# SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI

- **Citation:** [2014] 9 S.C.R. 247
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2014-08-20
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 920 of 2011
- **Bench:** Dipak Misra, V. Gopala Gowda
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/satvir-singh-v-state-of-delhi-through-cbi-30066
- **Pages:** 32

## Headnote

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: ss. 7, 13(2), 13(1)(d)
A
B
- Illegal gratification - Acquittal of appellant by trial court -
Reversal of acquittal by High Court - On appeal, held: A letter C
was written by complainant to the Department that the
appellant had not demanded any money from him when he
visited his premises for inspection and the telephonic
conversation for demand of money was made but he did not
recognize the voice to be that of the appellant - Trial court
D
relied upon the said fetter and held that appellant was not
guilty of the offence - The bag containing illegal gratification
was also not recovered from the person of the appellant -
Thus, neither acceptance nor recovery of illegal gratification
was proved - Trial court was right in holding that presumption
E
of innocence was in favour of appellant - High Court in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction had exceeded its.
parameters in reversing the acquittal order of the trial court -
Therefore, findings were not only erroneous in law but also
vitiated in law.
F
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The letter-Ex.PW-1/DA was written by the
complainant-PW2 to the Collector of Customs which
showed that there was no case of illegal gratification either
G
demanded by the appellant or paid to him by the
complainant PW2. The trial court on proper appreciation
of both oral and documentary evidence par~icularly the
247
H
., .,
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A contents of the said letter held that the appellant was not
guilty of the offence. It is an undisputed fact that neither
the Inspector-co-accused was arrayed as a witness nor the
appellant by the Investigating Officer. The brother-in-law
of the complainant-PW2 who was stated to be present at
B the time of the telephonic conversation with him was also
not examined during the investigation to prove the fact that
the appellant had telephonic conversation with him. [Paras
29 and 30) [265-8-C; 266-C]
Babu v. State of Kera/a (2010) 9 SCC 189: 2010 (9) SCR
C 1039; State of Kera/a & Anr. v .. C.P. Rao (2011) 6 SCC 450:
2011 (6) SCR 864; Murugesan v. State through Inspector of
Police (2012) 10 SCC 383: 2012 (13) SCR 1; K. S.
Panduranga v. State of Karnataka (2013) 3 SCC 721: 2013
(4) SCR 155 : Subash Parbat Sonvane v. State of Gujarat
D (2002) 5 SCC 86: 2002 (3) SCR 359; Mukut Bihari & Anr. v.
State of Rajasthan (2012) 11 SCC 642: 2012 (6) SCR 710;
C. M. Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kera/a (2009)
3 SCC 779: 2009 (2) SCR 1021; M. Narsinga Rao v. State
of Andhra Pradesh 2001 (1) SCC 691: 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR
E 584 - referred to.
2. As per the evidence of PW-2 and shadow witness
PW-3, the illegal gratification was in a black rexine bag
with a broken zip which was put on a steel cot. As the
F contents of the bag were not within the knowledge of the
accused, therefore, the relevant aspect of the case that
the appellant had accepted the illegal gratification as
required under Section 7 of the Act was not proved by
the prosecution. The plea of the prosecution that the said
G letter was written by PW-2 under pressure cannot be
accepted. If the letter was written by PW-2 under
pressure, then he should have lodged the complaint in
this regard. The black rexine bag containing the illegal
gratification which was kept on the steel cot at the
residence of the accused was not recovered from the
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI
249
person of the accused. Therefore, neither acceptance nor A
recovery of illegal gratification from the appellant was
proved. The trial judge rightly held that presumption of
innocence is in favour of the appellant and he was
acquitted on merits. [Paras 33, 34] [268-E-F; 269-A-F]
C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Government of India (1997) ·9
SCC 477: 1997 (1) SCR 107; State of Madras v. A
Vaidhyanatha Iyer AIR 1958 SC 61 :1958 SCR 580 - referred
to.
·
B
3. The High Court in exercise of its appellate
C
jurisdiction had exceeded its parameters in reversing the
acquittal order of the tri

## Text

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[2014] 9 S.C.R. 247
SATVIR SINGH
V.
STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI
(Criminal Appeal No. 920 of 2011)
AUGUST 20, 2014
[DIPAK MISRA AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: ss. 7, 13(2), 13(1)(d)
A
B
- Illegal gratification - Acquittal of appellant by trial court -
Reversal of acquittal by High Court - On appeal, held: A letter C
was written by complainant to the Department that the
appellant had not demanded any money from him when he
visited his premises for inspection and the telephonic
conversation for demand of money was made but he did not
recognize the voice to be that of the appellant - Trial court
D
relied upon the said fetter and held that appellant was not
guilty of the offence - The bag containing illegal gratification
was also not recovered from the person of the appellant -
Thus, neither acceptance nor recovery of illegal gratification
was proved - Trial court was right in holding that presumption
E
of innocence was in favour of appellant - High Court in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction had exceeded its.
parameters in reversing the acquittal order of the trial court -
Therefore, findings were not only erroneous in law but also
vitiated in law.
F
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The letter-Ex.PW-1/DA was written by the
complainant-PW2 to the Collector of Customs which
showed that there was no case of illegal gratification either
G
demanded by the appellant or paid to him by the
complainant PW2. The trial court on proper appreciation
of both oral and documentary evidence par~icularly the
247
H
., .,
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A contents of the said letter held that the appellant was not
guilty of the offence. It is an undisputed fact that neither
the Inspector-co-accused was arrayed as a witness nor the
appellant by the Investigating Officer. The brother-in-law
of the complainant-PW2 who was stated to be present at
B the time of the telephonic conversation with him was also
not examined during the investigation to prove the fact that
the appellant had telephonic conversation with him. [Paras
29 and 30) [265-8-C; 266-C]
Babu v. State of Kera/a (2010) 9 SCC 189: 2010 (9) SCR
C 1039; State of Kera/a & Anr. v .. C.P. Rao (2011) 6 SCC 450:
2011 (6) SCR 864; Murugesan v. State through Inspector of
Police (2012) 10 SCC 383: 2012 (13) SCR 1; K. S.
Panduranga v. State of Karnataka (2013) 3 SCC 721: 2013
(4) SCR 155 : Subash Parbat Sonvane v. State of Gujarat
D (2002) 5 SCC 86: 2002 (3) SCR 359; Mukut Bihari & Anr. v.
State of Rajasthan (2012) 11 SCC 642: 2012 (6) SCR 710;
C. M. Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kera/a (2009)
3 SCC 779: 2009 (2) SCR 1021; M. Narsinga Rao v. State
of Andhra Pradesh 2001 (1) SCC 691: 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR
E 584 - referred to.
2. As per the evidence of PW-2 and shadow witness
PW-3, the illegal gratification was in a black rexine bag
with a broken zip which was put on a steel cot. As the
F contents of the bag were not within the knowledge of the
accused, therefore, the relevant aspect of the case that
the appellant had accepted the illegal gratification as
required under Section 7 of the Act was not proved by
the prosecution. The plea of the prosecution that the said
G letter was written by PW-2 under pressure cannot be
accepted. If the letter was written by PW-2 under
pressure, then he should have lodged the complaint in
this regard. The black rexine bag containing the illegal
gratification which was kept on the steel cot at the
residence of the accused was not recovered from the
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI
249
person of the accused. Therefore, neither acceptance nor A
recovery of illegal gratification from the appellant was
proved. The trial judge rightly held that presumption of
innocence is in favour of the appellant and he was
acquitted on merits. [Paras 33, 34] [268-E-F; 269-A-F]
C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Government of India (1997) ·9
SCC 477: 1997 (1) SCR 107; State of Madras v. A
Vaidhyanatha Iyer AIR 1958 SC 61 :1958 SCR 580 - referred
to.
·
B
3. The High Court in exercise of its appellate
C
jurisdiction had exceeded its parameters in reversing the
acquittal order of the trial court. Therefore, the findings
were not only erroneous in law but also vitiated in law.
The High Court did not notice the very important lacuna
in the prosecution case that as per the evidence of PWD
2 and PW-3, the bribe money which was sought to be
given to the appellant was in a black rexine bag and not
in the brown rexine bag as shown to the witnesses
before the trial court by the prosecution. It further came
to notice that neither the two witnesses nor the C.B.I.
E
officials put any signature or identification mark on the
bottles containing solution which was the most crucial
evidence in the case to prove the acceptance of the
gratification by the appellant from the complainant. [Para
37, 38] [271-F-G; 277-C-D]
F
Case Law Reference:
2010 (9) SCR 1039 ·
Referred to
Para 8
2011 (6) SCR 864
Referred to
Para 9
G
2012 (13) SCR 1
Referred to
Para 9
2013 (4) SCR 155
Referred to
Para 11
2002 (3) SCR 359
Referred to
Para 11
H
A
B
c
D
E
250
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
2012 (6) SCR 710
Referred to
Para 11
2009 (2) SCR 1021
Referred to
Para 12
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 584
Referred to
Para 21
1997 (1) SCR 107
Referred to
Para 31
1958 SCR 580
Referred to
Para 36
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :Criminal Appeal
No.920 of 2011.
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.01.2011 of the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 337
of 1999.
Altaf Ahmad, Sibo Sankar Mishra for the Appellant.
Dr. Ashok Dhamija, P.K. Dey, Sonia Dhamija, B.V.
Balaram Das for the Respondent.
The Judgment oNhe Court was delivered by
V.GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the
appellant against the judgment dated 07.01.2011 and order on
sentence dated 08.03.2011 passed in Criminal Appeal No.337
of 1999 by the High Court of Delhi, whereby the High Court
reversed the order of acquittal dated 11.03.1999 recorded by
. the Trial Court in C.C No. 19 of 1993 and convicted the
F appellant for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as
\'the Act') with rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of
Rs.50,000/-, ;n default of payment of fine, to further undergo
three months simple imprisonment. The appellant has prayed
G for allowing the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment
of the High Court and to acquit him from the charge urging
various facts and grounds in support of the questions of law
framed in this appeal.
H
2. For the purpose of considering the rival legal contentions
SATVIR SINGH V; STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI
251
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
urged by the learned counsel for the parties and with a view to
A
find out whether this C'ourt is required to interfere with the
impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence of
the High Court, the necessary facts are briefly stated hereunder:
I
The complainant, Ramesh Suri (PW-2), was running a
8
business of import and export of buttons, zips, etc. in the name
and style of M/s Erica Enterprises. It is alleged that the appellant
along with his colleague P.S.Saini (both Inspector Customs
(Preventive)) visited the office cum godown of the complainant
(PW2) on 4.07.1989 and that P.S.Saini demanded a bribe of
C
Rs.2 lakhs from the complainant, one lakh each for himself and
the accused as the articles kept in the godown were notified
goods and since his firm was not a notified dealer, the
complainant has violated the provisions of CustomsAct, 1962.
3. Further, on 07 .07 .1989, it is alleged by the prosee'ution
D
that the appellant telephonically contacted the complainant (PW2) and reiterated the demand as made byP.S:Saini. During
the time of telephonic conversation, thebrother-in-law of the
compfainant Ram Malhotra was sitting with him. The
complainant said only an amount Rs.60,000/- could be
E
arranged by him and the same was delivered at the residence
of the apprllant on 08.07 .1989 at 8.00 a.m. as the rest
of the amount would be arranged within 3-4 days and will be
paid to the appellant.
4. It is alleged that on the written complaint lodged in the
CBI office and on the directions of the Deputy Superintendent
of Police a raid was conducted in the house of the appellant
with the help of the complainant and a shadow witness (PWF
3), the appellant was arrested on 8. 7 .1989. The charge sheet
was filed by the prosecution under Section 173 Cr.P.C. before
G
the court of Special Judge on the basis of which it has framed
the charges against the appellant for trial for offences
punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section
13(1)(d) of the Act.
. H
252 • ·· · SUPREME COURT REPORTS
:... [2014] 9 .S.C.R.
-
-.~
. ,._.
A .·
• 5. The Trial Court after evaluating the evidence on record
has come to the conclusion and held that the prosecution had·
failed .to. prove the guilt of the accused under Sections 7 and.
13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) of the Act and recorded the, .:
acquittal of the appellant from the charges vide its judgment and
B order dated 11.03.1999.
· ·
· · '
·
··, -·-·-.
• 6 .. The respondent-prosecution, aggrieved by the judgment
and order of the Trial Court has filed an appeal before the High
Court of Delhi urging various grounds: After hearing the learned"·
counsel for the parties, the High Court vide its .judgment and · ·
C order dated 07.01.2011 reversed the order of acquittal
recorded by the Trial Court and convicted the appellant for the .
offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act. The correctness
of thesame is challenged in this appeal by the appellant by
raising certain legal questions and urging grounds in support ·
D of the same.'·
. .
.
·• ~ +'- - - . -
.
' . ' .. ':
· 7. It is contended by Mr: Altaf Ahmed, the learned senior :
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that P.S. Saini on···.
all the occasions demanded the bribe money from the ..
E ·complainant but he was neither arrayed as· accused. nor: :
examined as witness by the prosecution in the case. Furt~er, •" ·
he submits that recovery memo Exh. PW-2/D is·not proved·
because neither its author Deputy Superintendent of Police; ·:
Darshan Singh was available rior the signatutes ofthe .other: :
F ··witnesses on the said memo have been proved. Therefore,
recovery of money from the appellant alleged to' have been
paid to him by the complainant-PW-2 is not proved by the ··
prosecution. It is urged by hirri that the further lacuna in the :
prosecution case is that Ram Malhotra,. the Brother-in~law of .. ·
G the complainant, who was stated to be presentat the tirrie of
the telephonic demand made by the accused with· the<,•
complainant was examined by the prosecution. The prosecution . . .
· • could neither prove the dema·nd and acceptan'cie ·of the ' ' ·
gratification by the appellanf'nor were they able to prove"
conscious possession of the black rexine bag containing the'::
H
·,SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI :rHROUGH CBI
253
,
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
GC.notes with him. Therefore, the alleged recovery of money ·A ,
cannot be stated to be "acceptance'' of illegal gratification by
.
'
. the appellant as alleged by the prosecution.
:
~
.
'
.
8: It has been.further submitted by the learneci senior·
counsel for the appellant that the appellate court in exercise of. 8 .
its appellate '.jurisdiction. has erroneously ··re-appreciated· the
evidence produced by the prosecution and has set aside the
valid finding of fact recorded by the learned trial judge on the .
· charg~s framed against the appellant. Therefore, the. finding ·
recorded on this aspect of the matter in the impugned judgment: C
by the appellate court is not only erroneous on facts but in law,·
therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. Further, it is ·
contended by him that the learned appellate judge·has not
noticed a very important lacuna in the prosecution case that as . ·
per the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 Rameshwar Nath, the bribe·
money which was sought to be given to the accused on . D •
08.07.1989 in a black rexine bag and.not in the brown bag as
shown to the prosecution witnesses by the learned counsel for··
the prosecution. :
J
, -.:-
•
• .. -~
9. He has further urgecithat t~e Ap.pellate Co~rt call
E
exercise its. jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances·. where
. there are compelling circumstances and the judgmentunder. .
appeal is found to be pe.rverse. In support of the· aforesaid legal ·
submission he placed reliance upon the decisiO!l of this Court
in the case ofBabu v. State of Kera/a,' wherein it has been_
F •
categorically held that: .
· ·
"In exceptfona/ cases ,where there are compelling
circumstances and the judgmeritunder the appeal is·.
~found to be peNerse, the appellate COUft can fnterfere With .
. order of acquittal. The appellate couifshou/d bear in mind
G
.. the presumption of innocence bf the accused and further ..
. that ttie trial Court's acquittal bolst£!rS ttie presumption· of
innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the
1.
c201oi s sec 1es.
H .•.
254
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A
other view is possible should be avoided, unless there
are good reasons for interference" (Para 19).
The presumption of innocence of the appellant is further
strengthened by the order of acquittal recorded by the trial judge
8 on proper appreciation of evidence on record. He had the
occasion to examine thellemeanor of the prosecution
witnesses. The Trial Court came to the right conclusion on facts·
and evidence on record and it has recorded a finding of fact
holding that the accused is innocent of the charges leveled
against him and consequently acquitted him from the said
C charges. It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel
that the Appellate Court could only interfere in rare cases where
it is found that the order of acquittal is erroneous or error in law.
Therefore, he submits that the High Court should not have
interfered with the judgment and order of the Trial Court. The
D learned senior counsel for the appellant has further placed
reliance on the following judgments of this Court, namely, 1)
State of Kera/a & Anr. v. C.P. Rao2, 2) Murugesan & Ors. v.
State through Inspector of Po/ice3.in support of his submission .
that the High Court has exceeded its parameters laid down by
E this Court in reversing the judgment and order of acquittal of
the accused. The relevant paragraphs from the above
judgments are extracted in the answering portion of the
F
contentious points.
'
10. The learned senior counsel further submits that
'presumption' of offence committed by the appellant under
Section 20 of the Act can be invoked against him by the
prosecution, only if the prosecution successfully proves the
foundational facts. In the case in hand, since the demand,
G acceptance of bribe money and recovery of the same from him
has not been proved by the prosecution, the statutory
presumption under-Section 20 of the Act against the guilt of the
accused does not arise and therefore rebuttal of such2.
(2011) 6 SCC450.
H 3.
(2012) 10 sec 383.
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI
255
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
presumption by the appellant also did not arise in this case.
11. The other legal contention urged by the learned senior
counsel is that mere recovery of the alleged tainted money
without there being any demand and acceptance by the
appellant from the complainant does not prove the guilt of the
appellant. In support of his aforesaid legal submission, he has
placed reliance upon the following decisions of this Court: (1)
K. S. Panduranga Vs. State of Karnataka4 (2) Subash Parbat
Sonvane Vs. State of Gujarat5 and (3) Mukut Bihari & Anr. Vs.
State of Rajasthan6• In Mukut Bihari & Anr., this Court has held
thus:
A
B
c
"11. The law on the issue is well settled that demand of
illegal gratification is sine qua non for constituting an
offence under the 1988 Act. Mere recovery of taint(;ld
D
money is not sufficient to convict the accused, when the
substantive evidence in the case is not reliable, unless
there is evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show
that the money was taken voluntarily as bribe. Mere
receipt of amount by the accused is not sufficient to
fasten the guilt, in the absence of any evidence with
regard to demand and acceptance of the amount as
illegal gratification, but the burden rests on the accused
E
to displace the statutory presumption raised under
Section 20 of the 1988 Act, by bringing on record
evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to establish with
reasonable proba.bility, that the money was accepted by
him, other than as a motive or reward as referred to in
Section 7 of the 1988 Act. While invoking the provisions
of Section 20 of the Act, the court is required to
consider the explanation offered by the accused, if any,
only on the touchstone of preponderance of probability
4.
(2013) 3 sec 721.
5.
(2002) 5 sec 86.
6.
(2012) 11 sec 642.
F
G
H
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A
and not on the touchstone of proof beyond all reasonable
doubt. However, before the accused is called upon to
explain as to how the amount in question was found in
his possession, the foundational facts must be
established by the prosecution. The complainant is an
B
interested and partisan witness concerned with the
success of the trap and his evidence must be tested in
the same way as that of any other interested witness and
in a proper case the court may look for independent
corroboration before convicting the accused person."
c
12. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has further
contended that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge
against the accused and placed reliance upon the decision of
this Court in C.M. Girish Babu Vs. CBI, Cochin, High Court
of Kerala7• The relevant paragraph is extracted in the reasoning
D portion.
13. In view of the aforesaid legal contentions urged by the
learned senior counsel he has prayed this Court to set aside
the impugned judgment and order of the High Court and restore
E the trial court judgment and order by allowing this appeal.
14. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the
respondent Dr. Ashok Dhamija has strongly relied upon the
version of PW-3, who is an independent witness and sought
to justify the impugned judgment and order as the High Court
F
has rightly reversed the judgment and order of acquittal passed
by the Trial Court. It has been urged by the learned counsel for
the respondent that even though the complainant-PW2 has
turned hostile in the case he has admitted his version in the
cross-examination and corroborated the evidence of PW-3.
G
15. Further, the learned counsel for the respondent has
contended that the complainant, PW-2 called PW-3 inside the
residence of the accused introducing him as his uncle. When
H ? . (2009) 3 sec 779.
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI 257
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
PW-3 went inside, the appellant enquired with the complainant
A
if he had brought the money. PW-2, thereafter asked if there
was anything to worry about and whether his work would be
done. PW-2 handed over the handbag containing the notes
towards gratification to the accused who touched the notes with
his right hand and placed the hand bag containing the money
8
on the cot made up of steel. Thus, the demand and acceptance
of gratification by the appellant from the complainant is duly
proved by the witness-PW3.
16. Further, he has contended that the testimony of PW-3
C
is corroborated by the testimony of PW-4 R.S.Manku, the
Deputy Superintendent of Police who had conducted the trap
and also PW-8 AS.Chhabra, the Senior Scientific Officer who
gave the report that the right- hand wash solution of the appellant
gave positive test for Phenolphthelin and sodium. Therefore, the
fact that the money was demanded and given to the appellant
D
for illegal gratification, which fact is further corroborated by
another fact that money was withdrawn from the bank account
of PW-2 who has clearly deposed about it before the court in
his evidence.
17. The High Co'Urt has concluded on the material
evidence on record and held thatthe reasons of the Trial Court
on the charge against the appellant is erroneous; stating that,
at the time of demand, normally nobody else, except the
complainant-PW2 would be present. Therefore, rejecting his
testimony by the Trial Court for want of corroboration of his
evidence by recording the findings of fact by him stating that it
I
was unsafe to rely on the sole testimony of the complainantPW-2, to convict the appellant would be contrary to the settled
principles of appreciation of evidence on record.
18. Further, the findings of the trial court that there was no
motive for the appellant to demand the gratification from thecomplainant as Sudan, the Custom (Supdt.) had satisfied
himself that the complainant had valid documents in support of
his claim and that he was not a notified dealer is also perverse
E
F
G
H
258
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A
as the complainant, PW-2 in his testimony has clearly stated
that the money was given to the appellant so that no harassment
would be caused to him in his business in future.
19. It has been further held by the High Court that the Trial
• ·9
Court has also failed to apply the settled legal principles of law
laid down by this Court. The Trial Court has erred in not
accepting the testimony of a hostilewitness-PW2, his evidence
cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record
altogether; part of his evidence which is otherwise acceptable
C could have been. acted upon at the time of recording his findings
on the charges.
20. Further, it is urged by him that it has been further held
by the High Court that since the illegal gratification is large, the
same could not have been accepted by the appellant as cashD in-hand and the same was handed over to him by keeping in
bags, suitcases, etc ... which can never be recovered from the
person of an accused.
2~, The f-:!igh Court further held that once demand and
E acceptance by the accused has been proved then the statutory
presumption under Section 20 of the Act arisE!S against him and
the onus of proof shifts on him to rebut the presumption by
adducing acceptable evidence to prove that he is not guilty of
offence. In support of the aforesaid contention, the decision of
this Court in the case of M. Narsinga Rao v. State of Andhra
F Pradesh, 8 was relied upon wherein it was held thus:
"13. Before proceeding further, we may point out that the
expressions "may presume" and "shall presume" are
defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act. The
G
presumptions falling under the former category are
compendiously known as "factual presumptior.s" or
"discretionary presumptions" and those faffing under the
latter as. "legal presumptions" or "compulsory
H
a.
2001 (1) sec 691.
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI 259
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
presumptions". When the expression "shall be
A
presumed" is employed in Section 20(1) of the Act it
must have the same import of compulsion.
14. When the sub-section deals with legal presumption
it is to be understood as in terrorem i.e. in tone of a
8
command that it has to be presumea that the accused
accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing
or forbearing to do any official act etc., if the condition
envisaged in the former part of the section is satisfied.
The only condition for drawing such a legal presumption
C
under Section 20 is that during trial it should be proved
that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept any
gratification. The section does not say that the said
condition should be satisfied through direct evidence. Its
only requirement is that it must be proved that the
accused has accepted or agreed to accept gratification.
D
Direct evidence is one of the modes through which a fact
can be proved. But that is not the only mdde envisaged
in the Evidence Act.
15. The word ''proof" need ·be understood in the sense
E
in which it is defined in the Evidence Act because proof
depends upon the. admissibility of evidence. A fact is said
to be prov.ed when, after considering the matters before
it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its
existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under
F
the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the
supposition that it exists. This is the definition given for
the word ''proved" in the Evidence Act. What is required
is production of such materials on which the court can
reasonably act to reach the supposition that a fact exists.
G
Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability
of its having existed. The standard required for reaching
the .supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any
important matter concerning him. Fletcher Moulton L.J.
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in Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd.
observed like this:
"Proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical
demonstration, because that is impossible; it must mean
such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to
come to a particular conclusion. "
16. The said observation has stood the test of time and
can now be followed as the standard of proof. In reaching
the conclusion the court can use the process of
· inferences to be drawn from facts produced or proved.
Such ·inferences are akin to presumptions in law. Law
gives absolute discretion to the court to presume the
existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have
happened. In that process the court may have regard to
common course of natural events, human conduct, public
or private ,business vis-a-vis the facts of the particular
case. The discretion is clearly envisaged in Seation 114
of the Evidence Act.
17. Presumption is an inference of a certain fact drawn
from other proved facts. While inferring the existence of
a fact from another, the court is only applying a process
of intelligent reasoning which the mind of a prudent
man would do under similar circumstances. Presumption
is not the final conclusion to be drawn from other facts.
But it could as well be final ifit remains undisturbed later.
Presumption in law of evidence is a rule indicating the
stage of shifting the burden of proof. From a certain fact
or facts the court can draw an inference and that would
remain .until such inference is either disproved or
dispelled.
18. For the purpose of reaching one conclusion the court
can rely on a factual presumption. Unless the
presumption is disproved or dispelled or rebutted, the
·court can treat the presumption as tantamounting to proof.
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI 261
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
However, as a caution of prudence we have to observe
A
that it may be unsafe to use that presumption to draw yet
another discretionary presumption unless there is a
statutory compulsion .. This Court has indicated so in
Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra. "A
presumption can be drawn only from facts - and not from
B
other presumptions - by a process of probable and logical
reasoning."
22. The High Court further held that in view of the
presumption as envisaged under Section 20 of the Act, it was
the duty of the accused to have rebutted the same by producing
C
cogent evidence on record. The accused has failed to
discharge that onus. No doubt as held in the case of Subash
Parbat (supra); "The Statutory presumption cannot be raised
for an offence u/s 13(1) (d) of the Act." However, for an offence
under section 7 of the Act this presumption would arise.
D
23. On the basis of the aforesaid rival legal contentions
urged on behalf of the parties, the following points would arise
for consideration of this Court.
(1) Whether the demand, acceptance and recovery .of
gratification are proved by the prosecution and whether the
presumption of offence alleged to have been committed by the
appellant would arise in this case?
(2) Whether the findings and reasons recorded on the
· charges by the High Court in reversing the findings of acquittal
recorded by the Trial Court are based on proper reappreciation of legal evidence on record and within the legal
parameters laid down by this Court in its decisions?
(3) What order?
24. The point Nos. 1 and 2 are inter-related and therefore,
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the same are answered together by assigning the following
reasons:. The learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant
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A has rightly placed reliance upon the evidence elicited in the
cross examination of PW-2 by the prosecutor. The relevant
portion from translation of deposition of PW-2 made by
appellant is extracted hereunder:
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"One P.S.Saini from the customs department asked me
to pay Rs. 2 lakhs and _at that time the appellant/accused
Satvir Singh was checking the goods in the godown. On
the sal'T!e day, at abouf 4.00 p.m. they took me to Customs
House at C.R. Building, and produced me before Shri
Sudan, Custom (Suptd.) who checked my papers.
Thereafter, I was advised to keep cordial relations with his
subordinates. Thereafter, when I came out of the office of
the superintendent, the accused Satvir Singh was standing
outside the office with P.~. Saini who again demanded
money from me. I refused to pay the same. On 7th July,
1989, I received a telephone call from the accused Satvir
Singh. At about 5-6 p.m. the accused told me over the
telephone, either to make the payment or otherwise they
would seize the goods from my premises. The accused
further asked me to make the payment at Gagan Vihar
residence. The accused asked me to pay Rs.60,000/- first
on 8.7.1989 at 8.00 a.m. as I could not arrange the entire _
amount. The accused further asked to make tbe payment
of the remaining balance amount within three-four days. My
brother in law, Shri Ram Malhotra was sitting with me at
the time of the telephonic conversation."
25. During the cross-examination of PW-2, he has stated
that the demand of Rs.2 lakhs was made by P.S. Saini on
4.7.1989 at his godown between 11.30 to 12.30 p.m. On the
very same day, he was taken to office of Customs department
G where Saini demanded the money at two places i.e. firstly just
outside the office of Superintendent and secondly, at the
staircase_ of the office building and on both the occasions, the
accused had not demanded the money from the complainant,
PW-2 at any time. It has been further stated by him during his
H r
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI
263
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
cross-examination that on both the occasions, the accused was
A
at a distance of three-four feet. It has been further stated by him
· that he did not have any direct talk with the accused either at
the C.R. Building or at his godown. He has further stated that
he had met the accused only once, so he had neither
conversant with the voice of the accused nor knows his style
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; of talking.
26. It has been further stated by PW-2 in his evidence that,
when he had gone to the house of the accused along w i t h
the punch witness, during the entire conversation, there was no
C
talk about the contents of the rexine bag which he was carrying
and neither did the accused enquire about the money nor
received the same from the complainant.
27. Further, the learned senior counsel for the appellant
D
has rightly placed reliance upon the questions put to the
appellant by the Court seeking the explanation from him under
Section 313, CrPC which reads thus:
"Question: It is further in evidence against you that while
you were checking the goods on the same day, Mr. P.S.
Saini of the Customs Department demanded a bribe of
Rs. 2 lakhs from the complainant, one lakh each for himself
and the accused failing which he threatened the seizure
of the said goods. What have you to say?
Ans: It is incorrect. No Customs officer demanded any
money in my presence."
A reading of the question framed by the learned trial Judge
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for seeking explanation from the appellant, would certainly go
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to show that he has not demanded illegal gratificatior:i from the
complainant.
28. The learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant
has further rightly placed reliance upon the letter written by ?WH -
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A 2 Exh. PW-1/DA dated 15.11.1989 to the Collector of Customs,
which reads thus:
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"In this connection, it is submitted that as written earlier Shri
Satvir Singh, Inspector has never demanded any money
on 4.7.1989 when they visited my premises. As far asl
telephone of 7.7.1989 is concerned, someone telephoned:
me in the name of Satvir Singh, but I could not recognize •
his voice as I have met Satvir Singh only once and that on
4.7.1989. However, when I visited his house on 8. 7.1989,
Satvir Singh did not demand any money nor accepted the
same. This is for your information please."
·
In this regard, the relevant portion of the evidence of Shri
AGL Kaul, PW-9, Inspector, CBI, is extracted hereunder:
"During the course of investigation conducted by him, he
came across the letter Exh. PW-1/DAwhich was already
in the investigation file. He further stated that he cannot tell
whether or not this letter was referred by the Customs
Department to the CBI for verification because the letter
was neither received nor seized by him. He recorded the
statements-of Chamanlal Marwaha and Shri Sharwan
Kumar Marwaha during the investigation and after
recording their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the
said witnesses stated that they were told by the
complc;tinant that he has got the accused falsely implicated
. in this. case. After consulting the crime file, witnesses have
stated that it is correct that initially this case was
recommended for being sent for departmental action and
npt for criminal prosecution. This recommendation was
tnade after obtaining legal opinion."
(emphasis supplied)
29. It is clear from the contents of the aforesaid
documentary evidence on record upon which appellant has
rightly placed strong reliance that he is innocent is evident from
H
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI 265
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
the version of the investigating officer PW-9, who had examined
A
those witnesses at the time of the investigation of the case.
They have stated that initially this case was recommended for
being sent for departmental action and not for criminal
prosecution against the appellant. The said evidence would
clearly go to show that there is no case of illegal gratification
either demanded by him or paid to him by the complainant PWB
2. This important aspect of the matter has been over..looked
by the High Court at the time of exercising its appellate
Jurisdiction for setting aside the order of acquittal passed in
favour of the appellant. In fact, the Trial Court on proper c
appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence particularly
the contents of ttie said letter-Ex.PW-1/DA as admitted by PW9 was considered by him and come to the right conclusion to
hold that the appellant is not guilty of the offence and rightly
passed the order of acquittal which has been erroneously . 0
reversed by the High Court as the same is contrary to the laws
laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra which
relevant paragraphs are extracted while. adverting to the
submissions of the learned senior counsel for the appellant.
Therefore, this Court has to hold that the High Court has
exceeded its jurisdictionJ>y not adhering to the legal principles
laid down by this Court in reversing the judgment and order of
the Trial Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
30. Further, the learned senior counsel for the appellant
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has relied upon the statement of PW-3 who in his testimony has
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stated thus:
·
"He along with the complainant left the CBI office at 7.35
a.m. and reached the residence of the accused at 8.00
a.m. The government vehicle was parked at a distance and
G
he was instructed to remain sitting in the car of the
complainant while the complainant would go to the
residence of the accused in order to find out if the accused
is available or not. The other members of the raiding party
took their positions here and there at a distance. The
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complainant came back after an hour and asked him to
accompany him. They both entered the residence of the
accused. The complainant was carrying the bag containing
the money:"
[Extracted from the translation made by the appellant]
It is also an undisputed fact that neither Inspector P.S.
Saini was arrayed as a witness nor accus~f! by the
Investigating Officer. Ram Malhotra, the brother-in-law of
the complainant-PW2 who was stated to be present at the
time of the telephonic conversation with him was also not
examined during the investigation to prove the fact that the
appellant had telephonic conversation with him.
31. The learned counsel for the prosecution has also relied
0
upon the case of C.K. Damodaran Nair Vs. Government of
lndia9 in support of presumption of offence alleged against the
appellant which reads thus:
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"Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under Section
7 or Section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section
(1) of Section 13 it is proved that an accused person has
accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or
attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any
gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable
thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the
contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed
to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that
valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward
such as is mentioned in Section 7 or, as the case may be,
without consideration or for consideration which he knows
to be inadequate."
32. This Court, in K.S. Panduranga's case (supra) has held
that the demand and acceptance of the amount of illegal
gratification by he accused is a condition precedent to
H 9.
(1997) 9 sec 477.
SATVIR SINGH v. STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI
267
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
constitute an offence, the relevant paragraph in this regard from
A
the above-said decision is extracted hereunder:
"39. Keeping in view that the demand and acceptance of
the amount as illegal gratification is a condition precedent
for constituting an offence under the Act, it is to be noted
8
that there is a statutory presumption under Section 20 of
the Act which can be dislodged by the accused by bringing
·on record some evidence, either direct or circumstantial,
that money was accepted other than for the motive or the
reward as stipulated under Section 7 of the Act. When
some explanation is offered, the court is obliged to
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consider the explanation under Section 20 of the Act and
the consideration of the explanation has to be on the
touchstone of preponderance of probability. It is not to be
proven beyond all reasonable doubt. In the case at hand,
we are disposed to think that the explanation offered by
D
the accused does not deserve any acceptance and,
accordingly, we find that the finding recorded on that score
by the learned trial Judge and the stamp of approval given
to the same by the High Court cannot be faulted."
(emphasis supplied)
33. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has also
placed reliance upon the case of Banarsi Das referred to supra
wherein it was held that:
"24. In M.K. Harshan v. State of Kerala this Court in
somewhat similar circumstances, where the tainted money
was kept in the drawer of the accused who denied the
same and ·said that it was put in the drawer without his
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knowledge, held as under:
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· "8 .... It is in this context the courts have cautioned that as
a rule of prudence, some corroboration is necessary. In all
such type of cases of bribery, two aspects are important.
Firstly, there must be a demand and secondly, there must
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be acceptance in the sense that the accused has obtained
the illegal gratification. Mere demand by itself is not
sufficient to establish the offence.