# SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR

- **Citation:** [2010] 6 S.C.R. 657
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-05-07
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 4347 of 2010
- **Bench:** G.S. Singhvi, Asok Kumar Ganguly
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/satheedevi-v-prasanna-and-anr-26935
- **Pages:** 41

## Headnote

Kera/a Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 - s.40
A
8
- Interpretation of - Suits for cancellation of sale deed -
Computation of Court fees - Held: When there is a special C
rule in the Act for valuing the property for the purpose of court
fee, that method of valuation must be adopted in preference
to any other method - Deeming clause in substantive part of
s.40(1) makes it clear that in a suit filed for cancellation of a
document which creates any right, title or interest in
D
immovable property, the court fees is required to be
computed on the value of the property for which the document
was executed, and not on its market value - Since s.40
contains a special rule for valuing the property for the purpose
of court fee, there is no reason why the expression 'value of E
the property' used in s.40(1) should be substituted with the
expression 'market value of the property'.
Words and Phrases - Expression "value of the property"
- Meaning of- In the context to s.40 of the Kera/a Court-Fees
and Suits Valuation Act, 1959.
F
Interpretation of statutes - Two well recognised rules of
interpretation - Held: First and primary rule of construction is
that intention of the legislature must be found in the words
used by the legislature itself - The other important rule of G
interpretation is that the Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe
the legislation because it has no power to do so.
The appellant owned 9.98 acres of rubber plantation.
She executed power of attorney in favour of her daughter
657
H
658
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R
A (respondent no.1) in respect of the said property. After
sometime, respondent no.1 transferred the property to
her husband (respondent no.2) by a registered sale deed.
The appellant filed suit for cancellation of the sale
deed by respondent no.1 in favour of respondent no.2.
B In the plaint, the value of the property was shown as Rs.7
lakhs and accordingly, the court fees was paid. However,
the trial Court directed the appellant to pay court fee on
the market value of the plaint property.
The High Court upheld the trial court order holding
C that in terms of s.40 of the Kerala Court-Fees and Suits
Valuation Act, 1959, the appellant was required to pay
court fees on market value of the property and not on the
value specified in the sale deed.
o
Before this Court, the appellant contended that the
interpretation placed by the Courts below on s.40 of the
Act was ex facie erroneous and liable to be set aside
because that section does not provide for payment of
court fee on the market value of the property. The
E appellant contended that in terms of s.40(1 ), court fees
is required to be paid on the value of the property for
which the document was executed and the appellant had
correctly paid the court fees as per the value of the
property specified in the sale deed i.e., Rs. 7 lakhs.
F
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. There are two well recognised rules of
interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of
construction is that the intention of the legislature must
be found in the words used by the legislature itsolf. If the
G words used are capable of one construction, only then
it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other
hypothetical construction on the ground that such
hypothetical construction is more consistent with the
alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in
H the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR.
659
in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when
A
such words are capable of two constructions that the
question of giving effect to the policy or object of.the Act
can legitimately arise. The other important rule of
interpretation is that the Court cannot rewrite, recast or
reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so.
B
The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words
which are not therein. Even if there is a defect or an
omission in the statute, the Court cannot correct the
defect

## Text

_Characters 0–39,974 of 77,360. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39974 for what follows._

[2010] 6 S.C.R. 657
SATHEEDEVI
v.
PRASANNA AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 4347 of 2010)
MAY 7, 2010
[G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.]
Kera/a Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 - s.40
A
8
- Interpretation of - Suits for cancellation of sale deed -
Computation of Court fees - Held: When there is a special C
rule in the Act for valuing the property for the purpose of court
fee, that method of valuation must be adopted in preference
to any other method - Deeming clause in substantive part of
s.40(1) makes it clear that in a suit filed for cancellation of a
document which creates any right, title or interest in
D
immovable property, the court fees is required to be
computed on the value of the property for which the document
was executed, and not on its market value - Since s.40
contains a special rule for valuing the property for the purpose
of court fee, there is no reason why the expression 'value of E
the property' used in s.40(1) should be substituted with the
expression 'market value of the property'.
Words and Phrases - Expression "value of the property"
- Meaning of- In the context to s.40 of the Kera/a Court-Fees
and Suits Valuation Act, 1959.
F
Interpretation of statutes - Two well recognised rules of
interpretation - Held: First and primary rule of construction is
that intention of the legislature must be found in the words
used by the legislature itself - The other important rule of G
interpretation is that the Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe
the legislation because it has no power to do so.
The appellant owned 9.98 acres of rubber plantation.
She executed power of attorney in favour of her daughter
657
H
658
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R
A (respondent no.1) in respect of the said property. After
sometime, respondent no.1 transferred the property to
her husband (respondent no.2) by a registered sale deed.
The appellant filed suit for cancellation of the sale
deed by respondent no.1 in favour of respondent no.2.
B In the plaint, the value of the property was shown as Rs.7
lakhs and accordingly, the court fees was paid. However,
the trial Court directed the appellant to pay court fee on
the market value of the plaint property.
The High Court upheld the trial court order holding
C that in terms of s.40 of the Kerala Court-Fees and Suits
Valuation Act, 1959, the appellant was required to pay
court fees on market value of the property and not on the
value specified in the sale deed.
o
Before this Court, the appellant contended that the
interpretation placed by the Courts below on s.40 of the
Act was ex facie erroneous and liable to be set aside
because that section does not provide for payment of
court fee on the market value of the property. The
E appellant contended that in terms of s.40(1 ), court fees
is required to be paid on the value of the property for
which the document was executed and the appellant had
correctly paid the court fees as per the value of the
property specified in the sale deed i.e., Rs. 7 lakhs.
F
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. There are two well recognised rules of
interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of
construction is that the intention of the legislature must
be found in the words used by the legislature itsolf. If the
G words used are capable of one construction, only then
it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other
hypothetical construction on the ground that such
hypothetical construction is more consistent with the
alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in
H the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR.
659
in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when
A
such words are capable of two constructions that the
question of giving effect to the policy or object of.the Act
can legitimately arise. The other important rule of
interpretation is that the Court cannot rewrite, recast or
reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so.
B
The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words
which are not therein. Even if there is a defect or an
omission in the statute, the Court cannot correct the
defect or supply the omission. [Para 10] [674-H; 675-AD]
C
Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan 1958 SCR 360;
Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992 Supp (1) SCC
323 and Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corporation
(1966) 3 SCR 366, relied on.
2.1. Section 7 of the Kerala Court-Fees and Suits · D
Valuation Act, 1959 lays down different modes for
determination of the market value of the property for the
purpose of payment of court fee. Sub-section (1) of
Section 7 begins with the expression "Save as otherwise
provided" and lays down that where the fee payable
E
under the Act depends on the market value of any
property, such value shall be determined as on the date
of presentation of the plaint. From the plain language of
Section 7(1), it is evident that it merely specifies the
methodology for determination of the market value of the
F
property where the court fee payable under some other
provisions of the Act depends on the market value of the
property which is subject matter of the suit. Sections 25,
27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48 deal with different kinds of
suit i.e., suits for declaration, suits for injunction, suits for G
possession under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, suits for
possession not otherwise provided f9r, partition suits,
suits for joint possession, suits under the Survey and
Boundaries Act and interpleader suits. These sections
provide for payment of court fee computed on the market
H
660
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A value of the property. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 lays
down that the market value of the agricultural land in suits
falling under Sections 25(a), 25(b), 27(a), 29, 30, 37(1),
37(3), 38, 45 and 48 shall be deemed to be ten times the
annual gross profits of such land where it is capable of
B yielding annual profits minus the assessment, if any, made
by the Government. In terms of sub-section (3), the
market value of a building in cases where its rental value
has been entered in the registers of any local authority,
shall be ten times such rental value and in other cases,
c the actual market value of the building as on the date of
the plaint. Clause (a) of sub-section (3) lays down that
market value of any property other than agricultural land
and building shall be the value it will fetch on the date of
institution of the suit. Sub-section (4) lays down that
0 where subject matter of the suit is only a restricted or
fractional interest in a property, the market value of the
property shall be deemed tp be the value of the restricted
or fractional interest. [Para 11] (675-E-H; 676-A-D]
'~
2.2. Section 40 deals with suits for cancellation of
E decrees etc. which are not covered by other sections. It
this section is interpreted in the light of the expression
'save as otherwise provided' used in Section 7(1 ), it
becomes clear that the rule enshrined therein is a clear
departure from the one contained in Section 7 read with
F Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48 which provide
for payment of court fee on the market value of the
property. In that sense, Section 40 contains a special
rule. Section 40(1) lays down that in a suit for cancellation
of a decree for money or other property having a money
G value, or other document which purports or operates to
create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in
present or in future, any right, title or interest in money,
movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed
on the value of the subject matter of the suit and further
lays down that such value shall be deemed to be if the
H
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR.
661
whole decree or other document sought to be cancelled, A
the amount or value of the property for which the decree
was passed or other document was executed. If a part of
the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled,
such part of the amount or value of the property
constitute the basis for fixation of court fee. Sub-section B
(2) lays down that if the decree or other document is such
that the liability under it cannot be split up and the relief
claimed relates only to a particular item of the property
belonging to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's share in such
property, fee shall be computed on the value of such c
property, or share or on the amount of the decree,
whichever is less. The deeming clause contained in the
substantive part of Section 40(1) makes it clear that in a
suit filed for cancellation of a document which creates
any right, title or interest in immovable property, the court 0
fees is required to be computed on the value of the
property for which the document was executed. To put it
differently, the value of the property for whic.h the
document was executed and not its market value is
relevant for the purpose of court fee. If the expression
'value of the subject matter of the suit' was not followed E
by the deeming clause, it could possibly be argued that
the word 'value' means the market value, but by
employing the deeming clause, the legislature has made
it clear that if the document is sought to be cancelled, the
amount of court fee shall be computed on the value of F
the property for which the document was executed and
not the market value of the property. The words "for
which" appearing between the words "property" and
"other documents" ciearly indicate that the court fee is
required to be paid on the value of the property· G
mentioned in the document, which is subject matter of
challenge. [Para 11] [676-E-H; 677-A-F]
2.3. If the legislature intended that fee should be
payable on the market value of the subject matter of the H
662
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 6 S.C.R.
A suit filed for cancellation of a document which purports
or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish
any present or future right, title and interest, then it would
have, instead of incorporating the requirement of
payment of fees on value of subject matter, specifically
B
provided for payment of court fee on the market value of
the subject matter of the suit as has been done in respect
of other types of suits mentioned in Sections 25, 27, 29,
30, 37, 38, 45 and 48. The legislature may have also,
instead of using the expression "value of the property for
c which the document was executed", used the expression
"value of the property in respect of which the document
was executed". However, the fact of the matter is that in
Section 40(1) the legislature has designedly not used the
expression 'market value of the property'. [Para 12} [677D G-H; 678-A-BJ
2.4. If the interpretation placed by the trial Court and
the High Court on the expression "value o~ the property
for which the document was executed" is accepted as
correct, then the word ·value' used in Section 40(1) of the
E Act will have to be read as 'market value' and there is no
compelling reason to add the word ·market' before the
word 'value' in Section 40(1) of the Act. [Para 13} [678-CDJ
2.5. When there is a special rule in the Act for valuing
F the property for the purpose of court fee, that method of
valuation must be adopted in preference to any other
method and, as Section 40 of the Act certainly contains
a special rule for valuing the property for the purpose of
court fee there is no reason why the expression •value
G of the property' used in Section 40(1) should be
substituted with the expression 'market value of the
property'. The legislature has designedly use·d different
language in Section 40 of the Act and the term 'market
value' has not been used therein. [Paras 30 and 31} [696H C-D; 697-CJ
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR.
663
2.6. The impugned ~rder of the High Court as also A
the order passed by the trial Court directing the appellant
to pay court fee on the market value of the property, in
respect of which the sale deed was executed by
respondent No.1 in favour of respondent No.2, are set
aside. The trial Court is directed to proceed with the case B
and decid~ the same in accordance with law. [Para 32)
[697-D-E]
Balireddi v. Khatipula/ Sab AIR 1935 Madras 863 and
K.utumba Sastri v. Sundaramma AIR 1939 Madras 462,
· distinguished.
C
Venkata Narasimha Raju v. Chandrayya AIR 1927
Madras 825; Navaraja v. Kaliappa Gounder (1967) 80
Madras Law Weekly 19 (SN); Arunachalathamma/ v.
Suda/aimuthu Pillai (1968) 83 Madras Law Weekly 789; 0
Andalammal v. B. Kanniah (1971) II Madras Law Journal
205 , and
Allam
Venkateswara
Reddy
v.
Golla
Venkatanarayana and others AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 122,
approved.
Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami Gounder and others AIR E
1971 Madras 380; S. Krishna Nair and another v. N.
Rugmoni Amma AIR 1976 Madras 208; Krishnan
Damodaran v. Padmanabhan Parvathy (1972) Kerala Law
Times 774; P.K. Vasudeva Rao ·v. Hari Menon AIR 1982
Kerala 35; Pachayamma/ v. Dwaraswamy Pillai (2006) 3 F
Kerala Law Times 527; Appikunju Meerasayu v. Meeran
Pillai (1964) Kerala Law Times 895; Uma Antherjanam v.
Govindaru Namboodiripad and others (1966) Kerala Law
Times 1046; R. Rangiah v. Thimma Setty (1963) 1 Mysore
Law Journal 67 and Smt. Narbada v. Smt. Aashi AIR 1987 G
Rajasthan 162, overruled.
Venkatasiva Rao v. Satyanarayanamurthi AIR 1932
Madras 605; Narasamma v. Satyanarayana AIR 1951
Madras 793 and T. Tharamma v. T. Ramchandra Reddy and
others AIR 1968 Andhra Pradesh 333, referred to.
H
664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A
Case Law Reference:
(1972) Kera la Law Times 77 4
overruled
Para 5
AIR 1982 Kerala 35
overruled
Para 5
B
(2006) 3 Kerala Law Times 527
overruled
Para 5
(1971) II Madras Law
Journal 205
approved
Para 6
AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh 122
approved
Para 6
c AIR 1939 Madras 462
distinguished Para 7
(1964) Kerala Law Times 895
overruled
Para 7
(1966) Kera la Law Times 1046
overruled
Para 7
D
AIR 1968 Andhra Pradesh 333
referred to
Para 7
AIR 1971 Madras 380
overruled
Para 7
AIR 1976 Madras 208
overruled
Para 7
AIR 1987 Rajasthan 162
overruled
Para 7
E
1958 SCR 360
relied on
Para 10
1992 Supp (1) sec 323
relied on
Para 10
(1966) 3 SCR 366
relied on
Para 10
F
AIR 1927 Madras 825
approved
Para 15
AIR 1935 Madras 863
distinguished Para 16
AIR 1932 Madras 605
referred to
Para 16
G (1967) 80 Madras Law
approved
Para 18
Weekly 19 (SN)
(1968) 83 Madras Law
approved
Para 19
Weekly 789
H AIR 1951 Madras 793
referred to
Para 20
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR.
665
(1963) 1 Mysore Law
Journal 67
overruled
Para 25
A
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s).
4347 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 21.07.2008 of the High
B
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in WP {C) No. 21820 of 2008.
Bechu Kurian Thomes, R.Basant, Liz Mathew for the
Appellant.
T.L.V. Iyer, Subramonium Prasad for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal filed for setting aside order dated
21.7.2008 passed by the learned Single Judge of Kerala High
Court in Writ Petition No.21820 of 2008 whereby he declined
c
D
to interfere with the direction given by Sub Judge, Palakkad
{hereinafter described. as 'the trial Court') to the appellant to
E
pay court fee on the market value of the plaint schedule property
raises an important question of law relating to interpretation of
Section 40 of the Kerala Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act,
1959 (for short, 'the Act').
3. The appellant owned 9.98 acres rubber plantation. She
F
executed power of attorney No.376/2006 in favour of her own
daughter (respondent No.1 herein). After sometime, respondent
No.1 transferred the property to her husband (respondent No.2
herein) by registered sale deed No.1784/2007. The appellant
filed O.S. No.231/2007 for cancellation of the power of attorney
G
by alleging that respondent No.1 had misused the same and
sold the property to her husband. By an order dated 21.5.2008,
the trial Court directed the appellant to pay court fees on the
market value of the plaint schedule property. The appellant
H
666
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010) 6 S.C.R.
A challenged that order in Writ Petition No.17032/2008 (C) which
was disposed of by the learned Single Judge of Kerala High
Court vide his order dated 26.6.2008, the relevant portion of
which reads as under:
8
c
D
E
"The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further
submitted that in view of the contentions raised in the
plaint, petitioner has to file an application for amendment
of the plaint modifying the relief sought for. In the nature of
the contentions raise.d in the plaint, an amendment of the
relief is definitely neqessary, as found by the learned Sub
Judge. In such circumstances, Writ Petition is disposed
granting liberty to the petitioner to amend the plaint and to
pay the necessary court fee payable on such pleading. It
is made clear that the fact that a time limit is fixed by this
Court will not prevent the court from granting amendment,
as it is necessary for an appropriate adjudication of the
dispute involved in the suit. It is made clear that the actual
court fee payable by the plaintiff is to be decided by the
trial Court afresh, taking into consideration the relief sought
for in the plaint, in the light of the amendment of the
pleading."
-4. In furtherance of the direction given by the High Court,
the appellant applied for and she was granted permission to
amend the plaint and to incorporate prayer for cancellation of
F the sale deed executed by respondent No.1 in favour of
respondent No.2. In the amended plaint, value of the property
was shown as Rs.7,00,000/- and accordingly, the court fees
was paid. However by an order dated 3.7.2008, the trial Court
directed the appellant to pay court fee on the market value of
G the plaint schedule property which was assessed at Rs.12 lakhs
H
per acre.
5. Writ Petition No.21820/2008 filed by the appellant
against the .above mentioned order was dismissed by the
learned Single Judge, who referred to the judgments of the
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR.
667
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Division Bench in Krishnan Damodaran v. Padmanabhan
A
Parvathy (1972) Kerala Law Times 774, P.K. Vasudeva Rao
v. Hari Menon AIR 1982 Kerala 35 and Pachayamma/ v.
Dwaraswamy Pillai (2006) 3 Kerala Law Times 527 and held
that in terms of Section 40 of the Act, the writ petitioner is
required to pay court fees on market value of the property and
B
not on the value specified in the sale deed.
6. Shri Bechu Kurian Thomas, learned counsel for the
appellant argued that the interpretation placed by the trial Court
and the High Court on Section 40 of the Act is ex facie
erroneous and impugned order is liable to be set aside
C
because that section does not provide for payment of court fee
on the market value of the property for which the document,
which is subject matter of the suit, was executed. Learned
counsel emphasized that in terms of Section 40(1), court fees
is required to be paid on the value of the property for which the
D
document was executed and submitted that the appellant had
correctly paid the court fees as per the value of the property
specified in the sale deed i.e., Rs. 7 lakhs. In support of his
arguments, the learned counsel relied upon the judgments of
the learned Single Judges of Madras High Court in
E
Andalamma/ v. B. Kannaiah (1971) 2 Madras Law Journal 205
and of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Allam Venkateswara
Reddy v. Golla Venkatanarayana and others AIR 1975 Andhra
Pradesh 122.
7. Shri T.L.V. Iyer, learned senior counsel appearing for
the respondent argued that the expression 'value of the property'
for which the document was executed means market value of
the property and the same cannot be read as value specified
F
in the document. Learned senior counsel submitted that
G
different High Courts have, following the judgment of the Full
Bench of Madras High Court in Kutumba Sastri v ..
Sundaramma AIR 1939 Madras 462, consistently held that the
market value of the property has to be taken into consideration
for the purpose of payment of the court fees. Learned senior
H
668
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A counsel relied upon the judgments of different High Courts -
Appikunju Meerasayu v. Meeran Pillai (1964) Kerala Law
Times 895, Uma Antherjanam v. Govindaru Namboodiripad
and others (1966) Kerala Law Times 1046, T. Tharamma v.
T. Ramchandra Reddy and others AIR 1968 Andhra Pradesh
B 333, Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami Gounder and others AIR
1971 Madras 380, Allam Venkateswara Reddy v. Golla
Venkatanarayana and others (supra), S. Krishna Nair and
another v. N. Rugmoni Amma AIR 1976 Madras 208 and Smt.
Narbada v. Smt. Aashi AIR 1987 Rajasthan 162 and argued
C that the learned Single Judge did not commit any error by
refusing to interfere with the order of the trial Court.
8. We have considered the respective submissions.
Sections 7(1) (2) (3) (3A) (4), 25(a) (b), 27(a), 29, 30, 37(1)
(3), 38, 40, 45 and 48 of the Act which have bearing on the
D issue raised by the appellant, read as under:
E
F
G
H
"7. Determination of market value
(1) Save as otherwise provided, where the fee payable
under this Act depends on the market value of any
property, such value shall be determined as on the date
of presentation of the plaint.
(2) The market value of agricultural land in suits falling
under Section 25(a), 25(b), 27(a), 29, 30, 37(1 ), 37(3), 38,
45 or 48 shall be deemed to be ten times the annual gross
profits of such land where it is capable of yielding annual
profits minus the assessment if any made to the
Government.
(3) The market value of a building shall in cases where
its rental value has been entered in the registers of any
local authority, be ten times such rental value and in other
cases the actual market value of the building as on the
date of the plaint.
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR.
669
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
(3A) The market value of any property other than
A
agricultural land and building falling under sub-sections (2)
and (3) shall be the value it will fetch on the date of
institution of the suit.
(4) Where the subject-matter of the suit is only a restricted
8
or fractional interest in a property, the market value of the
property shall be deemed to be the value of the restricted
or fractional interest and the value of the restricted or
fractional interest shall bear the same proportion to the
market value of the absolute interest in such property as
the net income derived by the owner of the restricted or
C
fractional interest bears to the total net income from the
property.
25. Suits for declaration.- In a suit for a declaratory decree
or order, whether with or without consequential relief, not o
falling under Section 26-
(a) where the prayer is for a declaration and for possession
of the property to which the declaration relates, fee shall
be computed on the market value of the property or on
E
rupees one thousand whichever is higher;
'I, /
'
(b) where the prayer is for a declaration and for
consequential injunction and the relief sought is with
refer~nce to any immovable property, fee shall be
computed on one-half of the market value of the property
F
or on rupees one thousand, whichever is higher;
27. Suits for injunction.- In a suit for injunction-
( a) Where the reliefs sought is with reference to any
immovable property, and
G
(i) where the plaintiff alleges that his title to the property is
denied, or
H
670
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A
(ii) where an issue is framed regarding the plaintiffs title
to the property,
B
c
D
fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of
the property or on rupees five hundred, whichever is higher;
29. Suits for possession under the Specific Relief Act,
1877.- In a suit for possession of immovable property
under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (Central
Act 1 of 1877), fee shall be computed on one-third of the
market value of the property or on rupees one hundred and
fifty, whichever is higher.
30. Suits for possession not otherwise provided for.- In a
suit for possession of immovable property not otherwise
provided for, fee shall be computed, on the market value
of the property or on rupees one thousand, whichever is
higher.
37. Partition suits
(1) In a suit for partition and separate possession of a
E
share of joint family property or of property owned, jointly
or in common, by a plaintiff who has been excluded from
possession of such property, fee shall be computed on the
market value of the plaintiff's share.
F
G
H
(2)
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3) Where, in a suit falling under sub-section (1) or subsection (2), a defendant claims partition and separate
possession of his share of the property, fee shall be
payable on his written statement computed on half the
market value of his share or at half the rates specified in
sub-section (2), according as such defendant has been
excluded from possession or is in joint possession.
38. Suits for joint possession.- In a suit for joint
possession of joint family property or of property owned,
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR.
671
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
'
jointly or in common, by a plaintiff who has been excluded A
from possession, fee shall be computed on the market
value of the plaintiffs share.
40. Suits for cancellation of decrees, etc.-
(1) In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other B
property having a money value, or other document which
purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or
extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title
or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee
shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the C
suit, and such value shall be deemed to beif the whole decree or other document is sought to be
cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the
decree was passed or other document was executed;
o
if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be
cancelled; such part of the amount or value of the property.
(2) If the decree or other document is such that the liability
under it cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates
E
only to a particular item of property belonging to the plaintiff
or to the plaintiffs share in any such property, fee shall be
computed on the value of such property, or share or on the
amount of the decree, whichever is less.
F
Explanation.- A suit to set aside an award shall be
deemed to be a suit to set aside a decree within the
meaning of this section.
45. Suits under the 'Survey and Boundaries Act.-ln a suit
under Section 14 of the Madra~\Survey and Boundaries G
Act, 1923, Section 13 of the Travancore Survey and
Boundaries Act of 1094, or Section 14 of the Cochin
Survey Act, II of 1074, fee shall be computed on one-half
of the market value of the property affected by the
determination of the boundary or on rupees one thousand,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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A
whichever is higher.
48. lnterpleader suits.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(1) In an interpleader suit, fee shall be payable on the plaint
at the rates specified in Section 50.
(2) Where issues are framed as between the claimants,
fee shall be payable computed on the amount of the debt
or the money or the market value of other property,
movable or immovable, which forms the subject-matter of
the suit. In levying such fee, credit shall be given for the
fee paid on the plaint; and the balance of the fee shall be
paid in equal shares by the claimants who claim the debt
or the sum of money or the property adversely to each
other.
(3) Value for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of
Courts shall be the amount of the debt, or the sum .of
money or the market value of other property to which the
suit relates."
9.
Section 7 (iv), (iv-A) (as inserted by Madras Act of
1922) and (v) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (for short, 'the
Court-fees Act'), which have been considered in various
judgments of Madras High Court relied upon by learned
counsel for the respondents reads as under:-
"7. Computation of fees payable in certain suits. - The
amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next
hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows:- "
xxx
xxx
xxx
(iv)
In suitsfor movable property of no market-va/ue.-(a) for moveable
property where the subject-matter has no market-value, as,
for instance, in the case of documents relating to title,
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR.
673
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
to enforce a right to share in joint family property.-(b) te
A ·
enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that
it is joint family property,
for a declaratory decree and consequential relief-(c) to
obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential
8
relief is prayed,
for an injunction.-(d) to obtain an injunction,
for easements.-(e) for a right to some benefit (not herein
otherwise provided for) to arise out of land, and
c
for accounts.-(f) for accountsaccording to the amount at which the relief sought is valued
in the plaint or memorandum of appeal;
In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which
he values the relief sought
·
(iv-A) In.a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or
other property having a money value or other document
securing money or other property having such value, the
valuation should be according to the value of the subjectmatter of the suit and such value shall be if the whole
decree is sought to be cancelled', the amount or value of
the property for which the decree was passed, and if a
portion of the decree is sought to be cancelled, such part
of the amount or value of the property.
(added by Madras Act of 1922)
D
E
F
for possession of land, houses and gardens.- (v) In suits
G
for the possession of land, houses, and gardens -
according to the value of the subject-matter; and such
value shall be deemed to bewhere the subject-matter is land, andH
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R
A
(a)
where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite
share of an estate, paying annual revenue to
Government,
or forms part of such an estate and is recorded in
B
the Collector's register as separately assessed with
such revenue;
-
and such revenue is permanently settled - ten times
the revenue so payable;
c
(b)
where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite
share of an estate, paying annual revenue to
Government, or forms part of such estate and is
recorded as aforesaid;
D
and such revenue is settled, but not permanentlyfive times the revenue so payable;
(c)
where the land pays no such revenue, or has been
partially exempted from such payment, or is charged
with any fixed payment in lieu of such revenue,
E
and net profits have arisen from the land during the
year next before the date of presenting the plaint -
fifteen times such net profits;
F
but where no such net profits have arisen
therefrom - the amount at which the Court shall
estimate the land with reference to the value of
similar land in the neighbourhood;
,,
G
(d)
where the land forms part of an estate paying
revenue to Government, but is not a definite share
of such estate and is not separately assessed as
above-mentioned - the market-value of the land:"
10. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well
H recognized rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR.
675
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
0
primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature A
must be found in the words used by the legislature it~elf. If the
words used are capable of one construction, only then it would
not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical
9onstruction on the ground that such hypothetical construction
is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.
B
The words used in the material provisions ;.qf the statute must
be interpreted in their plain grammatical m~a'ning and it is only
when such words are capable of two constructions that the
question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can
legitimately arise - Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan c
1958 SCR 360. The other important rule of interpretation is ~hat
the Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation
because it has no power to do so. The Court cannot add words
to a statute or read words which are not therein.Even if there
is a defect or an omission in the statute, the Court cannot 0
correct the defect or supply the omission. - Union of India v.
Oeoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323, Shyam
Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corporation (1966) 3 SCR
366.
11. Section 7 of the Act lays down different modes fQJ
E
determination of the market value of the property for the purpose
of payment of court fee. Sub-section (1) of Section 7 begins
with the expression "Save as qtherwise provided" and lays down
that where the fee payable under the Act depends on the market
valu·e of any property, such value shall be determined as on the
F
date of presentation of the plaint. Fro.m the plain language of
Section 7(1 ), it is evident that it merely specifies the
methodology for determination of the market value of the
0
property where the court fee payable under some other
provisions of the Act depends on the market value of the G
property which is subject matter of the suit. Sections 25, 27,
29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48 deal with different kinds of suit i.e.,
·suits for declaration, suits for injunction, suits for possession
under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, suits for possession not
otherwise provided for, partition suits, suits for joint possession,
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[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A
suits under the Survey and Boundaries Act and interpleader
suits. These sections provide for payment of court fee
computed on the market value of the property. Sub-section (2)
of Section 7 lays down that the market value of the agricultural
land in suits falling under Sections 25(a), 25(b), 27(a), 29, 30,
B
37(1), 37(3), 38, 45 and 48 shall be deemed to be ten times
the annual gross profits of such land where it is capable of
yi~lding annual profits minus the assessment, if any, made by
the Governrrient. In terms of sub-section (3), the market value
of a building in cases where its rental value has been entered
C
in the registers of any local authority, shall be ten times such
rental value and in other cases, the actual market value of the
building as on the date of the plaint. Clause (a) of sub-section
(3) lays down that market value of any property other than
agricultural land and building shall be the value it will fetch on
0
the date of institution of the suit. Sub-section (4) lays down that
where subject matter of the suit is only a restricted or fractional
interest in a property, the market value of the property shall be
deemed to be the value of the restricted or fractional interest.
Section 40 deals with suits for canr.ellation of decrees etc.
which are not covered by other sections. If this section is
E
interpreted in the light of the expression 'save as otherwise
provided' used in Section 7(1), it becomes clear that the rule
enshrined therein is a clear departure from the one contained
in Section 7 read with Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and
48 which provide for payment of court fee on the market value
F
of the property. In that sense, Section 40 contains a special rule.
Section 40(1) lays down that in a suit for cancellation of a decree
for money or other property having a money value, or other
document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign,
limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title
G or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee shall
be computed on the value of the subject matter of the suit and
further lays down that such value shall be deemed to be if the
whole decree or other document sought to be cancelled, the
amount or value of the property for which the decree was
H
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR.
677
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.)
passed or other document was executed. If a part of the decree
A
or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the
amount or value of the property constitute the basis for fixation
of court fee. Sub-section (2) lays down that if the decree or other
document is such that the liability under it cannot be split up
and the relief claimed relates only to a particular item of the
B
property belonging to the plaintiff or the plaintiffs share in such
property, fee shall be computed on the value of such property,
or share or on the amount of the decree, whichever is less. The
deeming clause contained in the substantive part of Section
40(1) makes it clear thc:it in a suit filed for cancellation of a c
document which creates any right, title or interest in immovable
property, the court fees is required to be computed ori the value
of the property for which the document was executed. To put it
differently, the value of the property for which the document was
· executed and not its market value is relevant for the purpose
0
of court fee. If the expression 'value of the subject matter of the
suit' was not followed by the deeming clause, it could possibly
be argued that the word 'value' means the market value, but
by employing the deeming clause, the legislature has made it
clear that if the document is sought to be cancelled, the amount
E
of court fee shall be computed on the value of the property for
which the document was executed and not the market value of
the property. The words "for which" appearing between the
words "property" and "other documents" clearly indicate that the
court fee is required to be paid on the value of the property
mentioned in the document, which is subject matter of
challenge.
12. If the legislature intended that fee should be payable
F
on the market value of the subject matter of the suit filed for
cancellation of a document which purports or operates to
G
create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any present or future
right, title and interest, then it would have, instead of
incorporating the requirement of payment of fees on value of
subject matter, specifically provided for payment of court fee
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 6 S.C.R.
A on the market value of the subject matter of the suit as has been
done in respect of other types of suits mentioned in Sections
25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48. The legislature may have
also, instead of using the expression "value of the property for
which the document was executed", used the expression "value
B of the property in respect of which the document was executed".
However, the fact of the matter is that in Section 40(1) the
legislature has designedly not used the expression 'market
value of the property'.
13. If the interpretation placed by the trial Court and the
C High Court on the expression "value of the property for which
the document was executed" is accepted as correct then the
word ·value' used in Section 40(1) of the Act will have to be
read as ·market value' and we do not see any compelling
reason to add the word 'market' before the word 'value' in
D Section 40(1) of the Act.
14. We may now advert to the judgments relied upon by
the learned counsel for the parties and some other judgments
of different High Courts in which Section 40(1) of the Act and
E similar provisions of other State legislations have been
interpreted.
15. In Venkata Narasimha Raju v. Chandrayya AIR 1927
Madras 825, the Division Bench of Madras High Court
F interpreted Section 7 (v) (a) of the Court-fees Act as amended
by Madras Act of 1922 and observed:
"One point raised is whether the market value of the
property should not be taken for the purpose of this
valuation, or whether the statutory value should be adopteo.
G
We think the latter is the proper course as there is nothing
in the Act to show that the market value is the value
contemplated in S. 7 (iv) (a). When there is in the Act itself
a special rule as to valuing property in suits for Courtfees, we think it is proper to take that method of valuation
H
in preference to any other method to get the value where
SATHEEDEVI v. PRASANNA AND ANR.
679
[G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
there is no indication that any other method should be A
adopted."
(emphasis supplie9)
16. In Ba/ireddi v.