# SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. + v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR

- **Citation:** [2008] 6 S.C.R. 566
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2008-04-16
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1897 of 2003
- **Bench:** B.N. Agrawal, G.S. Singhvi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/satyawati-sharma-dead-by-lrs-v-union-of-india-and-anr-24589
- **Pages:** 56

## Headnote

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:
s.14(1)(e) -
Constitutionality of - Held: s.14(1)(e) is
c violative of doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of
Constitution insofar as it discriminates between premises let
for residential and non-residential purposes when same are
required bona fide by landlord for occupation for himself or for
any member of his family dependent on him, and restricting
D latter's right to seek eviction of tenant from premises let for
residential purposes only- Discriminatory portion of s. 14(1 )(e)
struck down - While adopting this course, well recognized rule
kept in view that offending portion of statute can be severed
without doing violence to remaining part thereof - Legislation
E - Delhi Rent Control Act, 1995- s.22(r)- Constitution of India,
1950 - Article 14.
s.14(1)(e) - Classification of premises with reference to
purpose of their user - Reasonableness of - Held: The 1958
Act which was reasonable at the time of enactment has. with
F lapse of time or changed circumstances become unreasonable
- Period of almost 50 years has elapsed from enactment of
~ ..
1958 Act - During this long span of time those who came from
West Pakistan as refugees and even their next generations
have settled down in different parts of country and occupying
G prime positions in various fields and earned wealth - Not only
this, availability of premises which can be let for non-residential
purposes has substantially increased - Therefore, reason to
sustain classification of premises with reference to purpose of
their user, is no longer available for negating challenge to
H
566
SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF
567
INDIAANDANR.
• -I
s. 14(1)(e) on ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution A
- Legislation - Delhi Rent Control Act, 1995 - s. 22(r) -
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14.
Rent Control and eviction~ History of Rent Control
Legislation discussed - Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
B
1941 - Delhi Rent Control Ordinance, 1944 - Delhi and AjmerMarwara Rent Control Act, 1947 - Delhi and Ajmer Rent
Control Act, 1952 - Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1995
Judicial notice - Delhi Rent Control Act, 1995 - Makes c
no distinction between premises let for residential and nonresidential purposes for seeking eviction on ground of bona
fide need - Although 1995 Act is yet to be enforced, judicial
notice taken of fact that legislature has removed implicit
embargo on landlord's right to recover possession of premises D
if same are bona fide required by him/her, after taking note of
developments which took place in the last 37 years i.e.
substantial increase in availability of commercial and nonresidential premises or premises which can be let for
commercial or non-residential purposes and meteoric rise in
prices of land and rentals of residential as well as nonE
residential premises.
Constitution of India, 1950:
Article 14 - Doctrine of equality - Applicability of -
Reasonable classification - Theory of.
F
.. ~
Article 14 - Changed circumstances/Lapse of time -
Legislation- Constitutionality of- Held: Legislation which may
be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment
may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of
G
circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable .and violative
of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such
legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the
Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it
is found that the rationale of classification has become nonexistent.
H
568
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008) 6 S.C.R.
A
In the writ petition filed by landlords before the High Court,
~ ~
prayer made was that s.14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
was violative of equality clause embodied in Article 14 of the
Constitution insofar as it differentiated between the premises
let for residential and non-residential purposes in the matter of
B eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord
and restr

## Text

_Characters 0–39,649 of 113,673. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39649 for what follows._

[2008] 6 S.C.R. 566
A
SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS.
+- ..
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 1897 of 2003)
B
APRIL 16, 2008
[B.N. AGRAWAL AND G.S. SINGHVI, JJ.]
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:
s.14(1)(e) -
Constitutionality of - Held: s.14(1)(e) is
c violative of doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of
Constitution insofar as it discriminates between premises let
for residential and non-residential purposes when same are
required bona fide by landlord for occupation for himself or for
any member of his family dependent on him, and restricting
D latter's right to seek eviction of tenant from premises let for
residential purposes only- Discriminatory portion of s. 14(1 )(e)
struck down - While adopting this course, well recognized rule
kept in view that offending portion of statute can be severed
without doing violence to remaining part thereof - Legislation
E - Delhi Rent Control Act, 1995- s.22(r)- Constitution of India,
1950 - Article 14.
s.14(1)(e) - Classification of premises with reference to
purpose of their user - Reasonableness of - Held: The 1958
Act which was reasonable at the time of enactment has. with
F lapse of time or changed circumstances become unreasonable
- Period of almost 50 years has elapsed from enactment of
~ ..
1958 Act - During this long span of time those who came from
West Pakistan as refugees and even their next generations
have settled down in different parts of country and occupying
G prime positions in various fields and earned wealth - Not only
this, availability of premises which can be let for non-residential
purposes has substantially increased - Therefore, reason to
sustain classification of premises with reference to purpose of
their user, is no longer available for negating challenge to
H
566
SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF
567
INDIAANDANR.
• -I
s. 14(1)(e) on ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution A
- Legislation - Delhi Rent Control Act, 1995 - s. 22(r) -
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14.
Rent Control and eviction~ History of Rent Control
Legislation discussed - Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
B
1941 - Delhi Rent Control Ordinance, 1944 - Delhi and AjmerMarwara Rent Control Act, 1947 - Delhi and Ajmer Rent
Control Act, 1952 - Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1995
Judicial notice - Delhi Rent Control Act, 1995 - Makes c
no distinction between premises let for residential and nonresidential purposes for seeking eviction on ground of bona
fide need - Although 1995 Act is yet to be enforced, judicial
notice taken of fact that legislature has removed implicit
embargo on landlord's right to recover possession of premises D
if same are bona fide required by him/her, after taking note of
developments which took place in the last 37 years i.e.
substantial increase in availability of commercial and nonresidential premises or premises which can be let for
commercial or non-residential purposes and meteoric rise in
prices of land and rentals of residential as well as nonE
residential premises.
Constitution of India, 1950:
Article 14 - Doctrine of equality - Applicability of -
Reasonable classification - Theory of.
F
.. ~
Article 14 - Changed circumstances/Lapse of time -
Legislation- Constitutionality of- Held: Legislation which may
be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment
may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of
G
circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable .and violative
of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such
legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the
Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it
is found that the rationale of classification has become nonexistent.
H
568
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008) 6 S.C.R.
A
In the writ petition filed by landlords before the High Court,
~ ~
prayer made was that s.14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
was violative of equality clause embodied in Article 14 of the
Constitution insofar as it differentiated between the premises
let for residential and non-residential purposes in the matter of
B eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord
and restricts the landlord's right only to the residential premises.
t
The writ petitions were heard by the Full Bench of High
Court along with the other writ petitions involving challenge to
the vires of s.14(1)(e). After referring to **H.C. Sharma's case
c and ***Amarjit Singh's case, the Full Bench of High Court
dismissed the writ petitions. Hence these appeals.
Allowing the appeals and partly striking down
s.14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the Court
D·
HELD: 1. S.14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article
14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates
between the premises let for residential and nonresidential purposes when the same are required bona
E fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any
member of his family dependent on him and restricts the
latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the
premises let for residential purposes only. However,
s.14(1)(e) is not totally struck down because it is neither
F the pleaded case of the parties nor the argument that
s.14(1)(e) is unconstitutional in its entirety and ends of
;. ..
justice would be met by striking down the discriminatory
portion of s.14(1)(e) so that the remaining part thereof may
read as : "that the premises are required bona fide by the
G landlord for himself or for any member of his family
dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any
person for whose benefit the premises are held and that
the landlord or such person has no other reasonably
suitable accommodation." While adopting this course,
H well recognized rule is kept in view that if the offending
SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF
569
INDIAAND ANR.
. "'
portion of a statute can be severed without doing violence A
to the remaining part thereof, then such a course is
permissible. [Paras 38, 39] [620-G; 621-A, 8, C, D, E]
R.M.D. Chamarbaugwal/a v. Union of India AIR (1957)
SC 628; Bhawani Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 3 SCC B
-+
105.- relied on.
2. An analysis of Rent Control Legislation which were
made applicable from time to time show that till 1947 no
tangible distinction was made between the premises let
for residential .and non-residential purposes. The implicit c
restriction on the landlord's right to recover possession
of the non-residential premises was introduced in the
Delhi an.d Ajmer-Marwara Rent Control Act, 1947 and was
continued under the 1958 Act. However, the 1995 Act does.
not make any distinction between the premises let for D
~
residential and non-residential purposes in the matter of
eviction of tenant on the ground that the same are required
by the landlord for his/her bona fide use or· occupation.
I
Even though, the 1995 Act is yet to be enforced and in
*Common Cause v. Union of India this Court declined to
issue a writ of mandamus to the Central Government, for E
that purpose, judicial notice can be taken of the fact that
the legislature has, after taking note of the developments
which took place in the last 37 years i.e. substantial ·
increase in the availability of the commercial and nonresidential premises or the premises which can be let for F
.., ·-<I
commercial or non-residential purposes and meteoric rise
in the prices of land and rentals of residential as well as
non-residentiat premises, removed the implicit embargo
on the landlord's right to recover possession .of the
.
.
premises if the same are bona fide required by him/her. G
[Para 9] [588-F, G; 589-A, 8, C]
-+
Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra & Anr. (1998) 2 SCC 1; Prabhakaran Nair v. State
~
of Tamil Nadu (1987) 4 SCC 238; Mohinder Kumar and Ors.
H
1
570
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 6 S.C.R.
.
i, •
A v. State of Haryana and Anr. (1985) 4 SCC 221; 0. C. Bhatia
and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (1995) 1 SCC 104; C.N.
Rudramurthy v. K. Barkathulla Khan (1998) 8 SCC 275;
*Common Cause v. Union of India and Ors. (2003) 8 SCC
250 - referred to.
B
3. Article 14 declares that the State shall not deny to
any person equality before the law or the equal protection
of the laws. The concept of equality embodied in Article
14 is also described as doctrine of equality. The doctrine
of equality means that there should be no discrimination
c between one person and another, if having regard to the
subject matter of legislation, their position is the same.
The plain language of Article 14 may suggest that all are
equal before the law and the State cannot discriminate
between similarly situated persons. However, application
D of the doctrine of equality embodied in that Article has
not been that simple. The debate which started in 1950s
on the true scope of equality clause is still continuing. In
last 58 years, the courts have been repeatedly called upon
to adjudicate on the constitutionality of various legislative
E instruments including those meant for giving effect to
the Directive Principles of State Policy on the ground
that same violate the equality clause. It has been the
constant refrain of the courts that Article 14 does not
prohibit the legislature from classifying apparently
F similarly situated persons, things or goods into different
groups provided that there is rational basis for doing
~ ,.
so. The theory of reasonable classification has been
invoked in large number of cases for repelling challenge
to the constitutionality of different legislations. [Para 14]
G [595-A, 8, C, D, E]
Ram Krishna Dalmia and Ors. vs. Shri Justice S.R.
Tendo/kar and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 538; Mohd. Shujat Ali vs.
Union of India 1975 (3) SCC 76; L. I. C. of India and Another
vs. Consumer Education & Research Centre and Others 1995
H (5) sec 482 - relied on.
SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF
571
INDIAAND ANR.
~ +
Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar & Ors. 1985 (2) SCC A
683; Motor General Traders vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 1984
(1) SCC 222; Mohinder Prasad Jain vs. Manohar Lal Jain
(2006) 2 SCC 724; State of Haryana vs. Ved Prakash Gupta
(1999) 1 Rent Law Reporter 689 - referred to.
4. In the instant case, Full Bench of High Court upheld B
t
the validity of s. 14(1 )(e) mainly by relying upon the
judgment of the Division Bench in **H. C. Sharma case and
of this Court in ***Amarjit Singh case and by observing
that legislature has the right to classify persons, things,
and goods into different groups and that the Court will c
not sit over the judgment of the legislature. The Full Bench
did not, at all, advert to the question whether the reason/
cause which supplied rationale to the classification
continued to subsist even after lapse of 44 years and
whether the tenants of premises let for non-residential D
purposes should continue to avail the benefit of implicit
""'
exemption from eviction in the case of bona fide
•I
requirement of the landlord despite sea saw change in
the housing scenario in Delhi and substantial increase
in the availability of buildings and premises which could E
(
be let for non-residential or commercial purposes.
[Para 27] (612-G; 613-A, B, C]
**H. C. Sharma v. Life Insurance Corporation of India &
Anr. ILR (1973) 1 Delhi 90; ***Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon
Quamarin (1986) 4 sec 736 - referred to.
F
_, ~
4.2. In the rent control legislations made applicable
to Delhi from time to time, residential and non-residential
premises were treated at par for all purposes. The scheme
of the 1958 Act also does not make any substantial G
distinction between residential and non-residential
premises. Even in the grounds of eviction set out in
proviso to s.14(1), no such distinction has been made
except in Clauses (d) and (e). In **H.C. Sharma, the Division·
Bench of the High Court, after taking cognizance of the H
572
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008) 6 S.C.R.
A acute problem of housing created due to partition of the
country, upheld the classification by observing that the
Government could legitimately restrict the right of the
landlord to recover possession of only those premises
which were let for residential purposes. The Court felt that
B if such restriction was not imposed, those up-rooted from
Pakistan may not get settled in their life. As of now a period
of almost 50 years has elapsed from the enactment of the
1958 Act. During this long span of time much water has
flown down the Ganges. Those who came from West
C Pakistan as refugees and even their next generations
have settled down in different parts of the country, more
particularly in Punjab, Haryana, Delhi and surrounding
areas. They are occupying prime positions in political and
bureaucratic set up of the Government and have earned
huge wealth in different trades, occupation, business and
D similar ventures. Not only this, the availability of buildings
and premises which can be let for non-residential or
commercial purposes has substantially increased.
Therefore, the reason/cause which prompted the Division
Bench of the High Court to sustain the differentiation/
E classification of the premises with reference to the
purpose of their user, is no longer available for negating
the challenge to s.14(1)(e) on the ground of violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution, and such arbitrary
classification cannot be upheld the discrimination which
F was latent in s.14(1)(e) at the time of enactment of 1958
Act has, with the passage of time (almost 50 years) has
become so pronounced that the impugned provision
cannot be treated intra vires Article 14 of the
Constitution by applying any rational criteria. [Para 28]
. G [613-F, G; 614-A, 8, C, D, E, F, G]
Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab & Anr. (1996) 1
SCC 1; Rattan Arya v. State of Tamil Nadu (1986) 3 SCC 385;
Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal (2002) 5 SCC 397;
Rakesh Vij v. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi (2005) 8 SCC
H 504 - referred to.
SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF
573
INDIAANDANR.
5. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite A
reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment
may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of
circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and
violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity
of such legislation may have been upheld at a given B
point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation,
strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of
classification has become non-existent. [Para 29]
[614-G; 615-A]
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal Sugar Industries AIR c
(1964) SC 1179; Narottam Kishore Dev Verma v. Union of
India AIR (1964) SC 1590; H.H. Shri Swamiji Shri Admar Mutt
Etc v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable
Endowments Department (1979) SCC 642; Chintapa/li
Achaiah v. P. Gopa/a Krishna Reddy AIR (1966) AP 51; D
Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. Motor & General Traders (1975)
1 SCC 770; Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC
103 - referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
E
1897 of 2003
From the Judgment and Order dated 27 .8.2002 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in C.W.P. No. 1092/1999
t ~
WITH
F
Civil Appeal No. 1898 of 2003 and Civil Appeal No.
5622 of 2006.
C.S. Rajan, T.S. Doabia, A.C. Gambhir, P.O. Sharma,
Mohan Pandey, Shish Pal Laler, Balbir Singh Gupta, Sadhana
Sandhu, R.C. Kathiam, P. Parmeswaran, D.S. Mahra, B.V. G
Bairam Das, Manu Nayar, K.K. Sharma, Hameed S. Shaikh,
.. -J
A.L. Trehan, Praveen Swarup and Ashwani Kumar for the
appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
574
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 6 S.C.R.
A
G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Whether Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi
t "
Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short 'the 1958 Act') is ultra vires the
doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of
India is the question which arises for determination in these
appeals.
B
2. For the sake of convenience, we have noted the facts
from Civil Appeal No.1897 of 2003:
(i)
On August 18, 1953, Delhi Improvement Trust leased
out a plot of land measuring 184 sq. yards situated
c
at Basti Reghar, Block 'R', Khasra Nos.2942/1820
to 2943/1820 to Shri Jagat Singh son of Pt. Ram
Kishan. In terms of Clause 4(c) of the lease deed,
the lessee was prohibited from using the land and
building (to be constructed over it) for any purpose
D
other than residence, with a stipulation that in case
of breach of this condition, the lease shall become
void.
(ii)
After constructing the building, the lessee inducted
Shri Jai Narain Sharma and Dr. Ms. Tara Motihar, as
E
tenants in two portions of the building, who started
using the rented premises for running watch shop
and clinic respectively.
(iii) Smt. Satyawati Sharma (appellant herein), who is
now represented by her LRs, purchased property
F
i.e. house bearing No.3395-3397, Ward No.XVI,
...
Block R, Gali No.1, Reghar Pura, New Delhi from
;..
legal heirs of the lessee.
(iv) After purchasing the property. the appellant filed
Petition Nos.184 of 1980 and 187 of 1980 for eviction
G
of the tenants by claiming that she needed the house
for her own bona fide need and also for the use and
occupation of the family members dependant upon
her. The appellant further pleaded that she wanted to
demolish the building and reconstruct the same. She
H
also alleged that tenants have been using the
SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF
575
IN DIA AND ANR. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
premises in violation of the conditions of lease and,
A
therefore, they are liable to be evicted.
(v)
The tenants contested the eviction petitions by
asserting that the so called need of the landlord was
not bona fide; that there were no valid grounds for
B
permitting the landlord to demolish the building and
reconstruct the same and that they had not violated
the conditions of lease. They further pleaded that the
previous owner let out the premises for nonresidential purposes; that the appellant was also
issuing rent receipts by describing the rented c
portions as shop/clinic and that in view of order dated
11.12.1978 issued by the Government of India,
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Delhi
Development Authority was condoning violations of
the lease conditions.
D
(vi)
By an order dated 17.5.1991, Additional Rent
Controller, Delhi dismissed the eviction petitions. He
held that the appellant is owner and landlady of the
suit premises, but she has not been able to prove
E
that portions thereof were l~t for residential purposes;
that the appellant and her dependent family members
do not have suitable alternative accommodation
except the one occupied by her elder son, who was
under the threat of eviction and that the need of the
appellant is bona fide. The Additional Rent Controller
F
...
further held that the tenants are guilty of violating
clause 4(c) of deed dated August 18, 1953. He,
however, declined to pass order for recovery of
possession by observing that under Section 14(1 )(e)
of the Act, such an order can be passed only in
G
respect of premises let for residential purposes. The
... ,_
Additional Rent Controller also rejected other grounds
of eviction put forward by the appellant.
3. The appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed
H
576
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 6 S.C.R.
A by Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi vide its judgment dated
10.11.1998. The Tribunal agreed with the Additional Rent
Controller that an order of eviction of the tenant can be passed
under Section 14(1)(e) only if the premises were let for
residential purposes. The Tribunal then held that the portions
B given to the tenants were being used for non-residential
purposes and, therefore, they cannot be evicted on the ground
of bona fide need of the landlord.
4. The appellant challenged the orders of the Additional
Rent Controller and Rent Control Tribunal in Civil Writ Petition
C No.1093 of 1999. She filed another petition, which was
registered as Civil Writ Petition No.1092of1999, with the prayer
that Section 14(1 )(e) of the Act be declared ultra vires of Article
14 of the Constitution insofar as it does not provide for eviction
of the tenant from the premises let for non-residential purposes.
D Both the writ petitions were heard by the Full Bench of Delhi
High Court along with' other writ petitions involving challenge to
the vires of Section 14(1 )(e) and were dismissed by the order
under challenge. The Full Bench referred to an earlier judgment
of the Division Bench in H.C. Sharma vs. Life Insurance
E Corporation of India & Anr. [ILR 1973 (1) Delhi 90] and large
number of judgments of this Court including Amarjit Singh vs.
Smt. Khatoon Quamarin [1986 (4) SCC 736] and held:-
F
G
H
i)
Tenants of non-residential premises are a class by
themselves. The Parliament in its legislative wisdom
did not think it fit to make any provision for eviction
of a tenant from such premises on the ground of
bona fide requirement of the landlord for residential
purpose. Referenced to Section 29(2)(r) of the 1995
Act, in our opinion, cannot be said to have any
relevance whatsoever for the purpose of determining.
Admittedly, the 1995 Act is yet to come into force. If
the said Act is yet to come into force, the question of
taking recourse to the provisions of the said Act would
not arise more so because this court in exercise of
its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
-
)-
.
SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF
577
-1
INDIAAND ANR. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
,
India would not be in a position to direct the
A
Government to do so which is a legislative function.
On the other hand, the very fact that said Act is yet to
come into force in an indicia to the fact that the Central
Government does not in its wisdom consider that the
said benefit should be extended to non-residential
B
premises also.
ii)
Judicial review of legislation is permissible only on
limited grounds, namely when a statute is enacted
by a legislature which had no authority therefor or
when it inter alia violates any of the provisions c
contained in Part Ill of the Constitution. Once it is
held, as we are bound to, that the non-residential
premises having regard to the interpretation clause,
forms a separate class, such classification, having a
reasonable nexus with the ground of eviction, cannot D
be said to be discriminatory in nature. Article 14 of
the Constitution would apply only to persons similarly
situated. Owners of residential and non-residential
premises stand on different footings. In the event,
the legislature in its wisdom thinks it fit to extend its
E
protective wing to a class of tenants from being
evicted on a particular ground, the same by itself
cannot be said to be discriminatory so as to attract
-
the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India:
The court in a situation of this nature is only entitled
F
. _..
to see as to whether such classification is valid and
rational. Once the rationality in such legislation is
found, the court will put its hands off.
iii)
Furthermore, the provisions of the said Act had been
declared intra vi res by the Apex Court in Amarjit Singh G
v. Khatoon Quamarain (supra). In that case, an
,.. .;
argument was advanced that unless the second limb
of Section 14(1 ){e) of the Act is read in such a way
that it was in consonance with Articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution of India, the same would be void as
H
578
A
B
c
D
E
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 6 S.C.R.
being unconstitutional. The question raised therein
has been dealt with the Apex Court.
(iv)
In the instant case, the Statute itself has indicated
the persons or things to whom its provisions are
recommended to apply. The said Act is a beneficial
legislation. It seeks to protect the tenants. Tenants
are broadly classified into three categories -
residential, non-residential and/or other tenant. Such
a classification as regards premises or tenancy
cannot per se be said to be unreasonable.
(v)
In the instant case, so far as Sections 14(1 )(e) and
14(1 )(k) are concerned, the statute itself has
indicated the persons to whom the provisions would
apply. The provision is absolutely clear and
unambiguous. In such a case the Court is only
required to examine whether the classification is
based upon reasonable differentia, distinguishing the
person, group from those left out and whether such
differential has reasonable nexus with the objects to
be achieved. The impugned provision indisputably
was intended to beneficially apply to landlords and
of one class of tenancy viz. tenancy in respect of the
residential premises and not non-residential
premises.
F
5. The Full Bench also noticed the judgment in Harbilas
Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (1996 (1) SCC 1]
wher~by Section 13(3)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949, as amended by Punj~b Act No.29of1956,
was struck down but distinguished the same by making the
G following observations :-
H
"The objects and reasons of the said Act, thus, were
considered having regard to the provisions made at the
time of commencement of the said Act. Such a
contingency does not arise in the instant case. Reasonable
nexus to the objects to be achieved of the said Act having
t
-
)
I
SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF
579
INDIAAND ANR. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
regard to the performance for which the building is being
A
used must be found out from the legislative intent.
Legislative intent may change from State to State."
6. Learned counsel for the appellants relied on the
judgment of this Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of
Punjab & Anr. (supra) and argued that the classification made
B
between the premises let for residential purposes and nonresidential purposes in the matter of eviction of tenant on the
ground of bona fide need of the landlord is irrational, arbitrary
and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Shri A.C. Gambhir
submitted that even though the constitutional validity of Section C
14(1)(e) oftheActwas:upheld by the Division Bench of the High
Court in H.C. Sharma vs. Life Insurance Corporation of
India & Anr. (supra), that decision cannot, in the changed
circumstances and in view of the later judgments of this Court in
Rattan Arya vs. State of Tamil Nad.u [(1986) 3 SCC 385],
D
Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab (supra), Rakesh
Vij vs. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi [(2005) 8 SCC 504] be
treated as good law. He argued that the reason which prompted
the legislat,ure to exclude the premises let for non residential
purposes from the purview of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act E
and which found approval of the Division Bench of the High Court
has, with the passage of time, become non-existent and the
classification of the premises into residential and non-residential
with reference to the purpose of leas~ has become totally
arbitrary and irrational warranting a declaration of invalidity qua
F
the impugned section. In support of this argument, the learned
counsel relied on the judgmeQt of this Court in Malpe
Vishwanath Acharya and Others vs. State of Maharashtra
& Another [1998 (2) SCC 1]. Shri Gambhir pointed out that in
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1995 (for short 'the 1995 Act'), which
G
was enacted by the Parliament in the light of the National Housing
"-+
Policy, 1992 and observations made by this Court in
Prabhakaran Nair vs. State of Tamil Nadu [1987 (4) SCC
238], no distinction has been made between the premises let
for residential and non-residential purposes in the matter of
H
580
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 6 S.C.R.
A eviction of the tenant on the grounds of landlord's bona fide need
and argued that even though that Act has not been enforced,
the Court can take cognizance of the legislative changes and
declare the implicit restriction contained in Section 14(1)(e) on
the eviction of tenant from the premises let for non-residential
B purposes as unconstitutional.
+
7. Shri C.S. Rajan, learned senior counsel appearing for
the Union of India emphasized that the purpose of the Act is to
protect the tenants against arbitrary eviction by the landlord and
argued that the classification of the premises with reference to
c the purpose of lease should be treated as based on rational
grounds because the same is meant to further the object of the
enactment. Shri Rajan referred to the judgment of Amarjit Singh
vs. Smt. Khatoon Quamarin (supra) to show that challenge
to the constitutionality of the Section 14(1 )(e) on the ground of
D violation of Article 14 has already been negatived and argued
that the vires of that provision cannot be re-examined merely
because a similar provision contained in the 'Punjab Act' has
been declared unconstitutional in Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State
of Punjab (supra). Learned senior counsel relied on the
E judgments of this Court In Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978
[1979 (1) SCC 380] and Padma Sundra Rao (Dead) and
Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others [2002 (3) SCC
533] and argued that the Court should not attempt to rewrite
Section 14(1 )(e) so as to facilitate eviction of the tenants from
F the premises let for non-residential purposes. Shri S.P. Laler,
learned counsel appearing for the respondents in Civil Appeal
•
Nos.1897 of 2003 and 1898 of 2003 supported the judgment
of the Full Bench of the High Court and argued that the distinction
made by the legislature between the premises let for residential
G and non-residential purposes is based on rational ground i.e.
acute shortage of non-residential premises/buildings and,
therefore, the same cannot be treated as unconstitutional.
~-
8. We have considered the respective arguments/
submissions. For deciding the question raised in these appeals,
H it will be useful to notice the salient features of rent control
SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF
581
INDIAAND ANR. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
, ..
legislations, which were made applicable to Delhi from time to A
time. These are:-
i) In exercise of the power vested in it under Rule 81 of the
Defence of India Rules, the Government of India promulgated
New Delhi House Rent Control Order, 1939. This order was
B
made applicable only to residential premises. Section 11 thereof
provided that a tenant in possession of a house shall not be
evicted therefrom whether in execution of a decree or otherwise
and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy except
on the grounds mentioned therein. Clause (iv) of sub-section 2
of Section 11A was as under:
c
"that the landlord was at no time during the twelve months
immediately preceding the date of his application residing
within the limits of the Delhi or New Delhi Municipality or
the Notified Areas of the Civil Station, Delhi or Delhi Fort, D
that it is essential in the public interest that he should take
up residence in that area and that he is unable to secure
other suitable accommodation, the Controller shall make
an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in
possession of the house, and if the Controller is not so E
satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application."
(ii) On 15th October, 1942, the Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1941 was made applicable to the Province of
Delhi, except the areas to which the New Delhi House Rent
Control Order was applicable. The definition of the expression
F
"premises" in the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act made no
distinction between "residential" and non-residential" premises.
Section 10(1) of that Act provided that no order for recovery of
possession of any premises shall be made so long as the tenant
pays or is ready and willing to pay rent to the full extent allowable G
by this Act and perform other conditions of the tenancy. However,
in terms of proviso to Section 19(1), the Court could make an
~·,.
order for recovery of possession if the landlord satisfied that
the prescribed notice had been served on the tenant. Subsection 2 of Section.10 provided that where any order mentioned
H
582
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 6 S.C.R.
A in sub-section 1 has been made on or after the First day of
January, 1939 but not executed before the commencement of
the Act, the Court by which the order was made may if it is of
opinion that the order would not have been made if the Act had
been in operation on the date the order was made, rescind or
B vary the order. The proviso to Section 10(2) enumerated the
other grounds for eviction of the tenants. One of the grounds
was that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required
by the landlord for his own occupation.
(iii) In 1944, the Delhi Rent Control Ordinance (XXV), 1944
C was promulgated. In this Ordinance, the word 'premises' was
defined to mean any building which is let separately for use as
a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose.
Clauses (a) to (e} of Section 9 of the Ordinance specified the
grounds on which the landlord could recover possession of the
D premises. One of the grounds was that the landlord requires
the premises for his use as residence. This means the landlord
could not recover possession of the premises if he needed the
same for commercial use.
(iv) In 1947, the Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control
E Act was enacted and was made applicable to all the parts of
Delhi. Section 2(b) of the 1947 Act which contained the definition
of the word 'premises' read as under:-
"premises" means any building which is, or is intended to
F
be, let separately for use as a residence or for commercial
G
H
use or for any other purpose, ....................... "
Section 9(e} which provided for eviction of the tenant on
the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord was as under:-
"that purely residential premises are required bona fide
by the landlord who is the owner of such premises for
occupation as a residence for himself or his family, that he
neither has nor is able to secure other suitable
accommodation, and that he has acquired his interest in
the premises at a date prior to the beginning of the tenancy
+
)r
+
SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF
583
INDIAAND ANR. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
or the 2nd day of June, 1944, whichever is later, or if the A
interest has devolved on him by inheritance or succession,
his predecessor had acquired the interest at a date prior
to the beginning of the tenancy or the 2nd day of June,
1944, whichever is later; ............... "
(v) The 1947 Act was replaced by the Delhi and Ajmer 8
Rent Control Act, 1952. Section 13 of that Act enumerated
various grounds on which a tenant could be evicted. Clause (c)
of Section 13(1) was as under:-
"that the premises let for residential purposes are required c
bona fide by the landlord who is the owner of such
premises for occupation as a residence for himself or his
family and that he has no other suitable accommodation;
Explanation:- For the purposes of this clause, "residential
premises" include any premises which having been let for D
use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord,
used
incidentally
for
commercial
or
other
purposes: ...................... "
(vi) After 6 years, the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was
enacted. The Preamble of this Act shows that it is a legislation
E
for the control of rents and evictions and of rates of hotels and
lodging houses, and for the lease of vacant premises to
Government, in certain areas in the Union Territory of Delhi.
Section 2(i) of that Act defines the premises to mean any
building or part of a building which is intended to be or is let for
F
use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other
purpose. The definition of the term "standard rent" contained in
Section 2(k) refers to the premises irrespective of its use.
Section 3 which exempts certain premises from the operation
of the Act also does not make any distinction between residential G
and non-residential premises. Clause (c) of that section which
provides for exemption in the context of monthly rent speaks of
residential as well as non-residential premises. Section 6 relates
to standard rent. It deals with residential as well as nonresidential premises. Para A of Section 6(1) specifies the
H
584
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 6 S.C.R.
A standard rent for residential premises and para B specifies such
rent for premises other than residential premises. Sub-section
(2) of Section 6 which provides for fixation of standard rent refers
to premises irrespective of their user. The limitation prescribed
(Section 12) for filing application for fixation of standard rent
B does not make any distinction between the premises let for
residential, commercial and other purposes. Section 14(1) which
+
contains prohibition against passing of an order or decree by
any Court or Controller for recovery of possession of any
premises does not make any distinction between the premises
c let for residential, commercial or other purposes. Clauses (a),
(b), (c), (f), (g), U), (k) and (I) of proviso to Section 14(1) specify
different grounds for recovery of possession of the premises
irrespective of its user. Only clauses (d) and (e) speak of
premises let for use as residence or residential purposes.
D
Sections 2(i) and 14(1)(d) and (e) of the 1958 Act which
have bearing on the decision of the appeals, read as under:-
2.
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires
E
(i) "premises" means any building or part of a building
which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a
residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose,
and includes, -
F
G
H
(i)
the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any,
appertaining to such building or part of the building'
(ii)
any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such
building or part of the building;
but does not include a room in a hotel or l9dging house.
14. Protection of tenant against eviction. - (1)
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in any other law or contract, no order or decree for
the recovery of possession of any premises shall be
made by any court or Controller in favour of the
SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF
INDIAAND ANR. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
landlord against a tenant:
585
Provided that the Controller may, on an application
made to him in the prescribed manner, make an
order for the recovery of possession of the premises
on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-
+
(a) to (c) ................................ .
A
B
· (d)
that the premises were let for use as a residence
and neither the tenant nor any member of his family
has been residing therein for a period of six months
immediately before the date of the filing of the C
application from the recovery of possession thereof;
(e)
that the premises let for residential purposes are
required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as
a residence for himself or for any member of his D
family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof,
or for any person for whose benefit the premises are
held and that the landlord or such person has no
other
reasonably
suitable
residential
accommodation.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause,
"premises let for residential purposes" include any
premises which having been let for use as a residence
are, without the consent of the landlord, used
E
incidentally for commercial or other purposes.
F
(vii) The 1958 Act was amended five times between 1960
to 1988, but demands continued to be made by the landlords
and the tenants for its further amendment to suit their respective
causes. In 1992 National Housing Policy was notified. One of
the important features of that Policy was to remove legal G
impediments to the growth of housing in general and renta.1
housing in particular. Both the Houses of Parliament adopted
the Policy. Thereafter, the 1995 Act was enacted. Though the
new Act has not been enforced so far and in Common Cause
vs.