# SATISH KUMAR & ORS v. SURINDER KUMAR & ORS

- **Citation:** [1969] 2 S.C.R. 244
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-09-27
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 822 of 1966
- **Bench:** S. M. Sikri, R. S. Bachawat, K. S. Hegde
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/satish-kumar-ors-v-surinder-kumar-ors-4492
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

B
Indian Arbitration Act (10 of 1940)-Award in respect of property
over Rs. 100-Registration if compulsory.
Indian Registration Act (16 of 1"908), s.
17(1) (b)-Award in
respect of immovable property over Rs. 100-Registration if compulsory .
•
An arbitrator appointed by the appellants and respondent partitioned
their immovable property exceeding the value of Rs. 100. The arbitrator
applied nnder s. 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 to the Court for
making the award a rule of the court. On the question whether the
award was admissible in evidence as it was not registered,
HELD: (per Full. Court.) The award required registration.
(Per Sikri and Bachawat, JI.) All claims which are the subject matter
c
of a reference to arbitration merge in the award which is pron.onnoed in
D
the proceedings before the arbitrator and after an award has been pronounced, the rights and liabilities of the parties in respect of the said
claims can be determined only on the basis of the said award. After
an award is pronounced, no action can be started on the original claim
which had been the subject matter of the reference. The position nnder
the Act is in no way different from what it wa~ before the Act came into
force. Therefore. the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction on ·a court under
the Arbitration Act does not make an award any less binding than it was
E
under the provisions of the Second Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure. The filing of an unregistered award under s. 49 of the Registration Act is not prohibited : what is prohibited is that it cannot be taken
into evidence so as to affect immovable property falling under s. 17 of the
Registration Act. It cannot be said that the registration does not in any
manner add to its efficacy or give it added competence. If an award
affects immovable propertv order the value of Rs. 100 its rej!istration
F
does get rid of the disability created by •. 49 of the Registration Act.
The award in question was not a mere waste paper but had some legal
effect and it plainly
purports to affect or affects
oropertv within the
meaning of ·s. 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act [248 F-H; 249 F, 250 E]
Mis. Uttam Sin11h DuP.al & Co. v. Union of India, C.A. No.
162
of 1962 dated 11-10-1962. Champa/al v. Mst. Samarath Bai, [1960] 2
S.C.R. 810. 816 and Kashinathstt Yamosa Kabadi v. Narsingsa Baskarsa
Kabadi, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 792, 806, followed.
Sheonarain Lal v. Prabhu Chand, I.L.R. 37 Pat.
252 and Sardool
Singh v. Hari Singh, I.LR. [1967] 1 Punj. & Har. 622 disapproved.
Chamanlal Girdhar Ghanchi v. Dhtiyabhai Nathubhai Ghandi A.I.R.
1938
Born.
422, M. A. M. Salamullah Khan v. M. Noorul/ah Khan,
A.I.R. 1939 Nag. 233, Keltaha v. U. Pannawa A.LR. 1940 Rang. 228,
G
Nani Bela Sahli v. Ram Gopal Saha. A.LR. 1945 Cal. 19 and Bhajaharl
H
Saha Banikya v. Behary Lal Basak, 33 Cal. 881, approved.
(Per Hel!de. J. concurring) : It is one thing to say that a right is not
created. it is an entirely different thing to. say that the right created can-
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SATISH KUMAR v. SURINDER KUMAR (Sikri, J.)
245
not be enforced without further steps.
An award does create rights in
that property but those rights cannot be enforced until the award is made
a decree of the Court. For the purpose of s. 17 (I )(b) of the Registration Act, all that had to be seen is whether the award in question purport
or operate to create or declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in
present or future any right, title or interest whether vested or qontingent
of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property. Since it does, it is compulsorily registerable. [252 B-D]

## Text

SATISH KUMAR & ORS.
A
v.
SURINDER KUMAR & ORS.
September 27, 1968
[S. M. SIKRI, R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]
B
Indian Arbitration Act (10 of 1940)-Award in respect of property
over Rs. 100-Registration if compulsory.
Indian Registration Act (16 of 1"908), s.
17(1) (b)-Award in
respect of immovable property over Rs. 100-Registration if compulsory .
•
An arbitrator appointed by the appellants and respondent partitioned
their immovable property exceeding the value of Rs. 100. The arbitrator
applied nnder s. 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 to the Court for
making the award a rule of the court. On the question whether the
award was admissible in evidence as it was not registered,
HELD: (per Full. Court.) The award required registration.
(Per Sikri and Bachawat, JI.) All claims which are the subject matter
c
of a reference to arbitration merge in the award which is pron.onnoed in
D
the proceedings before the arbitrator and after an award has been pronounced, the rights and liabilities of the parties in respect of the said
claims can be determined only on the basis of the said award. After
an award is pronounced, no action can be started on the original claim
which had been the subject matter of the reference. The position nnder
the Act is in no way different from what it wa~ before the Act came into
force. Therefore. the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction on ·a court under
the Arbitration Act does not make an award any less binding than it was
E
under the provisions of the Second Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure. The filing of an unregistered award under s. 49 of the Registration Act is not prohibited : what is prohibited is that it cannot be taken
into evidence so as to affect immovable property falling under s. 17 of the
Registration Act. It cannot be said that the registration does not in any
manner add to its efficacy or give it added competence. If an award
affects immovable propertv order the value of Rs. 100 its rej!istration
F
does get rid of the disability created by •. 49 of the Registration Act.
The award in question was not a mere waste paper but had some legal
effect and it plainly
purports to affect or affects
oropertv within the
meaning of ·s. 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act [248 F-H; 249 F, 250 E]
Mis. Uttam Sin11h DuP.al & Co. v. Union of India, C.A. No.
162
of 1962 dated 11-10-1962. Champa/al v. Mst. Samarath Bai, [1960] 2
S.C.R. 810. 816 and Kashinathstt Yamosa Kabadi v. Narsingsa Baskarsa
Kabadi, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 792, 806, followed.
Sheonarain Lal v. Prabhu Chand, I.L.R. 37 Pat.
252 and Sardool
Singh v. Hari Singh, I.LR. [1967] 1 Punj. & Har. 622 disapproved.
Chamanlal Girdhar Ghanchi v. Dhtiyabhai Nathubhai Ghandi A.I.R.
1938
Born.
422, M. A. M. Salamullah Khan v. M. Noorul/ah Khan,
A.I.R. 1939 Nag. 233, Keltaha v. U. Pannawa A.LR. 1940 Rang. 228,
G
Nani Bela Sahli v. Ram Gopal Saha. A.LR. 1945 Cal. 19 and Bhajaharl
H
Saha Banikya v. Behary Lal Basak, 33 Cal. 881, approved.
(Per Hel!de. J. concurring) : It is one thing to say that a right is not
created. it is an entirely different thing to. say that the right created can-
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SATISH KUMAR v. SURINDER KUMAR (Sikri, J.)
245
not be enforced without further steps.
An award does create rights in
that property but those rights cannot be enforced until the award is made
a decree of the Court. For the purpose of s. 17 (I )(b) of the Registration Act, all that had to be seen is whether the award in question purport
or operate to create or declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in
present or future any right, title or interest whether vested or qontingent
of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property. Since it does, it is compulsorily registerable. [252 B-D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 822 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order, dated
April 27, 1965 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Revision No.
841 of 1964.
Sarjoo Prasad, D. N. Mishra and Ravinder Narain, for the
appellants.
A. K. Sen, S. V. Gupte, B. P. Maheshwari and R. K. Maheshwari, for respondent No. 1
The Judgment of S. M. SIKRI and R. s. BACHAWAT was delivered by SIKRI, J. K. S. HEGDE, J., delivered a separate Opinion.
Sikri, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment, dated April 27, 1965, of the High Court of Punjab
at Chandigarh (S. B. Capoor, J.) dismissing Civil Revision No.
841 of 1964.
The Civil Revision arose out of the following
facts.
The following pedigree table shows the relationship between
the parties :
Sohan Lal (Deed.) Husband of Gujri
I
Harbans Lal (D)
husband of Kamla Wali
(App. 7)
Jatisb
Knmar
App. I
~akcsh
Kumar
App. 2
I
I . d
Jatin er
Kumar
App. 3
J.aka
(Minor)
App.•
~mt.
Nirmal
Devi
Resp. 3
I
Sndarshan Lal (D)
husband of Lachmi Devi
(Resp. 6)
I
Chand
Rani
(Minor)
App. 5
J
Sunn der K.umar
(Resp. 6)
I
Smt .
Kanta
Devi
Resp. 4
I
!mt.
Lajya
Devi
Resp. 5
On the death of Sohan Lal, Behari Lal was appointed as
arbitrator by Harbans Lal, Surinder Kumar (then a minor through
his mother Smt. Lachmi Devi) and Smt. Gujri, widow of Sohan
Lal, for partition of the joint property. Behari Lal, by his award
dated October 21, 1956, divided the property into two
equal
246
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. [1969] 2 S.C.R.
shares between Harbans Lal and Surinder Kumar. Harbans Lal
A
and Surinder Kumar signed the award.
Harbans Lal died on
May 20, 1960, upon which Surinder Kumar filed a suit for yart!-
tion of the properties, the subject-matter of the award. This smt
was dismissed as withdrawn on March 13, 1962. On March 11,
1962, Behari Lal, arbitrator, filed an application under s. 14 of
the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940)-hereinafter referred to as the Act-for filing the award in Court and for making
the same a rule of the Court. Surinder Kumar entered appearance
and filed objections under s. 30 of the Act.
One of the objections was that the award dated October 21, 1956, was not admissible in evidence for want of proper stamp and registration and
could not, therefore, be made a rule of the Court. On January
31, 1963, the objections were dismissed by Miss Harmohinder
Kaur, Subordinate Judge, First Class, Ludhiana, as time-barred,
but she did not make the award a rule of the Court as there was ,
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a further objection to the effect that the award not having been
executed on a properly stamped paper and not having been
registered, was not admissible in evidence. This objection was
dealt with by Shri Om Parkash Saini, Subordinate Judge, First
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Class, Ludhiana, who, by his order, dated June 5, 1963, held
that the award in question was not admissible in evidence as it
was executed on deficiently stamped paper and was not registered. He accordingly dismissed the application.
An appeal was taken to the District Judge, and the Additional
District Judge by his order, dated November 23, 1964, upheld
the order of the Subordinate Jud~. A revision was then taken
to the High Court.
Capoor, J., field that the award actually
effected a partition and required registration under s. 17 ( 1) (b)
of the Indian Registration Act, 1908.
The learned Judge dissented from the decision of a Full Bench of the Patna High Court
in Seonarain Lal v. Prabhu Chand( 1), and preferred to follow
the view expressed by the Bombay High Court in Chiman/al
Glrdhar Ghanchi v. Dahyabhai Nathubhai Ghandhi,( 2 ) by the
iNagpur High Court in M. A. M. Salamul/ah Khan v. M. Noorullah Khan,(') by the Rangoon High Court in U. Keltaha v. U.
!l'annawa,(') and by the Calcutta High Court in Nani Bela Saha
!17. ~.am Gopal Saha('). He accordingly dismissed the revision
!!Jetltion.
•
The decision of the Patna High Court was, however, later
~ollowed by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
~n Sardoo/ Singh v. Hari Singh( 6 ) judgment dated November 8
1966.
,
. ,
,
(1) I.L.R. 37 Pat. 252.
(2) A.I.R. 1938 Born. 422.
(3) A.LR. 1939 Nag. 233, 235.
(4) A.I.R. 1940
Rang. 228.
(5) A.LR. 1945 Cal. 19, 21-22.
(6) T.L.R. [1967] 1 Pun. & Har. 622.
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SATISH KUMAR v. SURINDER KUMAR (Sikri, /.)
247
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D
The question which arises before us is w~ether an a~ard given
under the Act on a private reference requrres registralion under
is. 17 (1 )(b) of the Indian Registration Act, if the award effects
partition of immovable property exceeding the value of Rs. 100.
'The main reason given by Sinha, J. speaking for the Patna Full
'Bench in Seonarain Lal v. Prabhu Chand('), for holding that
~uch an award does not require registration is that under the
tcheme of the Act a private award, unless a decree is passed in
terms of the award, has no legal effect. This, according to him,
'follows from the conclusion that once a matter has been referred
to arbitration, it comes within the immediate control of the Court
tmder the Act, and no other authority has any jurisdiction to deal
'With the matter except as provided for in s. 35 of the Act. He
thought that what distinguishes the provisions in the Arbitration
Act from the provisions in the Second Schedule in the Code of
Civil Procedure is that the Act bars jurisdiction of all Courts to
-pronounce upon the validity, effect or existence of an award or
~rbitration agreement except the Court under the Act itself. Sinha,
J., looking at it from another point of view, namely, that an award
is only effective when a decree follows the judgment upon the
award, observed that such an award may be covered by the exception mentioned in section 17(2)(vi) (any decree or order of
a Court) of the Registration Act.
F
G
H
The Punjab Full Bench has followed this reasoning, and indeed
reproduced paras 5 to 15 of the Patna Full Bench judgment in
its own judgment. Mahajan, J., with whom the two other Judges
agreed, observed :
"I am in respectful agreement with the entire line
of reasoning in the Patna case barring the underlined
observations :-
". . . an award is only effective when a decree follows the judgment on the award such an· award may be
covered by the exception mentioned in section 17(2)
(vi) (any decree or order of a Court) of the Registration Act."
If these observations are meant to convey that award
as such is covered by the exception (vi) of section 17
(2) of the Registration Act, I am unable to agree. But
the decree that follows the award when it is made a rule
of the Court, no exception can be taken to the view
that such a decree is covered by the exception."
The Punjab Full Bench gave two additional reasons :
"(1) If an award is registered, it is still a waste
pap~r unless it is ~ade a rule of the Court. Thus registratmn does not, m any manner, add to its efficacy or
give it any added competence.
Section 32 of the
(!) I.LR. 37 Pat. 252.
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1969) 2 S.C.R.
Arbitration Act is specific for no right can be founded
on an award as such after coming into force of the
1940 Arbitration Act;
(2) It is not disputed and indeed it could not be
that the Court has the power, under section 16, to remit
the award from time to time. If registration of an
award is an essential pre-requisite. before it could be
made a rule of the Court under section 17, every time
an award is remitted and a new award is made, the new
award will require registration.
The result would be
that, in the same controversy, there can be not only one
registration but a number of registrations regarding the
same title, a situation which is not even envisaged by
the Registration Act."
It seems to us that the main reason given by the two Full
Benches for their conclusion is contrary to what was held by this
Court in its unreported decision in M/s. Uttam Singh Dugal &
Co. v. The Union of India('). The facts in this case, shortly
stated, were that M/ s. Uttam Singh Dugal & Co. filed an application under s. 3 3 of the Act in the Court of the Subordinate Judge,
Hazaribag. The Union of India, respondent No. 1, called upon
respondent No. 2, Col. S. K. Bose, to adjudicate upon the matter
in dispute between respondent No. 1 and the appellant company.
The case of M/s. Uttam Singh Dugal & Co. was that this pur- .
ported reference to respondent No. 2 for adjudication on the
matters alleged to be in dispute between them and respondent
No. 1 was not competent because by an award passed by respondent No. 2 on April 23, 1952, all the relevant disputes between
them had been decided. The High Court held inter alia that the
first award did not create any bar againsJ;,. the competence of the
second reference.
On appeal this Court after holding that the
application under s. 33 was competent observed as follows :
"The true legal position in regard to the effect of
an award is not in dispute. It is well settled that as
a general rule, all claims which are the subject-matter
of a reference to arbitration merge in the award which
is pronounced in the proceedings before the arbitrator
and that after an award has been pronounced, the
rights and liabilities of the parties in respect of the said
claims can be determined only on the basis of the said
award.
After an award is pronounced, no action can
be started on the original claim which had been the
subject-matter of the reference. As has been observed by
Mookerjee, J. in the case of Bhajahari Saha Banikya v.
Behary Lal Basak(2) "the award is, in fact, a final
(I) Civil Appeal No. 162 of 1962-judgment delivered on October II, 1962.
{2) 33 Cal. 881 at p. 898.
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SATISH KUMAR V. SURINDER KUMAR (Sikri, J.)
adjudication of a Court of t~e parties' owi;i choice, and
until impeached upon sufficient grounds m an appropriate proceeding, an award, which i~ on the fact_ of it
regular, is conclusive upon the merits of th_e controversy submitted, unless
possibly
the parties have
intended that the award shall not . be final and conclusive. . . in reality, an award possesses all the elements
of vitality, even though it has not been formally enforced, and it may be relied upon in a litigation
between the parties relating to the
same subjectmatter."
This conclusion, according to the learned
Judge, is based upon the elementary principle that, as
between the parties and their privies, an award is entitled to that respect which is due to the judgment of a
court of last resort. Therefore, if the award which has
been pronounced between the parties has, in fact, or
can, in law, be deemed to have dealt with the present
dispute, the. second reference would be incompetent.
This position also has not been and cannot be
sernously disputed."
249
This Court then held on the merits "that the dispute in regard
to overpayments which are sought to be referred to tlle arbitration of respondent No. 2 by the second reference are not new
disputes; they are disputes in regard to claims which the Chief
Engineer should have made before the arbitration under the first
reference."
This Court accordingly allowed the appeal and set
aside tlle order passed by the High Court .
This judgment is binding on us.
In our opinion this judgment lays down that the position under the Act is in no way
different from what it was before the Act came into force, and
l;hat an award has some legal force and is not a mere waste
paper. If the award in question is not a mere waste paper but
h~ _some legal _effect it plainly purports to or affects property
w1thm the meanmg of s. 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act.
We ~ay mention th_a~ ~ appeal was filed in this Court against
the. dec1s1on of the D1VIs10n Bench of the Patna High Court,
which had referred the case of Sheonarain
Lal v.
Prahhu
G
Ch~d(') .to the Full B~nch for opinion .on certain questions and
which decided the case m accordance With that opinion and the
same was dismissed by this Court in Sheonarain Lal v. 'Rameshwari Devi(2) in which the judgment was delivered by the same
Bench which decided the case of Ml s. Uttam Singh Dugal v.
The Union of lndia(8). It is true that this Court in Sheonarain
H
Lal v. Rameshwari Devi(2 ) did not expressly rule on the validity
(I) I.LR. 37 Pat. 252.
(2) Civil appeal No. 296of1960-judgment delivered on December 6, 1962.
(3) Civil Appeal No. 162 of 1962-judgment delivered on October 11, 1962.
2 Sup. CI/69-17
250
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
of the answer given by the Patna Full Bench in Sheonarain Lal v.
A
Prabhu Cl)and ( 1 ) that suc.h awards did not require registration,
but decided the case on the point whether the award in dispute in
that case in fact purported or operated to create a right, title
or interest of the value of more than Rs. 100 in immovable properties.
But, after holding that the document did not operate
to create or extinguish any right in immovable property, this
Court observed :
"The position would have been otherwise if the
arbitrators had directed by t11e award itself that this
shop would go to Prabhu Chand without any further
document.
In that case the award itself would have
created in Prabhuchand a right to ·these ptroperties.
That is not, however, the provision in the award.
In
the absence of a registered document, Prabhu Chand
would get no title on the award and Sheonarain's
title would remain in the shop."
In this connection we may mention two other decisions of
this Court.
In Champa/al v. Mst. Samarath Bai(2 ), Kapur, J.,
speaking for the Court, observed as follows :
"The second question that the
award
required
registration and would not be filed by the arbitrators
before it was registered is equally without substance.
The filing of an unregistered award under s. 49 of the
Registration Act is not prohibited; what is prohibited is
that it cannot be taken into evidence so as to affect
immovable property falling under s. 17 of the Act. That
the award required registration was rightly admitted
by both parties."
Again in Kashi'nathsa Yamosa Kabadi v. Narsingsa BhasKarsa Kabadi(') Shah J., speaking for the Court observed:
"The records made by the Panchas about the division of the properties, it is true, were not stamped nor
were they registered.
It is however clear that if the
record made by the Panchas in so far as it deals with
immovable properties is regarded as a non-testamentary instrument purporting or
operating to create,
declare, assign, lintit or extinguish any right, title or
interest in immovable property, it was compulsorily
registerable under s. 17 of the Registration Act, and
would not in the absence of registration be admissible
in evidence."
(1)
I.L.R. 37 Pat. 252.
(2) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 81(), 816.
(3)
(1961] 3 S.C.R. 792, 806.
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SAT!SH KUMAR v. SURINDER KUMAR (Hegde, J.)
251
In view of the above decisions it is not necessary to refute
the other reasons given by both the Full Benches, but out of
respect for the learned Judges we will deal with them. We may
mention that no comment was made in these cases on the provisions of para 7 of Schedule 1 to the Act. This para provides :
"7. The award shall be final and binding on the
parties and persons claiming under them respectively."
If the award is final and binding on the parties it can hardly be
said that it is a waste paper unless it is made a rule of the Court.
We are unable to appreciate why t~e conferment of exclusive jurisdiction on a court under the Act makes an award any
the less binding than it was under the provisions of the Second
Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The Punjab
Full
Bench held that the registration does not in any manner add to
its efficacy or give it any added competence. We cannot concur
with these observations. If an award affects immovable property over the value of Rs. 100, its registration does get rid of
the disability created by s. 49 of the Registration Act.
Regarding the difficulty poi111ted out by the
Punjab
Fu!l
Bench that there may be many registrations we are not called
upon to decide whether these difficulties would arise because the
language of s. 17 of the Registration Act is plain. It may be
that no such difficulties will arise because under s. 16 (2) of the
Act what the arbitrator submits to the Court is his decision and
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it may be that the decision may not be registerable under s. 17
of the Registration Act. But as we have said before we are not
called upon to decide this point.
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In our opinion, Capoor, J., was right in dissenting from the
Patna Full Bench in Sheonarain Lal v. Prabhu Chand (1) and
holding that the award in dispute required registration.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
We
may make it clear that we are dealing only with an
~ward made on a reference by the parties without the interven-
!Ion of court.
~eg~e, J. I agree.
But I would like to add few words.
Arb1tration proceedings, broadly speaking may be divided into
two stages.
The first stage commences with arbitration agreement and ends with the making of the award. And the second
stage _relates to the enforcement of the award.
Paragraph 7 of
the Flfst Schedule to the Arbitration Act lays down that "the
aw~r~ shall be final and binding on the parties and persons
clamnng u~der them respectively".
Therefore it is not possible
to agree with the Full Bench decisions of the Patna High Court
(1) I. L. R. 37 Part. 252.
252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1969] 2 S.C.R ·
and that of the Punjab and Haryana High Court that an award
which is not made a decree of the Court has no existence in law.
The learned Judges who decided those cases appea: to have
proceeded on the basis that an award which cannot be enforced
is not a valid award and the same does not create any rights in
the property which is the subject matter of the award. This in
my opinion is not a correct approach. The award does create
rights in that property but those rights cannot be enforced until
the award is made a decree of the Court. It is one thing to say
that a right is not created, it is an entirely different thing to say
tha~ the right created cannot be enforced without further steps.
For the purpose of s. 17 (1 )(b) of the Registration Act, all that
we have to see is whether the award in question purport or
operate to create or declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether
in present or future any right, title or interest whether vested or
contingent of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to
or in immovable property. If it does, it is compulsorily registerable. In the aforementioned Full Bench decisions sufficient
attention has not been given to s. 17 of the Registration Act.
The focus was entirely on the provisions of the Arbitration Act
and there again on the enforcement of the award and not in
the making of the award. A document may validly create rights
but those rights may not be enforceable for various reasons.
Section 17 does not concern itself with the enforcement of rights.
·That Section is attracted as soon as its requiremeidts are satisfied.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the award with which we
are concerned in this case, at any rate, purported to create rights
in immovable property of the value of rupees more than one
hundred.
Hence it is compulsorily registerable.
Y.P.
Appeal dismissed.
A
B
'
>-·
D
E