# SARDAR INDER SINGH v. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN - **Citation:** [1957] 1 S.C.R. 605 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1954-02-15 - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sardar-inder-singh-v-the-state-of-rajasthan-1359 - **Pages:** 18 ## Headnote S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 605 SARDAR INDER SINGH v. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN (and connected petitions) (S. R. DAS C.J., V ENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA, S. K. DAs and GA.JENDRAC;ADKAR JJ.) C01.stit11tio11a! la/IJ-Delegated legislation and conditional legislation-Distinction-Statute co11fe1"1'ing power 0•1 outside authority to extend its operatio11-Validity-Rajastha11 (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949, (Rajasthan Ordi11a11ce No. IX of 1949), SS. 3, 4, 7(1) 15-Notifications by R.ajpramukh-Validity-Whether Ordini!nce contravwes Aus. 14 ,;11d 19( 7)(/) of the Constitution of India. By s. 3(1) of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949, which was promulgated on June 21, 1949, by the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan, it was provided : "It shall come into force at once, and shall remain in force for a period of two years unless this period is further extended by the Rajprnmukh by notification in the Rajasthan Gazette." In exercise of the power conferred by this section the Rajpramukh issued a nctification on June 14, 1951, providing that the above Ordinance "shall remain in force for a further period of two years with effect from June 21, 1951'', and on June 20, 1953, he issued a iurther notification providing that the said Ordinance "shall r•':main in force for a term of one vear with effect from June 21, 1953'". Doubts having been raised as to the validity of the notification gislate conferred hv Art. 38l:i of tht Constitution had, 011 that date, come to an end. (3) Act No. X of 1954 is bad, as it purports to extend the life of Ordinance No. IX of 1949 after tht said Ordinancr had already become dead. (4) The impugned Ordinancr.- i~ bad as hcinr; repugnant to Art. 14 of the Comtitution ; and (5) The Ordinance also contravenes Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution in that it irriposes unreasonable restrictions on tht right of the petitioners to hold property. In logical sequence, it is the third contention that should first be considered, because if Act No. X of 1954 is upheld, that must validate Ordinance No. IX of 1949 for the periods covered by the impugneJ notifications dated June 14, 1951, and June 20, 1953, and in that event, the first two contentions will not survive for determination. The argument of the petitionerj in support of this contention is that even if either of the two notifications aforesaid is held to be bad, then the impugned Ordinance would have expired at least on June 21, 1953, if not earlier on June 21, 1951; and th3t 1 neither Act No. X of 1954 which came into force on ;('57 Sardar lndtr Si11tft v. T'lte Stntt of Rqiasth-:.n Vmkat~rama Ayyar ]. 1957 Smdur lnder Singh v. Tlit StaU of Rajasthan Vtiikatarama A»ar ]. 612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS r 19571 April 17, 1954, nor e1·en Ordinance No. III of 1954 which was promulgated on February 15, 1954, could give life to what was already dead. It is conceded that a legislation might be retrospective ; hut it is contended that Act No. X of 1954 was not an independent legislation enacting a code of provisions which were to operate retroactively but an amendment of Ordinance No. IX of 1949, and as that Ordinance had expired by effiux of time on June 21, 1951, if the notifications dated June 14, 1951, and June 20, 1953, were bad, then there was, when Act No. X of 1954 was passed, no Ordinance in existence on which the amend ment could operate, and that it was therefore indfective. Some support for this _contention might be found in the observations of Kania C.J. in fati11dra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar(1) at page 606, ·of Mahajan J. at pages 627628 and of Muliherjea J. at pages 643-644. There is, however, no need to discuss the matter further, as we are of opinion that the petitioners must fail in their contentions on the first two questions. Taking the first question as to whether s. 3 of the Ordinance is had, in so far as it authorised the Rajpramukh to extend the life of the Act, the contention of the petitioners is that it is essentially a matter for legislative determination as to how long a statute should operate, that s. 3 having provided that the Ordinance should be in force for a period of two years, any extension of that period could only be made by the Legislature and not by an outside outhority, and that accordingly the power conferred by that section on the Rajpramukh to extend the period fixed therein is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Reliance is placed in support .of this contention on the decision in fatindra Nath Gupta v . .The Province of Bihar( 1). There, the question was as to the validity of a notification issued by the Government of Bihar on March 7; 1949, extending .the operation of the Bihar Maintenance of Publjc Order Act V of 1947 to Chota Nagpur Division arid the Santhal Parganas District with retrospective .effect from Mar.ch 16, 1948. Section (1) [I9f9] F.C.R. 595. S.C.R. SUPREME. COUllT REPORTS 613 1 (3) of the Act had provided that it shall remain in force for a period of one year from its commencement, but that was subject to a proviso, which ran as follows : "Provided that the Provincial Government may, by notification, on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council, direct that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be prescribed in the notification." The notification in question was issued in exercise of the power conferred under this proviso, and it was held by the majority of the Court that the proviso was unconstitutional as it amounted to delegation of legislative authority, and that, therefore, the notification issued pursuant thereto was bad. Three of the learne1J(h v. The State o/' Rajasthan Vmkatarama Ayyar J. 1957 Sar.tor l11dtr Sinlh • v. Tht Stat1 of Rojasl!zan V cnkatarnma Ayyar J. • 614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] down in The Queen v. Burah (' ). The Act in a mandatory form stated that is shall be in force for one year only. + That being so, the power given in the proviso to reenact it for another year is legislative power and does not amount to conditional legislation." Mukherjea J. was of the opinion that if the legislation was to take effect on the determination of some fact or condition by an extraneous authority, it would be conditional legislation, and that would be valid on the authority of the decision in The Queen v. Burah ('), but that it would not be valid if it was left to an outside authority "to determine at some future \date whether the Act should be extended for one year further with or without rnodificatio1h". Faz! Ali J. took the\ contrary view. He observed at page 646 : "So far as the extension of the Act is concerr,ed, I am not prepared to hold that .it amounts to legislation or exercise of legisla1',e power. From the Act, it is clear that, though it was in the first instance to remain in force for a period of one year, the · Legislature did contemplate that it might have to be extended for a further period of one year. Having decided that it -.... might have to be extended, it left the matter of the extension to the discretion of the Provincial Government. It 'eems to me that the Legislature having exercised its judgment as to the period for . which the- >- Act was or might have to remain in force, there was nothing wrong in its legislating conditionally and leavfing it to the discretion of the executive authority whether the Act should be extended for a further period of one year or • not. 1t would be taking a somewhat narrow view of the decision in Burah's case( 1) to hold that all that the Legislature can do when legislating conditionally, is to leave merely the time and the manner of carrying its legislation into effect to the discretion of the executive authority am] that it cannot '- leave any other matter to its discretion. • The extension of the Act for a further period of one year does not 'r-'-' amount to its re-enactment. It merely amounts to a continuance of the Act for the maximum period contemplated by the 'Legislature when enacting it." (1) [1878] L.R. 5 I.A. 178 . • -+ 1 -~ ' \ S.C.R. ~ . ' SUPREME COURT '.REPORTS • 615 1957 , It will be noticed that the authoritY conferred on the Bihar Government by the ,proviso to s. 3 was one iiot merely to extend the life of the Act as in the present case, but also to extend it with such modifications as • might be,.specified in the notification. It is this latter clause that came in principally for attack in the judgments of the majority, and the decision that ~ proviso Sardar lnder Singh• as a whole was bad was based primarily on the view tl1at that clause was ultra vires. Ka1{ia C. J. no ,doubt observed that the power to extend the operation of the .fl.ct was, even .apart from the power to modify it, a kgislati ve function. But he also added that the power conferred by the proviso was a single one and that the· · power to extend the life of the Act could not be sevei"- ed from the power to modify it. The matter was made even 'more plain by Mukherjea J, in his judgment in State of Bombay v. Narothamdas fethabai ( 1 ). There,. ' the Bombay High Court had held, relying on the decision in /atindra Natlz Gupta v. The Protlince of · Bihar( ')ar J. " . ,,~·~if-. 1957 Smdar lnder Siu.~h Y. Thr Stafr 1( R(ljasthan· r·enkatarama ,l,yar J. 616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1957] way or not. It was conceded by the learmd Counsel appearing for the Province of Hihar that to authorise another body· 10 modify a statute. amounts to investing that body with legislative powers. What the learned Counsel contended for was that rhe power of modification was severable from the power of extending the duration of the Statute and the invalidity of one part of the proviso should not affect its other part. To this contention my answer was that the two provisions were inter-related in such manner in the statute that one could not be severed from the other." The decision in /11ti11dra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar ( 1) cannot therefore be regarded as a clear and direct pronouncement that a statutory provision authorising an outside authority to extend the life of a statute is per se bad. We must now rdcr to the decision in In re Thi Delhi LattJs Act, 1912( 2 ) wherein the law relating to delegated legislation was exhamtively reviewed by this Court. That was a reference under Art. 143 of the Constitution stating a number of questions for the opinion of this Court. Due to considerable divergence of views expressed in the several judgments as to the limits of permissible delegation, no unanimity could be reached in the answers to the questions referred. But it can be said of certain propositions of law t\iat they had the support of the majority of the learned Judges, and one such proposition is that when an appropriate Legislature enacts a law and authorises an outside authority to bring it into force in such area or at such time as it may decide, that is conditi<>- nal and not delegated legislation, and that such legislation is valid. In our opinion, s. 3 of the Ordinance in so far as it authorises the Rajpramukh to extend the life of the Act falls within the category of conditional legislation, and is, in consequence, intra vires. The leading authority on the question is the decision of the Privy Council in T lze Queen v. Burah( • ). There, the question was as ·to the validity of a notification issued by the Lieutenant-Governor of · Bengal (1) [1949] F.C.R. 595. (3) [1878] 5 I.A, 178. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 617 on October 14, 1871, extending the provisions of Act No. XXII of 1869 ,to :t territory known as the Jaintia and Khasi Hills in exercise of a power conferred by s. 9 of that Act, which was as follows : l "The said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette extend mutatis mutandis all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the J aintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and to such portion of the Khasi Hills as for the time being forms part of British India." The High Court had held by a majority that that section was ultra vires, as amounting to delegation m legislative authority. But that decisi.on was reversed on appeal to the Privy Council, which held that it was conditional legislation, and was valid. Lord Selborne stated the law thus : "Their Lordshins agree that the Governor-General in Council could not, by any form of enactment, create in India, and arm with general legislative authoritir, a new legislative power, not created or authorised by the Councils' Act. Nothing of that kind has, in their Lordships' opinion, been done or attempted in · the present case. What has been done is this. .The Governor-General in Council has determined, in. the dt!-: and ordinary course of legislation, to remove a particular district from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts and offices, and to place it under new Courts and offices, to be appointed by and responsible to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal ; leaving it to the Lieutenant-Governor to say at what time that change shall take place .......... The Legislature determined that, so far, a certain change should take place ; but that it was expedient to leave the time, and the manner, of carrying it into effect to the discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor ...... The proper Legislature has exercised · its judgment as to place, person, laws, powers ; and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things. The conditions having been fulfilled, the legislation is 11ow. absolute. Where plenary powers of . legislation exist as to particular s~bjects, whether in an Imperial or in a provincial Legislature, they may (in 1957 Sardar lnder Singh v. The State oj Rqjasthan Venkatarama Ayyar ]. '957 Sardar !tu/er Sinth Y. I he State of Rajastha~ i·n1katarama .. {1:.rar J. 618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19571 their Lordships' judgment) be well exercised, either absolutely or conditionally. Legislation, conditional on the use of particular powers, or on the exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the Legislature to persons in whotn it places confi.Oence, is no uncon11non thing; and, in many circumstances, it may be highly convenient. The British Statute Book abounds with examples of it ; and it cannot be supposed that the imperial Parliament did not, when con,tituting the Indian Legislature, contemplate this kind of conditional legislation .ts within the scope of the legislative powers which it from time to time conferred." This is clear authority that a provision in a statute conferring a power on an outside authority to bring it into force at such time as it might, in its own discretion, determine, is conditional and not delegated legislation, and that it will be valid, unless there is in the Comtitution Act any limitation on its power to enact such a legislation. The petitioners do not dispute this. What they contend is that while it may be competent to the Legislature to leave it to an outside authority to decide when an enactment might be brought into force, it is not competent to it to authorise that authority to extend the life of the Act beyond the period fixed therein. On principle, it is difficult to see wlty if the one is competent, the other is not. The reason for upholding a legislative prov1S1on authorising an outside authority to bring an Act into force at such time as it may determine is that it must depend on the facts as they may exist at a given point of time whether the law should . then be made to operate, anJ that the decision of such an issue is best left to an executive authority. Such legislation is termed conditional, because the Legislature has itself made the law in all its completeness as regards "place, person, laws, powers", leaving nothing for an outside authority to legislate on, the only function assigned to it being to bring the law into operation at such time as it might decide. And it can make no difference in the character of a legislation as a conditional one that the legislature, after itsdf enacting the law and fixing, on a consideration S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 619 of the facts as they might have then existed, the period of its duration, confers a power on an outside authority to extend its operation for a further period if it is satisfied that the state of facts which called forth the legislation continues to subsist. In the present case, the preamble to the Ordinance cle~rly recites the state of facts which necessitated the enactment of the law in question, and s. 3 fixed the duration of the Act as two years, on an une with the statement of the law in /atindra Nath Gupta v. The State . of Bihar(2) that a power to extend the life of an epactment. cannot validly be conferred on an outside authority. In this view, the question as to the permissible limits of delegation of legislative · authority on which the judgments in In re The Delhi Laws .Act, 1912(3 ), reveal a sharp conflict of opinion does not arise for consideration, anJ we reserve, our .. opii1ion thereon .. (2) lt is next contended that the notification ·dated June 20, 1953, is bad, because after the Constitmioi1 came into force, the Rajpramukh derived his authority to legislate from Art. 385, and that under that Article his authority ceased when the Legislature of the State was constituted, which was in the present case, on March ?), 1952. This argument proceeds on a misconception. :as to the true character of a notifi-· cation issued unt.ler s. 3 of the Ordinance. It was not an independent piece of legislation such as could be enacted ·on I y by the then competent legislative (1) (1878] 5 L:\. 178. (3J (1951] S.C,R: 747· (o) [19.[9] F.C.R. 595. 1957 Sardar lnder Sing•1 v. The Stale of Rajasthar1 Vn1kntarmna J!yyar ]. 1957 Sardar lnder Singh v. T lu Stat~ of Rqjasthafl Venkatarama Ayyar J. 620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] authority of the State, but merely an exercise of a power conferred by a statute which had been previously ena\:ted by the appropriate. legislative authority. The exercise of such a power is referable not to the legislative competence of the Rajpramukh but to Ordinance No. IX of 1949, and provided s. 3 is valid, the validity of the notification is co-extensive with that of the Ordinance. If the Ordinance did not come to an end by reason of the fact that the authority of the Rajpramukh to legislate came to an end-and that is not and cannot be disputed-neither did the power to issue a notification which is conferred therein. The true position is that it is in his character as the authority on whom power was conferred under s. 3 of the Ordinance that the Rajpramukh issued the impugned notification, and not as the legislative authority of the S~ate. This objection should accordingly be overruled. ( 4) We shall next consider the contention that the provisions of the Ordinance are repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution, and that it must therefore be held to have become void. In the argument before us, the attack was mainly directed against ss. 7 ( 1) and 15 of the Ordinance. The contention with reference to s. 7(1) is that under that section landlords who had tenants on thejr lands on April 1, 1948, were subjected to various restnct10ns in the enjoyment of their rights as owners, while other landlords were free from similar restnct10ns. There is no substance in this contention. The preamble to the Ordinance recites that there was :i. growing tendency on the part of the landholders to eject tenants, and that it was therefore expedient to enact a law for giving them protection ; and for granting relief to them, the Legislature had necessarily to decide from what date the law should be given operation, and it decided that it should be from April 1, 1948. That is a matter exclusively for the Legislature to determine, and the propriety of that determination is not open to que;tion in Courts. We should add that the petitioners sought to dispute the correctness of the recitals in the preambk. This they clearly cannot do. Vide the observations of Holmes J. in Block v. Hirsh('). (1) [1Q20] 256 U.S. 135 : 65 L. Ed. 865. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 621 A more substantial contention is the one based on s. 15, which authorises' the Government to exempt any person or class of persons from the operation of the Aa. It is argued that that section does not Jay down the principles on which exemption could be granted, and that the decision of the matter is left to the unfettered and uncanalised discretion of the Government, and is therefore repugnant to Art. 14. It is true that that section does not itself indicate the grounds on which exemption could be granted, but the preamble to the Ordinance sets out with sufficient clearnes& the policy of the Legislature ; and as that governs s. 15 of the Ordinance, the decision of the Government thereunder cannot be said to be unguided. Vide Harishanker Bag/a v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(1). But even if s. 15 were to be held to be bad, that does not affec:t the rest of the legislation, as the matter dealt with in that section is clearly severable. In fact, s. 15 was not in the Ordinance as it was originally enacted, and was only introduced later by Ordinance No. XII of 1949. We must accordingly' hold that the impugned Ordinance cannot be held to be bad under Art. 14. It is finally cont~nded that .the provisions of the Act are repugnant to Art. 19 (1) (f) in that they oblige the land-owners to kel"p tenants. on their lands, thereby preventing them from themselves cultivating the same. The object of the .Ordinance, as set out in the preamble, is clearly not to put a restriction on the right of an owner to himself cultivate the lands, but to prevent him when he had inducted a tenant on ,the land from getting rid of him without sufficient cause. A law which requires that an owner who is not himself a tiller of the soil should assure to the actual tiller some fixity of tenure, cannot on that ground alone be said to b~ unreasonable. Legislation of this character has been upheld in America as not infringing any Constitutional guarantee. Thus, in Block v. Hirsh(2 ), a statute which gave a right to tenants to continue in poss.ession eYen after the expiry of the lease, was held to he valid, Holmes J. observing, (1) (1955] 1 S.C.R. 380, 388. (2) [1920] 256 U.S. 135; 65 L. Ed. 865. 1957 •• Sardar lnhr Singh v. The State of Rajasthan Venkataramd Ayyar J. 1957 Sardar Inder Singh • v. The State af Rajasthan Venkawrama Ayya~J622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f 1957J "The main point against the law is that tenants are allowed to remain in possession at the same rent that they have been paying, unless modified by the commission established by the Act, and that thus the use of the land and the right of the owner to do what he will with his own and to make what contracts he pleases are cut