# SATISH CHANDHA ANAND v. THE UNION OF iNDIA

- **Citation:** [1953] 1 S.C.R. 655
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1953
- **Bench:** Patanjali Sastri 0.J, Mukhehjea, Vivian Bose, Ghula~I Hasan, Bhagwati
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/satish-chandha-anand-v-the-union-of-india-182
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1050, Arts. 14, 16, 311- Civil servantAppointment on contract for 5 years-Continuation of appointment
on temporary service basis-Tarrnination of service on one month's
notice-Legality·- Fundamental
rights-Central Civil
Services
(Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, r. fi.
The petitioner was employed by the Government of India on .
a five year contract in the Resettlement and Employment Directorate of the Ministry of Labour. When bis contract was due to
expire the Government made him a n.ew offer to
continu~ him ~n
service in his post temporarily for the period of the Resettlement
and Employment Organisation on the condition that he will be
governed by the Central Ciyil Services (Temporary Service)
Rules, 1949, which provided for termination of the contract by one
month's notice on either side. He accepted \be offer and continued
in service, but subsequently his services were terminated after
giving him one month's notice. The- petitioner applied for reiief
under Art. 32 (1) of the Constitution alleging Iba\ his fundamental rights under Arts. 311, 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution
were infringed:
Held, (i) that Art. 311 bad no application as this was not a
case of dismissal or removal from service nor a reduction in rank
but only an ordinary case of a contract being terminated by notice
under one of its clauses,· the difference between dismiesal and
1968
Rani Narayan.
Singh
v •
Th• Stat• of
Delhi
and Othsr3.
Patanja.lS
Sa~tl'i 0. I.
1968
Mar•k la
-656
SUPREME COURT REPOHTS
[1953)
1968
removal being that the former ordinarily disqualifies from future
employment but not the latter;
Batish Chandra
(ii) Art. 14 had no application as he bad not been discriminAnand
ated against and had not been denied the protection of any laws
v,
which others similarly situated could claim ;
The Union of
(iii) Art. 16 was equally inapplicable as the petitioner was
India
not denied equal opportunity in a matter relating to appointment
or employment but had been treated just like any other person
to whom an offer of temporary· _employment under these conditions was made.
The State can enter into contracts of temporary employment
and impose special terms in each case, provided they are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and those who choose to accept
those terms and enter into the contract are bound by them, even
as the State is bound.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition (No. 201of1952)
under Art. 32 of Lhe Oomtitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
R. K. Varma and G. 0. Mrithur for the petitioner.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Por1is
A. Mehta, with him) for th·~ -respondent.
1953. March 13. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
BosE J.-'l'his is a petition under article 32 of the
Constitution in which the petitioner seeks redress
for what, according to bim, is a breach of bis fundamental rights under articles 14 aud 16(1) of the Constitution. It was argued at considerable length by the
petitioner in person.
Then, wben our judgment was
nearly ready, he put in a petition asking for a rehearing aud for permission to file some fresh paper,;.
Wben that was refused be came again on another day
and asked for leave to engage an agent and appear
through counsel as he felt he bad not been able tO do
justice to bis case in person. (It may be mentioned
that tbougb he had originally engaged an agent he
dismissed him before the bearing when he appeared
in person.)
vVe granted bis request and counsel roargued the case for him but has not carried the matter
any funher. The facts are these .•
,
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
In October, 1945, the petitioner was employed by
1968
the Government of India on a five year contract in
. -
.
the Directorate· General of Resettlement and Employ..J''h'~ Oh~ndro
men\ of the Ministry of Labour. This was after selec-
::•
tiou by the Federal Public Service Commission. The U•ion of
After a short period of practical training, he was
fodia
posted in January, 1946, at Jabalpur as t

## Text

8.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
655
feel called upon to deprive other persons of their
persoi;ial liberty in the discharge ·of what they
conceive to be then· duty, must strictly and scrupulously observe the forms and rules of the law.
That
. has not been done in this case.
The petitioners now
before us are therefore entitled to be released and
they are set at liberty forthwith.
'
Petition allowed.
Agent for the petitioner: Ganpat Rai.
Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyakshri.
SATISH CHANDHA ANAND
v.
THE UNION OF iNDIA.
(PATANJALI SASTRI 0.J.,'MUKHEHJEA, VIVIAN BOSE,
GHULA~I HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1050, Arts. 14, 16, 311- Civil servantAppointment on contract for 5 years-Continuation of appointment
on temporary service basis-Tarrnination of service on one month's
notice-Legality·- Fundamental
rights-Central Civil
Services
(Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, r. fi.
The petitioner was employed by the Government of India on .
a five year contract in the Resettlement and Employment Directorate of the Ministry of Labour. When bis contract was due to
expire the Government made him a n.ew offer to
continu~ him ~n
service in his post temporarily for the period of the Resettlement
and Employment Organisation on the condition that he will be
governed by the Central Ciyil Services (Temporary Service)
Rules, 1949, which provided for termination of the contract by one
month's notice on either side. He accepted \be offer and continued
in service, but subsequently his services were terminated after
giving him one month's notice. The- petitioner applied for reiief
under Art. 32 (1) of the Constitution alleging Iba\ his fundamental rights under Arts. 311, 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution
were infringed:
Held, (i) that Art. 311 bad no application as this was not a
case of dismissal or removal from service nor a reduction in rank
but only an ordinary case of a contract being terminated by notice
under one of its clauses,· the difference between dismiesal and
1968
Rani Narayan.
Singh
v •
Th• Stat• of
Delhi
and Othsr3.
Patanja.lS
Sa~tl'i 0. I.
1968
Mar•k la
-656
SUPREME COURT REPOHTS
[1953)
1968
removal being that the former ordinarily disqualifies from future
employment but not the latter;
Batish Chandra
(ii) Art. 14 had no application as he bad not been discriminAnand
ated against and had not been denied the protection of any laws
v,
which others similarly situated could claim ;
The Union of
(iii) Art. 16 was equally inapplicable as the petitioner was
India
not denied equal opportunity in a matter relating to appointment
or employment but had been treated just like any other person
to whom an offer of temporary· _employment under these conditions was made.
The State can enter into contracts of temporary employment
and impose special terms in each case, provided they are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and those who choose to accept
those terms and enter into the contract are bound by them, even
as the State is bound.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition (No. 201of1952)
under Art. 32 of Lhe Oomtitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
R. K. Varma and G. 0. Mrithur for the petitioner.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Por1is
A. Mehta, with him) for th·~ -respondent.
1953. March 13. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
BosE J.-'l'his is a petition under article 32 of the
Constitution in which the petitioner seeks redress
for what, according to bim, is a breach of bis fundamental rights under articles 14 aud 16(1) of the Constitution. It was argued at considerable length by the
petitioner in person.
Then, wben our judgment was
nearly ready, he put in a petition asking for a rehearing aud for permission to file some fresh paper,;.
Wben that was refused be came again on another day
and asked for leave to engage an agent and appear
through counsel as he felt he bad not been able tO do
justice to bis case in person. (It may be mentioned
that tbougb he had originally engaged an agent he
dismissed him before the bearing when he appeared
in person.)
vVe granted bis request and counsel roargued the case for him but has not carried the matter
any funher. The facts are these .•
,
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
In October, 1945, the petitioner was employed by
1968
the Government of India on a five year contract in
. -
.
the Directorate· General of Resettlement and Employ..J''h'~ Oh~ndro
men\ of the Ministry of Labour. This was after selec-
::•
tiou by the Federal Public Service Commission. The U•ion of
After a short period of practical training, he was
fodia
posted in January, 1946, at Jabalpur as the Manager
of the Sub-Regional Employment Exchange and was
later confirmed in this appointment.
This contract of service was due to expire in 1950.
Shortly before its expiration the Government of India
made him a new offer, embodied in its letter dated the
30th June, l 950, to continue him in service on the
expiry of his contract on the terms specified in that
letter. Among them were the following:
"(3) Other conditions of service :-On the termi-
. nation of your contract you
will be allowed to
continue in your post temporarily for the period of
the Resettlement and Employment Organisation and
will be governed by the Central Civil Services
(Temporary Service) .Kules, 1949, nnless you are a permanent Government servant."
He was asked in the letter to intimate to the Ministry of Labour whether he was willing to continue in
service on those terms and he admits that he accepted
the offer and continued in service. Heiwas not a
permanent Government servant though it was contended in argument that he was, for he was Oil a five
year contract and tlie work for which he was employed, namely Hesettlement alld Employment, was itself
only of a temporary character.
Therefore,
the
Temporary Service Rules applied.
On those rules, rule 5 is material. It runs as
follows:
"5. (a) '.!.'he service of· a temporary Government
servant who is not in quasi-permanellt service shall be
liable to terminatioll at any time by notice ill writing
given either by the Government servant to the appointillg authority, or by tbe appointing authority to
the Government senant.
Bose J.
658
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953j
1959
(b) The period of such notice shall be one month,
S t . , Ck a unless otherwise agreed to by the Government and
a u·ri
an .ra..i..
h
t "
Ana"d
..,y t e Government servan .
v.
Quasi-permanent service is defined in the rules and
Tk• Union °1 it is clear that the petitioner does not come within
India
that class. It is also an undisputed fact that there
80,. J.
was no agreement between the petitioner and Government regarding the period of the notice.
'rherefore,
according to this rule, which was a term in the petitioner's contract of further service, his services were
liable to termination at any time by one month's
notice in writing. 'rhis notice was given on 25th
November, 1950, and he was told that his services
would terminate on the expiry of one month from 1st
December, 1950.
A large field was cove.red in the course of the arguments, and had the matter not been re-argued we
would, for the petitioner's satisfaction, have dealt
with the contentions raised more fully than will be
necessary now that counsel has appeared.
The petition is under article 32(1) of the Constitution and so it must be shown that a fundamental
right has been infringed. It was argued that the
rights infringed are the ones conferred by articles l 4
and 16(1).
Taking a:rticle 14 first, it must be shown that the
petitioner has been discriminated against in. the exercise or enjoyment of some legal right which is open
to others who are similarly situated.
The rights
which he says have been infringed are those confered by article 311. He says he has either been dismissed or removed from service without the safeguards
which that article confers. In our opinion, article 311
has no application because this is neither a dismissal
.nor a removal from service, nor is it a reduction in
rank. It is au ordinary case of a contract being terminated by notice under one of its clauses.
The services in lndi~ have long been afforded
certa.in statutory guarantees and safeguards against
arbitrary dismissal or reduction in rank.
Under
•
•
S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S
659
section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the
1958
safeguards were limited to those two cases .. Under 8 . k-O
d
th
C
.
.
h' d
dd d
l
atu
kan ra
e preseut
onst1tut10n, a t tr
was a
e , name y
Anand
removal from service. In order to understand the
v,
difference between "dismissal" and "removal" from Th• Union of
service, it will be necessary to turn to the Rules which
fodia
governed, and with modifications still govern, the
"services" in India. because of article 313 of the Constitution.
Part XII of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules relating to Conduct and Discipline includes rule 49 which sets out the various
penalties to which a member of the services can be
subjected for indiscipline and misconduct.
They are
seven in number and include censure, suspension,
reduction in rank, removal from service and dismissal
from service. The Act of 1935 selected only two of
these possible penalties as serious enough to merit
statutory safeguards, namely reduction in rank and
dismissal from service.
The Constitution has added
a third to the list.
The distinction which is drawn
between the two is explained in rule 49.
There is
first removal from service "which does not disqualify
from futu.re employment" and there is next dismissal
from service "which ordinarily disqualifies from future
employment."
Then follows an Explanation:
"The discharge-
(c) of a person engaged under contract, in ac- ·
cordance with the t,erms of his contract, does not
amount to removal or dismissal within the meaning of
this rule."
These terms are used in the same sense in article311.
It follows that the article has no application here
and so no question of discrimination arises, for the
"law" whose protection the petitioner seeks has no
application to him.
There was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter
into the contract he did.
He was as free under the
law as any other person to accept or to reject the
Bose J.
660
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953]
·z9;s
offer which was made to him.
Havi~g a,ccepted, he
S t . h-Ch a still has open to him all the rights and remedies
a" Anan~n '"available to other persons similarly situated to env.
force any rights under bis coritract which have been
Th• Union of denied to him, assuming tbere are any, and to pursue
I.idi•
in tbe .ordinary courts of the land such remedies for a
breach as are open to him to exactly the· same extent
Bose J.
as other persons similarly situated.
He has not been
discriminated against and he has not been denied the
protection of any laws which others similarly situated
could claim. 'I'he remedy of a writ is misconceived.
Article 16(1) is equally inapplicable.
The whole
matter rests in contract. 'When the petitioner's first
contract (tbe five year one) came to· an end, he was
not a permanent Government servant and Government was not bound either to re-employ him or to
continue him in service.
On the other hand, it was
open to Government to make him the offer it did of a
continuation of l)is employment on a temporary and
contractual basis. Though the employment was continued, it was iu point of fact, and in the eyes of the
law, under a new and fresh contract which was quite
separate and distinct from the old eveu though many
. of its terms were the same.
Article 16(1) deals with
equality of opportunity in all matters relatiug to
employment or appointment to any office under the
State.
'1
1he petitioner
has not been denied any
opportunity of employment or of appointment. He
has been treated just like any other person to whom
au offer of temporary employment under these conditions was made. His grievance, when flnalysed, is nob
one of personal differentiation but is against an offer
of temporary employment; ou special terms as opposed
to permanent employment. But of comse the State
can enter into contracts of temporary employment
and impose special terms in each cas·e, provided they
are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and those
who choose to accept those terms and enter into the
contract are bound by them, even as the State is
bound.
When the employment is permanent there
are certain statutory guarantees but in the absence of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
661
any such limitations Government is, subject to the
1958
qualification mentioned above, as free to make special 8 . h-C d
.
.
atis
han ra
contracts of service with temporary employees, engagAnand
ed in works of a temporary nature, as any other
v.
employer.
The Union of
Various matters .relating to the merits·of the case
India.
were referred to but we express no opinion about
Bo" J.
whether the petitioner has other rights which he can
enforce in other ways.
We are dealing here with a
writ under article 32 to enforce a fundamental right
and the only point we decide is that no fundamental
right bas been infringed.
When the matter was first argued we had decided
not to make any order about costs but now that the
petitioner has persisted in reopening the case and
calling the learned Attorney-General here for a
second time, we have no alternative but to dismiss
the petition with costs.
Petition dismissed.
Agent for the petitioner: Rajinder Narain.
Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha .
•
HABF,.EB MOHAMED
·v. •
·rHE STA'rE OF HYDERABAD.
[PATAl\JALI SAS1'RI C.J., MUKHERJEA, S.R. DAS,
Gm;LAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 13, 14-Hyderabad Regula·
tion X of 1359 F.-Trial by special jwlqe under Reg•tlation X after
26th January, 1950-Provisions of Regulation different from Criminal Procedure Code-Equal protection of the· law - Validity of
trial-Tests of validity-Effect of cu.rtailment of committal proceed·
ings and of right to transfer, revision, confinnation of death sentence.
In determining the validity or otherwise of a pre.Constitution
statute on the ground of any of its provisions being repugnant to
the equal protection clause of the Constitution, two principles
86
1953
March 30.