# SANTURAM KHUDAI v. KIMATRAI PRINTERS & PROCESSORS (P) LTD. & ORS

- **Citation:** [1978] 2 S.C.R. 387
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-12-09
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2111 of 1977
- **Bench:** N. L. Untwalia, Jaswant Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/santuram-khudai-v-kimatrai-printers-processors-p-ltd-ors-7385
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Bombay l11dustrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act No. XI of 1947),
s. 80 r /w s 27A, scope of-Right of the individual- employee to appear or act
in a proceeding under the 1946 Act, where a reprlisentative union has entered
appearance as the representative of the employees.
Respondent No. 1 is an undertaking in the Textile Processing Industry which
A
B
was recognised as such under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act.
Respon~
C
dent No. 2 namely, the General Workers' Union1, Bhadra, Ahmedabad is a
representative union of all the employees of the various undertakings registered
by the Registrar as undertakings in the Textile Processing Industry in the local
area of Ahmedabad city and city Taluka irrespective of the fact
that
the
employees of any of the aforesaid undertakings may or may not be members
of the representative union and is registered and recognised as such under 'the
provisions of the Act. An industrial reference No. 176/1976 was made to the
Industrial Court at Ahmedabad on 27-7-76 as respondent No. I did not agree
to a desire oJ respondent No. 2 for a change in respect of classification, pay
D
scales, dearness allowance, casual leaves, festival holidays and certain other
industrial matters. In May, 1976 a new rival union was formed under the nanie
and style o{ "New Labour General Trade Union, Ahmedabad"
which
was
registered under the Trade Unions Act on June 3, 1976. This new Union by
its letter dated June 8, 1976, raised certain demands regarding issue of perma·
nent entry passes, casual leave, festival holidays, provident fund, Employees
State Insurance Scheme, bonus, dearness allowance which were not heeded to
by respondent No. 1 on the ground that the Union could not be treated as a
representative union under the Act. Since every effort of theirs failed to elicit
E
any response from respondent No. 1, the New Union gave a strike notice on
September 2, 1976.
Pursuant thereto 131 employees of respondent No. I
went on strike on September 24, !976, whereupon an application No. 145517&
was made on the following day, by respondent No. I to the Third Labour
Court at Ahmedabad u/s. 79(1) and (4) r/w ss. 78(1)(A)(C) and 97(1)
of the Act for a declaration that the action of tbe
workers
mentioned
in
Annexures 'A' and 'B' to the application amounted to an illegal strike. Jn
the said proceedings respondent No. 2 appeared as
the
representative
and
approved union for the processing industry in the local area· where the mills
F
of respondent No. 1 are situate and filed written statement admitting that the
strike resorted to by the workmen was illegal. On October 4, 1976, the appel·
lant and five other employees of respondent No. 1 made an application to the
said Labour Court for impleading them as parties to the aforesaid proceedings
No. 1455176 and allowing them to appear and defend the same. On the same
day, the appellant and 15 other employees of resp1lndent No. l requested the
Labour Court to declare the strike as legal. The aforesaid application for
being impleaded as parties was rejected by the Labour Court, as per its order
dated 6-10-76.
On 12-10-76, the Labour Court allowed the application No.
G
1455 of 1976 of respondent No._ I u/s. 79(1) and (4) read with
ss. 78(1)(A)(C) and 97(1) of the Act and declared that the employees mentioned in Annexures 'A' and 'B' to the application resorted to an illegal strike
w.e.f. 24-9-1976 the continuation whereof was also illegal as it
had
been
resorted to during the pendency of the reference No. 176 of 1976, wherein as
a result of negotiations, an interim settlement was arrived at on November 17,
1977. A special Civil Application No. 1845/76 filed by the appellants under
Art 227 of the Con•titution for quashing the two orders of the Labour Court
dated 6-10-76 and 12-10-76 was dismissed in limine by
tlie
Gujarat
High
ff
Court.
Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court,
!2-l 114SCI/77
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388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
HELD : ( 1) The legislative intent un

## Text

387
SANTURAM KHUDAI
v.
KIMATRAI PRINTERS & PROCESSORS (P) LTD. & ORS.
December 9, 1977
(N. L. UNTWALIA AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ .. ]
Bombay l11dustrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act No. XI of 1947),
s. 80 r /w s 27A, scope of-Right of the individual- employee to appear or act
in a proceeding under the 1946 Act, where a reprlisentative union has entered
appearance as the representative of the employees.
Respondent No. 1 is an undertaking in the Textile Processing Industry which
A
B
was recognised as such under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act.
Respon~
C
dent No. 2 namely, the General Workers' Union1, Bhadra, Ahmedabad is a
representative union of all the employees of the various undertakings registered
by the Registrar as undertakings in the Textile Processing Industry in the local
area of Ahmedabad city and city Taluka irrespective of the fact
that
the
employees of any of the aforesaid undertakings may or may not be members
of the representative union and is registered and recognised as such under 'the
provisions of the Act. An industrial reference No. 176/1976 was made to the
Industrial Court at Ahmedabad on 27-7-76 as respondent No. I did not agree
to a desire oJ respondent No. 2 for a change in respect of classification, pay
D
scales, dearness allowance, casual leaves, festival holidays and certain other
industrial matters. In May, 1976 a new rival union was formed under the nanie
and style o{ "New Labour General Trade Union, Ahmedabad"
which
was
registered under the Trade Unions Act on June 3, 1976. This new Union by
its letter dated June 8, 1976, raised certain demands regarding issue of perma·
nent entry passes, casual leave, festival holidays, provident fund, Employees
State Insurance Scheme, bonus, dearness allowance which were not heeded to
by respondent No. 1 on the ground that the Union could not be treated as a
representative union under the Act. Since every effort of theirs failed to elicit
E
any response from respondent No. 1, the New Union gave a strike notice on
September 2, 1976.
Pursuant thereto 131 employees of respondent No. I
went on strike on September 24, !976, whereupon an application No. 145517&
was made on the following day, by respondent No. I to the Third Labour
Court at Ahmedabad u/s. 79(1) and (4) r/w ss. 78(1)(A)(C) and 97(1)
of the Act for a declaration that the action of tbe
workers
mentioned
in
Annexures 'A' and 'B' to the application amounted to an illegal strike. Jn
the said proceedings respondent No. 2 appeared as
the
representative
and
approved union for the processing industry in the local area· where the mills
F
of respondent No. 1 are situate and filed written statement admitting that the
strike resorted to by the workmen was illegal. On October 4, 1976, the appel·
lant and five other employees of respondent No. 1 made an application to the
said Labour Court for impleading them as parties to the aforesaid proceedings
No. 1455176 and allowing them to appear and defend the same. On the same
day, the appellant and 15 other employees of resp1lndent No. l requested the
Labour Court to declare the strike as legal. The aforesaid application for
being impleaded as parties was rejected by the Labour Court, as per its order
dated 6-10-76.
On 12-10-76, the Labour Court allowed the application No.
G
1455 of 1976 of respondent No._ I u/s. 79(1) and (4) read with
ss. 78(1)(A)(C) and 97(1) of the Act and declared that the employees mentioned in Annexures 'A' and 'B' to the application resorted to an illegal strike
w.e.f. 24-9-1976 the continuation whereof was also illegal as it
had
been
resorted to during the pendency of the reference No. 176 of 1976, wherein as
a result of negotiations, an interim settlement was arrived at on November 17,
1977. A special Civil Application No. 1845/76 filed by the appellants under
Art 227 of the Con•titution for quashing the two orders of the Labour Court
dated 6-10-76 and 12-10-76 was dismissed in limine by
tlie
Gujarat
High
ff
Court.
Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court,
!2-l 114SCI/77
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
HELD : ( 1) The legislative intent underlying the scheme of the Bombay
Industrial Relations Act being to inculcate and encourage the practice of collective bargaining so that the Jabour is neither exploited nor victimised and industrial peace and harmony is ensured, the provisions of the Act are designed
to emphasize that if labour in an industry is organised through its own union
which is registered and recognised under the Act, then it is that union which
can appear and do all acts and agitate matters in its represeptative capacity for
the labour and if it does choose to appear or act, then no individual employee
is competent to appear and present his point of view.
[392 B-C]
(2) Section 80 of the Act makes it clear that the Labour Court can pern1it
the parties affected by the dispute to appear- in the manner provided by ss. 80A
to SOC of the Act, but the discretion conferred on the Labour Court has
specifically b~en made subject to the provisions of Chapter V which deals with
"representation of employees and employers and appearance on their behalf".
[392 E-F]
(3) Section 27 A of the Act consists of tv.ro parts. While the second part
contains the general rule prohibiting the grant of permission to an individual
employee to appear or act in any proceeding under the Act except through the
representative of the employees, the first part carves out three exceptions to
the said general rule which are mentioned in s. 32, 33 and 33A of the Act.
· Whereas the last exception, that is, the one carved out by s. 33~A of the Act
relates to proceedings where the dispute is bet\veen employees and employees,
the other two exceptions mentioned in ss. 32 and 33. of the Act relate to proceedings in respect of certain other disputes.
Sections 32 and 33 of the Act,
no doubt, engraft exceptions on the aforesaid general rule embodied in s. 27 A
of the Act, the provisos appended thereto specifically preclude individual
employees from appearing or acting in any proceeding under the Act \vhere
the representative union enters appearance or acts as the representative of em~
ployees.
[392 G-H. 393 A-F]
Girja Shankar Kashi Rain v. The Gujarat Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.
[1962] 2 Supp. SCR 890=[1962] 2 L.L.J. 369 (S.C.) and Textile Laboar Association, Bhadra Al11nedabad v. Alunedabad Mill Owners Association, Ahmedabad
(1970)3 sec 890 at p. 891, followed.
(4) Mala tides or bona fides of a representative union has no relevance
\vhile considering the provisions of s. 27-A and ss. 32 and 33 of the Act \vhich
taken together impose an absolute ban on the appearance of any individual
employee in
any proceeding
under
the Act \.Vhere the representation union
chooses to
appear or
act as
representative of the
en1ployees.
In case
the employees
find that
the
representative
union
is acting in
3 manner
which
is
prejudicial
to
their
interest,
their
remedy
lies
in
in\'oking
the aid of the Registrar under Chapter III of the Act ana asking him to cancel
the registration of the union.
f395 A-C]
Girja Shankar Kashi Rain v. The Gujarat SpinninR & Weaving Co. Ltd.
[19621 2 Supp. SCR 890=(1962) 2 L.L.l. 369(SC), applied.
N. M. Naik v. Golaba Land Mills (1960) L.l.J. 448, over-ruled.
(5) A con1bined reading of ss. 80, 27A, 30, 32 and 33 of the Act
leaves
no room for doubt that consistent with its avowed policy of preventing the
exploitation of the workers and augmenting their bargaining power, the Legislature has clothed the representative union with plenary power to appear or
act on behalf of employees in any prociteding under the Act and has deprived
the individual employee or workman of the right to appear or act in any proceeding under the Act where the representative union enters appearance or acts
as representative of employees.
[383 B-C1
·
Girja Shankar Kaslti Ram v, Tlie Gujarat Spin11inR & Weavinf.:
Co.
Ltd.
[19621 2 Supp. SCR 890=(1962) 2 L.LJ. 369 (S.C.), applied.
(6) In the instant case (a) neither the appellant nor his other co-empWyees
had any locus standi to appear or act as individual employees in the proceedings
initi,ated by respondent No .. 1 in which respondent No. 2 which is a representative union in the industry in the local area had the right to appear and act
as the representative of the employees in the industry and did apear or act as
such; [395 G-H]
SANTURAM v. KIMATRAI PRINTERS (Jaswant Singh, J.)
389
(b) The Hew union to which the appellant and some of his co-employees
·belonged would have no right to appear or act on behalf of the appellant or
his co-employees in the proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1 as it had not
been registered and recognised as the represe.ntative union of employees under
the Act.
[396 Al
fin view of the abstention of the parties from addressing the court
regarding the legality or otherwise of the strike, the court refrained
from making any observation in regard thereto.]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2111 of 1977.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
16-11-76 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No.
1845 of 1976.
B. Datta and K. Kumar for the Appellant.
Y. S. Chitley, V. N. Ganpule, Mukul Mudga!, M. R. Gehani and
Mrs. V. D. Khanna for Respondent No. I.
V. M. Tarkunde, K. L. Hathi and P. C. Kapur for Respondent No.
2.
The Judgment of the Court was deliv1;red by
JASWANT SINGH, J. This appeal by special leave which is directed
against the order dated November 16, 1976 of the High Court of Gujarat
at Ahmedabad summarily dismissing Special Civil Application No. 1845
of 197 6 filed by the appellant and another under Article 22 7 of the
·Constitution raises an interesting question regarding the right of individual employees to appear or act in a proceeding under the Bombay
Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act No. XI of 1947) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') where a representatitve union has entered
appearance as the representative of the employees.
The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal, in brief, are :
Respondent No. 1 herein viz. The Kimatrai Printers and Processors
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Pvt. Ltd. Ahmedabad is an undertaking in the Textile. Processing
Industry which was recognised as sucb vide Notification No. KH-SHMC/ . F
2724/RU dated September 13, 1974 issued by the Assistant Registrar,
Bombay Industrial Relatiooo Act in exercise of the powers conferred on
•
him under secfom 11 ( 1) of the Act. Respondent No. 2 viz. the General
Workers Union, Bhad1a, Ahmadabad is a Fep•esen!ative union of all
the employees of the various undertakings registered by the Registrar
as undertakings in the Textile Processing Industry in the local area o~
Ahmedabad City and city Talul<a irrespective of the fact that the emploG
yees of any of the aforesaid undertakings may or may not be members
of the representative union and is registered and recognised as such
under the provisions of the Act.
Jn 1975, the said union raised
demands regarding w,;gcs, dearness aHowance, washing allowance,
supply of shoes, unifonns, and casual holidays. As the demands were
not agreed to, the dispute was taken in '~onciliation which culminated
in an amicable settlement between the parties on the basis whereof an
H
award was mrule by the Industrial Col!rt on September 29, 1975.
On
December 22, 1975, respondent No. 2 gave a notice under sub-section
(2) of section 42 of the Act intimating thereby its desire for a change
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 s.c.&.
in rnspec\ of classification, pay scales, dearness allowance, casual leave,
festival hohdays and certain other industrial matters. The notice was
followed by two other notices dated March 22, 1976 and March 27,
1976 under the sa1:11e provision of the Act.
The dispute not ha~ing been
settled by the parties amicably, the same was taken in conciliation which
failed.
Consequently op. July 27, 1976, a refe.rence being Reference
No. 176 of 1976, was made to the Industrial Court at Ahmedabad
under section 73-A of the Act, wherein as a result of negotiations, an
mternn settlement appears to have been arrived at on November 17,
1977.
Meanwhile, the workers of respondent No. 1 struck work with
effect from September 24, 1976 whereupon an application being application No. 1455 of 1976 was made on the following day by the respon- ·
dent to the Third Labour Court at Ahmedabad under section 79 (1) &
(4) read with section 78(1) A (C) and section 97(1) of the Act for a
declaration that the aforesaid action of the workers mentioned in
Annexures 'A' and 'B' to the application amounted to an illegal strike.
A public notice regarding the filing of this application was given in
'Gujarat Samachar' on September 27, 1976 and a copy thereof was also
affixed on the notice board of respondent No. 1.
In the proceeding•
taken upon the said application of respondent No. 1, respondent No. Z
appeared as the representative and approved union for the processing
industry in the local area where the mills of respondent No. 1 are
situate, and filed written statement admitting that the strike resorted to
by the workmen was illegal.
Without meaning to burden the record
unnecessarily but with a view to complete the narrative, it may
bel
stated that in May, 1976, a new union of workers employed in the
concern of respondent No. 1 was formed under the name and style of
'New Labour General Trade Union' Ahmedabad which was registered
under the Trade Unions Act on June 3, 1976. Vide its letter dated
June 8, 1976, the new union raised demands regarding issue of permanent entry passes, casual leave, festival holidays, provident fund,
Employees State Insurance, Bonus, Dearness Allowance etc. which were
not heeded to by respondent No. 1 on the ground that the union could
not be treated as a: representative union under the Act
The reminders
sent by the new union on June 21, 1976, Jmie 29, 1976 and July 2,
1976 were also ignored by respondent No. 1.
On July 6, 1976, the
new union suggested a few names of its members to responden~ No.- 1
for the purposes of negotiation and requested it to fix a date for that
purpose before July 10, 1976.
As the attempt at negotiation also failed
to evoke a favourable response from respondent No. l, the new union
made a representation to Labour Commissioner on July 10, 1976. A
further representation made by the workmen tO the Management of
respondent No. 1 on August 15, 1976 which was followed by representations to the Governor of Gujarat on August 18, 1976 and August 25,
1976 also failed to elicit any response from respondent No. I. There•
upon the new union gave a strike notice on September 2, 1976 pursuant
thereto 131 employees of respondent No. 1 went on strike on September
24, t 976, as already stated.
Ori October 4, 1976, the appellant and five other employees of
respondent No. 1 made an application to the. Labour Court praying
that they may be impleaded as parties to the aforesaid proceedings
'
>'
..
•
SANTURAM v. KJMATRAI PRINTERS (laswant Singh, J.)
3 91
initiated by respondent No. 1 und allowed to appear and defend the
same.
By means of another application of the even date, the appellant
and fifteen other employees of the respondent tequested the Labour
Court to' declar.e the strike as legal.
The former application was rejected
by the Labour Court vide order dated October 6, 1976.
On October
12, 1976, the Labour Court allowed the aforesaid application of
respondent No. 1 under section 79(1) & (4) read with section 78(1)
A ( C) and sec\ion 97 (1) of the Act and declared that the employees
mentioned in Annexures 'A' and 'B' to the application resorted to an
illegal strike with effect from September 24, 1976 and the continuation
thereof was also illegal as it had been resorted to dnring the pendency
of the aforesaid Reference No. 176 of 1976. Aggrieved by these orders,
, the appellant and Kamalgiri, two of the aforesaid six employees, filed,
as already stated, Special Civil Application No. 1845 of 1976 in the
High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad under Article 227 of the Constitution praying that the aforesaid orders dated October 6, 1976 and
October 12, 1976 passed by the Labonr Court be quashed. They also
asked for a declaration that the strike resorted to by the employees of
respondent No. 1 pursuant to the afOCC6aid notice of strike given by
their new union was jnst, proper and legal and that the employees who
resorted to the strike continued to be in service of respondent No. 1
without any break or interruption. The said employees further prayed
that respondent No. 1 be directed to award full wages to the employees
who went on strike for the period commencing from September 24, 197 6
(when they initially went on strike) to the date of resumption of work
by them. Vide its order date<l November 16, 1976, the High Court
summarily dismissed the petition and declined to give feave to appeal
to this Court. The appellant thereupon made an application to this
Court for Special Leave which was granted. This is how the matter is
before us.
Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. B. Dutta has contended
that the order of the High Court dated November 16, 1976 dismissing
in limine the aforesaid petition No. 1845 of 1976 submitted by the
appellant and his co-employee, Kamalgiri, nnder Article 227 of the
Constitution thereby upholding the aforesaid orders of the Labour
Court and dismissing the application of the appellant and his five
co-employees for being impleaded as parties to the aforesaid application of respondent No. 1 under section 79(1) & (4) read with section
78 (' ) A ( C) and section 97 ( 1) of the Act is erroneous and cannot
be sustained on a true interpretation of section 80 of the Act which
confers a right on every individual employee to appear before the Labour
Conrt and contest on application under section 79 of the Act which
may threaten to adversely affect his rights and interests.
Mr. Dutta
has also urged that the application could not have been rejected in
view of the two exceptions engrafted on section 27 of the Act. Mr.
Dutta has finally nrged that in any event, the application onght to have
been allowed and the individual employees permitted to appear and
contest the aforesaid application of responddent No. 1 as the stand
taken by the representative nnion in regard thereto was mala fide and
against their interests .
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
A
Mr. Tarkunde and Mr. Chitale have, on the other hand contended
that it was respondent No. 2 alone, which
was
the
representative
um?n, and not the appellant or any other individual employee who had
a nght to appear and act in the aforesaid proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1 before the Labour Court.
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For a proper appreciation of the rival contentions advanced by
counsel for the parties, it is necessary to refer to section 80 and oth"r
relevant provisions of the Act.
Before doing so, it is necessary to bear
in mind that the legislative intent underlying the scheme of the Act
being to inculcate and encourage the practice of collective bargaining
so that the labour is neither exploited nor victimized and industrial
peace and harmony is ensured, the provisions of the Act are designed
to emphasize that if labour in an industry is organised through its own.
union which is registered and recognised under the Act, then it is that
union which can appear and do all acts and agitate matters in its representative capacity for the labour and if it does choose to appear or acl
then no individual employee is competent to appear and present his
point of view.
With these prefatory observations, we
proceed
to
advert to the relevant provisions of the Act.
Section 80 of the Act provides : "on receipt of
an
application
under section 79, the Labour Court shall issue a notice to all parties
affected by the dispute, in the manner provided by rules under section
85.
Subject to the provisions of Chapter V, the Labour Court may
permit the parties so affected to appear in the manner provided by the
provisions of sections 80A to 80-C.
The Labour Court shall then
hold an inquiry".
A plain reading of the above section which was substituted for the
original section 80 by the Bombay Act 49 of 1955 makes it clear that
the Labour Court can permit the parties affected by the dispute to
appear in the manner provided by sections 80-A to 80-C of the Act
but the discretion conferred on the Labour Court has specifically been
made subject to the proisions of Chaptcr-V which deals with "representation elf employees and employers and appearance on their behalf"
and contains amongst other provisions section 27-A which is
in
the
following terms :-
"27-A.
Save as provided in sections 32, 33 and 33-A.
no employee shall be allowed to appear or act in any proceeding under this Act except through the representative of
employees ...
This section. it would be noted, consists of two Parts.
While the
second part contains the general rule prohibitin.g the grant of. permission to an individual employee to appear or act m any procecdmg under
the Act except through the representative of employees, the first part
carves out three exceptions to the said geueral rule which are mentioned in scct;ons 32, 33 and 33-A of the Act.
Whereas the last exception i.e. the one carved out by section 33-A of the Act relates to proceedings "here the dispute is between employees and employees, the
other two exceptions mentioned i'! sections ~2 and 33 of the Act relate
to proceedings in respect of certam other disputes.
...
SANTURAM v. KIMATRA[ PRINTERS (Jaswant Singh, !. )
3 93
The term 'representative of employees' as used in the above quoted
section 27-A of the Act is defined in section 3(32) of the
Act . as
meaning "a representative of employees entitled to appear or act as
such under section 30."
This takes us to section 30 of the Act.
This section which sets
out in preferential order the persons who are entitled to appear or act
as representatives of employees in any industry in local area assigns the
foremost position to the representative union.
Now a combined reading of sections 80, 27-A, 30, 32 and 33 of
the Act leaves no room for doubt that consistent with its avowed policy
of preventing the exploitation of the '-':orkers and
augmenting their
bargaining power, the Legislature has clothed the representative union
with plenary power to appear or acf on behalf of the employees in any
proceedings under the Act and has deprived the individual employees
or workmen of the right to appear or act in any proceeding under the
Act where the representative union enters appearance or acts as representative of employees.
We are fortifid in this view by a decision of
this Court in Girja Shankar Kashi Ram v. The Gujarat
Spinning
&
Weaving Co. Ltd.( 1 ) where Wanchoo, J. (as he then was)
speaking
for the Court observed as follows :-
"It will be seen that s. 27-A provides that no employee
shall be allowed to appear or act in any proceeding under the
Act, except through the representative of employees, the only
exception to this being the provisions of ss. 32 and 33. Therefore, this section completely bans the appearance of an employee or of any one on his behalf in any proceeding after
it has once commenced except through the representative of
employees.
The only exceptions to this complete ban arc to
be found in sections 32 and 33.
The first contention advanced by Mr. Dutta is, therefore, overruled.
The second contention raised by Mr. Dutta
is
also
devoid
of
substance.
Sections 32 and 33 of the Act no doubt engraft
excepA
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tions on the aforesaid general rule embodied in section 27-A of the
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Act but they are not helpful to the appellant as the provisos appended
thereto specifically preclude individual employees from appearing or
acting in any proceeding under the Act where the representative union
enters appearance or acts as the representative of employees. It will be
advantageous in this connection to refer to the following
passage
occurring in the decision of this Court in Girja Shankar Kashi Ram v.
The Gujarat Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. (supra), where Wanchoo,
G
J. (as he then was) summarising the position observed as follows :-
"The result therefore of taking ss. 27-A, 32
and
33
together is that s. 27 A first places a complete ban on the
appearance of an employee in proceedings nnder the
Act
once it has commenced except through the representative of
employees.
But there arc two exceptions to this ban contained in ss. 32 and 33.
Section 32 is concerned with all
H
proceedings before the authorities and gives power to
the
(1) [19621 2 Supp. S.CR. 890 : [\9621 2 L.L.J. 369 (S.C).
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394
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 2 S.C.R.
authorities uder the Act to permit an employee himself to
appear even though a representative of employees may have
appeared but this permission cannot be granted where the
representative union has appeared as a
representative of
employees.
Section 33 which is the other exception allows
an employee to appear through any person in certain proceedmgs only even though a representative of employees might
have appeared; but here again it is subject to this that no one
els~, not ~ven the employee who might have made the applicat10n, will have the nght to appear if a Representative
Union has put in appearance as the representative of employees.
It is quite clear therefore that the scheme of the Act
is that where a Represenllrtive Union appears in any proceeding under the Act, no one else can be allowed to appear not
even the employee at whose instance the proceedings might
have begun under s. 42 ( 4). But where the appearance is
by any representative of employees other than a Representative Union authorities under s. 32 can permit the employee
to appear himself in all proceedings before them and further
the employee is entitled to appear by any person in certain
proceedings specified in s. 33.
But whenever the Representative Union has made an appearance, even the employee
cannot appear inany proceeding under the Act and the representation must be confined only to the Representative Union.
The complete ban therefore laid by s. 27A on representation
otherwise than through a representativei of employees remains
complete where the representative of employees is the Representative Union that has appeared; but if the representative
of employees that has appeared is other than the Representative Union then ss. 32 and 33 provide for exceptions with
which we have already dealt. There can therefore be no
escape from the conclusion that the Act pkiinly intends that
where the Representative Union appears in any proceeding
under the Act even though that proceeding might have commenced by an employee under s. 42( 4) of the Act, the
Representative Union alone can represent the employee and
the employee cannot appear or act in such proceeding."
The following observation made by Hidayatullah, C.J. in Textile
Labour Association, Bhadra Ahmedabad v. Ahmedabad Mill Owners
Association, Ahmedabad(') is also pertinent:-
"Reading these two sections (ss. 32 and 33 of the Act),
we find that it is quite clearly stated in the provisos to the
two sections that no individual is allowed to appear in any
proceeding in which the representative Union has appeared
as the representative of the employees.
The second contention raised by Mr. Dutta is
also, therefore,
repelled.
The last contention of Mr. Dutta that in view of the fact that while
appearing as the representative union in respondent No. l's aforesaid
(!) [1970j 3 s.c.c. 890-91.
SANTURAM v. KIMATRAI PRINTERS (Jaswant Singh,!.)
3 95
application No. 1455 of 1976, respondent No. 2 was not acting for
A
and on behalf of the employees but was acting mala fide and against
their interests, the appellant and his five other co-employees should
have been allowed to be added as parties to the application and permitted to appear and act therein has also no force. It has to be
remembered that malafides or bonafides of a representative union has
no relevance while considering the provisions of section 27-A and
section$ 32 and 33 of the Act which taken together impose an absolute
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ban on the appearance of any individual employee in any proceeding
under the Act where the representative union chooses to appear act as
representative of the employees.
In case, the employees find that the
representative union is acting in a manner which is prejudicial to their
interests, their remedy lies in invoking the aid of the Registrar under
Chapter III of the Act and asking him to cancel the registration of the
union.
The following observations made in Girja Shankar Kashi Ram
C
v. The G1ijarat Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. (supra) are apposite in
.\his connection :-
"But it is clear that bona fides or mala fides of the representative of employees can have nothing to do with the ban
placed by s. 27A on the appearance of any one else except
the representative of employees! as defined in s. 30 and that if
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anyone else can appear in any proceeding we must find a
provision in that behalf in either s. 32 or s. 33, which are the
only exceptions to s. 27 A. It may be noticed that there is
no exception ins. 27A in favour of the employee, who might
have made an application under s. 42(4), to appear on his
own behalf and the ban which is placed bys. 27A will apply
equally to such an employee.
In order however to soften
E
the rigour of the provisions of s. 27A, for it may well be that
the representative of employees may not choose to appear in
many proceedings started by an employee under s. 42(4),
exceptions are provided in ss. 32 and 33. The scheme of
these three provisions clearly is that if the Representative
Union appears, no one alse can appear and carry on a proceeding, even if it be begun on an application under s. 42( 4)
F
but where the Representative Union does not choose to
appear there are provisions in ss. 32 and 33 which permit
others to appear in proceedings under the Act."
In view of the above quoted categoric and unequivocal observa-
·tions, the contrary observations made in N. M. Naik v. Colaba Land
Mills(') on which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Dutta must
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be treated as overruled.
We have, therefore, no hesitation in
agreeing with the
view
expressed by the Labour Court and the High Court and holding that
neither the appellant nor his other co-employees had any locus standi
·to appear or act as individual employees in the aforesaid proceedings
initiated by respondent No. 1 in which respondent No. 2 which is the
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-representative union in the industry in the local area had the right to
(1} [1960] 1 L.L.J. 440.
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396
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978) 2 S.C.R.
appear and act as the representative of the employees in the industry
and did appear or act as such.
We may observe here in passing that
even new union to which the appellant and some of his co-employees
belonged would have no right to appear or act on behalf of the appellant or his co-employees in the aforesaid proceeding initiated by respondent No. 1 as it had not been registered and recognised
as
the
representative union of employees under the Act.
In conclusion, we wish to make it clear that as learned counsel for
the parties have abstained from addressing us regarding the legality or
otherwise of the aforesaid strike in view of the fact that it was not
open to the appellant to agitate that question because the
Labour
Court had refused to add him as a party to respondent No. 1 \ aforesaid application No. 1455 of 1976, we have refrained from
making
any observation in regard thereto.
In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but in the
circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.
S.R.
Appeal dismmed.