# SATINDER SINGH AND OTHERS v. AMRAO SINGH AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1961] 3 S.C.R. 676
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendra\Jadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. c. DAS GUPTA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/satinder-singh-and-others-v-amrao-singh-and-others-2070
- **Pages:** 22

## Headnote

Land Acquisition-Cis-Sutlij Jagir-Inalienable Land-Compensation, apportionment of-Interest, when payable-East Punjab
Acquisition and Requisition of· Immovable Property (Temporary
Powers) Act, x948 (E.--P . .¢of x948), s. s~Land Acquisition Act,
x894 (I of x894), H, z3, 3z, 34-lnterest Act, x839 (3z oj.r839)
SS.I, Z.
Lands in four villages forming part of the Cis-Sutlej Jagir
were compulsorily acquired under the· East Punjab Acquisition
and Requisition of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers}
Act, 1948. At the time of the acquisition A was the holder of
the jagir. Possession over one of the villages had been given to
,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
A's wife G in lieu of maintenance under a consent decree. The
matter of payment of compensation was referred to an arbitrator.
A claimed that he was entitled to the entire compensation amount
as he was the present holder of the Jagir. A's son S claimed that
the lands acquired were inalienable, that A merely had a life
interest therein and that the compensation money should be
deposited out of which A should get only the interest for his life.
G claimed that she was entitled· to the entire compensation in
respect of the lands over which she was in possession. All the
claimants claimed interest on the compensation amount from the
date of taking of possession to the date of payment of compensation. The arbitrator held.:. (i) the acquired lands were inalienable
and A merely had a life interest therein,_ (ii) S was entitled to a
share in the compensation awarded, . (iii) the amount of compensation for the first three villages should not be deposited but
should be divided between A and S in the proportion of 3/ 4th to
1/4th, (iv) the compensation for the fourth village should be
deposited and the interest thereof be paid to G and after the
death- of G the amount be divided between Aarn;j S half and half,
and (v) the claimants were not entitled to anyi interest on the
amount of compensation. On appeal the High Court confirmed
the awards in toto. The claimants appealed to the Supreme Court
by special leave.
·
Held, that the acquired lands formed part of a Cis-Sutlej Jagir
which was inalienable, that A was merely a limited owner thereof
and was not entitled to the entire amount of compensation and
that the reversioners were also entitled to a share therein. The
compensation amount could not be permanently deposited leaving the parties the right to enjoy only its income. Even if the
equitable principle of s. 32, Land Acqnisition Act, r&;4, was
applied it would not justify the permanent investment of the
compensation amount. Section 32(1)(b) was intended to be applied
provisi9nally for short perigds, where other lands had to be,
pnrchased out of the compensation money but were not immediately available and the money had to be invested as an interim
measure till such lands were available. It was fair to divide the
compensation money in respect of the first three villages half and
half between A and S. In deciding the question of apportionment
on equitable grounds it was relevant and material t_o take into
account the facts that no part of the amount paid to A would
reach the reversioners. that S himself had a son and that the
reversionary interest had to be safeguarded.
Shri Somashekhar Swami v. Bapusaheb Narayanrao Patil
A.I.R. 1948 Born. 176, K. C. Banerjee, Official Receiver, In re:
A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 402, Mt. Gang; v. Santu A.LR. 1929 Lah. 736
and Special Deputy Collector, Ramnad v. Rajah of Ramnad A.I.R.
1935 Macj. 215, referred to.
Held, further, that the claimants were entitled to interest at
4 % per annum on the compensation amount. from the date when
possession was taken by the State to the date on which it deposited
Sa1inder Singh
v.
Amrao Singh
Satinder Singh
v.
Amrao Singh
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
or paid the amount of compensation to the claimants. 'I:he
provision in s. 5(e) of the. 1948 Act which made s. 23(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, applicable did not exclud

## Text

_Characters 0–39,881 of 49,247. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39881 for what follows._

676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
' 96'
judgment in C. A. No. 416 of 1958 (Standard Vacuum
Burmalo-Shlll
Refining Co., Ltd.
versUIJ Its Workmen) the compoR•ftneri" Limil•a nents of a living wage are largely different from those
v.
of a fair wage. The difference in the living wage
TluirWorkm"' standards of the class to which operatives generally
belong and the class to which the clerical staff belongs
Das Gupta].
I96z
February :1.
may produce much greater differences in the money
value in the components of the requirement of Jiving
wage as between the two classes than the difference
in the money value of. the components of fair wage of
the two classes.
·
There is no justification therefore for thinking that
the living wage of the clerical staff is only 80% more
than the living wage of the operatives and so no
conclusion that the gap between the living wage and
the actual wage is less in the case of clerks than in
the case of operatives can be drawn from a consideration of the comparative wages received by them.
We find nothing that would justify us in interfering
with the conclusion of the Tribunal that the clerical
staff should be awarded bonus at the same rate as the
operatives.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
SATINDER SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
AMRAO SINGH AND OTHERS.
(P. B. GAJENDRA\JADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and
K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
Land Acquisition-Cis-Sutlij Jagir-Inalienable Land-Compensation, apportionment of-Interest, when payable-East Punjab
Acquisition and Requisition of· Immovable Property (Temporary
Powers) Act, x948 (E.--P . .¢of x948), s. s~Land Acquisition Act,
x894 (I of x894), H, z3, 3z, 34-lnterest Act, x839 (3z oj.r839)
SS.I, Z.
Lands in four villages forming part of the Cis-Sutlej Jagir
were compulsorily acquired under the· East Punjab Acquisition
and Requisition of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers}
Act, 1948. At the time of the acquisition A was the holder of
the jagir. Possession over one of the villages had been given to
,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
A's wife G in lieu of maintenance under a consent decree. The
matter of payment of compensation was referred to an arbitrator.
A claimed that he was entitled to the entire compensation amount
as he was the present holder of the Jagir. A's son S claimed that
the lands acquired were inalienable, that A merely had a life
interest therein and that the compensation money should be
deposited out of which A should get only the interest for his life.
G claimed that she was entitled· to the entire compensation in
respect of the lands over which she was in possession. All the
claimants claimed interest on the compensation amount from the
date of taking of possession to the date of payment of compensation. The arbitrator held.:. (i) the acquired lands were inalienable
and A merely had a life interest therein,_ (ii) S was entitled to a
share in the compensation awarded, . (iii) the amount of compensation for the first three villages should not be deposited but
should be divided between A and S in the proportion of 3/ 4th to
1/4th, (iv) the compensation for the fourth village should be
deposited and the interest thereof be paid to G and after the
death- of G the amount be divided between Aarn;j S half and half,
and (v) the claimants were not entitled to anyi interest on the
amount of compensation. On appeal the High Court confirmed
the awards in toto. The claimants appealed to the Supreme Court
by special leave.
·
Held, that the acquired lands formed part of a Cis-Sutlej Jagir
which was inalienable, that A was merely a limited owner thereof
and was not entitled to the entire amount of compensation and
that the reversioners were also entitled to a share therein. The
compensation amount could not be permanently deposited leaving the parties the right to enjoy only its income. Even if the
equitable principle of s. 32, Land Acqnisition Act, r&;4, was
applied it would not justify the permanent investment of the
compensation amount. Section 32(1)(b) was intended to be applied
provisi9nally for short perigds, where other lands had to be,
pnrchased out of the compensation money but were not immediately available and the money had to be invested as an interim
measure till such lands were available. It was fair to divide the
compensation money in respect of the first three villages half and
half between A and S. In deciding the question of apportionment
on equitable grounds it was relevant and material t_o take into
account the facts that no part of the amount paid to A would
reach the reversioners. that S himself had a son and that the
reversionary interest had to be safeguarded.
Shri Somashekhar Swami v. Bapusaheb Narayanrao Patil
A.I.R. 1948 Born. 176, K. C. Banerjee, Official Receiver, In re:
A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 402, Mt. Gang; v. Santu A.LR. 1929 Lah. 736
and Special Deputy Collector, Ramnad v. Rajah of Ramnad A.I.R.
1935 Macj. 215, referred to.
Held, further, that the claimants were entitled to interest at
4 % per annum on the compensation amount. from the date when
possession was taken by the State to the date on which it deposited
Sa1inder Singh
v.
Amrao Singh
Satinder Singh
v.
Amrao Singh
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
or paid the amount of compensation to the claimants. 'I:he
provision in s. 5(e) of the. 1948 Act which made s. 23(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, applicable did not exclude the application of ss. 28 and 34 of the latter Act which dealt with the
payment of interest. On grneral principles, the act of taking
possession of immovable property generally implied an agreement to pay interest on the value of the property ; the right to
receive interest took the place of the right to retain possession.
The application of this rule was not exclud.ed by s. 5 of the 1948
Act. Even under the Interest Act, 1839, the power to award
interest on equitable grounds was expressly saved by the proviso
to S, l,
Swift 0- Co. v. Board of Trade [1925] A.C. 520, Birch v. Joy
(1852) 3 H.L.C. 565 and Inglewood Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd. v. New
Brunswick Electric Power C0mmission [1928] A.C. 429, applied.
Surjan Singh v. Tile East Punjab Government A.LR. 1957
Punj. 265, approved.
Seth Thawardas Pherumal v. The Union of India [1955] 2
S.C.R. 48 and Nachiappa Cheltiar v. Subramaniam Chettiar [1960]
2 S.C.R. 209, referred to.
CIVIL
AI'PELLATE
JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 396 to 398 and 419 to 421 of1959, and 152of1960.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and
order dated November 5, 1958, of the Punjab High
Court in First Appeals from Orders Nos. 42 to 44, 60
to 62 and 55 of 1955 respectively.
M. 0. Betalvad, Attorney-General for India, 8. N.
Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the
appellants (in C. As. Nos. 396 to 398 of 59) and Respondent No. 2 (in C. As. Nos. 419 to 421 of 59 and
152 of 60).
A. V. Viswanatha Bastri and G. 0. Mathur, for the
appellant (In C. As. Nos. 419 to 421of59), Respondent
No. 1 (In 0. As. Nos. 396 to 398 of 59) and Respondent
No. 3 (In C. A. No. 152 of 60).
G. 0. Mathur, for the appellant (In C. A. No. 152
of 60).
<iOpaJ, Singh and D. Gupta, for Respondent No. 2 (In
C. As. Nos. 396 to 398 of 59) and Respondent No. 1 (In
C. As. Nos. 419 of 59 and 152 of 60).
1961. Februarr 2. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
'
'
I
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
679
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This is a group of seven
196r
ap. peals all of which arise from the same land acquisih
P
. b
Satinder Singh
tion proceedings in respect of whic
the
unia
Government originally issued a notification under s. 4
Amrn:·singh
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on March 23, 1948.
By this notification the State Government declared Gajendragadkar J.
its intention to acquire land in the Ambala District
for t.he construction of the new Capital for East
Punjab. No rtction was, however, taken in purRuance
of this notificrttion . .Meanwhile the Punjab Legislature
passed the East Punjab Requisition of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 48 of 1948. Under the
provisions of this Act the Government requisitioned
the land in question for the purpose of resettling the
persons who were likely to be evicted from their lands
as a result of the construction of the new Capital.
The said land was actually acquired on May 20, 1951.
This l~nd forms part of a Jagir known as "Singh
Purian" and comprises the areas of villages Mataur,
Dhirpur, Saneta and Giddarpur in the District of
Ambala. It appears that these villages originally
formed part of 1.he area covered by the Cis Sutlej
States. S. Amra.o Singh was entered as owner of the
htnd thus acquired. His wife is Sardarani Gurdial
Kaur and his son is Satinder Singh. The estate of
Amra.o Singh was at th_e relevant time being managed
by the Court of Wards. Pursuant to the provisions
of the Act compensation was assessed by the estate
officer and was accordingly offered by the State
Government to th<" Court of Wards. The Court of
Wards agreed to the amount of compensation thus
offered and Amra.o Singh himself did not object to it.
Sa.tinder Singh, however, was not willing to accept
the said compensation and he raised several objections
contending that it was wholly inadequate. He also
objected to the compensation being paid either to the
Court of Wards or to his father Amrao Singh, and in
support of this contention he urged that since the
estate once formed part of Cis Sutlej States, Amra.o
Singh was entitled only to its usufruct for his life and
had no right to alienate or otherwise deal with its
corpus. Satinder Singh's plea was that after the
87
680
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
'96'
amount of compensation was finally determined it
Satinder Singh should be deposited in Government Securities or
v.
alternatively a part of it should be paid to him as
Amrao Singh
compensation for the land of his reversionary rights.
. --
This plea applied to the three villages of Mataur,
Ga;endragadkar J. Saneta and Giddarpur. In regard to the village of
Dhirpur, Amrao Singh's wife Sardarani Gurdial Kaur
claimed that she was in possession of the said village
as it was charged for the payment of her maintenance
by a compromise decree passed in her favour and
against her husband Amrao Singh. She therefore
claimed for herself the entire amount of compensation.
Thus the contest about the apportionment of the
compensation amount took a triangulM form.
At this stage it would be convenient to refer to the
relevant provisions of the statute under which the
present proceedings have been taken. In 1948 the
relevant Punjab statute was East Punjab Act, 48
of 1948. Section 2 of the said Act deals with the
requisitioning of property, and s. 3 empowers the
State Government to acquire requisitioned properties.
Section 5 prescribes the principles according to which
compensation had to be paid in regard to acquired
properties. Section 5(e) provides that the arbitrator,
in making his a.ward, shall have regard to the provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 23 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (I of 1894) so far aB the same can be made
applicable.
This Act w.as followed by the Punjab Requisitioning
of Immovable Property (Amendment and Validation)
Act, 1951 (President's Act No. 2 of 1951). Bys. 5 of
this Act s. 5 of the earlier Act was amended, inter
alia., by adding one provision. This provision provides
that·where any property is acquired in connection
with the new Capital of the State of Punjab compensation may be pa.id whether by agreement or by a.ward
of the arbitrator, either in money or in kind or partly
in money and partly in kind, and where there is no
person competent to alienate the property, or there is a
person with limited interest in such. property, o! there
is any dispute as to the persons entitled to receive the
compensation or a.s to the apportionment thereof, the
arbitrator shall make an award in such a manner or
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
681
make an arrangement in such a way as may be equitr96r
able havin0"
regard to the interests of the persons
Satinder Singh
concerned ; in other words, the principle of equitable
v,
apportionment which had been recognised by s. 32 of
Amrao Singh
tbe Land Acquisition· Act of 1894 has in effect been
added by this amending Act.
Gajendragadkar ].
In 1953 the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition
of Immovable Property Act, 1953 (XI of 1953), came
into force.
Section 24 of this Act repeals the two
earlier Acts of 1948 and 1951, and after this Act came
into force it was the provisions of this Act that
governed the proceedings relating to the requisitioning
and acquisition of immovable properties in Punjab.
The equitable principle which was inserted in the Act
of 1948 by the amending Act of 1951 has been retained
in the present Act under s. 8 (3).
Section 23 (1) of this
Act validates requisitions and acquisitions of properties there specified, while sub-s. (2) of the said section
provides, inter alia, that acquisition of immovable
property purporting to have been made before the
commencement of this Act shall be deemed for aJI
purposes to have been validly made as if the provisions of the said enactment or order had been included
and enacted in this section, and this section had been
in force on and from the date of the acquisition. It
has been held by a Full· Bench of the Punjab High
Court in Colonel His Highness Raja Sir Harindar Singh
Brar Bans Bahadur, Ruler, F'aridkot State v. The State
of Punjah (1) that compensation for property acquired
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or under the
Punjab Act ofl948 must be paid in accordance with the
principles set out in those Acts and not in accordance
with the principles set out in the later Act of 1953. This
position is not disputed by either party in the' present
proceedings. Thus it is common ground that for
determining the amount of compensation and its
apportionment amongst the rival claimants the provisions of the relevant Act of 1948 are applicable though
the proceedings were held under the relevant provisions of the later Act of 1953. In fact, the appointment of the arbitrator who conducted the proceedings
(i) (r957) 59 Punj. L.R. 386.
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
z96z
in the preRent case was made by the State Government under s. 8(l)(b) of the Act of 1953.
We have
Satinder Singh
v.
already noticed that the provisions of s. 8 (3) of this
Amrao Singh
Act were included by an amendment in the earlier Act
of 1948 by the amending Act of 1951.
Gaj•ndragadkar J.
Befora the arbitrator the acquisition proceedings
were dealt with in four different cases, each one being
related to the lands in one of the four villages in question. On the contentions raised by the parties the
arbitrator .first considered two preliminary issues.
They wgre: (1) Is Satinder Singh competent to object
to the amount of compensation awarded in the nase,
and (2) Is the appointment of the arbitrator invalid
on account of the agreement between the State and
the Court of Wards about the amount of compensation
payable by the State to the Court of Wards. It
appears that Amrao Singh contended tha.t his son
Satinder Singh had no locus standi in the matter, and
that since he and the pourt of ·wards had agreed to
the amount of compensation offered by the State the
arbitrator had no jurisdiction to hold any enquiry on
the claim put forward by Satinder Singh.
The
arbitrator, however, rejected Amrao Singh's pleas,
and held that he was entitled and bound to hold the
proceedings and to consider the merits of the pleas
raised by Satinder Singh.
The arbitrator then proceeded to examine the
merits of the rival contentions. He found that the
property in suit was a part of Cis Sutlej States a.rid so
Amrao Singh had only a limited interest in it and had
no right to alienate it.
As a result of this conclusion
the arbitrator held that Satinder Singh, who was the
next heir, was entitled to contest the amount of compensation and was also entitled to claim a share in
the distribution of the amount. In regard to Dhirpur
land he hetd that :Sardarani Gurdial Kaur was entitled
to retain the possession of the village for her maintenance under a compromise decree and that both
Amrao Singh and Satinder Singh were bound by the
said decree. In the result the arbitrator determined
tho amount of compensation and directed that the
entire amount of compensation in regard to Dhirpur
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
683
should be invested in Government Securities in the
name of the holder of Manauli Estate with a charge·
z961
Salinder Singh
in favour ofGurdial Kaur which would entitle her to
v.
its annual profits in lieu of maintenance. He also
Am•ao Singh
directed that on the death of Gurdial Kaur the amount
should be divided half and half between the then Gajendragadkar J.
holder of the Estate and the next heir or heirs taken
togeth1>r. In regard to the lands in the three other
villages the arbitrator directed that the amount of
compensat.ion determined by him should be paid in
cash, 3/4thR to Amrao Singh and l/4th to the next
sole heir Satinder Singh.
The amount originally
offered by the Government and ultimately awarded
by the arbitrator were as follows :
V iUage
Govt. Off er
Mataur (Plus
Rs. 93,309·00
15% acquisiAward
Rs. 1,82,813·00
tion charges)
Saneta
Rs. 42,179·00
Rs.
55,377·00
Giddarpur
Rs. 15,726·00
Rs.
27,640·00
Dhirpur
Rs.1,17,912·00
Rs. 2,27,860·00
It would thus be seen that the contest made by
Sa.tinder Singh in respect of the amount of compensation originally offered by the Government substantially
succeeded inasmuch as the total amount offered was
increased by the a.rbitrator by Rs. 2,24,564/-.
. The order thus passed by the arbitrator was
recorded by him in the four cases tried before him in
respect of the four villages. These orders became the
subject matter of several appeals in the Punjab High
Court. The State of Punjab preferred four appeals
67 to 70 of 1955; Satinder Singh preferred three
appeals 42 to 44 of 1955; Amrao Singh preferred four
appeals 59 to 62 of 1955; and Sardarani Gurdial Kaur
preferred Appeal No. 55 of 1955. In its appeal the
State urged before the High Court that Satinder
Singh was.not competent to object to the compensation offered by the State and so the proceedings held
before the arbitrator were invalid. It was also urged
alternatively that Amrao Singh and Sardarani Gurdial
Kaur were not entitled to compensation at the higher
rates directed by the arbitrator, and. that the benefit
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
r96i
of the award should be available only to Satinder
Singh, and it was contended that the amount of comSatinder Singh
v.
pensation fixed by the arbitrator was excessive. All
""''"''Singh
these contentions have been rejected by the High
Court and the appeals preferred by the State have
Gajendragadkar J. been dismiRsed.
The State has not challenged the
correctness of the decision of the High Court, and so
we are not concerned in the present appeals with the
merits of the pleas raised by the State before the
High Court.
In the appeals preferred by Satinder Singh the High
Court rejected his plea that the valuation fixed by the
arbitrator in respect of certain properties was inadequate. It also rejected his plea that the amount of
compensation ordered to be divided between him and
his father Amrao Singh should be deposited in Government Securities. The High Court held that though
equitable considerntions would be relevant in deciding
the question of apportionment, it would be inexpedient
to direct that the amount shquld be deposited in
Government Securities because in that case no one
will ever be absolutely entitled to it. The High Court
also thought that since the State in whose favour the
estate may finally lapse owing to escheat did not
object to the apportionment made by the arbitrator
there was no reason to interfere with the actual order
as to apportionment between father and son which
the arbitrator thought was reasonable. In dealing
with this question the High Court took the view that
the alleged reckless extravagance of the father on
which the son relied was not relevant. In the result
the three appeals filed by Satinder Singh were
dismissed.
The High Court then dealt with the appeal preferred
by Amrao Singh, and it confirmed the finding of the
arbitrator that the property acquired originally formed part of Cis Sutlej State~ and that in regard to the
said States the rule is now well settled that the J agirs
large or small in Cis Sutlej States are non-transferable
and are even exempt from attachment as political
pensions, the holder for the time being ha:vin~ only
life interest in the estate, the corpus of whtch is to be
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
685
kept intact so that it may pass from heir to heir and
z96z
lapse in favour of the Government in the absence of Satindrr Singh
any legal heir. The High Court also held that even
...
if the character of the property was considered from
Am•ao Singh
the angle of the general custom of Punjab the same
conclusion followed because the property in question Gajendragadk"' J.
was undoubtedly ancestral immovable property iu the
hands of the father qua his son and as such the father
had no right to alienate it to . the prejudice of his son
without legal necessity or any other compelling
reason. That is how the principal point urged by the
father against the claim set up by his son was rejected
and his appeals were dismissed. The appeal preferred
by Sardarani Gurdial Kaur also met the same fate
and was dismissed.
It appears that all J;he three claimants urged before
the High Court that they were entitled to interest at
a reasonable rate on the amount of compensation
from the time that the property was acquired and
they lost possession of it. This contention was likewise rejected by the High Court, and it was held that
under the relevant Act of 1948, it was not permissible
to award interest on the amount of compensation .
. The result was that the decision of the arbitrator was
fully confirmed and all the appeals preferred before
the High Court were dismissed. This decision of the
High Court is challenged by special leave by the three
claimants Amrao Singh, Satinder Singh and Sardarani
Gurdial Kaur respectively. The appeals preferred by
Sa.tinder Singh are Civil Appeals Nos. 396 to 398 of
1959; Amrao Singh's appeals are Civil Appeals
Nos. 419 to 421 of 1959, whereas Sardarani Gurdial
Ka.ur's appeal is Civil Appeal No. 152 of 1960. That
is how this group of seven appeals arises from the
same land acquisition proceedings taken by the State
of Punjab in respect of the lands situated in the four
villages already mentioned. We wonld hereafter refer
to Sa.tinder Singh as the appellant, Amra.o Singh as
respondent 1, the State of Punjab as respondent 2,
and Sa.rdarani Gurdial Kaur as Sardarani.
Logically then the first point which we must consider is the nature of the property and the tit.le· of
686
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
I96I
respondent I in relation to it. That is the principal
Point which Mr. Viswanatha Sastri sought to raise
Satindtr Singh
v.
before us in the appeal filed by reBpondent I. This
Ammo Singh
question has been considered both by the arbitrator
.
and the High Court elaborately and they have conGa;end•agadkar J. curred in making a finding against respondent I. As
ti1e judgment of the High Court points out the fact
that the lands in question originally formed part of
the domain of S. Budh Singh or of the Cis Sutlej
States was not seriously dii;puted before the High
Court. This implied concession naturally makes
Mr. Sastri's task very difficult. Besides, we are not
satisfied that there is any substance in the plea which
Mr. Sastri has raised before us on this point. The
history of the property has been considered by the
arbitrator, and the arbitrator as well as the High
Court have placed considerable reliance on the relevant
statements made in the Punjab Land Administra.tion
Manual compiled by Sir James McC. Douie and revised
in 1931. Reliance has also been placed on the relevant
statements in the compilation known aa the "Chiefs
and Families of Nate in the Punjab " published by
the Punjab Government in 1940. The pedigree table
of the Singh Purian family given in this publication
shows that the family was founded by S. Kapur Singh
who held the title of Nawab. S. Budh Singh was his
grandson and he was the head of the family in 1809.
Amrao Singh is a descendant of Gopal Singh who was
one of the seven sons of Budh Singh. The large
J agirs owned by the families are situated in Kharar
and Rupar Tehsils of Ambala District and they
formed part of the area formerly known as Cis Sutlej
States. Paragraphs 100, 101and102 ofDouie's Land
Administration Manual give a detailed account of the
families and their properties. The same is also briefly
mentioned in the Punjab Gazel'teer dealing with
Ambala District.
It appears from this material that the Sardars in
the Cis Sutlej States were independent Rulers whose
ancestors ultimately came under the protection of the
British Government in about 1809.
Between 1809 to
1847 the British Government tried to enforce. good
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
687
government amongst the semi-independent States; in
z96z
order to achieve this object the British Government
d
11
Id
d
h
d
Satind~r Si11ih
gra ua y strengthened its ho
an tig tene the reins
v.
with a view to enforce good government. It appears
Amrao Sin8h
that the Government exercised the right of escheat
very freely and whenever there was lapse of heirs it Gajendragadkar J.
took up the management and government of the area
in its own hands.
After 1846 Government began to
introduce sweeping measures of reform and with that
object Government reduced the privileges and rights
of the petty chieftains. In 1849 the chieftains lost
their sovereign powers and were deprived of their
criminal, civil and fiscal jurisi;liction so that they
became no more than Jagirdars. Their rights in the
lands held by them were, however, left untoached.
Rules regarding succession to these J agirs were framed
by the Central Government from time to time and
family custom was respected within reasonable limits.
-One of these rules is to be found in paragraph 111 of
Douie's Manual. Clause (c) of this paragraph laid
down "that alienations by a Jagirdar or pattid11.r of
portions of his holding, whether to his relations or
strangers, shall neither be officially recognised nor
officially recorded." Similarly paragraph 164 emphasised the inalienable character of the J agirs and
referred to the opinion expressed by the Court of
Directors whereby the said character was clearly and
unambiguously notified. "We should have supposed ", said the Court of Directors, " that there could
be no necessity for notifying this as a rule, since it
follows from the very nature of.a Jagir\ which cannot
be alienated and can only be attached tor the life of
the holder." There is thus no doubt that the statements in the authorised publications to which we
have just referred· and on which the High Court and
the arbitrator have relied conclusively show that the
holder of property which was a pa.rt of Cis Sutlej
States did not own the property absolutely but held
it as a limited owner. The Kaifiat Ta.Iuka. of Singh
Purian family which has been produced in these
proceedings supports the same conclusion,
88
MB
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
r961
Mr. Sastri, however, wanted to contend that the
5o1;..a., Sn•gh evidence on the record was insufficient to justify the
v.
conclusion that the lands under acquisition formed
.dmrao Singh
part of the original estate of S. Budh Singh ; but he
. -
fairly conceded. that respondent I had not g01Je into
Ga1endragadhar J. the witness box and bad not purported to justify his
plea that any of the lands in dispute have been
acquired either by him or by his ancestors in such
manner that they could be treated as the absolute
properties of the holder. The circular issued by the
Office of the Commissioner and Superintendent of Cis
Sutlej States on February 26, 1857, unambiguously
shows that " all prop..rietary right to any part of the
lands forming a part of the Jagir which may be held
by the J agirdar will be considered as pertaining to
the J agir and will go to the holder of the J agir for
the time being." This principle was applicable even
to houses and other buildings standing on the J agir
which are in the nature of forts and may be conHidered tc:> appertain to the estate. The only exception made
was in regard to the. shops built or acquired by the
Jagirdar in a town apart from his place of residence.
Therefore, on the material as it stands it is difficult
to sustain the plea that the concurrent findings made
by the arbitrator and the High Com;t on the question
about the character of the property and the nature of
the title held by the holder of the said property are
wrong. Incidentally it may be added that the same
conclusion has been reached by the High Court on
the ground of the customary law prevailing in the
Punjab. We must accordingly proceed to deal with
the rest of the dispute between the parties on the
basis that the respondent I is not the absolute owner
of the property and that the appellant is entitled to
represent the reversionary interest in the present
proceedings.
That takes us to the pleas raised by the appellant
in his appeals. On his behalf it has been urged by
the learned Attorney-General that the whole amount
of compensation in respect of the three villages
Mataur, Suneta and Giddarpur should be appropriately invested and both he and respondent l should
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
689
be allowed to enjoy the income coming from the said
r961
investment in the share which may ultimately be
h
Salinde, Si~lt
fixed between them. In support of this rn;mtention e
v.
relies on the provisions of s. 32(l)(b) of the Land
Amrao sin~h
· Acquisition Act I of 1894. This provisioμ empowers
the Court to direct that the compensation amountGajendragadhar ].
payable to the owners should be invested either in
Government or approved securities and the payment of
interest or other proceedings arising from such iuterest
should be directed to the person or persons who would
for the time being have been entitled to the possession
of the lands under acquisition. The argument is that
sinuu respondent 1 was not entitled to alienate the
property and was under an obligation to keep the
corpus in tact for the benefit of the reversioners the
compem[ttion amount payable in respect of the
acquisition of the said property should be similarly
treated ii.nd saved for the benefit of the reversioners;
in other words, it is urged that the compensation
amount should be treated as a conversion of the corpus
of lands and .the same should not be distributed as
directed by the High Court. Section 32 deals with
cases where the land acquired belonged to any person
who had no power to alienate the same; and since·
respondent 1 was not entitled to alienate the property
the principle. enunciated by s. 32(1) (b) is pressed into
service as an equitable principle which should be
applied to th'3 present case. In support of this argument
the learned Attorney-General has relied on decisions
of different High Courts. where this principle has been
extended to watan property (Shri Somashekhar Swami
v. Bapusaheb Narayanrao Patil (1)), to the property
belonging to an idol (K. G. Bannerjee, Ojficial Receiver,
In re (')), to the property held by a widow (Mt. Gangi
v. Santu & Others (') ), or to land belonging to an
impartible estate (Special Deputy Oolleetor, Ramnad v.
Rajah of Ramnad (') ).
This contention, however, ignores that. the provisions ofs. 32 (1) (b) are intended to be applied only
provisionally and for a short period. The scheme of
(1) A.l.R. 1948 Bom. 176•
(•) A.LR. 1928 C&I. 402.
(3) A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 736.
(4) A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 215 •.
690
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
x96x
s. 32 is that in cases to which the said section applies
the Court shall order the compensation amount to be
Satinde, Singh
d
v.
iuveste in the purchase of other lands which would
Amrao .Singh
be held under the right, title and conditions of ownership a.s the land in respect of which the compensation
s•j•ndragadk•r J. amount has been deposited. That is the plain effect
of a. 32(l)(a). Section 32 (l)(b) comes into operation if
such purchase cannot be effected . forthwith; and it
has to remain in operation until such purchase is
made. In other words, if the compensation amount
cannot be immediately invested in the purchase of
other lands, as an interim measure the said amount
may be invested in the prescribed securities and
income thereof distributed to those who were entitled
to it. Therefore, even if the principle underlying s. 32
i11 extended to the present case on equitable considerations it would not justify the appellant's claim that
the compensation amount should itself be treated as
corresponding to the corpus of lands acquired and
should be permanently invested in suitable securities
leaving to th.e parties concerned the right to enjoy
only its income> ~uch a course is plainly inconsistent
with the principle'recognised by s. 32(l)(a). There·
fore, we are not prepai'W. to accede to the argument
that the compensation ambunt should not be divided
between the parties and sho.:uld be permanently
deposited iii the fund set apart in'··proper investments.
If the said amount must, therefore, be divided between the appellant and respondent I how should it be
divided? That is the next question which calls for
our decision. The appellant contends that the fairest
way to distribute this amount would be to divide it
half and half between him and respondent 1. We are
inclined to hold that this contention is well fQunded.
As the High Court has observed, it is not at all easy
to estimate the relative value of the two interests
represented by the appellant and respondent 1. The
High Court thought that the ratio may be 2/3 and 1/3
or 3/4 and 1/4 there being little to choose between the
two; and so it confirmed the apportionment made by
the arbitrator. This decision, however, suffers from
one serious infirmity. The High Court thought that
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
the conduct of respondent 1 which was characterised
1961
by the appellant as the conduct of a reckless spendthrift and squanderer was wholly irrelevant in
sa1inder Singh ·.
determining the shares to which the appellant and A,,.,.:·s;.,11
respondent 1 were respectively entitled. In our
opinion, in deciding the question of apportionment onGajmdr•gadk•< J.
equitable grounds it is relevant and material to take
into account the grievance made by the appellant that
the money which would be left with respon~ent 1
would be frittered away by him and no part of it would
reach the reversioner. In support of this <rontention
1;he appellant relied on the past conduct of respon·
dent 1. Several alienations made by him are cited and
attention is invited to the fact that after respondent 1
became a major his estate has been taken over by the
Court of Wards for management under s. 5(2) (b) of
the Court of Wards Act, 1903, from 19~8 to 1938, 1939
to 1947, 1948 to 1954. It has also been urged that
since 1954respondent1 has made several unauthorised
alienations. We do not propose to consider' the
validity of each one of these allegations but we have
no hesitation in holding that on the material available
on the record it would be difficult to reject as unfounded the apprehensions which the appellant entertains in regard to the fate of the amount which may
be given to respondent 1.
Besides, we a.re also
inclined to take into account the fact that the appellant himself has a son and in apportioning the amount
we have to bear in mind the fact that the amount is
being paid in respect of the lands which respondent 1
holds as a limited owner and the reversionary interest
in respect of which has to be safeguarded. We would,
therefore, direct that the amount of compensation in
respect of the three villages should be divided between the appellant and respondent 1 half and half. It
is significant that the amount of compensation in
respect of the fourth village which is at present
charged for the maintenance of Sardarani has been
ordered to be divided ha.If and half. Therefore, we
would uphold the contention raised by the learned
Attorney-Genera.I on behalf of the appellant and
direct that the said amount should be divided· not as
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
z96z
2/3 and 1/3 but half and half between the father
and son.
Sa/i1tder Singh
v.
The next point which the learned Attorney-General
Amrao Singh
wanted to urge was that the increase in the a.mount
of compensation directed by the arbitrator should be
;aj••dragadkar J. pa.id to him exclusively. His case w.as that the Court
of Wards and respondent l had accepted the amount
offered by the State Government, and it was because
· he raised contentions that the proceedings were
referred to the arbitrator whose award ultimately
enhanced the compensation amount to a very large
extent. This contention was not raised either before
the arbitrator or before tlie High Court, and we have
therefore not allowed the appellant to raise it before us.
That takes us to the ·question of interest which has
been urged before us by a.11 the three claimants alike.
The,. argument is that the amount of compensation
a.warded should carry a reasonable rate of interest
from the date. of acquisition when the claimants lost
possession of. their properties. . This. argument has
been rejected':by the High Court principally on the
ground that the relevant Act of 1948 makes no provision for payment of interest and omission to make
such a pr-0visii>n amounts in law to an intention not to
a.ward interest in regard. to compensatio1'hJamount
determined .under it. In support of this condusion
the High Court has referred to the fact that s. 5(e) of
the Act specifically makes applicable the provisions of
s. 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, and that,
it JS said, inevitably leads to the inference that SS. 28
and 34 of the. Act whfoh deal with the payment of
interest are .not intended to apply to the. proceedings
under it. In our opinion, this oonC!usion is not well.
founded. It would be legitimate to hold that by the
application of s. 23(1) in terms the provisions of
s. 23(2) a.re by necessary implication excluded. If the
Legislature has . provided t.hat only one part of s. 23
should be applied it would be reasonable to hold that
the other part· of s. 23 was not intended to be applied ;
but we do not see how it would. be l'easonable to hold
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
that by the application of s. 23(1) the principles underI96I
lying the provisions of ss. 28 and 34 are also excluded.
·
Salinder Singh
Therefore, it is necessary to examine this question. on
v.
general grounds and principles without assuming that
Amrao Singh
the application of these .general considerations is
. -.
excluJed by any of the provisions of the Act.
Ga1endragadkar J.
What then is the contention raised by the claimants?
They contend that their immuvable property has been
acquired by the State and the State has ~a.ken possession of it. • Thus they have been deprived of the
right to receive t.he income from .the property and
there is a time lag between the taking of the possession
by the State and the payment of compensation by it
to the claimants. During this period they have been
deprived of the income of the property and t!J'ey have
not been able to receive interest from the amount of
compensation.
Stated broadly the act of taking
possession of.immovable property generally implies an
agreement to pay interest on the value of the property and it is on this principle that a claim for
interest is made against the State. This . question has
been considered on several occasions and the general
principle on which the. contention is raised by the
claimants has been upheld .. In Swift &, Co. v.