# SANJEEV COKE MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1983] 1 S.C.R. 1000
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1982-12-10
- **Case number:** Transferred Cases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1980
- **Bench:** P.N. Bhagwati, 0. Chinnappa Reddy, E.S. Venkataramiah, _ Bharul Islam, AMARENDRh NATH SEN
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sanjeev-coke-manufacturing-company-v-bharat-coking-coal-ltd-and-another-8565
- **Pages:** 36

## Headnote

(A) Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 226 and 32-Practice and
Procedure-In proceedings Involving constitutional issues, courts
cannot travel beyond their scope.
(B) Interpretation of Statutes-Rules of Construction-Value . of
grammaf'.
...
(C) Con.titution of India, 1950-Legislative validity of-Tem for
determination-Affidavits made tn the courts to sustain legislation,
value of.
(D) Constitution of /ndia, 1950, Articles 39(b), 3/C and 14-Directlve
•
Principle of State Policy under Article 39(b)-lmmun/ly of
challenge under Article 31 Con ground of violation of Article 14 is
not permissible, Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 3~ of
1972.
(E} Constitution of India, Article 14-Whether Coking Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act is violative of Art. 14.
(F} Judicial review of matters of State policy like scheme of Nationalisation-Proceedings under Article 226.
(G} Constitution of India, Article 39(b)- Whether "material resources
of the community" referred to is confined to "natural resources".
( H) Constitution of India, Article 31 C (as amended by the Constitution
Forty Second Amendment A.ct 1976, and Articles 14 and 39. Scope
of-Article 31 C with its extended protection is constitutionally
valid.
(I) Coking Coal Mines ( NatiOnalisation) Act (Act 36 of 1972) Sections
3 (g), l3(b) and 4(1)-The definition of "C1ke oven plants" In
Section 3(b) should be read together with claus.?S (vi) and (x) of 3(i)
defining "m;ne'' for understanding the correct description of .. Mines"
In the Act.
(J) Costs in proceedings under -Articles 226 or 3;! whe11 the grievances
are not frivolous,,cost should not be award~d, when the petition is
dis/mssed~
\
:
SANJBEV COKB V. BHARAT COKING
JOO!
Consequent I<> the passing of the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971, which.was replaced by the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisa•
1. /
tion) Act, 1972, the· Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973 and the
Coal Mines (l'lationaHsation) Act, 1973, all coat mines known to exist in the
country were nationalised. whether they are coking co3.I mines or non~coking
mines. Along with them coke o~en plants in or belonging to the mines were
also nationalised. Jn addition twelve specified coke oven plants not belonging
to the owners of the mines, but known to exist near about •the mines were alSo
nationalised. All other coke oven plants were left out of the scheme of
nationalisation 'for private exploitation.
Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company, Bhowra Coke Company who
were own1::rs of fhe coke oven plants described in items 2 and 9 of the Second
Schedule filed writ petitions in the Calcutta High Court challenging the inclusion
of their coke oven plants in the Second Schedule as ·violative of the provisions
--..........___
of Article 14 of the Constitution. Tho· writ petitions were withdrawn to the
Supreme Court under Article 139 A.
Dismissing the petitions, the Court.
HBLD: 1. It is not open to a court to answer academic or hypothetical
questions on such lcoD.siderations, such as that they dealt with ·eoDstitutional
amendments and not ordinary law, which of their own force permitted violation
of freedoms:through laws passed for certain purposes, particularly so when serious
constitutional issues· are involved. Judges arc not authorised to make disembodied
pronouncements on serious and cloudy issues of constitutional Policy without
battle'lines being properly drawn. Judicial pronouncements cannot be immaculate
legal conceptions. It is but right that ·no, important point of law should be
decided without a proper /is between parties properly ranged on either side and
a croSsing of the swords. It is in 'expedient for the Supreme Court to delve into
problems which do not arise and express opinion thereon. [1016 A-CJ
2. Adjectives are attractive forensic aids but in matters of interpretation
they are divertiog intruders. They should not be allowed to get the better of the
A
B
c
D
nouns which they qualify. [1020 G-H] ·
f
'
3:1. Validity of legislation is not

## Text

_Characters 0–39,555 of 92,973. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39555 for what follows._

A
8
c
D
E
F
G
H
1000
SANJEEV COKE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
V.
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. AND ANOTHER
December 10, 1982
(P.N. BHAGWATI, 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH,
_ BHARUL ISLAM AND AMARENDRh NATH SEN, JJ.]
(A) Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 226 and 32-Practice and
Procedure-In proceedings Involving constitutional issues, courts
cannot travel beyond their scope.
(B) Interpretation of Statutes-Rules of Construction-Value . of
grammaf'.
...
(C) Con.titution of India, 1950-Legislative validity of-Tem for
determination-Affidavits made tn the courts to sustain legislation,
value of.
(D) Constitution of /ndia, 1950, Articles 39(b), 3/C and 14-Directlve
•
Principle of State Policy under Article 39(b)-lmmun/ly of
challenge under Article 31 Con ground of violation of Article 14 is
not permissible, Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 3~ of
1972.
(E} Constitution of India, Article 14-Whether Coking Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act is violative of Art. 14.
(F} Judicial review of matters of State policy like scheme of Nationalisation-Proceedings under Article 226.
(G} Constitution of India, Article 39(b)- Whether "material resources
of the community" referred to is confined to "natural resources".
( H) Constitution of India, Article 31 C (as amended by the Constitution
Forty Second Amendment A.ct 1976, and Articles 14 and 39. Scope
of-Article 31 C with its extended protection is constitutionally
valid.
(I) Coking Coal Mines ( NatiOnalisation) Act (Act 36 of 1972) Sections
3 (g), l3(b) and 4(1)-The definition of "C1ke oven plants" In
Section 3(b) should be read together with claus.?S (vi) and (x) of 3(i)
defining "m;ne'' for understanding the correct description of .. Mines"
In the Act.
(J) Costs in proceedings under -Articles 226 or 3;! whe11 the grievances
are not frivolous,,cost should not be award~d, when the petition is
dis/mssed~
\
:
SANJBEV COKB V. BHARAT COKING
JOO!
Consequent I<> the passing of the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971, which.was replaced by the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisa•
1. /
tion) Act, 1972, the· Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973 and the
Coal Mines (l'lationaHsation) Act, 1973, all coat mines known to exist in the
country were nationalised. whether they are coking co3.I mines or non~coking
mines. Along with them coke o~en plants in or belonging to the mines were
also nationalised. Jn addition twelve specified coke oven plants not belonging
to the owners of the mines, but known to exist near about •the mines were alSo
nationalised. All other coke oven plants were left out of the scheme of
nationalisation 'for private exploitation.
Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company, Bhowra Coke Company who
were own1::rs of fhe coke oven plants described in items 2 and 9 of the Second
Schedule filed writ petitions in the Calcutta High Court challenging the inclusion
of their coke oven plants in the Second Schedule as ·violative of the provisions
--..........___
of Article 14 of the Constitution. Tho· writ petitions were withdrawn to the
Supreme Court under Article 139 A.
Dismissing the petitions, the Court.
HBLD: 1. It is not open to a court to answer academic or hypothetical
questions on such lcoD.siderations, such as that they dealt with ·eoDstitutional
amendments and not ordinary law, which of their own force permitted violation
of freedoms:through laws passed for certain purposes, particularly so when serious
constitutional issues· are involved. Judges arc not authorised to make disembodied
pronouncements on serious and cloudy issues of constitutional Policy without
battle'lines being properly drawn. Judicial pronouncements cannot be immaculate
legal conceptions. It is but right that ·no, important point of law should be
decided without a proper /is between parties properly ranged on either side and
a croSsing of the swords. It is in 'expedient for the Supreme Court to delve into
problems which do not arise and express opinion thereon. [1016 A-CJ
2. Adjectives are attractive forensic aids but in matters of interpretation
they are divertiog intruders. They should not be allowed to get the better of the
A
B
c
D
nouns which they qualify. [1020 G-H] ·
f
'
3:1. Validity of legislation is not to be judged merely.by ·affidavits filed
ori behalf of the State, but by all the relevant circumstances which the court may
ultimately find out and more especially by what may be gathered from what the
legislature has itself said. [1029 F-G]
3:2. Courts are not really concemed with the hollowness or the selfG
condemnatory nature of the statements made in the affidavits filed by the
respondents to justify and sustain the legislation. The deponents of the affidavits
filed into court may speak for the parties on whose behalf they swear to the
statements. They do not speak for the Parliament and Parliament is never
before the Court. Once a statute leaves Pafliament House, _the Court's is the
only authenti1: Voice which may echo (interpret)· the Parliament. This the ·
H
cOurt will do with reference to the language of the statutC! llQ~ oth~r pt;rffii<J~ible
aids. [1029 A-DJ
A
8
c
,)
D
E
I
G
H
1002
SUPREMB COURT REPORTS
IJ983) J S.C.R
3:3. No act of Parliament can be struck dc•wn because of the under-
.standing or misunderstanding of Parliamentary inte 11tion by the executive
government or because ,theii' (the Government's) spo'i:esmen do not bring out.
relevant circumstances but indulge in empty and self defeating affidavits. They do
not and cannot bind Parliament. [1029 E-F]
4:1. The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 1972 is a legislation
for giving effect to the policy of the State ·towards securing the principle specified
in Article 39(b) of the Cons.titution and iS.
t~efefol-1~. inimune under Article
31-C from attack on the ground that it offends the funCamental right suaranteed
by Article 14. (1027 C-D]
'
4:2. By the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisalion Act all coking coal
mines known to exist in ~he country were1nationalised,; t Other coke :oven plants
whi~h did not belong to the owners ,of th'e mines but which were located near
about the nationalised coking Coal mines were also
i~·entified and ilationalised
by e~press provision to that effect. ·At~ that stage of the rationalisation and
natiqnalisatioa of the coal mining ind11stry, it was app1rently thought necessary
and sufficient to nationalise such •cok~. oven- ·plants~ as were in or belonged
to tbe nationalised coking coal mines or as were ide11tified as located near the
nationalised coking coal mines, leaving out 'all ·other col:e oven-oJants. :,
(1021 F-H; I 022 A-BJ
I
" i
i1
4:3. The object of the coking .coal Mine~ (Nationalisation Act is to
recognise and reconstruct coking coal m~nes and coke. oven plants for the purpose
of protecting, conserving and promoting ·scientific development of the resources
of coking coal needed to meet the growing requ_iremen ts of the Iron and Steel
Industry and for matters connected therewith. and incidental thereto. The
requirements of the Iron and Steel. industry .a.rt'. recog11ised as 'Growing requirements• and it is found necessary t~ protectr .conserve. aud promote the scientific
development of resources Of coking coal so. as to m_eet thoSe '1;.rowirig requirements'. The Act is contemplating the future. If, the object or the Act is to
provide for the future, it does not make any, difference, if in the past or in tbe
present, the hard coke produCed by the nationalised
cokitig coal mines is
diverted elsewhere than the Iron aad Steel Industry.
The requirements of the
Iron and Steel lndu'!lry which are to be met by the nationalised coke ~vcn plants
are its growing requirements, that is to say.lits future requirements.
.
[1026 E-H; l027 A]
S:l. The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act is nOt violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution. There has been no such infringement, as could be
seen from the facts of the right guaranteed uiider J\tticlc 14. (1027 D; 1028 F]
5:2. The process of nationalisation of the Coal industr~ i~, of course,
not complete as yet, Nationalisation of any in9ustry or means of ,production
may not be and need not be effected all at once. It may be achieved in stages. If
in the process of nationalisation some units- are ·left out in the earlier stages
either because it i'i so planned Or because of some mistake it cannot be said that
there has.been a violation of Article 14. Nof can any inference be drawn of
discrimination from the Circu1nstance that subsequently eighty seven new coke
oven plants have been allowed to come up_' Obviously there is demand for
h~rd co~e fro!ll induitrie• oJber lh&u 1be iron and steel industry and normally,
' ,_
\
j
\.
-/
/
SANJEBV COKB V. BHAllAT COKING
1003
the State does not want to stifle those industries by making· it d :fficult for them
to obtai~ their' requirement~,. espe~ially ~ince the prod1,1ction Or the ~ationalised
Coke Oven Plants bas tirSt to meet the requirements of the iron and steel industry.
What is important to note is that these eighty seven new coke oven plants are
riot situated in or af)out coal: .n\ines though tb~y are i~ lhe Coal field area, ·as
indeed they are bound to be. [lo2S E-HJ ·
·
·
'
•
'-
•
•
·•
I
-
· 6. The- distribution between public, Private alld joint sectors ·8:nd the
exfent aD.d range of any scheme of oat ionalisatioii are essentially ·matters of State
policy which are inhere1,1tly inappropriate subjects for judicial reView.
Scales· of
justice are just n~t d~signed tci 'we"igb Competing s«:ial and -eqo~omiC factors.
In suCh matters legisiative Wisdom inust Pr"ev~il
0
arid ju~icial revie'w must abstain:
The ~ontention that Article 39(b) w0utd be attraCled, if the industry as a whole
Was -iiationalised and not if only a part of the industry was nationalised is,
therefore, mispla.;.;d. (1026 B-D)
·
·
"
·
·
.
"'·
.
7:1. The expresSioo '"Material resource& of "the community" as used JD
Article 39(b) of the Constitution is not confined to natural resources ; it is not
confined to resou;rceS owlied by the public;· it -ineans and includes all resour~s,
natural and _man-made, public and private•owned. [1026 A-Bl
7:2.
1~hc expression "material resources of the community" means all
things which are capable of producing wealth for the community. There is
no warrant for interpreting the expression in so narrow a fashion as to confine it
to public-owned material resources and· exclude.private owned material resources.
The expression itivolves no dicl:totomy. The words must· be un.derstood in the
context of the constitutional goal of establishing a Sovreign. socialist, secularf
democratic republic. [1022 H; 1023 A.-B)
7:3_.
When Article 39(b) refers to material resources of the community
it does not refer only to fesourcos ow.oed by th~- community as a·,whole, but it
ref~is also to resources owned by individual
members of the community.
Re~ources of the community. do not meaD pUblic resources only but include
private resource& as well
The distribution envisaged by Article 39(b) necessarily
takes within its stride the transforlnation of.wealth. from private-ownership into
public-ownership and is not confiD;Cd to.that which is already public-owned.
.£1023 G-H;'I024 A·B]
State of Karna_taka v. Ranganathan Reddy, [197R) I S.C.R. 641@ 689
followed.
8:1. The question of the validity of- Article 3 t C stands concluded by
the decision of the Supreme Court in Ktshavananda Bharafi's case. in which ir
was expressly ruled that Article 31 C, as it stood at that time i.e., as inserted by
the Constitution. (Twe~tY-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971,
was. constitutionally
valid. No doubt the protection of Article 31C was at that time confined to law
giving effect to the po~icy ~f the, clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39. · By the
Constitution Forty Second Amendment Act,' the protection was ex:teoded·to all
laws giving effect to aH or any of the principles laid down in Part IV~ Tht
d~alectics, the
logic and the rationale involved in upholding the validity of
Article 31C wh.eo it confiQcd its protection to Jaws enacted to further Article
39(li) or Article 39(c) shoulc! Q.Qcom"romisin'1f lea<! to \he ~~we resolute
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
1C04
SUPREME COURT REPOll.TS
(1983] I S.C.11..
conclusion that Article 31 C with its extended protection is also constitutionally
valid. It cannot also be said that the nature of the Directive Principles
enunciated in other Articles of Part iV of the Constitution is so drastic or
different rrom the Directive Principle in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39, that
the extensipn of constitutional immunity to laws made to further thoso principles
would afford the basic structure of the constitutioti
Any observations made to
the contrary in Minerva Mills' case, (1981] I S.C.R. 206 may be held to be obiter.
(1016 D-H]
9:2. ·To contend that a law founded· on discrimination is not entitled
to the protection of Article 31 C. as such a law can never be said to furth"er the
directive principles affirmed io Article 39(b) would be to put the cart before the
hOrse. If the law made to further directive principle is necessarily non-di~crimi
natOry or is based on a reasonable classification, then such law does not need
any protection such as that afforded by Article 31 C. Such law would be valid
on its oWn strength, with no aid from Article 31 C. To make it a condition
precedent that a law seeking the haven .of Article 31 C must not be discriminatory or based on reasonable classification is to make Article 31 C meaningless.
i:r Article 14 is not offended, no one need give any immunity from an attack based
on Article 14. (1019 A; 1020 A-Bl
The broad egalitarian principle of social and economic justice for all
was implicit in every Directive Principle, and, therefore, a law 'designed to
promote a directive principle, even if it came into conflict with the formalistic
and doctrinaire view of equality before the law, would most certainly advance
the broader egalitarian principle and the desirable constitutional goal of social
and economic justice to all~ If the law was aimed at the broader egalitarianism
of the Directive Principles, Article 31 C protected the law from needless,·unending
and rancourous debate on the question whether the law Contravened Article 14's
concept of equality before the law. The law seeking the immunity afforded by
Article 31 C must be a law directing t~.e policy of the State towards securing a
Directive Principle. The object of the law must be to give effect to the Directive
Principle" and the connection with the Directive Pri~ciple must not be "same
remote or tenuous connection". [1020 B-F]
9:3. When Article 31 C comes in, Artic'Je 14 goes out. There is no scope
for bringing in Article 14 by a side wind as it were9 that is, by equating the rule
of equality before the law of Article 14 with the broad egalitarianism or Article
39(b) or by treating the principle of Article 14, as included in t~e Principle of
Article 39(b). To insist on nexus between the law for which protection is claimed
and the principle of Article 39(b) is not to insist on fulfilment of the requirement
of Article 14. They are different concepts ·and in certain circqmstances, may
even run counter to each other. That is why the need. for the immunity atfofded
by Articles 31 C.
(1021 A-BJ
·
.
10:1:
T~e "'.'ord ''Mine
0 as defined in Section 3(j) of the Coking Coal
Mines (Nat1onahsat1on) Act 36 of 1972 does include 'Coke Oven Plant'. If the
definition of 'Coke Oven Plant' in Section 3(b) is read alongside clauses (vi) and
(x) of ~ection 3Cp whi~h d~fines mine, it becomes plain tbat ~coke oven plant'
belonging to or 1n a m1n.) is treated as comprised in 'mine' as defined. iThereforC,
all coke oven plants beJong to Qf jq ttie niines lllentiOoed in the First Schedule,
;
SANIEEV COKE v. BHAJ,l.AT COKING
1005
•
by the very force of definition of 'mine', go with the mines and the right, title,
and interest thereto vest in the Central Government under Section 4(1) of
the Act. [1008 D-F; 10!0 DJ
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. P.K. Agarwala and Anr, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 609,
over ruled.
10:2. The object of the Coking 'coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act was
to nationalise all coking coal mines and coke oven plants situated in Or about
the mines whether or not .they belonged to the ·owners of the mines. Those
which belonged to the owners of ihe min~s, went with the mines1 but ~those which
did not belong to the owners of the rilines, obviously did not go with the mines,
an<l separate Provision had to be made for their nationalisation, and payment
of compensation etc. .That was the reason for the separate definition of "Coke
Oven Pla11:t" and the separate pr9vision for the nationalisation of certain coke
oven plants. The reason wa.s not any dichotomy. between the word •mine• on
the one hand and the words ucoke oven plant'" on the other. [1010 B-F]
10:3. All coke oven plants were not nationalised; only those which , were
situated in or abo.ut the natiQnalised coking coal mines were nationalised. There
was no separate legislation Providing for the take over of alJ coke oven plants
but as a part of the legislation to take over coking coal mines~ suCh Coke oven
plants were a~so nationalised. Quite obviously coke· oven plants situated in or·
about coal mines bad to be nationalised along with the mines in the inter"ests
of convenience and efficiency of the coal industry and to minimise the oppor·
tunities for clandestine operations for which thC co.al industry has become
notorious. Coke oven plants away from the mines were not touched either by
the· Coking Coal (BmergCncy
Provisions)· Act
or the Coking
Coal
(Nationalisation) Act. [1010 H; 1011 A-CJ
~·
Amarendra Nath Sen, J. (Contra) costs generally follow event. When a
citizen is, deprived of his property by a State action and feels ~ggrieved by the
act of the State and approaches the Court and if it ·cannot be said that his
gricvanc:e is absolutely frivolous, the citizen in such a case should not be saddled
with the costt simply because _the q,ur,t finds that his grievance has no valid.
-.,
legal basis.
[1034 G-H]
\,'\ .
'-----
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Transferred Cases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1980.
Transferred from the Calcutta High Court Matter
1979 with the petitions pending in the Court.
WITH·-
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2020 of 1980.
No. 307 of
From the Judgment and Order dated· the 27th November,
1979 of the Calcutta High Court in F.M.A.T. No. 3124 of 1979.
A
B
c
D'
l!l
F
G
S.N. Kacker, A.K- Ganguli and G.S. Chatterjee for the Petitioner
H
in Transfered Case No. I of 1980.
A
tbOll
ti 983 i 1 s.c.il.
M.C. Bhandare, Sukumar Bose,
G.S. Chatterjee and Miss
Mirdula Ray for Transferred Case No. 2 of 1980 •
. G .S. Chatterjee for the Petitioner.
L.N. Sinha, Attorney General, M.L. Verma and. Miss A.
B
Subhashini for the Respondents.
c
D
F
c
B
The following Judgment were delivered
CllJNNAPPA REDDY, J. In these cases, Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. and Sunil Kumar Ray, representing the Bhowra Coke
Company question the nationalisation of the Coke Oven Plants
belonging to them.
The history of the legislation concerning the take· over of the
Management and the Nationalisation of Coal Mines bas been set out
in some of the earlier judgments of this Court (Tara Prasad Singh
v. Union of India, etc.(') and it is not necessary for us to recall here
that history in any great detail. The Coking Coal Mines (Emergency
Provisions) Act, 1971, the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation)
Act, 1972, the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act,
1973, and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 were respectively enacted in that order.
First came the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency) Provision Act
1971 which provided for the taking over of the manage~ent of
coking' coal mines and coke oven plants pending nationalisation of
such mines and plants. Sec. 3(1) of the Act declared that on and
from the appointed day, the management of air coking coal mines
shall vest in the Central Government. All coking coai mines which
were known to exist were specified in the First Schedule to the Act
and Sec. 3(2) declared that those were the coking coal mines whose
management vested in the Central Government under sub-sec: (1).
It was further provi<!ed that if any· coal mine was found, after
investigation made by the Coal Board, to contain coking coal, a
declaration to the effect shall be made by the Board and thereupon
the management of such' min'e sha11 vesrin the Central Government
and the mine shall be deemed to be included in the First Schedule.
.
.
'
\
.
The idea clearly was not to leave out of the management of the
Central Government any coking coal mine.
The words 'mine',
'coking: coal mine' _and 'coke oven pla~t' were separately defined in
fl) [1980) 3 S.~.R.1042.
'·...,_
----
/
'
y·
J
\
'SANJBBV COKB •. BH4RAT c6KING (thinnappa b.eddy, 1.)
1001
,. "'I
.~
i
f
. '
'
•·.
'
•
~
'' 'i
• "
the Act. 'Mine' was defined widely enough that 'coking coal mine'
would take within its expanse 'coke oven plants' belonging to or in
a mine. By the very force -of the definition of 'mine', the management of coke oven plants belonging to or in coking' coal' mines also
stood vested in the Central Government from the appointed day,.
This aspect of the matter '.will. be considered in slightly greater detail
when we refer to the provisions of the Coking Coal Mines Nati onali•
. sation Act.· . As one may weU expect, there were some .coke oven
plants which 'were situated near about coking coal miries but which
did not belong to the owners of such mines and the managemeilt of
which did not, therefore, automatically vest in the Central Government along with the, vesting of the management of the coking
coal mines. It was apparently ·thought necessary and desirable
that the management of such coke oven plants also · should be
taken over.
Twelve such coke oven plants were identified and
specified in the Second Schedule and by Sec. 7 of the.Act the mana-·
gement of the coke oven plants specified in Second Schedule were
. declared to vest in the Central Government. ·
•• l
....
Next, The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 was
enacted "to provide for the acquisition and transfer of ihe right,
title and interest of the owner of the coking· coal mines specified in
the First Schedule, and the right, title and interest of.. the owners of
such coke oven plants as are in or about the said coking coal mines
with a view to reorganising .and reconstr,ucting such mines and plants
for the.purpose of .. protecting, conserving and p,romoting scientific
d.evelopment. ~f ,the resourc;es ,of coking coal needed to meet the
growing requirei;ne~!~ of-,tlle . .irp.n;and steel industry and for , matters
co11nected therewith 91' incidental t.her~to." .. _By .Section .4'. of the Act
the right,. title and·inter~i l)fthe owners .in relation to the coking
coal mines specified.in the Pirst;:Schedule stands. transferred .to-, and.
v.ests absolutely in , the ce.ntral Go~ernment.
The First. Schedule
mentions the names (!f,214 coking coal mines, with. their location
and with the names and •. addresses . of. the owners of the mines.
'Coking coal mine'. i.s. d~flned, by, Section 3(c) to mean ·"a· coal
min,e in which there exist,one or more.seams of coking coai, whether
exclusively or in addition.to. any seam ,of other coal". 'Mine' is.
defined by s. 3(j). to mean "any e.x23.vation where .any· operation .. for
the purpose of searching. for or' obtaining minerals . bas been or . is
being carried on" .. and to include, among other things.
"(vi) all lands, building's; · ~orks, adits~ leveis, pl~nes,
machinery and equipment, vebicies, railways, tramways and
. I 8
c
I
D
E
.H
toos
stJl'R.eMI! ci>tlRt Rl!l'Okts
(I983J 1 s.c.li..
A
sidings bei.ongi n,g to, or about, a mine;" and
"~-
"(x) all lands, buildings and equipment belonging to,
or hi, a mine where the washing of coal or manufacture of
coke is carried ·on ;"
B
We may also notice here the definition of 'Coke Oven Plants' as in
B. 3(b) which is as follows :
c
D
E
F
G
H
"coke oven plant" means the plant and equipment with
which the manufacture of hard coke has been, or is ·being,
carried on, and includes-
(i) .. .
· ...
(ii) .. .
(iii) .. .
(iv) .. .
(v) all lands, buildings and equipment belonging to the
coke oven plant where the washing of coal is
carried on,
(vi) ...
If the definition of 'coke oven plant' in s. 3(b) is read alongside clause
(vi) and (x) of s. 3(j) which defines mine, it becomes plain that 'coke
oven plant' belonging to or .in a mine is treated as comprised in 'mine'
as defined. Therefore, all coke oven plants belong .to or in the mines
mentioned in the First Schedule, by the very force of the definition of
'mine', go with the mines and the right, title and interest thereto vest
in the Central Government under s. 4(1) of the Act. But the object
of the Act was not merely to acquire the right, title and interest of
the owners -of the coking coal mines specified in the First Schedule
induding the coke oven plants in or belonging to such coking coal
mines but also io acquire the right, title and interest ·of the owners
of coke oven plants which were generally, in or about such coking
poal mines, even if they did not belong to the owners of such mines.
Apparently, it was not thought sufficient to acquire the coke oven,
pla.ilts in the acquired mines or belonging to the owners of the
acquired mines but it was thought necessary, also, to acquire the
cdke oven plants which were near about the acquired •mines. So a
separate .provision had to . he made in the Act to · aequire such
'
.,
..
•
,.
/
'i
I
j
SANllll!v cOKE v. BHARAT COKING (Chinnappa. Reddy,/.)
1009
coke oven plants as were near about the acquired mines but
did not belong to the owners of the mines.
Twelve such coke oven
plants, the same twelve coke oven plants which were mentioned in
the Second Schedule to the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, are again specified in the Second Schedule to the
Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act too and s. 5 of the Act
pro~ides that the right, title and interest of the owners of each of
the coke oven plants specified in the Second Schedule, being the
coke oven plants which are situated in or about the coking coal
mines specified in the First Schedule also vest in the Cenlral
Government. Thus, all coke oven plants which belonged to or
which were in the mines specified in the First Schedule stood transfem~ to the Central Government along with ·tho~e mines aO:d, in
addition, the twelve coke oven plants specified in the Second
_ Schedule which did not belong to the mines but which were near
about coking coal mines also stood transferred to the Central
Government.
In order that the ground may straight away be cleared, we
must mention here that in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd; v. P.K. Agarwala
and Anr.(1) Krishna Iyer and A.P. Sen, JJ. considered the definitions
of "Mine" and "coke oven pl.ant" in the Coking Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act, 1972 and expressed the view, wrongly in our
opinion, that 'Coking Coal Mine' did not include a 'coke oven
plant'. The learned judges appear to have •thought that there was
a dichotomy between the word 'mirie' on the one hand and the
words 'ooke oven plant' on the ·other and that was why separate
provision was made in the same Act for the .nationalisation of mines
and coke oven plants. The learned Judges observed :
"It must be said in fairness to counsel that there was
some bafllement when confronted by these prov1s1ons
although on a broader consideration, we are clear in our mind
that a dichotomy was made by the statute between mines on
the one hand as defined in Section 3U) and coke oven plants
as defined in s. 3(b) on the other.
To give meaning to this
dichotomy one has to read coke oven plants as clearly out
from the mines, which in turn means that mere equipment
where washing of coal or manufacture of coal is done as a
simple subsidiary or an equipment or machinery which is
a small part of a mine cannot be exalted to the position of
. (I) [1979] 3 SCR 609.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
c
" 0
G
H
1010
StiPRilMb c6URT RBPOitTS
'
a coke oven plant which, as Section 3(b) bears out, is an
important but separate equipment · with which the manufacture ofhard coke is carried on. This is a processing of
considerable significance, for coal that is extracted from a
colliery has an independent existence. It cannot be confused
with a minor item such as is covered by s. 3(j)(xi) or (x) of
the Act. It is easy to .find industrial similarity when we
are referring to oil mines. It. is one thing to take over oil
fields and minor machinery or equipment that· may be
attached thereto necessary for the very mining operation,
but by no stretch of imagination can it be said that
nationalisation of oil fields or mines also covers oil
refineries.
In this view, we think that there is no substance
in the submission on behalf of the appellant (Union of
india) that mine by definition includes coke oven"
I
We are afraid, we are unable to agree with the view expressed by
Krishna Iyer and A.P. Sen, JJ. that 'coal mine' as defined in s. 3(j)
particularly els. (vi) and (x) does not include 'coke oven plant'. As
already mentioned by us, there were in existence 'coke oven plants'
in or about coking coal mines, some of which belonged to the
owners of the mines and· some to persons other than the owners of
the min-es.
The object of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation)·
Act was to nationalise all coking coal mines anci coke oven plants
situated in or ahout the mines whether or not they belonged to the
owners of the mines.
Those which belonged to the owners of the
mines went with the mines but those which did not belong to the
owners of the mines, obviously, did not so go with the mines and
separate provision had to be made for thier nationalisation, and
payment of comp-ensation etc .. That was .the reason for the separate
definition ·of 'coke oven plant' and the seperate provision for the
nationalisation of certain coke oven plants.
The reason was not
any dichotomy between the word 'mine' on the one hand and the
words 'coke oven plant' on the other as was supposed in Bharat
Coking Coal Ltd, v. P.E. Agarwala. As was said, the separate
definition of coke oven plant and the separate provision for the
nationalisation of coke oven plants was necessary to cover those
coke oven plants which were sit,uated in or about the nationalised
mines but which did not belong to the owners of those mines.
It
is important to note that all coke oven plants were not nationalised;
only those which were situated in or about the nationalised coking
coal mines were nationalised. There was no separate legislation
providing for the take-over of all coke oven' plants but as a
/
/
r i
SANllii!V COKE v. llHARAt C<>KING (Chinnappa fl.eddy, J.)
1011
part of the legislation to take over coking coal mines, such
coke oven plants as were in or about the mines were also n.atio:
nalised. Quite obviously coke ·oven plants situated in '.or about
coking coal mines had to be nationalised along with the mines in
the interests of convenience and efficiency of the coal industry ~nd
to minimise the opportunities for clandestine operations for which
the coal industry bas become notorious. Coke . oven plants away
from the mines were not touched . either by the Coking' Coal
(Emergency Provisions Act) or the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act.
The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 was followed soon thereafter by the Coal M.ines (Taking Over of Management)
Act, 1973. Coal _Mine is defined by sec. 2(b) of the Act to meali"
a mine in which there exists one or more seams of coal. It is seen
that the definition of coal mines takes in coking coal mines also.
Mine is defined by Section 2(g) in practically the same terms as in
Section 3(j) of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act with
some differences which are not material for the purposes of this case.·
Sec. 3(1) provides that on and· from the appointed day, the
managements of all coal mines shall vest 'in the Central Government.
The provision is peremptory; all coal mines whether they are coking
coal mines or non-coking coal mines are included; none is excluded.
Sec. 3(2) further provides that the coal mines specified in the
schedule to the Act' shall be deemed to be the coal mines the
management of which shall vest in the Ce11tral Government under
sub-sec. (I) and further that . if the existence of any coal mine
comes to the knowledge of the Ceutral Government, the Central
Government shall make a declaration about the exist~~c~ of such
m_ine and the management of such coal mine shall thereupon be
deemed· to ·vest in· the Central Government and the coal mine
deemed to be included in the schedule. After the Coai Mines
(Taking over of management) Aci' 1972, came the Coal Mines
. (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 which ·was enacted "to provide for the
acquisition and transfer of the right, title and interest of the owners
in respect of the coal miries specified in the schedule with a view·. to
re-organising and re·constrllcting such. coal mines so as' to ensure
the rational, coordinated and scientific development a~d utilisation
of coal resources consistent with the . growing requirements of. the
country 'in order that· the ownership and control of such resources
are vested in the State and thereby sq distributed as best to
subserve the common good and for matters conneeted therewith. or'
incideritartheretd"'. The expreisions' 'coal mine' and ;mine' are
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
rt
H
A
B
c
D
B
F
G
H
1012
SUPREME COUllT RBPOlts
(198~] I s.C.R.
defined on practically the same lines as in the Coal Mines (Taking
Over of Management) Act. Sec. 3(1) declares that· on the appointed day, the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to the
coal mines specified in the schedule shall stand transferred to and·
shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all
encumbrances. Sec. 3(2) provides that if the existence of any other
coal mine comes to the knowledge of the Central Government, after
the appointed· day, the provisions of the Coal Mines (Taking over
of Management) Act shall apply to such mine until that mine is
nationalised by an appropriate legislation.
We have already
mentioned that the expression 'mine' is defined in the Coal Mines
(Taking over of Management) Act and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act in practically the same terms as in the Coking Coal Mines
(Emergency Provisions) Act and the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act. The definition is so wide, as to take in coke oven
plants belonging to or in the mine. So, all coke oven plants belonging to or in a coal mine are nationalised along with the mine, But,
there are no provisions in the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act
1973 corresponding to Section 5 of and the Second Schedule to the
Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act 1972 to cover coke oven
plants which are situated near the coal mines but which do not
belong to the owners of the mines. Therefore, coke oven plants
not belonging to or in coal mines (not already nationalised under
the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act are left out of the
Coal Mines (Taking over of Management) Act and the Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act, 1973. Of course, coke oven _plants situated
away from the mines are not touched by either the Coal Mines
(Nationalisation) Act, 1973 or the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972.
The final result of these statutes is that all coal mines known
to exist in the country are nationalised, . whether they are coking
coal mines or npn-coking coal mines. Along with them coke oven
plants in or belonging to the mines also stand nationalised. In
addition twelve specified coke oven plants not belonging to the
owners of the mines but known to exist near about the mines are
also nationalised. All other coke oven . plants are left out of the
scheme of nationalisation. The design revealed by the Acts is that
mining of coal is r~served entirely for the public sector, and so, all
existing coal mines, whether coking coal or ·non-coking coal, are
nationalised and the management of mines which may be discovered
in the future is automatically taken over by the Central Government until nationalisation by appropriate legislation; and, the
,..
/
'
SAN!EEV COKE v. BHARAT COKING_ (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
1013
manufacture of bard coke from coal is reserved for the joint sector
and so all coke oven plants belonging to or in coal mines and twelve
specified coke oven plants are nationalised while all other coke oven
plants are left for private exploitation ; there is no ban against any _
new cqke oven plants being set up.
Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company, who were the owners
of the coke oven plant described in Item 9 of the Second Schedul_e
and Bhowra Coke Company, who were the owners of the Coke oven
"plant described in Item 2 of ~he Second Schedule filed writ; petitions
in the Calcutta-High Court challenging the inclusion of these coke
oven plants in the Second Schedule. The writ petitions have been
withdrawn to this Court for disposal.
The_ principal ground of
challenge was that other coke oven plants standing in exactly the
same position as the coke oven plants of the petitioners were left
out and had not been nationalised; there was, therefore, rank dis· .
crimination. It was said that as many as eighty seven new coke
oven plants were allowed to come into existence subsequent to
the Nationalisation Act and so the nationalisation of twelve of the
existing coke 'oven plants was ex-facie arbitrary and discriminatory.
There were other grounds, branches and shades of challenge to
which we shall refer later in the course of the judgment. The straight
answer of the Central Government was that the provisions of the
Ac_t were immune from the challe~ge based on the ground of discrimination because of the protection afforded by Art. 31C of the
Constitution. The Central Government also _defended the inclusion
of the coke oven plants of the petitioners in Second Schedule on
merits and explained how it came about that certain coke oven
plants were excluded.
The principal question for consideration, therefore, is whether
the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 is entitled to the
protec
0
tion of Art 31C of the Constitution Art. 31C of the Constitution, which was introduced by the Twenty-fifth Amendment Act,
1971, as it stood before the Forty-second Amendment, provided,
"Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving
effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in cl (b) or cl.(c) of Art. 39 _shall be deemed to be void on the
· ground that it was inconsistant -with, or takes away or abridges any
of the rights ' conferred by Art. 14, Art. 19 or Art. 31 ". By the
Constitution Forty-second Amendment Act, the protection of Art.
31 C was extended not merely to laws giving effect to the policy
of the State towards securing the principles specified in cl.(b) or (c)
A
B
c
D
F
G
H
A
8
c
D
E
F
G
H
1014
S.UPRBMB COURT REPORTS
i 1983) I s.c.a.
of Art.39 but to laws givi~g effect to the policy of the State towards
securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part JV of the
Constitution. The constitutionality of the original Art. 3JC as
introduced by the Constitution Twenty·fifth Amendment Act, was
upheld by .the Court in Keshvananda Bharati v. The State of Kera/a(')
Section 4 of the Constitution Forty· second Amendment Act of 1976
which substituted the words "all or any of the principles laid down
in Part IV;' for the words "the principles specified in Cl.(b) or (c) of
Art.