# SARAT CHANDRA RABHA AND OTHERS v. KHAGENDRANATH NATH AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1961] 2 S.C.R. 133
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1958-08-12
- **Case number:** No. 375 of 1959
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, J. L. Kapur, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. SuBBA RAo, K. N. W Anohoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sarat-chandra-rabha-and-others-v-khagendranath-nath-and-others-2202
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Election
Dispute-Disqualification-Conviction by CourtRejection of nomination paper-Remission of sentence by Government, if operates as reduction of sentence by Court-Inference of
consent to corrupt practice from proved facts, if a mixed question of
fact and law-Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951),
ss. 7(b), 1oo(r)(b)-Code of-Criminal Proeedure (Act V of 1898),
s. 401.
The appellant's nomination paper for election to the Assam
Legislative Assembly was rejected by the Returning Officer on
the ground of disqualification under s. 7(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, in that he had been convicted
and $entenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment under s. 4(b)'
of the Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908) and five years had
not expired after his release. The appellant had applied to the
Election Commission for removing the said disqualification but
it had refused to do so. The appellant's sentence was, however, remitted by the Government of Assam under s. 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and the period for which he was
actually in jail was less than two years. The Election Tribunal
held that the nomination paper had been improperly rejected
and set aside the election but the High Court taking a contrary
view, dismissed the election petition.
Held, that the High Court was right in holding that the
appellant was disqualified under s. 7(b) of the Representation
of the People Act and that ·his nomination paper had been
rightly rejected. That section speaks of a conviction and sentence by a Court and an order of remission of the sentence under
s. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, unlike the grant of a
free pardon, cannot wipe out either the conviction or the sentence. Such order is an executive order that merely affects the
execution of the sentence and does not stand on the same footing as an order of Court, either in appeal or in revision, reducing the sentence passed by the Trial Court.
Venkatesh Yeshwant Deshpande v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1938 Nag.
513, distinguished.
G11nda Singh v. Sampuran Singh, (1953) 3 E.L.R. 17, overruled.
Held, further, that an inference as to whether a successful
candidate was a consenting party to the corrupt practice under
Sa11a-t Chandra
Rabha &
Other!
v.
Khagendranath
Nath & Olhers
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
s. 100(1)(b) of the Act from facts found on evidence was a question of fact and not a mixed question of fact and law.
Mecnakshi Mills, Madurai v. The Commissioner of Income-tax,
Madras, [1956] S.C.R. 691, referred to.

## Text

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
133
SARAT CHANDRA RABHA AND OTHERS
v.
KHAGENDRANATH NATH AND OTHERS.
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KAPUR,
P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo and
K. N. W ANOHOO, JJ.)
Election
Dispute-Disqualification-Conviction by CourtRejection of nomination paper-Remission of sentence by Government, if operates as reduction of sentence by Court-Inference of
consent to corrupt practice from proved facts, if a mixed question of
fact and law-Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951),
ss. 7(b), 1oo(r)(b)-Code of-Criminal Proeedure (Act V of 1898),
s. 401.
The appellant's nomination paper for election to the Assam
Legislative Assembly was rejected by the Returning Officer on
the ground of disqualification under s. 7(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, in that he had been convicted
and $entenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment under s. 4(b)'
of the Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908) and five years had
not expired after his release. The appellant had applied to the
Election Commission for removing the said disqualification but
it had refused to do so. The appellant's sentence was, however, remitted by the Government of Assam under s. 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and the period for which he was
actually in jail was less than two years. The Election Tribunal
held that the nomination paper had been improperly rejected
and set aside the election but the High Court taking a contrary
view, dismissed the election petition.
Held, that the High Court was right in holding that the
appellant was disqualified under s. 7(b) of the Representation
of the People Act and that ·his nomination paper had been
rightly rejected. That section speaks of a conviction and sentence by a Court and an order of remission of the sentence under
s. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, unlike the grant of a
free pardon, cannot wipe out either the conviction or the sentence. Such order is an executive order that merely affects the
execution of the sentence and does not stand on the same footing as an order of Court, either in appeal or in revision, reducing the sentence passed by the Trial Court.
Venkatesh Yeshwant Deshpande v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1938 Nag.
513, distinguished.
G11nda Singh v. Sampuran Singh, (1953) 3 E.L.R. 17, overruled.
Held, further, that an inference as to whether a successful
candidate was a consenting party to the corrupt practice under
Sa11a-t Chandra
Rabha &
Other!
v.
Khagendranath
Nath & Olhers
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
s. 100(1)(b) of the Act from facts found on evidence was a question of fact and not a mixed question of fact and law.
Mecnakshi Mills, Madurai v. The Commissioner of Income-tax,
Madras, [1956] S.C.R. 691, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
No. 375 of 1959.
Ci vii Appeal
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the
12th August, 1958, of the Assam High Court in First
Appeal No. 11 of 1958.
·
L. K. Jha and Sukumar Ghose, for appellants Nos.
1 to 3.
G. S. Pathak a.nd Naunit Lal; for respondents Nos.
1 a.nd 2.
1960. October 27. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Wanchoo J.
WANOHOO J.-Thie is a.n appeal ·on a. certificate
granted by the Assam High Court in an election
matter. An election was held in the double-member
constituency of Goalpara to the Assam Legislative
Assembly. Nomination papers were filed on the 19th
January, 1957, by a number of persons including Aniram Basumafari (hereinafter ca.lied the appellant). He
wa.s a. ca.ndida.te for the seat reserved for scheduled
tribes. The nomination paper of the appellant wa.s
rejected by the returning officer on the ground tha.t he
was disqualified under s. 7(b) of the Representation
of the People Act, No. XLIII of 1951, (hereinafter
called the Act). The polling took place on February
25, 1957, and Khagendra.na.th and Hakim Chandra.
Ra.bha were elected, the latter being a member of e.
scheduled tribe. Thereupon a.n election petition wa.s
filed by a.n elector challenging the election of the two
successful candidates on a. number of grounds. Of
these grounds, however, only two a.re now ma.teria.l,
1
namely, (1) that the nomination paper of the appellant was wrongly rejected, a.nd (2) that a corrupt
practice was committed by the successful candidates
inasmuch as voters were carried on mecha.nica.lly propelled vehicles to the polling booth~. The election
tribune.I held on the first point that the nomination
2 S.C.lt. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
135
paper of the appellant had been improperly rejected.
z960
On the second point it held that the corrupt practice
c
a.lleged had not ~een proved. In the result, the elec- ;;;;! ;a;f;.:.
t10n was set aside. Thereupon there was an appeal
v •
.by the two successful candidates to the High Court. Khagsndranath
The High Court was of the view that the nomination Nath 0- Others
paper of the appellant was properly rejected ; further
on the question of corrupt practice the High Court
Wanchoo J.
agreed with the conclusion of the tribunal. In the
result the appeal was allowed and the election petition was ordered to be dismissed. There was then an
application to the High Court for a certificate to
appeal to this Cout"t which was granted; and that is
how the matter has come up before us.
The ma.in contention on behalf of .the appellant is
that the High Court was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the nomination pa.per of the appellant
was properly rejected under s. 7(b) of the Act. That
provision lays down that a. person shall be disquali:
fied for being chosen as a member of either House of
Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a. State if he is convicted by a court
in India. of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two yea.rs, unless a period of
five yea.rs, or such less period as the Election Commission may allow in any particular case, has elapsed
since his release. The appellant in this case was convicted under s. 4(b) of the Explosive Substances Act
No. VI of 1908; and sentenced to three years' rigorous
imprisonment on July 10, 1953. The nomination
pa.per in this case was filed in J a.nua.ry 1957 and the
election was held in February 1957 and therefore
five yea.rs had not -elapsed since his release.
But
though the appellant was sentenced to three yea.rs'
rigorous imprisonment, his sentence was remitted by
the Government of Assam on November 8, 1954,
under s. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and he
was released on November 14, 1954. The contention
of the appellant before the election tribunal was that
in view of this remission his sentence in effect was
reduced to a period of less than two yea.rs and there- ·
fore he could not be said to have incurred disqualification within the meaning of s. 7{b).
This contention .
'
136
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
was accepted by the tribunal and that is why it held
that the nomination paper of the appellant was imSarat Chandra
Rabila c;. Others properly rejected.
When the case came to be argued
in the High Court on behalf of the successful candiKhagendranath dates, two arguments were addressed in support of the
1 Nath & Others plea that the nomination paper of the appellant was
properly rejected. In the first place, it was urged
v.
Wanchoo J. ·that in view of the provisions of Articles 72, 73, 161
and 162 of the Constitution read with s. 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, the State Government
had no authority ·to i:emit the sentence of the appellant; 'and secondly even if the remission was properly
granted it would not affect the sentence imposed by
the Court, though the appellant might not have had
to undergo part of the sentence after the date of the
remission order'. The High Court did not decide the
question as to the power of the State Government to
grant remission in this case as it had not full materials before it because the matter was not raised before
the tribunal, though it was inclined to the view that
the State Government might not have such power.
But the High Court was of the opinion that a remission of sentence did not have the same effect as a
free pardon and did not have the effect of reducing
the sentence passed on the appellant from three years
to less than two years, even though the appellant
might have remained in jail for less than two years
because of the order of remission.
What s. 7(b) lays down is that there should be a
conviction by a court in India for any offence and a
sentence of imprisonment for not less than two years
in order that a person may be disqualified for being
chosen as a member of either House of Parliament or
of Legislative Assembly or of Legislative Council of
a State. In terms, therefore, the provision applies to
the case of the appellant for he was convicted by a
court in India and sentenced to imprisonment for
more than two years. Further the period of five years
had not expired after his release. The appellant had
applied to the Election Commission for removing the
. disqualification but it had refused to do so. The main
question therefore that falls for consideration is
•
I
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
whether the order of remission has the effect of,
I960
reducing the se
1
n
1
tence in ~~e sa
1
me.w~y i
1
n whichhan Sarat Chandra
order of an appe ate or rev1s1ona crimma court
as Rabha & Others
the'effect of reducing the sentence passed by the trial
v.
court to the extent indicated in the order of the appelKhagendranath
late or revisional court.
Nath & Others
Now it is not disputed that in England and India.
the effect of a pardon or what is sometimes called a
free pardon is to clear the person from a1l infamy
an9 from all consequences of the offence for which it
is granted and from all statutory or other disqualifications following upon conviction. It makes him, as it
were, a new man: (See Halsbury's Laws of England,
Vol. VII, Third Edition, p. 244, para 529).
But the
same effect does not follow on a mere remission which
stands on a different footing altogether. In the first
place, an order of remission does not wipe out the
offence; it also does not wipe out the conviction. All
that it does is to have an effect on the execution of the
sentence; though ordinarily a convicted person would
have to serve out the full sentence imposed by a court,
he need not do so with respect to that part of the
sentence which has been ordered to be remitted. An
order of remission thus does not in any way interfere
with the order of the court; it affects only the execution of the sentence passed by the court and frees the
convicted person from his liability to undergo the full
term of imprisonment inflicted by the court, though
the order of conviction and sentence passed by the
court still stands as it was. The power to grant
remission is executive power and cannot have the
effect which the order of an appellate or revisional
court would have of reducing the sentence passed by
the trial court and substituting in its place the reduced sentence adjudged by the appellate or revisional
court. This distinction is well brought out in the
following passage from Weater's " Constitutional Law"
on the effect of reprieves and pardons vis-a-vis the
judgment passed by the court imposing punishment,
at p. 176, para 134 :-
" A reprieve is a. ternpor<l.ry suipr.mc:iion of the
18
Wanchoo ].
z960
Sarat Chandra
Rabha 0- Others
v.
Khagendranalh
N•lh cSo Olh•is
Wane/loo ],
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
punishment fixed by law. A pardon is the rem1ss1on
of such punishment. Both &re tlie exercise of executive functions and should be distinguished from the
exercise of judicial power over sentences. 'The judicial power and the ··executive power over sentences
&re readily distinguishable,' observed Justice Sutherland, ' To render & judgment is & judicial function.
To carry the judgment into effect is an executive
function. To cut short & sentence by &n &ct of
clemency is &n exercise of executive power which
abridges the enforcement of the judgment but does
not alter it qua judgment'."
Though, therefore, the effect of an order of remission
is to wipe out that part of the sentence of imprisonment which has not been served out and thus in
practice to reduce the sentence to the period already
undergone, in law the order of remission merely
means that the rest of the sentence need not be undergone, leaving the order of conviction by the court and
the sentence passed by it untouched. In this view of
the matter the order of remission passed in this case
though it bad the effect that the appellant was released from jail before he ha.d served the full sentence
of three years' imprisonment and ha.d actually served
only &bout sixteen months' imprisonment, did not in
any way affect the order of conviction and sentence
passed by the.court which remained as it was. Therefore the terms of s. 7(b) would be satisfied in the
present case and the appellant being a. person convicted and sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment would be disqualified, as five years had not
passed since hif:! release and as the Election Commission had not removed his disqualification.
' We may now refer to a number of cases on which
reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant.
In Venkatesh Yeah.want Deshpande v. Emperor (1),
Bose, J. (as he then was), observed as follows at
p. 530:-
.
" The effect of an order of remission is to wipe
out the remitted portion of the sentence altogether
and not merely to suspend its operation ; suspension
(1) A.l.R. 1938 Nag. 513.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
139
is separately provided for. In f&ct, in the case of a.
r96o
pardon in England statutory a.nd other disqua.lifica.-
5
Ch
d
tion following upon conviction a.re removed and the R:::! .s. i;;,h:~.
pardoned man is enabled to maintain an action
v.
a.go.inst any person who afterwards defames him in J<hagend•anatJ.
respect of the offence for which he wa.s convicted. Nath .s. Others
That may not apply in full here but the effect of a.n
order of remission is certa.mly to entitle the prisoner
Wanchoo f.
to hie freedom on a. certain date."
It is urged that if the effect of a.n order of remission
is to wipe out the remitted portion of the sentence
altogether it means that the sentence is reduced to the
period already undergone a.nd the order of remission
has the same effect a.s an order of a.n appellate or
revisiona.l court reducing the sentence to the period
already undergone. That ca.se, however, dealt with a.
different point altogether, namely, whether a. remission having been granted a.nd having ta.ken effect it
could be cancelled thereafter. It was in that context
tha.t these observations were ma.de. Even so, the
learned judge wa.s careful to point out that there was.
a difference between a pardon and a. remission and
the effect of an order of remission is to entitle the
prisoner to his freedom on a. certain date. That case
is no authority for the view that the order of remission a.mounts to changing the sentence passed by a.
competent court and substituting therefor the sentence
of imprisonment already undergone up to the date of
release following the order of remission.
Reference was also ma.de to a number of election
cases in which the view which has been urged on behalf of the appellant seems to have been ta.ken. We
may refer to only one of them, namely, Ganda Singh
v. Sampuran Singh (1), which l!t~ specifically dealt
with this point. In that c&re&n order was passed by
the Maharaja of Nabha granting amnesty to a.II political prisoners detained or convicted ~gnder the .Punjab Public Safety Act, l!M:'i',.as applied-to Na.bha.
Sta.te, and releasing them unconditiona.]Jy. ··The ea.me
order also provided for grant of remiliiiOn w persons
convicted for offences other tha.n political offences on
(1) (1953) 3 E.L.R. 17.
I
Saraf Chandra
llabha & Others
v.
J<hagcndrauafh
Nath Qi. Others
Wa·Hchoo ].
140
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
a certain scale. The successful candidate in that case
was sentenced to. more than two years' rigorous imprisonment under the Punjab Public Safety Act, as
applied to Nabha State, and was thus a political prisoner. He was therefore released before he had served
two years imprisonment. The main plank of the
election petition in that case was that the successful
candidate was disqualified under s. 7(b) of the Act in
view of his conviction and sentence and the, election
tribunal held that remission by government (executive
authority) has the same effect as an order passed by
a ·court of law in appeal or on revision and that under
s. 7 of the Act the court has to look to the amount
of sentence imposed on a person and it made no
difference whether the sentence was reduced by a
court of law on appeal or by revision or by the powers
of the government reserved for it under s. 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, as the effect in both
cases was the same. We are of opinion that this view
is incorrect, though perhaps on the facts of that case
the order of the tribunal was right for it seems that
political prisoners had been granted a pardon by the
Ruler of Nabha and not a mere remission under
s. 401 of th!) Code of Criminal Procedure.
We cannot
agree that remission by government has the same
effect as an order passed by a court of law in appeal
or on revision. It is true that under s. 7(b) of the
Act one has to look at the sentence imposed ; but it
must be a sentence imposed by a court. Now where
the sentence imposed by a trial court is varied by way
of reduction by the appellate or revisional court, the
final sentence is again imposed by a court; but where
a sentence imposed by a court is remitted in part
under s. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that
has not the effect in law of reducing the. sentence
imposed by the court, though in effect the result may
be that the convicted person suffers less imprisonment than that imposed by the court. The order
of remission affects the execution of the sentence
imposed by the court but does not affect the sentence
as such, which remains what it was in spite of the
order of remission. It is also well to remember that
(
!
!
\
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS·
141
s. 7(b) speaks of the conviction and sentence passed
i96o
by a court of law; it does not speak of the period of 5
Ch
d
imprisonment actually suffered by the convicted perR;;,~ & ~~"·;~.
son. The other election cases to which our attention
v.
was drawn by the learned counsel for the appellant Rhagendranath
are similar and they are all in our opinion wrongly Nath & Others
decided. We are therefore of opinion that the High
h
h
1Va1lc!zoo ].
Court was right in the view t at t e nomination paper
of the appellant was properly rejected.
The next contention on behalf of the appellant is
that both the High Court and the tribunal were wrong
in holding that a corrupt practice within the meaning
,
of s. IOO(l)(b) read with s .. 123(5) had not been
proved in this case. The case of the appellant was
that voters were carried by mechanically propelled
vehicles to the polling booths by Birendra Kumar
Nath who was in-charge of the electioneering cam.
paign on behalf of the Congress Party and Bholaram
Sarkar who was president of the Primary Congress
Committee of Dhupdhara.. The successful candidates
were both contesting the election as nominees of the
Congress Party and therefore these two persons who
carried electors in mechanically propelled vehicles to
the polling booths did so as agents of the successful
candidates and with their consent. The High Court
as well as the election tribunal held that though
Birendra Kumar Nath and Bholaram Sarkar might
be deemed to be the agents of the successful candidates for purposes of the election and though the
hiring of mechanically propelled vehicles by the agents
for conveyance of electors to polling booths had been
proved, there was no proof that this was done with
the consent, express or implied, of the successfol
candidates. The High Court pointed out that consent,
express or implied, of the candida.tes was necessary
for purposes of s. 100(1) (b) and was of the view that
on the facts proved in this case such consent could
not be inferred and the circumstances did not convincingly lead to an inference that the corrupt practice in question was committed with the knowledge
and consent of the successful candidates. In view of
this concurrent finding of the High Court and the
SaYal ChandYa
Rabha & Othet's
v.
J(hagendt'anath
Nath & Othet's
'Wanchoo ].
142
.SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
tribunal on this question, namely, whether there was
consent, express or implied, of the successful candidates to the commission of this corrupt practice, it is
in our opinion idle for the appellant now to contend
tha.t there was consent express or implied, as required
by s. lOO(l)(b).
The inference whether there was
consent or not from the facts and circumstances
proved is still a.n inference of fact from other fa.eta and
circumstances and cannot be a question of le.w as
urged by learned counsel for the appellant. Reference
in this connection may be ma.de to Meenakshi Mills,
Madurai v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras('),
where it was held that a finding of fact, even when
it is a.n inference from other facts found on evidence,
is not a question of law and that such an inference
can be a. question of law only when the point for
determir.ation is a mixed question of law and fact. In
the present case the only question is whether the
corrupt practice was committed with the consent of
the candidates, whether express or implied, and the
question whether such consent was given in the
circumstances of this case is a question of fact and not
a mixed question of law and fact and therefore the
fiinding of the High Court as well a.s the tribunal that
there was no consent, either express or implied, in
our opinion, concludes the matter. There is no force
in this point either.
The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
(1) [1956) S.C.R. 691.