# Sardar San1sher Singh v. Ua;a Sar,lar l\'arain ~Others

- **Citation:** [1961] 1 S.C.R. 128
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-04-03
- **Bench:** B. p_ SINHA, Ja}'Er Imam, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, J.C. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sardar-san1sher-singh-v-ua-a-sar-lar-l-arain-others-1914
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Land Acquisilion--Preliminary notification-Land needed for
company-Non ·tnrnlion of public p11rpose-Lega!ity-Procudings,
if violate f11ndamrntal rights-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of
1894),
ss. 4, 5A, 6, 40-Co1>stitution of India,
Arts. 19(r)(j), 3r.
By a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, the State of Bombay (now }!aharashtra) sought to acquire
certain lands, including those o( the petitioner, which were likely to be needed by a company, manufacturing steel bars and
rods, for its factory and buildings and appointed a Special Land
Acquisition Officer to !unction as a Collector under s .. 5A of the
Act.
The petitioner by an objection filed before the said officer
denied that the lands were required for a public purpose and
prayed that the proceedings be quashed.
By his petition to this
Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution the petitioner challenged the legality of the notification under s. 4 of the Act on the
ground that it did not in tern1s say that the acquisition \\'as for
a public purpose, and that the acquisition proceedings infringed
Arts. 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
Held, that it is not essential that a notification under s. 4
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, should expressly state that
I
(
. --
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORT~
129
the land sought to be acquired is needed for a public purpose.
I96-0
Where the land is required for a· company, the requirement of
the law will be sufficiently met if the appropriate Government
Babu Barkya
1•
is satisfied on a report under s. 5A(2) . or by an enquiry under
Thakur.
s. 40 of the Act. that the purpose of the acquisition is the same
v.
as contemplated by s. 40 cif the Act.
.
The State of
.It is apparent from the definitions of the expressions 'com- _Bombay & Others
pany ' and ' public purpose ' contained in s. 3 of the Act that the
former is·used in a very comprehensive sense and the latter is
used in its gen.eric sense including any purpose which may benefit even a fraction of the commnnity and such purposes as are
mentioned in .s. 40 of the Act must fall within its ambit.
State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, [1955] r .S.C.R. 777, referred to.
·
A notification under s. 4 of the Act envisages a 'preliminary
investigation and it is only under s. 6 that the Government
makes a firm declaration. It is not, therefore, correct to say
·that a defect in the notification can be fatal to the·acquisition
proceedings and particularly where 'the acquisition is.for _a company and investigation has to be made under s. 5A or s; 40 after
the issue of the notification. In this view of the matter the
present application must be premature.
.
Clause (6) of the Art. 31 'has obviously no application to the
Land·Acquisiti'on Act, 1894, and so it is saved by Art. 31(5)(a)
of the Consiitut~on even if it contemplates acquisition for a company which may or may not be for a public purpose.
Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay, [1957] S.C.R. 721, referred to.
The attack under Art. l9(1)(f) of the Constitution must also
fail in view of the decision of this Court in State "of Bombay v.
Bhanji Munji, [1955] r S.C.R. 777.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petition No. 134 of 1959.
Petition under Art. 32 ofthe ConsLitution of India.
for enforcement of fundamental rights.
.
,
· 'J, C. Bhatt, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrish_nan, for the petitioner.
N. S. Binrl.ra, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for respondents Nos. 1- and 2.
S. K. Kapur, P. M. Mukhi a,nd B. P. Maheshwari,
for respondent No. 3.
1960.
August 8..
The Judgment of the Court wa.s
delivered by
17
130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1961]
z96o
SINHA C. J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution impugns the constitutionality of the land
Babu Batkya
Thak"r
a.cq uisition proceedings with particular reference to
v.
the notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act
The State of (hereinafter referred to a.s " the Aot ") in respect of an
Bombay <>- Others area. o{ land within the district of Thane. in the State
of Bombay, now known a.s the State

## Text

Sardar
San1sher Singh
v.
Ua;a Sar,lar
l\'arain ~Others
August 8.
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[196 I]
one on account of costs, that is, for 11. total sum of
lls. 2,04,366-5-9 with proportionate costs with interest
pendente lite and future interest a.t the rate of 4 per
cent. per annum simple from tho date of the application, i.e., October 26, 1936, till realisation.
'
Accordingly, we allow tho appeal, set aside the
decree passed by the courts below and order t bat in
place of the decree made by the Trial Court be substituted a money decree in the terms as mentioned
above.
Tho appellant will get his costs in the appeal.
Appeal all-Owed.
BABU BARKYA THAKUR
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS.
(B. p_ SINHA, c. J., JA}'ER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Land Acquisilion--Preliminary notification-Land needed for
company-Non ·tnrnlion of public p11rpose-Lega!ity-Procudings,
if violate f11ndamrntal rights-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of
1894),
ss. 4, 5A, 6, 40-Co1>stitution of India,
Arts. 19(r)(j), 3r.
By a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, the State of Bombay (now }!aharashtra) sought to acquire
certain lands, including those o( the petitioner, which were likely to be needed by a company, manufacturing steel bars and
rods, for its factory and buildings and appointed a Special Land
Acquisition Officer to !unction as a Collector under s .. 5A of the
Act.
The petitioner by an objection filed before the said officer
denied that the lands were required for a public purpose and
prayed that the proceedings be quashed.
By his petition to this
Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution the petitioner challenged the legality of the notification under s. 4 of the Act on the
ground that it did not in tern1s say that the acquisition \\'as for
a public purpose, and that the acquisition proceedings infringed
Arts. 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
Held, that it is not essential that a notification under s. 4
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, should expressly state that
I
(
. --
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORT~
129
the land sought to be acquired is needed for a public purpose.
I96-0
Where the land is required for a· company, the requirement of
the law will be sufficiently met if the appropriate Government
Babu Barkya
1•
is satisfied on a report under s. 5A(2) . or by an enquiry under
Thakur.
s. 40 of the Act. that the purpose of the acquisition is the same
v.
as contemplated by s. 40 cif the Act.
.
The State of
.It is apparent from the definitions of the expressions 'com- _Bombay & Others
pany ' and ' public purpose ' contained in s. 3 of the Act that the
former is·used in a very comprehensive sense and the latter is
used in its gen.eric sense including any purpose which may benefit even a fraction of the commnnity and such purposes as are
mentioned in .s. 40 of the Act must fall within its ambit.
State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, [1955] r .S.C.R. 777, referred to.
·
A notification under s. 4 of the Act envisages a 'preliminary
investigation and it is only under s. 6 that the Government
makes a firm declaration. It is not, therefore, correct to say
·that a defect in the notification can be fatal to the·acquisition
proceedings and particularly where 'the acquisition is.for _a company and investigation has to be made under s. 5A or s; 40 after
the issue of the notification. In this view of the matter the
present application must be premature.
.
Clause (6) of the Art. 31 'has obviously no application to the
Land·Acquisiti'on Act, 1894, and so it is saved by Art. 31(5)(a)
of the Consiitut~on even if it contemplates acquisition for a company which may or may not be for a public purpose.
Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay, [1957] S.C.R. 721, referred to.
The attack under Art. l9(1)(f) of the Constitution must also
fail in view of the decision of this Court in State "of Bombay v.
Bhanji Munji, [1955] r S.C.R. 777.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petition No. 134 of 1959.
Petition under Art. 32 ofthe ConsLitution of India.
for enforcement of fundamental rights.
.
,
· 'J, C. Bhatt, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrish_nan, for the petitioner.
N. S. Binrl.ra, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for respondents Nos. 1- and 2.
S. K. Kapur, P. M. Mukhi a,nd B. P. Maheshwari,
for respondent No. 3.
1960.
August 8..
The Judgment of the Court wa.s
delivered by
17
130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1961]
z96o
SINHA C. J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution impugns the constitutionality of the land
Babu Batkya
Thak"r
a.cq uisition proceedings with particular reference to
v.
the notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act
The State of (hereinafter referred to a.s " the Aot ") in respect of an
Bombay <>- Others area. o{ land within the district of Thane. in the State
of Bombay, now known a.s the State of :Maharashtra..
Sinha c. J.
In order to appreciate the controverny raised in
this case, it is necessary to state the following
facts.
By a. notification dated April 3, 1959, the first
respondent, the State of Bombay (now Maharashtra)
under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, stated
that the lands specified in the schedule attached to
the said notification were likely to be needed for the
purposes of the third respondent, Messrs. Mukund
Iron & Steel Works Ltd., a. company registered under
the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and having its
registered office a.t Kurla, Bombay No. 37, in the State
of Maharashtra, for its factory buildings etc.
The
notification further stated that under cl. (c) of s. 3 of
the Act, the Government was pleased to appoint the
Specie.I J..a.nd Acquisition Officer, the second respondent, to perform the functions of the Collector under
s. 5A of the said Act. The land in w hi eh the petitioner, who is a. citizen of India., claims to be interested
a.s owner is included in the schedule aforesaid.
The
petitioner appeared before · .. the second respondent
aforesaid and after several adjournments lodged objections on June 9, 1959 and also made ore.I submissions
through his Ad voca.te on that date and the day
following, and requested the second respondent to
quash the proceedings on the ground that the lands
contained in the notifioa.tion were not required for
any publio purpose a.nd that the proceedings were
vexatious and malicious. It was further stated before
the second respondent that the third respondent had
negotiated by private treaty for the purchase of the
notified area.
The second respondent adjourned
further hearing of the ease in order to enable tho
petitioner and the third respondent to come to a.n
amicable settlement.
A further hearing took place
before the second respondent on July 15, 1959. On
..
1 s.c.R, SUPREME COURT REPORTS
131
that date the petitioner proposed to lead evidence of
'96°
owners of several pieces of land included in the ·area
.
h
h l
d . l d
Babu Barkya
notified for acqmsition to prove t at t e · an s me u -
Thakur ·
ed in the schedule. to the· notification were not as a
v.
matter of fact required by the third respondent for
The state of
any public purpose and that the third respondent had Bombay & Dthers
even negotiated for the purchase of the said lands by
b
h
d
d
f
d
Sinha C. ].
private treaty,
ut t e secon
respon ent re use
permission to lead such evidence on behalf of the
· petitioner.
The . petitioner raises a number of questions of law
attacking the constitutionality of the land acquisition
proceedings and prays for orders or directions to the
State Government not to give its consent to the aforesaid acquisition under s. 39 of the Act nor to enter
into any agreement with the third respondent under
s. 41 of the Act nor to issue a notification under s. 6
of the Act declaring that the land in question is
needed fo~ a public purpose, becau"e after such a
declaration . the petitioner may be deprived qf the
opportunjty of contending that · the land was not
needed for a public purpose.
The third respondent, through its Business Manager, has .put in an affidavit in answer to the petitioner's case. and has contended that this writ petftion is
premature and not maintainable, that so far, only a
notification under s. 4 of the Act has been· issued and
objections under s. 5A on· behalf of the petitioner
have been heard by the second respondent, that the
State Government has yet to be satisfied as to whether
the acquisition is for purposes specified in s. 40 of the
Act and so long as the previous consent of the appropriate Government has not beei1 given, the provisi6ns
of ss. 6 to 37 of the Ac£ cannot be put into operation.
It is denied that the acquisition is not for a public
purpose and that the proceedings are vexatious or
malicious. The third respondent does not admit that
the second respondent refused permission to the petitioner to lead any evidence. The averments in the
petition on the merits of the controversy are denied.
It· is stated on behalf of the third respondent that
public are vitally interl?sted' in the production of this
132
SCPREIIIE COCRT ltEPORTS
[I!l61]
z96o
Company, the chief products boing st.col bars and rods
which a.re in groat public demand and a.re of such
Bab11 Harkya
· 1
•
h
h
J
d
Th•k•"
vita. necessity to t e country t a.t t 1eir very pro ucv.
tion, distribution, supply and price are controlled by
The s1a1, of
tho Government. The products of the Com;ia.ny are
llombay ~ Olhm consumed directly in hulk for public utility projects like
dams, hydro-electric projects, roads, railways, industriSi•h• c. J.
al plants and housing projects, both in the public and
private sectors, which constitute the core of the several
live year plans of the Government. It is further
stated that the Company (respondent No. 3) has in.
eluded in its proposed industrial expansion projects to
be established on the land sought to be acquired,
extensive provisions for housing for a large number of
employees' families as also for their welfare by providing for parks, gardens, playgrounds, medical relief
centre and similar other amenities for the welfarn of
the employees and their families.
All those projects,
it is claimed on behalf of the third respondent, aro a.
"highly commendable public purpose" which is far
more advantageous to the community in general than
to shareholders of the Company. It is further stated
that the first respondent ma.de a detailed investigation
a.bout the usefulness to tho public of the expansion
project of the Company including employees' . housing
schemes and welfare projects and when it was satisfied
a.bout the borwfideB of the respondent Company and
the genuineness and urgency of their projects and
their utility to the public tha.t Lho first respondent
published the notification under s. 4 of the Act on
April 3, 1959.
The affidavit sworn to by the second respondent,
Specie.I Land Acquisition Officer, Thana, also questions
the maintainability of the writ petition and generally
supports the ca.se sought to be ma.de out by the third
respondent. It is a.lso stated on his behalf that the
petitioner or a.ny of the other persons interested in the
land sought to be acquired did not produce any
evidence a.nd that it was absolutely incorrect to se.y
that he prevented anyone from leading any evidence as
alleged. The Special Land Acquisition Officer has ma.de
the following ca.tegorica.1 statements :-
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
133
" It is denied that the acquisition of the said
'960
lands for the purpose of the third respondent is in no
Babu Barkya
way useful to the public or that the public are not
Thakur
entitled to the use of any of the works of the Com-
· v.
pany as alleged by the petitioner.
I say that the . The State of
products which are being produced and will be· pro- Bombay & Others
· duced are used and intended to be used inter alia in
Sinha c. J.
public undertakings intended for the general industrial development of the country. It is denied that
the proposed acquisition is· .merely for the benefit of
few individuals, namely, the'shareholders of the Company as alleged by the petitioner."
Further on he adds the following :-
"With reference to paragraph 13 of the said
petition, it ·is denied that I did not permit the petitioner to lead any evidence before me as alleged by
the petitioner. This allegation, I say, is absolutely
dishonest and false. It is denied that the notification
issued by Government under se'ction 4 of the said Act ·
is not bona fide or is an abuse of the powers vested in
Government. It is denied that the said notification
is illegal or that it is not made _in good faith".
.
On these allegations and counter allegations the
petitioner has moved this Court to exercise its powers
under Art. 32 of the Constit1ition on.the grounds that
the notification under s. 4 of the A ct 'is illegal, that
the land acquisition. proceedings are in violation of
Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution and that the.
acquisition is not for a public purpose and is mala fide.
In· order to determine the present controversy, it
· will be convenient, at this stage, to examine the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act has the following
preamble:-
" Whereas it is expedient to amend the law for
the acquisition of land needed for public purposes and
for Companies and for determining the amount of
compensation to be made on account of such acquisition; ...... ".
In tho definitfou section·3, the definitions of " Com-
. pany" and "public . purpose " are particularly noteworthy. The expression" Company" has been used
in a very comprehensive.sense of including not only
134
SUPRE)IE COURT REPORTS
[ 1961 J
r96o
the Companies registered under several statutes,
Indian a.nd English, but also includes a society rngisBab" Rark)'a
na•"'
tered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860 and
v.
a. registered society within the meaning of the Co-opeThe State a/
ra.th·e Societies Act. The expression "public purpose"
Bombay & Others includes the provision of village sites in distl'icts in
which the appropriate Government shall have <lccla.rSi•h• c. f.
ed by notification in the official gazette that it. is
customary for the Government to make such provision.
It will thus be noticed that the expression
"public purpose" has bcoo used in its generic sense of
including any purpose in which even a. fraction of the
community may be interested or by which it may be
benefited.
The proceedings begin with a Government notification under s. 4 that land in any locality
is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. On the issue of such a notification it is pClrmissible for a public servant a.ad workmen to enter upon
the land to do certain acts specified therein with a
view to ascertaining whether the land is adapted for
the purpose for which it was proposed to be acquired
as also to determine the boundaries of the land proposed to be included in the scheme of acquisition. lt
will be noticed that though the preamble ma.J;es
reference not only to public purposes, but ,.iso to
Companies, the preliminary notification under s. 4
has reference only to public purpose and not to a.
Company.
Section 5A, which was inserted by the a.me11din~
Act of 1923 and makes provision for hearing of objections by any person interested in any land notified under
s. 4, makes reference not only to public purpose, but
also to a Company. It is noticeable that s. 5A predicates th1\t the notification under s. 4(1) may not only
refer to land needed for a. public purpose, but a.lso to
land ncoded for.a. Company and after the enquiry as
contemplated by s. 5A has been made a.nd t.he Collector
has heard objections, if any, by interested parties be
has to submit his report t-0 the Government along with
the rocord of the proceedings held by him a.nd his
recommendations on the objections. Thereupon, the
Government bas to make up its mind whether or not
'
· 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'.f' REPORTS
135
. the objections were well-founded and the decision of
z96o
the appropriate Government of those objections is to
be treated as final. If the Government decides to over..
Bab;/:,.::ra
. rule the objections and is satisfied that the hl.nd, the
-,.
subject-matter of the proceedings, was needed for a'
The State of
.
public purpose or for a Company, a declaration has to Bombay.:& Others
be made to that effect. Such a declaration has to be
published in the official gazette and has to contain the
Sinha c. f.
particulars of the land including its approxima,te area
and the purpose for which it is needed. Once · the
declaration -under s. 6 has been made, it shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public
purpose or for a Company. Then follow the usual
proceedings after notice is given to the parties concerned to claim.c3mpensation in respect of any interest in
the land in question ; and the award after making the
necessary investigation aH to claims to conflicting title,
the compensation to be' allowed in respect of the land,
and; if necessary, apportionment of the amount of
c~mpensatiou .amongst the persons believed to be
interested in the land under acquisition.
We are not
concerned here with the proceedings that follow upon
· the award of the Collector and the matters to be
agitated therein.,
From the preamble as also from the provisions of
ss. 5A, 6 and 7, it is obvious that the Act makes a
clear distinct.ion between acquisition of land needed
for a public purpose and that· for a Company, as if
. land needed for a Oonipany is not also for a public
. purpose. The Act has gone further and has devoted
Part VII to acquisition of land for Companies and in
sub-s. (2) s. of 38, with which Part VII begins, provides
that in the case of an acquisition for a Company, for
the words " for such purpose " the words " for purposes of the Company" shall be deemed to have been
substituted. It has been la.id down by s. 39 that the
machinery of the Land Acquisition Act, beginning
with s. 6 and ending with s. 37, shall not he put into
operation unless two conditions precedent are fulfilled,
namely, (1) the· previous consent of the appropriate
Government has been obtained and (2) an agreement
in terms of s. 41 has been execute~ by t_he Company.
136
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
The condition precedent to the giving of consent aforesaid by the appropriate Government is that the
Babu Harkya
Thak'"
Government ha.s t-0 be satistiecl on the report oft he
v.
enquiry envisaged by s. 5A(2) or by enquiry held
The State of
under s. 40 itself that the purpose oft.ho acquisition is
Bombay & Othm to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for
workmen employed by the Company or for the provisi .. ha c. f.
sion of amenities directly connected therewith or that
such acquisition is needed for the construction of some
work which is likely to prove useful to tho public.
When the Government is satisfied as to the purposes
aforesaid of the acquisition in question, the appropriate
Government aha.II require the Company to euter into
an agreement pro\•iding for the payment to the Government (l) of the cost of the acquisition, (2) on such
payment, the transfer of the land to the Company a.nd
(3) the terms on which the land shall he held by the
Company. The agreement has also to ma.ke pro\·ision
for the time within which the conditions on whic.h and
the manner in which the dwelling houses or n.menitics
shall .be erected or provided and in the case of a construction of any other kind of work the time within
which and the conditions on which the work shall be
executed and maintained and the terms on which the
public shall he entitled to use the work.
Such are the relevant provisions of the Act that
we have to consider with reference to the question of
the constitutionality of the land acquisition proceedings
now impugned. The first ground of attack is based on
Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. The provisions of Art.
31(2) make it clear beyond all controversy that in order
that property may be compulsorily acquired, the
acquisition must be for a public purpose and by authority of law.
But Art. 31(5)(a) lays down that nothing
in cl. (2) shall affect the provisions of any existing law
other than a law to which the provisions of cl. (6)
applies (and the Act is obviously a law to which the
provisions of cl. (6) do not apply). Therefore even i~
the Act contemplated acquisition for a company which
may or may not he for a public purpose, it would he
saved by Art. 31(5)(a) as an existing law. (See Lilavati
Bai v. State of Bambay (') ).
F'urther, though it may
(1) [19~7J S.C.R. 721.
r
I
'
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
appear on the words of the Act contained in Part II,
r96o
which contains the operative portions of the proceed-
,
Babu Barkya
ings leading up to acquisition by the Collector that
Thakur
acquisition for a Company may or may μot be for a
v.
public purpose, the provisions of Part VII make it
The State of
clear that the appropriate Government cannot permit Bombay & Others
the bringing into operation the effective machinery of
·
the Act unless it is satisfied as aforesaid, _namely, that · Sinha c. f.
the. purpose of acquisition is to enable the Company to
erect dwelling . houses for workmen employed by it or
for the provision of amenities directly connected with
the Company or that the land is needed for construction of some work of public utility. These require;
ments indicate that the acquisition for a Company
also is in substance for a public purpose inasmuch as
it cannot be seriously contended that constructing
dwelling houses, and providing amenities for the benefit of the workmen employed by it and construction of
some work of public utility do not serve a public pur.
pose. It is not necessary for the purposes of this case
to go into the question whether acquisition for a Com:
pany, even apart from the provisions of s. 40, will be
.. for a public purpose, or justifiable under the provisions of the Act, even on the assumption that it will
not serve a public purpose.
T.he facts of the present
case have not been investigated,. as this Court was
.J
moved when only a notification. under s. 4 of the Act
had been ·issued; and the purpose of the acquisition in
question was still at the enquiry stage. By s. 38A,
which was inserted by the amending -Act of 1933, it
has been made clear that an industrial concern not
being a Company, ordinarily employing not less than
100 workmen, may also take the advantage of land
acquisit,ion proceedings if the purpose of the acquisition is the same a's is contemplated by s. 40 in respect
of. Companies. It has been recognised by this Court
in the case of The State of Bombay v-Bhanji Munji and
Another (1) that providing housing accommodation to
the homeless is a. public purpose.· In an industrial concern employing a large number of workmen awa.y.
(I) [1955] I s.c.R: 777 .
. 18
,_
..
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
1960
from their homes it is a social necessity that thore
should be proper housing accommodation available for
Rabu flark>·a
h
k
Wh
l
·
f I
Thak"'
sue
wor men.
ere a argc sectwn o t 1c commuv.
nity is concerned, its welfare .is a matt.er of public
Tl" State of
concern.
Similarly, if a Company is generous enough
/lunoba.1· ,.;. OtJ.er.< to erect a. hospital or a public reading room and library or an educational institution open to the public, it
Sinha c. J.
cannot be doubted that the work is one of public
utility and comes within the provisions of the Act.
We a.re not in possession of all the rolevant facts in
the present case as to the exact purpose for which the
land is sought to be acquired. That investigation was
in ·progress when the petitioner moved this Court.
Hence, the contention raised on behalf of the respondents that the. application is premature is not wholly
devoid of merit.
But the main attack on the constitutionality of the
proceedings in question was based upon the notification under s. 4, which is in theso terms:-
"Ex." A".
NOTIFICATIO:N"
REVENUE DEPARTMENT.
Sachivalaya, Bombay, 3rd April, 1959.
LAND ACQUlSlTIOK ACT, 1894 (I of 1894).
District Thana.
No. LTH. 15-59/42051-H-Whereas it appears to
the Government of Bombay that tho lands specified in
the schedule hereto are likely to be needed for the
purposes of the Company, viz., for factory buildings,
etc., of l'll/s. Mukund Iron and Steel Works Limited,
Bombay. It is hereby notified under the provisions
of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of
1894), that the said lands are likely to be needed for
the purpose specified above.
All persons interested in the said lands are hereby
warned not to obstruct or interfere with any surveyors
or other persons employed upon the said lands for the
purpose of the said acquisition.
Any contracts for the
disposal of the said lands by sale, lease, mortgage,
assignment, exchange or otherwise, or any outlay or
improvements made therein, without the sanction of
the Collector after the date of this notification will,
,
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
139
under section 24 (seventhly) of the said Act, be disz96o
regarded by the officer assessing compensation for such
Babu Batkya
parts of the said lands as may be finally acquired.
Thakur
· If the Government of Bombay is satisfied that the
v.
said lands are needed for the aforesaid purpose, a final
The State of
notification to that effect under s. 6 of the said Act Bombay·&- Others
will be published in the Bombay Government Gazette
h
.
b
d
d
h JI
Sinha C. ].
in due course. If t e acquisition IS a an one w o y
or in part, the fact will be duly notified in the Bombay.
Government Gazette.
·
Under clause (c) of section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Government of Bombay is pleased
to.appoint the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Thana,
to . perform the functions of a Collector under section
5-A of the said Act in respect of the said lands."
It is' argued that in terms the notification does not
state that the land sought to be acquired was needed
for a public purpose. In our opinion, it is not absolutely necessary to the validity of the land acquisition
proceedings that that statement should find a place in
the notification actually issued. The requirements of
the law will be satisfied if, in substance, it is found on.
investigation, and the appropriate Government is
satisfied as a result of the investigation that the land
was needed for the purposes of.the Company, which·
would amount to a public purpose under Part VII, as
already indicated.' See in this connection The State of
Bombay v. Bhanji. Munji and Another (1). In that case
the quest.ion was whether the Bombay Land Requisition Act (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948) was invalid
inasmuch as the purpose for the requisition was not in
express terms . stat-ed to be a public purpose. This
Court laid it down that the statute was not invalid for
that reason provided that from the whole tenor and
intendment of the Act it could be gathered that the
property Was acquired either for the purpose of the
State or for any public purpose.
· · ·
It is further argued that s. 4(1) of the Act had deliberately omitted the words " for a Company " and
insisted upon a public purpose. The abserice from the
/
notification under' s. 4 aforesaid of those .words,
(I) [1955] I S:C.R. 777·
140
~UPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1961]
.'96°
namely, for a public purpose, are fat&! to the proceod- ·
ings.
Tho purpose of the notification under s. 4 is to
Babu Rarkya
Th"'"'
carry on a. preliminary invostiga.tion with a. view to
v.
finding out after necessary survey and ta.king of levels,
1he s1a1e of a.nd, if necessary, digging or boring into the sub.soil
Bombay b· Ollom whether the land was adapted for the purpose for
which it wa.s sought to be acquired. It is only under
Srnha c. .f.
a. 6 tha.t a firm docla.ra.tion ha.a to be ma.de by Government that la.nd with proper description and a.rea. so as
to be identifiable is needed for a public purpose or for
a. Company. What was a mere proposal under a. 4
becomes the subject matter of a. definite proceeding for
acquisition under the Act.
Hence, it is not correct to
say that a.ny defect in the notification under s. 4 is
fa.ta.I to the validity of tho proceedings, particularly
when the acquisition is for a Company a.nd the purpose has to be investigatod under a. 5A or s. 40 necessarily after the notification under s. 4 of the Act.
The other attack under Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution is equally futile in view of the decisions of this
Court in State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Another(') and Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay('). Nothing
wa.s sa.id with reference to the provisions of Art. 14 of
the Constitution, though tha.t Article ha.a been referred
to in the grounds in support of the writ petition.
For the reasons given above, this petition must bo
dismissed with costs to the contesting parties.
Petition dismissed.
(1) [1955] I !!.C.R. 777'.
(2) [1957] S.C.R. 7Zt.