v-union-of-india-3560
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

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SAHIB SINGH DUGAL
v.
UNION OF INDIA
July 30, 1965
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.I., K. N. WANCHOO, M. HlDAYA•
TULLAH, J.C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, U.]
Dt/tnce of India Rules, r. 30(1) (b)-Detentlon of person immediately
after his discharge from a criminal case-Legallry-Such detention whether
mala fide.
The petitioner was arrested on December 6, 1964 for a11 offence under
s. 3 of the Official Secrets Act.
On March 11 the investigating officer
made a report to the Magistrate that there was insufficient evidence to
charge the accused, and thereupon the Magistrate discharged the petitioner.
Immediately after the petitioner came out of the jail ho was served with
an order under r. 30( I) (b) of the Defence of India Rules under which
ho was to be detained in order to prevent him from acting in a manner
prejudicial to the defence of India, public safety, and India's relations
with foreign powers. He was then arrested and sent to jail in accordance
with the further orders of the Government of India under r. 30( 4) of
the Rules.
In a petition under Art. 32 it was contended on behalf of
tho petitioner that in view of this Court's decision in Rameshwar Shaw's
case the detention order was illegal; it was also illegat. for the reason that
in the circumstances of the case it was ma/a fide.
HELD: (i) What was decided in Rameshwar Shaw's case was that when
a peiliOll was already in jail and would continue in jail custody for an
indefinite length of time it could not be postulated about him that if he
was not detained he would act in a prejudicial manner. In the present
case the petitioner was not to continue in jail indefinitely but on the other
hand stood discharged in the criminal case. [316 G)
It was further held in Rameshwar Shaw's C38e that the past activities
on the basis of which detention order is passed against a person should
ordinarily be proximate in time.
In the present case the petitioner had
been in jail only for three months and it could be said that the conduct of
the petitioner before this period of three months was not proximate enough
to justify an order of detention based on that conduct. [317 D}
Rame•hwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan [1964) 4 S.C.R. 921
distinguished.
Smt. Godavarl Shamrao v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1964 S.C.
1128, referred to.
(ii) It may very well be that the executive authorities felt that it was
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~ible to obtain a conviction for a particular offence under the
Oflic1al Secrets Act; at the same timo they might reasonably have come
to the conclusion that the activities of the petitioner which had been watched for oYer two years before the order of detention was passed were of
such a nature as to justify the order of detention. From the mere fact
that the authorities decided to drop the case under the Official Secrets Act
and thereafter to order the detention of the petitioner, it cannot be inferred that the order of detention was ma/a fide. (317 G-HJ
314
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1966] l S.C.R.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 55 and 56 ot
A
1965.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the
enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the petitioners (in both the petitions).
R. GanapaJh.v Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent (in
both the petitions).

## Text

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SAHIB SINGH DUGAL
v.
UNION OF INDIA
July 30, 1965
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.I., K. N. WANCHOO, M. HlDAYA•
TULLAH, J.C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, U.]
Dt/tnce of India Rules, r. 30(1) (b)-Detentlon of person immediately
after his discharge from a criminal case-Legallry-Such detention whether
mala fide.
The petitioner was arrested on December 6, 1964 for a11 offence under
s. 3 of the Official Secrets Act.
On March 11 the investigating officer
made a report to the Magistrate that there was insufficient evidence to
charge the accused, and thereupon the Magistrate discharged the petitioner.
Immediately after the petitioner came out of the jail ho was served with
an order under r. 30( I) (b) of the Defence of India Rules under which
ho was to be detained in order to prevent him from acting in a manner
prejudicial to the defence of India, public safety, and India's relations
with foreign powers. He was then arrested and sent to jail in accordance
with the further orders of the Government of India under r. 30( 4) of
the Rules.
In a petition under Art. 32 it was contended on behalf of
tho petitioner that in view of this Court's decision in Rameshwar Shaw's
case the detention order was illegal; it was also illegat. for the reason that
in the circumstances of the case it was ma/a fide.
HELD: (i) What was decided in Rameshwar Shaw's case was that when
a peiliOll was already in jail and would continue in jail custody for an
indefinite length of time it could not be postulated about him that if he
was not detained he would act in a prejudicial manner. In the present
case the petitioner was not to continue in jail indefinitely but on the other
hand stood discharged in the criminal case. [316 G)
It was further held in Rameshwar Shaw's C38e that the past activities
on the basis of which detention order is passed against a person should
ordinarily be proximate in time.
In the present case the petitioner had
been in jail only for three months and it could be said that the conduct of
the petitioner before this period of three months was not proximate enough
to justify an order of detention based on that conduct. [317 D}
Rame•hwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan [1964) 4 S.C.R. 921
distinguished.
Smt. Godavarl Shamrao v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1964 S.C.
1128, referred to.
(ii) It may very well be that the executive authorities felt that it was
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~ible to obtain a conviction for a particular offence under the
Oflic1al Secrets Act; at the same timo they might reasonably have come
to the conclusion that the activities of the petitioner which had been watched for oYer two years before the order of detention was passed were of
such a nature as to justify the order of detention. From the mere fact
that the authorities decided to drop the case under the Official Secrets Act
and thereafter to order the detention of the petitioner, it cannot be inferred that the order of detention was ma/a fide. (317 G-HJ
314
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1966] l S.C.R.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 55 and 56 ot
A
1965.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the
enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the petitioners (in both the petitions).
R. GanapaJh.v Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent (in
both the petitions).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
II
Wancboo, J. These two writ petitions under Art. 32 of the
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·Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus raise common question>
and will be dealt with together.
We may set out the facts in ooe
of the petitions (namely Petition 55) in order to highlight the
points raised on behalf of the petitioners. It is unnecessary to relcr
to the facts in the other petition as they are similar except th~t
in the other case the original arrest took place on December <•
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instead of December 8.
Sahib Singh Dugal, petitioner, was employed in the Posts and
Telegraph Directorate of the Central Government
Ho was
arrested on December 8, 1964 and put in jail as an under trial
prisoner for an offence under s. 3 of the Official Secrets Act.
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Various remands were taken up to March 11, 1965 in connection
with the criminal case against the petitioner.
It appears that
besides Dugal, eight other persons were also involved in the case
under s. 3 of the Official Secrets Act, including Jagdev Kumar
Gupta petitioner in pe~ition No. 56 of 1965. On March 11,
1965, the Deputy Superintendent of Police who was apparently
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in-charge of the investigation made a report to the court to the
effect tha~ all the nine persons involved in that criminal Cll!IC
might be discharged as sufficient evidence for their conviction could
not be discovered during the investigation.
Consequently, the
magistrate discharged all the nine persons including Sahib Singh
Dugal and Jagdev Kumar Gupta petitioners and they were relca<ed
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from jail that very evening.
Immediately after Sahib Singh Dugiil
came out of the jail, he was 5erved with an order under. 30 (I ) (to)
of the Defence of India Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules)
This order was passed by the Government of India and provided
that Dugal be detained in order to prevent him from acting in a
manner prejudicial to the defence of India, public safety and
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India's relations with foreign powers.
Dugal wa5 then arrested
and detained in the Central Jail, Tebar, New Delhi in accordance
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SAlllB SINGH v. UNION (Wanchoo, J.)
315
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with the further order of the Government of India under r. 30 ( 4)
of the Rules.
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The case of the petitioners before us is two-fold.
In the first
place they rely on the decision of this Court in Rameshwar Shaw
v. District Magistrate, Burdwan(') and their case is that in view
of that decision the order of their detention and the service of
that order are illegal and tlley are therefore entitled to release. In
the second place, it is urged that the order of detention is ma/a fide
in the circumstances of the case and therefore should be set aside .
The Union contests the petitions and urges that Rameshwar Shaw's
case(') has no a;)plication to the present cases and that there wa~
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no mala fide intention in making the orders of detention.
We shall first consider whether the orders in the present cases
are covered by the decision of this Court in Rameshwar Shaw's
case(') and should therefore be set aside.
It is necessary in this
connection to refer to the facts in that case. Rameshwar Shaw
was ordered to be detained by an order passed on February 9,
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1963. This order was served on him on February 15, 1963. At
that time he was in Burdwan jail.
He had been in that jail for
~ometime past in connection with a criminal complaint pending
against him.
Therefore, both when the order was passed and when
it was served on Rameshwar Shaw, he was already in jail in con1:
nection with the criminal case pending against him and it was not
known how long he would remain in jail in that connection. It
was also impossible to say at that stage whether he would be
convicted in the criminal case or acquitted. It may be mentioned
that that was a case of detention under the Preventive Detention
Act where grounds and particulars are supplied to the detenn.
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But the main question that was decided therein was that where
a person was already in jail for an indefinite length of time in
connection with a criminal case pending against him it would not
be possible for ~he authority to come to the conclusion that such
a· person's detention is necessary in order to prevent him from
acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety etc. It was
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pointed out that the scheme of the section postulates that if an
order of detention is not passed against a person he would be
free and able to act in a prejudicial manner; but when the person
against whom an order is passed is already in jail for an indefinite
lengt;h of time or for a long time to come (say when he is undergoing sentence of imprisonment for a number of years) it could
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hardly be said that such a person would act in a manner prejudicial
to the public safety etc. unless he is detained. In such a case preven-
(1) [1964! 4 S. C. R. 921.
316
SUPllEMB COtiaT llEPORTS
[1966] l S.C.R.
rive detention would be unnecessary for the person concerned is
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already in jail for an indefinite length of time or for a long time.
In Rameshwar Shaw's case('), he was in jail in connection with
~ criminal case pending against him for an indefinite length of
time.
It was in those circumstances that this Court held tha~ the
authority ordering detention could not legitimately come to the
conclusion that the detention of the person was necessary to prevent
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him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety etc.
for in coming to that conclusion the authority had to be satisfied
that if the person is not detained, he would act in a prnjudicial
manner and that inevitably postulates freedom of action to the said
person at the relevant time. If such a person was already in jail
custody for an indefinite length of time it could not be postulated
about him th3t if he was not detained he would act in a prejudicial
manner.
This m3tter was again considered by this Court in Smt. Godac
vari Shamrao v. The State of Maharashtra.(')
That was a case
where a certain person had been detained under the Defence of
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India Rules.
Later, this order was revoked and another order
was passed to remove some technical defects.
The latter order
was challenged as illegal as it was passed at the time when the
person concerned was in detention and it was also served on her
in jail.
This Court held that the second order of the State Government after it bad decided to revoke the earlier order was perfectly
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valid so far as the time of making the order was concerned and
its service on the detenu who was demined not as an undertrial
or as a convicted person could not be assailed, and the case ef
Rameshwar Shaw( 1 ) was distinguished.
It will be noticed that the facts of the present two cases differ
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from the facts of Rameshwar Shaw's case(') in one material particular.
Rameshwar Shaw was in jail in connection with the criminal case pending against him for an indefinite duration.
The
order of detention as well as the service of that order was made
on Rameshw3r Shaw when he was in jail for an indefinite period
in connection with the criminal case pending against him. In the
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present cases io is true that the petitioners had been in jail for
about three months before the order of detention was made against
them.
But there is a significant difference in the present ca..es,
namely, that the executive authorities had decided that the criminal
case against the petitioners could not succeed for want of sufficient
evidence and applied for the discharge of the petitioners. It was
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in these circumstances that the executive authorities decided to
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(I} (196414 S. C. R. 921.
(2) A. I. R. (1964) S. C. 117.8.
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SAIUB SINGH v. UNION (Wanchoo, /.)
317
pass an order of detention.
So on March 11 a report was made
to the magistrate that the petitioners should be discharged as there
was not sufficient evidence for their convictfon and on the same
date the order for their detention was passed under the Rules ..
Further It was served on the petitioners immediately after their
release from jail. In these circumstances, the ratio decidendi of
Rameshwar Shaw's case(') will not apply, for the authorities had
decided to drop the criminal case and ask for the discharge of
the accused.
Then they considered whether there was justification·
for the detention of the peti.tioners under the Rules and decided to•
detain them.
As was pointed out by this Court in Rameshwar
Shaw's case(') detention is made generally in the light of the·
evidence about the past activities of the person concerned.
But
these past activities should ordinarily be proximate in point of
time in order to justi.fy the order of detention.
In the present
cases the petitioners had been in jail for only three months before·
the order of detention was passed. It cannot be said that the·
conduct of the petitioners before this period of three months is:
not proximate enough to justify an order of detention based on
that conduct.
As a matter of fact, the affidavit on behalf of the
Government of India is that the material in respect of the activities
of the petitioners ranged over a period of two years before the
date of detention and that was taken into account to come to the·
conclusion whether the detention under the Rules was justified or
not. We are therefore of opinion that the petitioners cannot get
advantage of the decision of this Court in Rameshwar Shaw's
case (') on the facts in the present cases.
The next contention on behalf of the petitioners is that the
order is mala fide.
The reason for this contention is that it was
originally intended to prosecute the petitioners under s. 3 of the
Official Secrets Act and when the authorities were unable to get
sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction they decided to drop
the criminal proceedings and to order the detention of the petitioners.
This by itself is not sufficient to lead to the inference
that the action of the detaining authority was ma/a fide.
It may·
very well be that the executive authorities felt that it was not
possible to obtain a conviction for a particular offence under the
Official Secrets Act; at the same time they might reasonably come
to the conclusion that the activities of the petitioners which had
been watched for over two years before the order of detention was
passed were of such a nature as to justify the order of detention.
We cannot infer merely from the fact that the authorities decided'
(1) [1964] 4 S. C. R. 921.
L6Sup.CI/65-6
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318
SUPREMB comT REPORTS
{1966] I S.C. R.
to drop the case under the Official Secrets Act and thereafter to
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order the detention of the petitioners under the Rules that the
order of detention was ma/a fide.
As we have already said, it
may not be possible to obtain a conviction for a particular offence;
but the authorities may still be justified in ordering detention of a
person in view of his past activities which will be of a wider range
than the mere proof of a particular offence in a court of law. We
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arc not therefore prepared to hold that t:he orders of detention in
.these cases were ma/a fide.
The petitions therefore fail and are hereby dismissed.
Petition.r dismissed.
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