# SATYAVIR SINGH AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS. ETC. ETC. SEPTE!'!BER 12, 1985

- **Citation:** [1985] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 791
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1985
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 242 & 576 of 1982
- **Bench:** V.D. TULZAPU!U<.Ak, R.S. Pathak, D.P. Madon
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/satyavir-singh-and-others-v-union-of-india-and-others-etc-etc-septe-ber-12-1985-9017
- **Pages:** 51

## Headnote

Service jurisprudence - Dismissal from serv.ice under clause
(b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution
of India read with Rule 19 (ii) of the Central Civil Services
A
B
(Classification Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 without serving
C
any charge-sheet and without holding any inquiry - r.onstitutional
validity of.
It is incwnbant upon the competent authority, before exercising its power to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank of persons
employed in civil capacities under. his control, to follow the
D
constitutional provisions contained in Article 311 and also the
procedure prescribed in Rules 14 to 18 of the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
Prior to the amendment of the second clause of. Article 311
of the· Cons-titution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 with
E
effect from January 3, 1977, the second proviso to the said
clause was the only proviso to the said clause 2. Article 311 as
amended- by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and
the Constitution (Forty-second
Amendment) Act, 1976 reads as
follows:-
.. 311 Dismissal, remi>val or reduction in rank of persons
F
employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State:-
( l) No person who is a member of a civil service of the
Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or
holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed
or removed by an autttority . subordinate to that by which he was
appointed.
G
(2) No such
person as - aforesaid shall be .dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank except after an in<,.uiry in which he
has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges:-
Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to
impose
upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed
H
792
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1985] SUPP:Z S.C.R.
A
on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it
shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of
making representation on the penalty proposed:
Ptovided further that this clause shall not apply:-
(a)
where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank
on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a
criminal chargt; or
(b)
where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person
or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be
recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably
c
practicable to hold such inquiry;'or
(c)
where the Ptesident or the Governor, as the cse may be, is
satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is
not expedient to hold such inquiry.
(3)
If, in respect of any such person as afo~esaid, a question
IJ
arises whether it is reasonably practicable to· hold such inquiry
as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the
authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce
him in rank shall be final•"
·
In exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Article
;;
309 of the Constitution the President has made the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 Rule 19
of the said Rules is in substance the same as the second proviso
to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and provides as follows:-
"Rule 19 Special procedure in certain cases:-
NotwithstandF
ing anything contained in Rule 14 to rule 18:-
(i)
where any penalty is imposed on a Government servant on the
ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal
charge, or
G
(ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons
to be recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules,
or
(iii) where the Ptesident is satisfied that in the interest
of
H
the securit; of the State, it is not expedient to hold any
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.O.I.
793
inquiry in the manner provl.ded in these rules,
the disciplinary
authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make
such o

## Text

_Characters 0–39,588 of 113,177. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39588 for what follows._

791
SATYAVIR SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS. ETC. ETC.
SEPTE!'!BER 12, 1985
[V.D. TULZAPU!U<.Ak, R.S. PATHAK AND D.P. MADON, JJ.]
Service jurisprudence - Dismissal from serv.ice under clause
(b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution
of India read with Rule 19 (ii) of the Central Civil Services
A
B
(Classification Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 without serving
C
any charge-sheet and without holding any inquiry - r.onstitutional
validity of.
It is incwnbant upon the competent authority, before exercising its power to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank of persons
employed in civil capacities under. his control, to follow the
D
constitutional provisions contained in Article 311 and also the
procedure prescribed in Rules 14 to 18 of the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
Prior to the amendment of the second clause of. Article 311
of the· Cons-titution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 with
E
effect from January 3, 1977, the second proviso to the said
clause was the only proviso to the said clause 2. Article 311 as
amended- by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and
the Constitution (Forty-second
Amendment) Act, 1976 reads as
follows:-
.. 311 Dismissal, remi>val or reduction in rank of persons
F
employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State:-
( l) No person who is a member of a civil service of the
Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or
holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed
or removed by an autttority . subordinate to that by which he was
appointed.
G
(2) No such
person as - aforesaid shall be .dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank except after an in<,.uiry in which he
has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges:-
Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to
impose
upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed
H
792
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1985] SUPP:Z S.C.R.
A
on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it
shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of
making representation on the penalty proposed:
Ptovided further that this clause shall not apply:-
(a)
where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank
on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a
criminal chargt; or
(b)
where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person
or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be
recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably
c
practicable to hold such inquiry;'or
(c)
where the Ptesident or the Governor, as the cse may be, is
satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is
not expedient to hold such inquiry.
(3)
If, in respect of any such person as afo~esaid, a question
IJ
arises whether it is reasonably practicable to· hold such inquiry
as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the
authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce
him in rank shall be final•"
·
In exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Article
;;
309 of the Constitution the President has made the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 Rule 19
of the said Rules is in substance the same as the second proviso
to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and provides as follows:-
"Rule 19 Special procedure in certain cases:-
NotwithstandF
ing anything contained in Rule 14 to rule 18:-
(i)
where any penalty is imposed on a Government servant on the
ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal
charge, or
G
(ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons
to be recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules,
or
(iii) where the Ptesident is satisfied that in the interest
of
H
the securit; of the State, it is not expedient to hold any
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.O.I.
793
inquiry in the manner provl.ded in these rules,
the disciplinary
authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make
such orders thereon as it deems fit:
Ptovided that the Commission shall be consulted, where such
consultation is necessary before any orders are made in any case
under this rule."
The wrod "COlllllission" is defined by clause (d) of Rule 2 as
meaning "the Union l'Ublic Service Commission".
A five-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, with
one learned Judge dissenting, except as regards the interpretation to be placed upon clause ( c) of the second proviso to
Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, while interpreting Articles
309, 310 and 311 of the Cons_titution and in particular the second
proviso to Article 311 (Z) of the Constitution, in the case of
Union of India and Another v. Tulairam Patel. and other connected
matters, [1985]
3 sec 398 reached as many as 114 conclusions on
several issues like the pleasure doctrine in the United Kingdom
and in India, the nature of inquiry under Article 311 (2) of the
Constitution and in particular the second proviso to Article 311
(2), Article H and the second proviso, the Service Rules
and
Acts, the ratio decfdenclf
in Divisianal Personnel Officer,
Sonthern Rai1-y and another V• T.!l. Qnllappan, [1976] 1 SCR 783
and the correctness ther~of, and the remedies available to civil
servants both departmental remedies and by way of judicial review
etc.
According to Challappan's case, a civil servant to whom a
service rule analogous to the second proviso to Article 311 (2)
is sought_ to be applied has only the right to be heard with
respect to the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him. The
majority
judgment , in Tulsiram Patel's case,
has,
however,
conferred upon the civil servants who have been dismissed or
removed from service or reduced in rank bY applying the second
proviso to Article 311 (2) or an analogous service rule the right
to a full and complete inquiry in, an appeal or , revision unless -a
situation envisaged by the secMd proviso is pre'lailing at the
time of the hearing of th.. appeal or revision application. Even
in such a case under the majority judgment the hearing of the
appeal or revision application is to he postponed for a
reasonable length of time for the situation to become norms!.
The a,ppellants in both the appeals were employees of the
Research and Analysis Wing, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of
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SUPRE~!E COURT REPORTS
[1985] SUPP;2 s.c.~.
India. Earlier, the different branches and departments of the RAW
in New Delhi were scattered in several buildings. Ultimately, a
new building was constructed for the RAW at Lodhi Road. In the
said building the Counter Intelligence Section was house~. After
the CIS was shifted to the building at Lodhi Raod, strict
security measures were introduced and the employees, when going
from one floor to the other, had to show their identity cards.
This was resented by the employees and they demanded the withdrawal of this regulation and insisted that the identification
check should be made only at the time of entering the building.
In the forenoon on November 2 7 , 1980 a number of staff members
collected in the galleries leading to the CIS rooms, protesting
against the said security regulation and demanding its immediate
withdrawal. All attempts to pacify them proved
unsuccessful,
More and more employees joined them and they turned aggressive,
breaking into the various rooms of the CIS unit. Several persons
forced their entry into the room of the Director CIS and forced ,
him as also the Assistant Director and the Security Field Officer
who were in the room to stand in a corner and did not allow them
to move f rnm the spot but kept them as hostages in order to have
their deJMnd conceded. The employees who had gathered there
shouted slogans against the organisation and its officers. These
slogans were obscene,
abusive,
threatening and personal in
nacure. All attempts made by senior officers to pacify them
proved unsuccessful and the employees made it clear that they
would not let the said three officers go unless the Director of
, the Counter Intelll gnece Section announced the withdrawal of the
said security regulation. Ultimately with the help of the local
police &t about 8,30 p.m. the said three officers were rescued
and 31 agitators who were found inside the room were arrested and
charged under sections 342, 506, 353, 186, 332 and 333 of the
Indian Penal Code and section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 1952. The arrested employees were suspended under clause (b)
of sub-rule 1 of rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control arni Appeal) Rules, 1965 as a criminal case
against them was under investigation. The next day, namely, on
November 28, 1980, the agitation continued and many employees did
~ot perform their duties but instead collected inside the
building and in the premises in groups stopping work in many
branches. A large number of them went round shouting slogans and
made speeches in the corridors of the office. On November 29,
1980, a letter was issued by an association called the Cabinet
Secretariat, (Research and Analysis Wing) Employees Association
(Regd.) demanding the illlnediate withdrawal of the criminal cases
against the 31 e.mployees as also of the said security regulation.
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.O.I.
795
The letter stated that unless these demands were met, the
employees would go on a pen-down strike with immediate effect.
Thereupon, orders of suspension were issued" against those who
were taking a leading, active and aggressive role in the
agitation and indulging in these activities. The said suspension
orders were issued from the 1st December, 1980 onwards but the
pen-down strike continued and spread to other off ices of the RAW
in New Delhi as well as in different parts of India including
Lu~.know and
JS111111.1.
Daily the situation worsened. There was
completed insubordination and total breskdown of discipline. The
atmosphere was charged with tension and there did not seem any
hope of the situation becoming normal. Ultimately the seven
·Appellants ir. Civil Appeal No. 242 of 1982 and the sole Appellant
in Civil Appeal No. 576 of 1982 were dismissed by orders dsted
December 6, 1980 without holding any enquiry by applying to them
clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) re'ld with
Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
Thereupon a writ petition was filed in the Delhi High Court.
At the date of the filing of the said writ petition only appellants Numbers 1 to 3 in Civil Appeal No. 242 of 1982 had been
served with the orders of dismissal while the remaining Appellants and Respondents Nos. 4 to 44 in Civil Appeal· No. 242 of
1982 joined in the said writ petition as co-petitioners together
with
the Cabinet Secretariat (Research and Analysis Wing)
Employees Association (Regel.), contending that similar action of
dismissal was being 'lpprehended by them. Pending the said writ
petition the orders of dismissal were also served upon the
remaining Appellants. During the course of the hearing of the
said writ petition a statement was made to the High Court on
behalf of the Union of India that the other petitioners would not
be dismissed without holding a regular inquiry. The said writ
petitf.on, therefore, proceeded only so far as the Appellants in
these two appeals were concerned. A Di vision Bench of the said
High Court dismissed the writ petition by its judgment and order
dated September 25, 1981. Hence the appeals by special leave.
In view of the judgment in Tulsiram Patel's case overruling Cballappan'a case, the only contention taken at the
hearing of these
two Appeals wss that the said orders of
dismissal were passed mala fide and the reasons given therein for
dispensing with the inquiry were not true and that an inquiry was
reasonably practicable. In support thereof, it was contended that
(i) the orders of suspension showed that a disciplinary inquiry
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796
SUPREME COORT REPORTS
[1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.
was in fact contemplated and nothing had happened between the
date of the orders of suspension and the date of the orders of
dismissal warranting the conclusion that the inquiry was not
reasonably practicable; (ii) while eight employees were dismissed
for their part in the agitation which took place in Delhi, in
respect of the agitation which took place in the Lucknow office
of the RAW only two employees of that office were dismissed and
therefore, there was no applicaion of mind on the part of the
disciplinary authority; (iii) even on December 6, 1980 a suspension order was issued against one of the employees and that ~n
December 9, 1980 a suspension orders were issued against two
other employees, and that the issuance of these suspension orders
on the 6th and 9th December showed that the holding of an inquiry
was .reasonably practicable; (iv) it was not alleged by the
authorities that anyone was physically injured in the agitation;
(v) after the suspension orders, the Appellants were prohibited
from visiting any of the Cabinet Secretariat Off ices except for
the purpose of collecting their dues and that too with prior
permission and therefore, they could not have held any meeting or
demonstration inside the office premises;
(vi) even though
co-workers may not have been available as witnesses, there were
policemen and police officers posted inside and outside the
building and they were available to give evidence and that
superior officers were also available to give evidence; and (vii)
the Appellant in Civil Appeal No. 576 of 1982, who was posted at
Jammu could not, have taken any active part in the agitation
.which took place in Delhi.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court, summarizing topic-wise
the conclusions reached in Union of India and another v. Tulsiram
Patel and other connected matters, [1985] 3 s.c.c. 398.
I'
HELD: 1.1 Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 3ll
(2) and Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, .1965, were properly applied to the
case of
~ach of the Appellants and the impugned orders of
dismi.ssal were validly passed against them. [841 C-DJ
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Union of India and another v. Tulsiram Patel and other
connceted matters, [1985] 3 sec 398 applied.
1.2 It is true that each order of
suspension stated that
the concerned employee was being suspended in the exercise of the
powers conferred by Rule 10 ( l) of the Central Civil Services
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(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, because a
SAT'iAVIR SINGH v. U.O.I.
797
disciplinary proceeding against him under Rule 14 of the Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965
was contemplated and that at the date of the orders cif suspension
disciplinary proceedings against the Appellants was in contemplation. This, however, does not mean that the situation will
continue to be the same and. that at no time thereafter will the
holding of the inquiry become "not reasonably practicable.· It is
not necessary that a situation which makes the holding of an
inquiry not reasonably practicable should exist before the
disciplinary inquiry is initiated, because a situation which
renders the holding of ~n inquiry not reasonably practicable can
come into being .even during the course of an enquiry. [838 A-D]
In the instant case, the affidavits filed in the High Court
clearly show that the situation had so changed after the orders
of suspension were issued against the appellants that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold any inquiry against the appellants. The all-India pen-down strike was spreading. More and more
centres in India were joining in the said strike. The position
was fast deteriorating; Employees were being instigated into
~urther acts of indisci.pline and insubordination and loyal
employees and senior officers were being intimidated. Meetings
and demonstrations were regularly being held within the office
premises and their presincts and there was no possibility of any
witness coming forward to give evidence against the appellants
who were said to have taken a leading part in this agitation.
Further, when the first batch of dismissal orders was served upon
some of the appellants on December 8, 1980, the pen-down strike
was called off on December 9, 1980. In such a situation as was·
then prevailing, prompt and urgent action was required to bring
the situation under control, Sometimes not taking prompt action
may result in the trouble spreading and the situation worsening
and at times becoming uncontrolable, and may at times be also
construed by the trouble""1llakers and agitators as a sigo of weakness on the part of the authorities and encourage them to step up
the tempo of their .activities or agitation. This is exactly what
happened when the suspen.qion orders were issued and that what was
required was prompt and urgent ation against those who were
considered to be.· the ring leaders and that once such action was
taken the situation improved and started becoming normal. It is
pertinent to note that when the first batch of dismissal orders
were served upon some of the appellants on December 8, 1980,
the
pen-down strike was called off on December 9, 1980. [838 o-G]
1,3 The fact that it was thought fit t0 dismiss only two
employees of the Lucknow of flee cannot
lead to the conclusion
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1985] SUPP:2 s.c.R.
that the appellants
were
wrongly
dismissed
without
any
application of mind. [893 C-D]
1.4
It will not be reasonably practicable to hold an
inquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and
insubordination prevails.· It is, therefore,
not
necessary that the disciplinary authority should wait until incidents take place in which physical injury is caused to others
before dispensing with the inquiry. [839 F-G]
1.5
In view of the admitted position that the appellants
were regularly coming to the office building and talking with
other employees over the wall and at the gate twice a day at
11.30 a.m. and 3.30 a.m. and were making inflamatory speeches and
holding out threats, it cannot be said that they could not have
held any meeting or demonstration inside the office premises.
[839 H, 840 A-BJ
1.6 Where the disdplinary authority feels that crucial and
material evidence will not be available in an inquiry because the
witnesses who could give such evidence are intimidated and would
not come forward and the only evidence which would be available,
namely, in this case, of policemen, police officers and senior
officers, would only be peripheral and cannot realte to all the
charges and that, therefore, leading only such evidence may be
assailed in a Court of law as being a mere farce of an inquiry
and a deliberate attempt to keep back material witnesses, the
disciplinary authority would be justified in coming to the conclusion that an inquiry is not reasonable practicable.
From a
perusal of the affidavit filed and its annexures it is clear that
the police officers, policemen and senior officers could not have
possibly given evidence with respect to all these acts. Further
the senior officers were also intimidated and were threatened
with dire consequences if they gave evidence.
Grievances were
· also made against the senior officers of the RAW in the charter
of demands submitted by the association and the evidence of
senior officers would have been attacked . as being biased and
partisan. [840 C-G]
1.7 The contention taken on behalf of the sole appellant in
Civil Appeal No. 576 of 1982 that having been posted at Jammu, he
could not have taken part in the agitation which took place in
New Delhi is falsified by the fact that during the relevant time
he had taken leave for personal reasons and had come down to
Delhi and had played an active role in the said agitation. He
made inflamatory
speeches on the Ist, 3rd, 4th and 5th of
December, 1980 and had instigated the other employees to continue
' •
SATYAVIR SINGH v. u.o.r. [MADON, J.]
799
the agitatio!l and intimidated those who had not joined in the
agitation into doing so. Further, in a speech made by him on
December 4, 1980 he had tried to make public some of the top
secret operations of the RAW claiming to have special knowledge
of these operations by virtue of his having been posted earlier
in a sensitive branch. He was also actively engaged in collecting
funds for continuing the agitation. [840 G-H, 841 A-B]
The Court, directed:- (i) if any payment has been made to
any of the appellants in pursuance of any interim order, such
appellant will not be liable to refund such· amount or any part
thereof; and (ii) since the appellants have a right to file a
departmental appeal under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 in case they desires' to
file such an appeal, they may do so on or before October 31, 1985
and that the Appellate Authority must condone, ln the exercise of
its power under the proviso to Rule 25 of the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 the
delay in filing the appeal and hear and dispose of such appeals
expeditiously subject to what has been laid down in TulsirPAtel 's case.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal Nos. 242 & 576
of 1982.
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From the Judgment and Order dated 25. 9 .1981 of the Delhi
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High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1786 of 1980.
Appellant in person for Petr. No. 4 in C.A. No. 242 of 1982.
V.N. Ganpule for the Appellant in C.A. No. 242/82.
V.M •. Tarkunde, V.N. Ganpule and G.B. Sathe for the Appellants in C.A. No. 576 of i982.
K.Parasaran, Attorney General and Miss
A.
Subhashini
for
the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MADON, J. The appellants who were employed in the Research
and Analysis Wing, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India were
dismissed from service in the exercise of the power conferred by
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clause (b) of the second p.roviso to Article 311 (2) of the
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Constitution of India read with Rule 19 of the Central Civil
800
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%5) SUPP.2 s.c.R.
A
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, without serving any charge-sheet ·upon them and w.ithout. holding any
inquiry. The Appellants thereupon filed in the relhi High Court a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging
the said orders of dismissal. The said writ petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of ·the Delhi High Court by its judgment
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and order dated September 25, 1981. It is against the said judgment and order of the Delhi High Court that the present two
Appeals have been filed by Special Leave granted by this Court.
Article 311 of the Constitution
Prior to the amendment of the second
clause of Article 311
C
of the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment)
Act, 1976, with effect from January 3, 1977, the second proviso
to the said clause was the only proviso to the said clause (2).
Article 311 as amended by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment)
Act, 1963, and the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act,
1976, reads as follows:
D
"311. Dismissal, removal or reduction In rank ofpersons employed
in civil capacities uoder the Union or a State. -
(1) No person who is a memher of a civil service of the
Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or
holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed
E
or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was
appointed.
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he
has been informed of the charges· against hirn and given a reasonF
able oppo~tunity of being heard in respect of those charges:
Provided that where it is proposed ·after such .inquiry, to
impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may he imposed on
the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it
shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity or
G
making representation on the penalty proposed:
Ii
Provided further that this clause shall not apply-
(a) ''where a person is dismissed or removed or
r(~duced i 1:1
rank on the ground of conduct which has led to h i.s
conviction on a criminal charge; or
SP.T'L>VIR SINGH v. u.o.r. [MADON, J.]
801
(b)
where the authority empowered to dism1ss or remove a
A
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for
some
reason,
to
be
recorded
by
that
authority
in
wri.ting, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such
inquiry; or
(c)
where the Fresic;ent or the Governor, as the case may
B
be, is sati.sfied that in the interest of the security
of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.
(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a
question arises whether it is reasonably practicable
to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2),
C
the
decision thereon
of
the
nuthority
empowered
to
dismiss or remov·e such person or to reGuce him in rank
shall be final."
Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and
Appeal} Rules, 1965
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The
Central
Civil
Services
(Classification,
Control
and
Appeal) Rules, 1965, have been made by the President in exercise
of
the
power
conferred
by
the
proviso
to Article 309
of the
Constitution. Rule 19 of the said Rules is in substance the same
as the second proviso to Article 311 (2) and provides as follows:
"19.
Special procedure.
in
cettain
""""""
-
Notwithstanding
anything contained in rule 14 to rule 18 -
(i)
where
any
penalty
is imposed on a Government
servant on the ground of conduct which bas led to his
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conviction on a crimiP.al charge, or
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(ii)
where
the
disciplinary authority is satisfied
for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that it is
not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the
manner provided in these rules, or
(iii)
where
the President
is
satisfied that in the
interest
ot
the security of
the
State,
it
is
not
expedi.ent to hold any inquiry in the manner provided
in these rules,
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tlw diSc.i\)linary authority llKlY COllɔl,!lɕr thЎ drqnnstances of the
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case and make such orders theron as ;t de.en's fit;
802
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(1985) SUPP.2 s.c.R.
. Provided that the Commission shall be .consulted, where such.
consultation is necessary, before any orders are mad~ in any case
under this rule."
'
The word "Co!l:mission" is defined by clause (d) of Rule 2 as meaning "the Union Public Service Commission".
The Decision in Tulsiram Patel's Case
It was not disputed at the hearing of these two Appeals that
they fall to be decided in the light of what was held in Union of
India and another v.Tulsiram Patel and other connected lllattezs.
[1985) 3 s.c.c. 398. By the decision in Tulsiram Patel's Case a
large Dlllllber of writ petitions either filed in this Court or in
various High Courts and transferred to this Court and several
Appeals by Special Leave, all involving the interpretation of
Articles 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution and in particular
of the second proviso to Article 311 (2), were disposed of by a
five-judge Constitution tench of this Court,· with one learned
judge dissenting except as regards the interpretation to be .
placed upon clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2).
A large number of points fell for decision in . Tulsirais
Patel's case. (1985] 3 s.c.i::. 398. It will, therefore, be convenient first to summarize topic-wise the conclusions reached by
the majority in that · case and then to emphasize the important·
rights conferred by the majority judgment upon persons who are
members of a civil service of the Union of India or an all-India
service or a civil service of a State or hold a civil post under
the Union of India or a State, 1n other words, upon civil
servants, and thereafter to deal with the facts of the present
Appeals and the contentions raised at the hearing thereof.
The conclusions reached by the majority in Tulsiram Patel's
Case were:
I. The Pleasure Doctrine in the United Kil'&dom
(l).The pleasure doctrine relates to the tenure of a
government servant, that is, his right to continue to
hold office. Under it all public officers and servants
of the Crown in the United Kingdom hold their appointments at the pleasure of the Crown and their services
can be terminated at will without assigning ar.y cause.
'
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U .Q. I. [MADON, J.]
803
(2) The pleasure doctrine is not based upon any
A
special prerogative of the Crown but is based on
public poiicy and is in public interest and for public
good. The basis of the pleasure doctrine is that the
public is vitally interested in the efficiency and
integrity of civil services and,
therefore
public
policy requires, public interest needs and public good
li
demands that civil servants who are inefficient, dishonest or corrupt or have become a security risk
should not continue in service.
(3) In the United Kingdom, Parliament is sovereign and
can make any law whatever and the courts have no power
<.:
to declare it void. In the United Kingdom, therefore,
the pleasure doctrine is subject to what may be
expressly provided otherwise by legislation.
II. The Pleasure Doctrine in India
(4) In India the pleasure doctrine has received
Constitutional sanction by being enacted in Article
310 (1) of the ConstitutJ.on of India. Under Article
310 (1), except as expressly provided in the Constitution, every person who is a member of a defence
service or of a civil serv:!.ce oi t'he Union of India or
ll
of an all-India service or holds. any post connected
E
wj th defence or any civil post under the Union of
India
holds
office
during
the
ple&sure
of
the
President, and every per.son who is a member of a civil
service of a State or holds any civil post under a
State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor
of the State.
F
(5) Thus, unlike in the Untied Kingdom, in India the
pleasure doctrine is not subject to any law made by
Parliament or a State Legislature but is subject to
only what · i.s expressly provided in the Constitutfon.
In India, the.refore, the exceptions
to the pleasure
G
doctrine can only be those which are expressly provided in the Constitution.
(6) There are several exceptions to the pleaGure
doctrine expressly provided in the Constitutione
(7) Article 3li, being an express provision of the
Constitution, is an exception to the pleasure doctrine
804
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contained in Article 310 (1) of ·the Constitution.
Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311 restrict the operation of the pleasure doctri1le so far as civil servants
. are concerned by conferring upon civil servants the
safeguards provided in those clauses.
(8) Under clause (1) of Article 311 no civil servant
can be dismissed or
authority
subordinate
appointed.
removed
f ram
to
that
by
service by an
which
he
was
(9) Under Clause (2) of Article 311 no civil servant
can be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in
rank except after an inquiry :i.n which he has been
informed of the charges against him and given a
reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of
such charges. By reason of the amendment made by the
Constitution (Forty-second A'!lendment) Act, 1976, in
clause (2) of Article 311 it is now not necessary to
give to a civil servant an opportunlty of making a
represent:atio~ with respect to the penalty proposed to
be i.rnposed upon him.
(10) An order of compulsory retiren:ent from service
:i.1tposed upon a civil servant by way of pE·nalty amounts
to "removal"'from service and attracts the provisions
of Article 311.
(11) Restrictions on the operation of the pleasure
doctrine contained in legislation Il'iade by Parli.ament
~i.n the Uni.ted Kingdom and· in clauses (1) and (2) of
"Article 311 in India are aJ,so based on pobli ... ;. policy
and are in public tnterest and for public good in.asmuch ar. they give to c.ivtl servants a feeling of
security of tenure.
·· (12)
The
clause (.2)
the thret
the
only
app1 ir:rtr.1 p"
safeguard provided to civil servants by
of ArticJe 311. is t;-;kcu away
when
any of
clauses of the second proviso (origin.:ilJy
pt'O'/iso)
to
i\rt.ic1f::·
3li
(2)
becomes
(13) lr: l~ ir1correct t:o sf!y that tl1e pleasure doctrine
is a -prero5ative of the British Crown lj,'hic\i haH heen
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U .o. I. [!'.AIXJN, J.]
805
inherited by India and transposed into its Constitu-.
tion , adapted to suit the Constitutional. set up of
the Republic of India. Author.itative jUdicial dicta
both in England and in India, for instance, Shenton v.
Smith, L.R. [1895] A.C. 229 J.C. Dunn v. The Queen,
L.R.
[1896]
Q.B.D. 116,
119-120; s.c. [1895-96] 73
L.T.R. 695 and sub oomine Dunn v. Regeni in [1895-1899]
All E. R. Rep. 907. n,.; State of Uttar Pradesh and
others v. Babu Ram Upadhya, [1961] 2 s.c.R. 679, 696.
Motl. Ram Ueka etc. v.· General l1anager N.E.F. Railways,
Maligaon, Pando, etc. [1964] 5 s.c.R. 683, 734-5 and
Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, [1968] 1 s.C.R.
185, 195, have laid down that the pleasure doctrine
and the protection afforded · to civil servants by
legislation in the United Kingdom and by clauses ( 1)
and (2) of Article 311 in India are based on public
policy and are in public interest and for·public good.
Similarly, the withdrawal of the safeguard contained
in clause (2) of Article 311 by the second proviso to
that clause is also based. on public policy and is in
public interest and for public good.
(14) Neither Article 309 nor Article 310 nor Article
311 8ets out the grounds for dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank or for imposition of any other
penalty upon a civil servant. These Articles also d(,.
not specify what
the · other penalties are.
Tqese
matters are left to be dealt with by rules made under
the proviso to Article 309 or by Acts referable to
that Article or rules ~de under such.·Acts.
(15) The pleasure of the ·President or the Governor is
not to be exercised by him personally. It is to be
exercised by the appropriate . authotity specified in
rules made.under the proviso to Article 309 or by Acts
referable to that Article "Or rules made under such
Acts. \..There, however, the President _or the Governor,
as the.- case m.B.y . be, e:Xertise hi!? -pleasure -under -
Article 310 (1), it is not required that such act of
exercise of the pleasure under Article 310 (1) 1m1st be
an act of the President (lr the Governor himself but it
must be an act of __ the President or the Governor in the
Constitutional sense, that is, with the" aid and on the
advice of the Council of Ministers.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1985j SUPP.2 s.c.R.
III. The Inquiry under Article 311 (2)
(lb) Clasue (2) of Article 311 gives a Constitutional
mandate to the principles of natural justice and the
audi alteram partem rule by providingthat
a
civil
servant shall not be dismissed or removed from service
or reduced in rank until after an inquiry in which he
has been informed of the charges against him and has
been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in
respect of those charges.
(17)
The nature ot this inquiry has been elaborately
set out by this Court in Khan Chand v.
The Union of
India and others [195tiJ s.c.R. 10~0, 1005-97 and even
after the Constitution (Forty-second AP.lendment) Act,
197b, the inquiry required by clause (2) of Article
311 would be the same except that it would not be
necessary to give to a civil servant an opportunity to
make a representation with respect to the penalty
proposed to be imposed upon him.
(18) As held in Suresh Koshy George v. The University
of Kerala and others [1969J
s.c.R. 317,326-7.
and
Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. T.C. Shrivast,,va
and others, [1984]
3 S.C.R. 361, 369. apart from
Article 311 prior to its amendment by the Constitution
(Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, it is not necessary either under the ordinary law of the land or under
industrial law to give a second opportunity to show
casue against the penalty proposed to be imposed upon
an employee.
(19) If an inquiry held against a civil servant under
Article 311 (2) is unfair or biased or has been
conducted in such a manner as not to give him a fair
or
reasonable opportunity to defend himself,
the
principles of natural justice would be violated; but
in such a case the order of di.Smissal, removal or
reduction in rank would be bad as contravening the
express provisions of Article Jll \2) and there is no
scope for having recourse to Article 14 for the
purpose of invalidating it.
IV. The Second Proviso to Article 311 (2)
)
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.O.I. [MADON, J.]
807
(20) The language of the second proviso to Article 311
A
(2) is plain and unambiguous. The keywords in the
second proviso are "this clause shall not apply".
There is no ambiguity in these words. Where, therefore, a situaion envisagea in any of the three clauses
of the second proviso arises, the safeguard provided
to a civil servant by clause (2) of Article 311 is
B
taken away.
(21) The second proviso to Article 311 (2) becomes
applicable in the three cases mentioned in clauses (a)
to (c) of that proviso, namely, (a) where a person is
dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground
C
of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank -is
satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that
authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable
to hold such inquiry;· and (c) where the Ptesident or
D
the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in
the interest of the security of the State it is not
expedieat to hold such inquiry.
(22) The governing words of the second proviso to
clause (2) of Article 311, namely, "this clause shall
not apply", are mandatory and not directory and are in
E
·the nature of a Constitutional prohibitory injunction
restraining the disciplinary authority from holding an
inquiry under Article 311 (2) or from giving any kind
of opportunity to the concerned civil servant in a
case where one of the three clauses of the seco!ld
proviso becomes applicable. There is thus no scope for
F
introducing into the second proviso some kind of
inquiry or opportunity to show cause by a process of
inference or implication. The maxim "expressum fac!t
cessare tacitum" ("when there is express mention of
certain
things,
then
anything
not
mentioned
is
excluded") applies to the case. ThiS well-known maxim
G
is a principle of logic and
co~n sense and not
merely a technical rule of construction as pointed out
in B.Sbankara Rao Badami. and others v. State of Mysore
and another [1969] 3 s.c.R. 1, 12.
(23) The second proviso to Article 311 (2) has been in
H
the Constitution of India since the time the Constitu-
808
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ti.on was originally 12:nacted. It was not blindly or
slavJshly copied from section 240 (3) of the Government of lnciia Act, 1935. There was a considerable
debate on this proviso i.n the ConstjtutEnt Assembly as
shown
by
the Offici.al Ri::-port
of the Constituen,t
·Assembly Debates, vo.l. IX, pages 1099 to 1116. The
majority of the members of the Consti.tuent Assembly
had fought for freedom and had suffered imprisonment
in the cause of liberty and were, therefore, not
likely to introduce into our Constitution any provision fron; the earlier Government of India Act which
had been enacted purely for the benefit of a foreign
i.mperalistic power. They retained the second proviso
as a matter of public policy and as being in the
public interest and for public good.