# Sardar Syedna T<1lrer Saiffuddin Sa/re/ v. The State of B<mlbay Venkataramc

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1015
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1955-09-05
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 76 of 1954
- **Bench:** S. R. DAS c. J, VENKATARAMA AtYAR, s. K. DAS, A. K. Sarkar, VIVIAN BosE
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sardar-syedna-t-1lrer-saiffuddin-sa-re-v-the-state-of-b-mlbay-venkataramc-1389
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

State Service-Formation of new State by intergration
of States-Effect-Employee under intergrating State continuing in service of new State-Status-If can be inferred
1957
Sardar
Syedna T<1lrer
Saiffuddin Sa/re/,.
v.
The State of
B<mlbay
Venkataramc
Aiyar J.
1957
Novr1nber,
::!~J
1016
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958]
1957
from description in orders of transfer and increment of pay
. .
.
-Substantive appointment to a lower grade on guaranteed
.RaJ" Amar Smgh .emoluments-If amounts to reduction in rank-Constituv.
tion of India, Art. 311.
T~ ~·~t• of
The appellant was a District and Session Judge in the
01°' an.
State of Bikaner and after its merger in the new State of
Rajasthan, on August 7, 1949, continued to serve in the
new State. The covenant of integration provided, inter
a!ia, that the conditions of such service were to be no less
advantageous than those under which he was working on
November 1, 1948. By a Gazette Notification the appellant
was appointed as an ad hoc Civil and Additional Sessions
Judge. After the reorganisation of the Services he was
substantively appointed as a Civil Judge and placed in
grade C (Civil Judges and Munsiffs) and placed at No. 18
in the list of Juniors, but his old pay and emoluments remained as guaranteed. Before such appointment he was,
however, described in certain orders of transfer and
increments of pay as District and Sessions Judge. The
appellant moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and contended that he had been reduced in rank
without being afforded an opportunity to show cause
under Art. 311 of the Constitution. The High Court held
that the appointment must he treated as an ad hoc appointment till it was regularised under the Constitution. This
was done by the Government after the decision of the High
Court and the appellant was again appointed as a Civil
Judge:
Held, that it is well settled that when a State is by
merger integrated to form a new State, all contracts of
service between the prior Government and its servants
automatically came to an end and those who elect to serve
in the new State, or are taken in by it, serve on such terms
and conditions as the new State may choose to impose.
The State of Madras v. K. M. Rajagopalan, [1955] 2 S.C.R.
541, relied on.
Virendra Singh & Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,
[1955] 1 S.C.R. 415, referred to.
'
As the appellant's postings in the new State previous
to his substantive appointment were all transitional and
temporary in character and the guarantee given by the
convenant was fulfilled, no question of reduction in rank
arose so as to attract Art. 311 of the Constituti6n.
No inference of any determination· by the new Government to appoint the appellant in his old post could follow
from the descriptions made in the orders of transfer and
increments of pay as appointments are not made in that
casual way.

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1015
(supra), there was a decree, and the requirements of
s. 205 were satisfied. Here, there is only a finding on
a preliminary issue, and there is no decree or final
order. The Explanation to Art. 132 provides that :
"For the purposes oi this Article, the expression
'final order' includes an order deciding an issue which,
if decided in favour of the appellant, would be sufficient for the final disposal of the case."
Applying this test, even if we accept the contention of
the appellant that the impugned Act is bad, that
would not finally dispose of the suit, as there are other
issues, which have to be tried. We are clearly of
opinion that the appeal is not competent under Art.
132, and the fact that a certificate has been given does
not alter the position. It is said that the certificate is
also under Art. 133, but under that article also, an
appeal lies only against judgments, decrees or final
orders, and no certificate could be granted in respect
of an interlocutory finding.
The result is that this appeal must be dismissed, as
not maintainable. We should add by way of abundant caution that as we express no opinion on the
correctness of the decision under appeal, this order
will not preclude the appellant from claiming such
rights as he may have, in appropriate proceedings
which he may take. In the circumstances, there will
be no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
RAJVI AMAR SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
(S. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AtYAR, s. K. DAS, A.
K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)
State Service-Formation of new State by intergration
of States-Effect-Employee under intergrating State continuing in service of new State-Status-If can be inferred
1957
Sardar
Syedna T<1lrer
Saiffuddin Sa/re/,.
v.
The State of
B<mlbay
Venkataramc
Aiyar J.
1957
Novr1nber,
::!~J
1016
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958]
1957
from description in orders of transfer and increment of pay
. .
.
-Substantive appointment to a lower grade on guaranteed
.RaJ" Amar Smgh .emoluments-If amounts to reduction in rank-Constituv.
tion of India, Art. 311.
T~ ~·~t• of
The appellant was a District and Session Judge in the
01°' an.
State of Bikaner and after its merger in the new State of
Rajasthan, on August 7, 1949, continued to serve in the
new State. The covenant of integration provided, inter
a!ia, that the conditions of such service were to be no less
advantageous than those under which he was working on
November 1, 1948. By a Gazette Notification the appellant
was appointed as an ad hoc Civil and Additional Sessions
Judge. After the reorganisation of the Services he was
substantively appointed as a Civil Judge and placed in
grade C (Civil Judges and Munsiffs) and placed at No. 18
in the list of Juniors, but his old pay and emoluments remained as guaranteed. Before such appointment he was,
however, described in certain orders of transfer and
increments of pay as District and Sessions Judge. The
appellant moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and contended that he had been reduced in rank
without being afforded an opportunity to show cause
under Art. 311 of the Constitution. The High Court held
that the appointment must he treated as an ad hoc appointment till it was regularised under the Constitution. This
was done by the Government after the decision of the High
Court and the appellant was again appointed as a Civil
Judge:
Held, that it is well settled that when a State is by
merger integrated to form a new State, all contracts of
service between the prior Government and its servants
automatically came to an end and those who elect to serve
in the new State, or are taken in by it, serve on such terms
and conditions as the new State may choose to impose.
The State of Madras v. K. M. Rajagopalan, [1955] 2 S.C.R.
541, relied on.
Virendra Singh & Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,
[1955] 1 S.C.R. 415, referred to.
'
As the appellant's postings in the new State previous
to his substantive appointment were all transitional and
temporary in character and the guarantee given by the
convenant was fulfilled, no question of reduction in rank
arose so as to attract Art. 311 of the Constituti6n.
No inference of any determination· by the new Government to appoint the appellant in his old post could follow
from the descriptions made in the orders of transfer and
increments of pay as appointments are not made in that
casual way.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
330 of 1956.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1017
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and
t957
decree dated September 5, 1955, of the Rajasthan Rajvl Amar Singh
High Court in Writ Petition No. 76 of 1954.
v.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and Ratnaparkhi A. G.
T"fi0fd:t'h0:f
for the appellant.
R. Ganapathy Iyer, Ram Avtar Gupta and T. M. '
Sen, for the respondent.
1957. November 28. The following Judgment of
the Court was delivered by
Bose J .-This appeal. arises out of a writ petition
for mandamus under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
The appellant was a District and Sessions Judge in
the former Bikaner State. He was appointed . on
January 29, 1948, in the grade of Rs. 500-40-700 and
worked as such till April 7, 1949.
On that date a new State of Rajasthan was formed
by the integration of a number of States (including
the former State of Bikaner) by means of a Covenant
signed by the High Contracting Parties.
Article XVI (1) of the Covenant ran thus:
"The United State hereby guarantees either the
continuance in service of the permanent members of
the public services of the former Rajasthan State and
of each of the new Covenanting States on conditions
which will not be less advantageous than those on
which they were serving on the 1st November 1948 or
the payment of reasonable compensation or retirement on proportionate pension."
The integration necessarily involved a reorganisation of the various services in the several integrating
States. On the judicial side it was found that there
were as many as twenty-eight Courts of District and
Sessions Judges in the aggregate. In the integrated
State it was proposed to have only fifteen. The reorganisation took time and in the interval certain
interim arrangements had to be made. These arrangements are set out in a Rajasthan Gazette Notification
dated May .25, 1950. We append the relevant extracts:
"4. In Appendix F ........ have been indicated
LISup. Court/61-9
Bose I.
1018
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958]
1957
the provisional postings on an ad hoc basis of the posts
R4frl Amar Singh specified in Appendices A to E.
v.
The Stat• of
Rajas than
BoseJ.
6. All the appointments mentioned in the different
Appendices, attached to this Order, are provisional.
The emoluments of none of these officers appointed
are being affected and they will continue to draw
their existing salaries until further orders. . All the
appointments are without prejudice to the creation
of a Judicial Service in Rajasthan to be formed in
accordance with the rules which may be made therefor."
Appendix F is headed-
"Ad hoc pbstings of Judicial Officers to Civil and
Sessions Courts."
The appellant was appointed under this heading in
Part II as a Civil and Additional Sessions Judge in
the Jaipur Division.
But before this Notification was made, namely, on
December 9, 1949, the appellant received the following order from the new Rajasthan Government :
"Shri Amar Singh, District and Sessions Judge,
Churu, is transferred to Ganganagar as District and
Sessions Judge, Ganganagar."
Among other contentions, the appellant relies on this
as an election by the new Government to continue
him in his original post and contends that it could not
later change its mind and make his service provisional
as it purported to do in the notification just cited.
Two months after the notification, namely on July
31, 1950, the appellant's increment became due and
Government sanctioned it in the following terms :
"Sanction is accorded to the grant of a stipulated increment of Rs. 40 p.m. in the scale of Rs. 500-40700 to Shri Rajvi Amarsingh, District and Sessions
Judge in Bikaner Division, with effect from the 23rd
March, 1950, thereby raising his salary from Rs. 540
to Rs. 580 p.m."
When the final re-organisation was brought into
force and the twenty-eight Courts of District and
Sessions Judges reduced to fifteen, the appellant was
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1019
posted as Civil and Additional Sessions Judge on an
1957
ad hoc basis on May 25, 1950.
Ra/vi Amar Singh
On September 11, 1950, the appellant made a rev.
presentation to the Government of Rajasthan against
Tiie State of
his posting of May 25, 1950, as an ad hoc Civil and
Rajasthan
Additional Sessions Judge. He says in his writ petiBose I.
tion to the High Court that
"he was given to understand that these ad hoc
postings were without prejudice to the claims of the
Government servants for a suitable position in the
integrated set up on permanent basis."
This allegation was admitted by the opposite party.
Later, he was appointed substantively as Civil
Judge on April 23, 1951. He was placed in Group C
(Civil Judges and Munsiffs) and placed at No. 18 in
the list of junior posts. His pay and emoluments were
- as before and he retained the same grading, namely
Rs. 500-40-700. His earned increments were not
affected and, except for the change in name, his conditions of service were not worse than when he was in
the service of the Bikaner State. We were given the
last two facts by his counsel. They do not appear in ,
the paper book. All that is to be found there are
references to these orders but the orders themselves
have not been included.
Being aggrieved by this, the appellant filed the writ
petition out of which this appeal arises on April 3,
1954. His contention was that under the guarantee
given by the United State of Rajasthan, and also
otherwise, he was entitled to be posted as a District
and Sessions Judge in the new set up and that the
posting of April 23, 1951, reduced him in rank. As
that was done without affording him an opportunity
to show cause, Art. 311 of the Constitution was:
violated.
The High Court held that the posting 0£ April 23,
1951, which purports to appoint the appellant substantively as a Civil Judge, is wrong and that it must
be treated as an ad hoc appointment till properappointments are made to the Judicial Service of
Rajasthan according to the Constitution of India.
1020
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958 j
1951
The learned Judges held that as there had been a
.Raivi Amar S/11gh clear declaration that a new Judicial Service was to
v.
be created in Rajasthan and that the existing officers
Th• State of from the various covenanting States were not to be
Rajas1Juu1
BoseJ.
taken into it as a matter of course, it followed that all
appointments to it would be by way of fresh recruitment, and, as the Constitution of India was in force at
that date, these recruitments must conform to its
provisions. It was admitted before the learned Judges
that after the Constitution only the Rajpramukh had
power to make rules regulating the recruitment and
conditions of service of those appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the
State until provision in that behalf is made by art Act
of the Legislature, and it was also admitted that the
State Public Service Commission must be consulted.
As this was not done, the learned Judges directed as
follows:
"The petition is allowed, the postings made by
notification dated the 23rd April, 1951, including that
of the petitioner as Civil Judge, are declared to be on
an ad hoc basis, and a direction is made to the Government to provide a machinery according to the
provisions of the Constitution for the first recruitment
to the Rajasthan Judicial Service."
The judgment was delivered on September. 5, 1955,
and the appellant thereupon came here and was
granted special leave to appeal on April 16, 1956.
In the meanwhile, according to the facts set out in
the respondent's statement of the case, the Rajasthan
Government complied with the orders of the High
Court, reframed their rules and made fresh appointments in accordance with them. These were duly
published in the Rajasthan Gazette and the appellant
was finally selected to the Rajasthan Judicial Service.
He was appointed a Civil Judge.
The Appellant's contention is that the order of
April 23, 1951, reduced him in rank and as he was not
afforded an opportunity of showing cause, Art. 311 of
the Constitution was violated. If this contention is
sound, it will follow that the fresh appointment as
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1021
Civil Judge after the High Court's order will also be
bad for the same reasons.
Now it is well established that when one State is
absorbed in another, whether by accession, conquest,
merger or.integration, all contracts of service between
the prior Government and its servants automatically
terminate and thereafter those who elect to serve in
the new State, arid are taken on by it, serve on such
t~rms and conditions as the new State may choose to
impose.
This is nothing more, (though on a more
exalted scale), than an application of the principle
that underlies the law of Master and Servant when
there is a change of masters. So far as this Court is
concerned, the law is settled by the decision in The
State of Madras v. K. M. Rajagopalan (I), which follows the decision of the Privy Council and the House
of Lords in Remy v. The King ( 2 ), and Nokes v.
Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. (3 ). The distinction between rights to property and contractual
rights when there is a change of sovereignty was pointed out in Virendra Singh & others v. The State of
Uttar Pradesh ( 4 ).
The appellant founds on Art. XVI(l) of the
Covenant. It was contended that he cannot rely on
this because he was not a party to it but we need not
decide this because, even if this be assumed to be the
law of the new State settling the conditions of service
of those who continue in service, all that it says is that
the conditions of their service will not be less advantageous than those on which they were serving on
November 1, 1948. We have shown above that this
condition is fulfilled.
But that apart, Article XVI( 1) indicates that the
old contracts terminate just as they did in The State of
Madras v. K. M. Rajagopalan'(5) . In the first place,
there were three optibns :
(1) continuance in service,
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 541, 562.
(2) (1934) A.C. 176.
(l) (1940) A.C. 1014.
(~) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 415, 427.
(5) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 54 t, 562.
1957
Rajvi Amar Singh
v.
The State oj
Rajasthan
BoseJ.
-
1022
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1937
(2) payment of reasonable compensation, and
RoJvl A"!"' Singh
(3) retirement on proportionate pension.
v.
That shows that the old contracts terminated and that
The State of
Rajaslhan
those who continued in service did so on the basis of
BoseJ.
fresh contracts, the conditions of which had yet to be
determined. The only guarantee (assuming that the
appellant can avail himself of it) was that the new
conditions were not to be less advantageous than those
on which the appellant was serving on November 1,
1948. There was no guarantee that they would be
the same or better.
This was emphasised in the Rajasthan Gazette
Extraordinary dated June 4, 1949. It first referred to
the broad outlines of the programme of integration
that had already been published and then outlined the
procedure and principles to be observed in carrying it
~mt. Paragraph 6 is as follows :
"After final orders have been passed by the Government on the Departmental re-organisation schemes
and cadres and strength for different kinds of establishments in each department are fixed, the heads of
departments will prepare gradation lists according
to prescribed rules and put up proposals for fixation
of each individual Government servant in the posts on
permanent, officiating or deputation basis.
They will also determine the revised rates of pay
admissible to each Gazetted and nan-Gazetted officer
under the new scales etc."
and then paragraph 15-
"It is not the intention of Government to throw
any Government servant out of employ as far as practicable. If necessary, services of efficient and deserving staff will be retained temporarily on supernumerary basis in the prospect of finding work for them in
connection with new development schemes."
The order of December 9, 1949, on which the appellant relies, transferring him as District and Sessions
Judge to the District Court at Ganganagar, must be
read subject to the above and, if Article XVI(l) of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1023
the Covenant applies, then subject to that as well. An
1957
order of transfer cannot be equated to an order of Rajvi Amar Singh
appointment; and in any case, the new cadres had
v.
not been established and the new Courts under the
~
f'a~ of
proposed scheme of re-organisation had not been cona ast an
stituted, so, anything done at that stage could only
Bose I.
have been part and parcel of the temporary transitional arrangements pending the final settlement by
the new State of the schemes and conditions of service.
The next set of orders published in the Gazette of
May 25, 1950, brings this out clearly. We have already set out its terms.
The orders of March 25, 1950, and July 31, 1950,
sanctioning the increment do not help the appellant.
He is described there as
"Shri Rajvi Amarsingh, District and Sessions
Judge in Bikaner Division."
This is merely descriptive as the endorsement on the
letter indicates. It rtins-
"Copy forwarded to-
( 1) Shri Amarsingh, Civil and Addl. Sessions
Judge, Jhunjhunu."
No determination to pnst the appellant permanently
in a particular cadre and post can be spelled out of
these accidental descriptions in orders dealing with a
different matter. Postings to a cadre and engagements
of service are not made in this incidental way.·
The substantive appointmertt gazetted on April 23,
1951, after the new cadres and Courts had been fixed,
was struck doWll by the High Court, and the Government of Rajasthan was directed to treat that as an ad
hoc appointment. According to the respondent in its
statement of the case, the matter was regularised after
the High Court's decision and the appellant was again
appointed a Civil Judge. If that is so, then this must
be regarded as his first substantive a~pointment in the
new State. But whether this is his first substantive
/
1024
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
1957
appointment after the integration, or the one of April
Raji•i Amar Singh 23, 1951, no question of reduction in rank can arise
v.
and so Art. 311 is not attracted.
All his previous
The ~rahre of postings in the new State were purely transitional and
RaJOS/an
f
I
f h c
temporary; and so ar as Art. XVI( ) o t e ovenant
Bose J.
is concerned, its guarantee has been fulfilled.
1957
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
S. RM. AR. S. SP. SATHAPPA CHETTIAR
v.
S. RM. AR. RM. RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR
(BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR
and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)
Court fee, Computation of-Suit for enforcement of
share in joint family property-Plaintiff's valuation of the
claim-Value for purposes of jurisdiction, if must he tite
same-Court-Fees Act, 1870 (VII of 1370), s. 7(IV) (b)-
Suits Valuation Act, 1887 (VII of 1887), s. 8.
The computation of Court fees in suits falling under
s. 7 (IV) of the Court-Fees Act depends upon the valuation
which the plaintiff in his option puts on his claim and once
he exercises his option and values his claim, such value
must also be the value for purposes of jurisdiction under
s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. The value for purposes
of Court fee, therefore, determines the value for purposes
of jurisdiction in such a suit and not vice versa.
Where, therefore, the Court finds that the case falls
under s. 7 (IV) (b) of the Court-Fees Act, and the pla\ntiff
has omitted to specifically value his claim, liberty should
ordinarily be given to him to amend his plaii!lt and set out
the amount at which he wants to value his claim. The value
put for purposes of jurisdiction which cannot be binding
for purposes of Court fee, and must be altered accordingly.
Karam Ilahi v. Muhammad Bashir, A.LR. (1949) Lah.
116, referred to.
Consequently, in the present case where the Division
Bench of the Madras High Court was of the opinion that s.
7 (IV) (b) of the Court-Fees Act appJ;ed but nevertheless