# SAUDAN SINGH AND ORS. ETC v. N.D.M.C. AND ORS. ETC

- **Citation:** [1992] 2 S.C.R. 243
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1992-03-13
- **Bench:** Am. Ahmadi, V. Ramaswami, K. Ramaswamy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/saudan-singh-and-ors-etc-v-n-d-m-c-and-ors-etc-11452
- **Pages:** 22

## Headnote

B
...,.,,.
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 19(1)(g)-Public Street-User by
citizen-Scope of-Street-trading-Whether a fundamental right-Right of a
hawker-Ambit of.
--
....
c
Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 32, 136-Deciding the question of
livelihood and survival of large number of families-Whether Court to adopt
_,l
compassionate approach-Claims of genuine squatters/hawkers-Detennination-Courl's directions to NDMC and MCD.
Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 32,136, 19(1)(g)-Petitions by D
hawkers-Pending-Their claims to be finalised--Courl's direction on listing
of new petitions.
The writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution and tertain
appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution filed against adverse judgE
nients _of the High Court, were referred to a Constitution Bench for
--'-
_ deciding the grievance of the pavement-traders that the Municipal
Authorities were violating their fundamental rights under Articles 14,
19(1)(g) and or 21 of the Constitution by refusing to permit them to trade
on streets and footpaths in different localities of the city of Delhi, under
the respective control of the NDMC and MCD.
F
f
The Constitution Bench in Sodan Singh & Others v. New Delhi
~
Municipal Committee & Others, [1989) 4 SCC 155 held that the right to
carry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution on street pavements, if properly regulated, could not be denied on the G
ground that the street pavements were meant exclusively for pedestrians
and could not be put to· any other use; that the right of a pavement-hawker
was subject to reasonable restrictions under clause(6) of Article 19 of the
COllstitution and the State as trustee was entitled to impose all necessary
'r
limitatil>ns bn the tharacter extent of user by ~uch pavement-hawkers; that
there could not be a fundamental right of citizen to occupy a particular H
243
244
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992) 2 S.C.R.
A
place on the pavement where he would squat and engage in trading
business, that a hawker could not assert a fundamental right to occupy r
permanently specific places on any pavement, that the right to carry on
any trade or business and the concept of life and personal liberty
enshrined under Article 21 had no connection whatsoever and, that Article
B 21 had no application.
c
After stating the law, the Constitution Bench remitted all the peti- "'f'.
tions to the Division Bench for final disposal. After the decision rendered
by the Constitution Bench, several other writ petitions ca1ne to be filed in
this Court.
NDM<:; Cases.
This Court by its order dated 21st December, 1989 appointed a ~
Committee, known as the Thareja Committee. In the light of the NDMC's
Scheme vide Resolution No.28 dated 10.11.1989 and the decision in Sodan
D Singh the Committee examined the claims made by the squatters and
identify street pavements in different areas where street hawking could be
regulated without being a hindrance to other users.
A direction was also ~ven by order of 23rd March, 1990 that pending
E receipt of the report from the Committee h~wking would be permitted
subject to the same being regulated in sensitive areas.
During preliminary scrutiny, the Committee found that 'takhats'
were given on hire by those who claimed to possess them on rentals varying
from Rs.300 to Rs. 1,000 per day depending on the season or the 'takbat
F
holders' used to carry on business at the said 'takhats' through servants
while they themselves attended to theil; business elsewhere and at certain
places the 'takhat-holders' whose names appeared in the petitions were r
non- existent i.e. the orders were in fictitious names.
.J.....
The Committee considered it imperative to undertake a strict
G scrutiny to ensure that the benefit of the scheme percolated to the deserving and not to those who were merely exploiting the fluid situation by
obtaining court orders on distorted and inaccurate facts. The Committee,
therefore, invited claims in the form of a statement on

## Text

_Characters 0–39,599 of 52,079. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39599 for what follows._

SAUDAN SINGH AND ORS. ETC.
A
v.
N.D.M.C. AND ORS. ETC.
MARCH 13, 1992
[AM. AHMADI, V. RAMASWAMI AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.]
B
...,.,,.
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 19(1)(g)-Public Street-User by
citizen-Scope of-Street-trading-Whether a fundamental right-Right of a
hawker-Ambit of.
--
....
c
Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 32, 136-Deciding the question of
livelihood and survival of large number of families-Whether Court to adopt
_,l
compassionate approach-Claims of genuine squatters/hawkers-Detennination-Courl's directions to NDMC and MCD.
Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 32,136, 19(1)(g)-Petitions by D
hawkers-Pending-Their claims to be finalised--Courl's direction on listing
of new petitions.
The writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution and tertain
appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution filed against adverse judgE
nients _of the High Court, were referred to a Constitution Bench for
--'-
_ deciding the grievance of the pavement-traders that the Municipal
Authorities were violating their fundamental rights under Articles 14,
19(1)(g) and or 21 of the Constitution by refusing to permit them to trade
on streets and footpaths in different localities of the city of Delhi, under
the respective control of the NDMC and MCD.
F
f
The Constitution Bench in Sodan Singh & Others v. New Delhi
~
Municipal Committee & Others, [1989) 4 SCC 155 held that the right to
carry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution on street pavements, if properly regulated, could not be denied on the G
ground that the street pavements were meant exclusively for pedestrians
and could not be put to· any other use; that the right of a pavement-hawker
was subject to reasonable restrictions under clause(6) of Article 19 of the
COllstitution and the State as trustee was entitled to impose all necessary
'r
limitatil>ns bn the tharacter extent of user by ~uch pavement-hawkers; that
there could not be a fundamental right of citizen to occupy a particular H
243
244
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992) 2 S.C.R.
A
place on the pavement where he would squat and engage in trading
business, that a hawker could not assert a fundamental right to occupy r
permanently specific places on any pavement, that the right to carry on
any trade or business and the concept of life and personal liberty
enshrined under Article 21 had no connection whatsoever and, that Article
B 21 had no application.
c
After stating the law, the Constitution Bench remitted all the peti- "'f'.
tions to the Division Bench for final disposal. After the decision rendered
by the Constitution Bench, several other writ petitions ca1ne to be filed in
this Court.
NDM<:; Cases.
This Court by its order dated 21st December, 1989 appointed a ~
Committee, known as the Thareja Committee. In the light of the NDMC's
Scheme vide Resolution No.28 dated 10.11.1989 and the decision in Sodan
D Singh the Committee examined the claims made by the squatters and
identify street pavements in different areas where street hawking could be
regulated without being a hindrance to other users.
A direction was also ~ven by order of 23rd March, 1990 that pending
E receipt of the report from the Committee h~wking would be permitted
subject to the same being regulated in sensitive areas.
During preliminary scrutiny, the Committee found that 'takhats'
were given on hire by those who claimed to possess them on rentals varying
from Rs.300 to Rs. 1,000 per day depending on the season or the 'takbat
F
holders' used to carry on business at the said 'takhats' through servants
while they themselves attended to theil; business elsewhere and at certain
places the 'takhat-holders' whose names appeared in the petitions were r
non- existent i.e. the orders were in fictitious names.
.J.....
The Committee considered it imperative to undertake a strict
G scrutiny to ensure that the benefit of the scheme percolated to the deserving and not to those who were merely exploiting the fluid situation by
obtaining court orders on distorted and inaccurate facts. The Committee,
therefore, invited claims in the form of a statement on oath coupled with
original genuine docuJDents in support of it. This was done by public ~
H notices at the spot and through counsel in case of pending cases. In
Ii
SAUDAN SINGH v. N.D.M.C.
245
~
addition, local visits were made to verify presence of the claimant at the A
site where he professed to carry on business and if not found at such visits
he was asked to substantiate his claim by proof of challan, fine receipts or
tehbazari receipts in order to eliminate bogtis_ and fictitious claims.
Records of NDMC were also checked for cross verification.
Out of the 460 claims registered with the Committee, 458 related to B
,,,,,Resolution No.28 while the remaining two concerned contempt proceed·
ings. Out of the 458 claims, the Committee scrutinised 440 claims out of
which it upheld as many as 114 claims for allotment of stalls/kiosks/sites,
etc., (area mentioned for each claimant) and 110 claims for other reliefs
·~referred to in Resolution No. 28.
C
.
Seventeen claims in respect of Sarojini Nagar area could not be
_l, verified by the Committee, as the claimants contended that they were not
in a position to meet the minimum proof standard of producing at least
one genuine document in a time gap of one year as they were under the D
patronage of a local politician, and hence they were n~ver disturbed by tht;
police. or any other authority and, therefore, they were not in a position to
offer proof of the type insisted upon by the Committee. The non-cooperation by the N.D.M.C. added to the problems of the Committee. The
Committee, thef'.efore, sought the guidance of the Court to resolve this
deadlock.
E
The pavement-hawkers, submitted that the strict standard adopted
by the Thareja Committee for recognising the claim of a pavement- hawker
overlooked the fact that most of the pavement-hawkers were poor and
illiterate persons who could not be expected to have maintained proper F
records of receipts, challans, etc., issued by the police or other local
f authorities to support their claims; that the standard of proof e~pected by
>. the Thareja Committee was unrealistic and it was essential to modify the
same to do complete justice to the concerned parties; that the deadline
prescribed by the Thareja Committee was strictly enforced, with the result
that many of the rightful claimants were denied the opportunity of submit· G
ting their claims to the Thareja Committee and having the same duly
scrutinised and verified by him; that several pavement-hawkers who were
unaware of the constitution of such a Committee and to whom a cause of
'r action for seeking redress through court had not arisen were left out from
consideration and as such pavement-hawkers were likely to be denied their H
246
SUPREME COURT REP.ORTS
[1992) 2 S.C.R.
A
rightful place in the scheme if the scheme was rmalised without their
knowledge; that scores of writ petitions were filed after the Constitution /r:..
Bench rendered its decision and most of the petitioners were not before
B
c
the Tbareja Committee; and that if strict proof as provided by the .
guidelines of Resolution No. 28 is not insisted upon in respect of Sarojini
Nagar are.!t claimants, there was no reason why it should not be relaxed in
respect of the other claimants whose claims were rejected.
NDMC point out that the situation in Sarojini Nagar was completely
different and uncomparable with other areas in view of the peculiarity of
the prevailing circumstance.
-MCD Cases
The MCD prepared a scheme for regulating squatting/hawking business in Delhi and appointed a Committee for the identification of squatting/non-squatting areas in different zones. This Committee was expected
D
to take a final decision regarding the areas identified for squatting/hawking. This was to be done in consultation with the Commissioner of Police
so that the needs of vehicular traffic and other police/health probl~ms
could be taken care of. The criteria for priority allotment here also
determined.
E
F
Under the scheme the squatters were expected to agree to their being
shifted from one zone to another but they showed reluctance to move on
to less lucrative zones. The areas in the ten zones under the MCD control
were duly identified on the plans and the total number of squatters/hawkers to be accommodated in the areas were also worked out. Objections
were invited from the squatters/hawkers but that barring a few others did
not react.
Disposing of the writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution and the appeals filed under Article 136 of the Constitution, in the light
G of the law settled by the Constitution Bench in Sodan Singh's case, [1989)
4 SCC 155 and disposing of the writ petitions filed after the Constitution
Bench rendered its decision, this Court,
HELD : 1.01. Every citizen has a right to the use of a public street
~-
vested in the State as a beneficiary but this right is subject to such
""'1
H reasonable restrictions as the State may choose to impose. [252E]
SAUDAN SINGH v. N.D.M.C.
247
1.02. Street-trading is albeit a fundamental right under Article A
~
19(1)(g) of the Constitution but it is subject to reasonable restrictions
which the State may choose to impose by virtue of clause (6) of Article 19
of the Constitution. The right to street-trading under Article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution does not, however, extend to a citizen occupying or
squatting on any specific place of his choice on the pavement regardless B
of the rights of others, including pedestrians, to make use of the pavey
ments. In other words, a citizen is permitted· to hawk on the street pavements by moving from one place to another without being stationary on
any part of the pavement vested in the State. [252E-G]
"'C
2.01. Having regard to the fact that the Court dealing with the C
question oflivelihood and survival of a large number of families, this court
does not think it would not be justified if it adopts a compassionate
......_
approach so as to ensure that genuine squatters/hawkers are not denied
their daily bread at the alter of technicalities while at the same time
ensuring that those who are out to exploit and abuse the process of law do D
not succeed. [258C-D]
2.02. In order to ensure that genuine claims are not defeated and in
order to further ensure that the situation in thdive zones identified earlier
does not remain in a state of flux for all times to come, in regard to NDMC
cases, the following directions were made :
E
(1) Out of the 440 claimants, the one-member, Thareja Committee
will review the cases of those claimants, whose claims have been rejected
for non-compliance of the standard of proof laid down by Resolution No.
28, if the claimant adduces any other authentic proof in the form of
government or local authority records, the genuineness whereof is unimF
peachable, and the Committee considers such proof presented to it to be
adequate for review. If on perusal such proof is found to be unacceptable,
the Committee may refuse to review its decision.
(2) In regard to the Sarojini Nagar claims, the Committee may G
evolve its own criteria or standard of proof dehors the one laid down by
Resolution No. 28 and proceed to dispose of the claims on the basis
thereof. In doing so fresh claims, if any, received may also be scrutinised;
(3) Public advertisements will be issued by the Committee in local
newspapers having wide circulation invi~ing claims from squatters/haw- H
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992] 2 S.C.R.
A
kers who have not preferred claims or filed proceedings in court by a date
to be stipulated therein, such claims must of course be consistent with the
eligibility criteria laid down in Resolution No. 28. In addition to such
public advertisement to be issued in newspapers of different languages
such as English, Hindi, Urdu, South-Indian languages, etc., to be deterB
c
mined by the Committee, hand bills and pamphlets shall also be printed
and distr.ibuted and pasted in different parts of the five zones selected for
squatting/hawking inviting claims by the stipulated date. The advertise·
ments/pamphlets, etc. will also cover the claimant~ falling within direction
(1) and (2) above ;
(4) The Registry of this Court will not entertain any further Writ
Petitions/Special Leave Petitions from any squatter or hawker ccinceming
the sites chosen in the five zones mentioned hereinabove but will instead
dire~t the petitioners to approach the Thareja Committee if they have
moved such Writ Petitions/Special Leave Petitions before the date stipulated by the Committee (which date will be communicated to the Registry)
D and no Writ Petition/Special Leave Petition or any other proceeding shall
be entertained by the Registry concerning the sites in the five zones after
the stipulated date.
(5) The High Court of Delhi and all Courts subordinate thereto will
E
also follow the course of action set out in direction No. 4 hereinabove.
(6) All Writ Petitions/Civil Appeals/Special Leave Petitions and
....__
CMPs/IAs therein which concern the five zones will stand disposed of by
this order except one in which orders have been made from time to time
and the claimants of all the matters disposed of pursuant to this direction
F
will be at liberty to seek further directions in the one matter kept pending
under this direction as interveners in case such need arises in future. This
is essential to regulate such cases against NDMC.
(7)
The interim stay orders will continue in respect of the 224
G claimants whose claims have already been scrutinised by the Committee.
In respect of the other claimants out of 440, whose claims have been
rejected,. the status quo will be maintained for two months after the
stipulat~d date in respect of those claimants who have sought review on or
before the stipulated date. If during.· the said period of two months the
exercise for review cannot be completed, the authorities desirous of taking
H any action will approach the Committee and seek its approval. If the
SAUDAN SINGH v. N.D.M.C.
249
Committee is of the opinion that there is no prima f acie case for review it A
may permit such action to be taken 10 days thereafter so that the claimant
likely to be affected may in the meantime approach the Court and obtain
appropriate orders. In respect of all other cases, the interim orders, if any,
will continue, till the Committee has scrutinised their cases and rejected
them. Liberty is, however, reserved to NDMC to move for vacating any B
order if public interest so demands or it is found that the claimant is in
any way misusing it.
(8) The Thareja Committee will draw up a list of squatters/hawkers
identified by it as entitled to protection so that their claims can be
~
regulated in future also. In drawing up the list care should be taken to C
ensure that one and the same person dose not secure a double benefit.
(9) The Committee may also draw up a list of squatters/hawkers on
the basis of their actual standing for being accommodated in future as and
when there is a vacancy in the available space in the five zones or when
such space is expanded or new space within the five zones is cleared for D
squatting/hawking. The Committee will also suggest sites wihtin the zones,
over and above those already identified, can be made available to accomodate such surplus squatters/hawkers who cannot be accommodated
in the five zones on account of paucity of space. [258E-261A]
·
2.03. The area falling under the administrative control of MCD has
_J
a large belt of agricultural lands and, therefore, any scheme to be prepared
in regard to facilitating trade by squatters/hawkers must be confined to
the urban areas only. [261C]
E
2.04. In order that the squatters/hawkers may have one more opporF
tunity before any final dedsion is taken on the scheme prepared by MCD, it
is proper that a public notice/advertisement should issue inviting objections
from the squatters/hawkers against the proposed scheme by a date to be
stipulated therein. Such public notice/advertisement will be iss,ued in daily
newspapers of different languages such as English, Hindi, Urdu, South-Indian languages, etc., as well as by printing and distributing handbills and G
pamphlets in the zones identified for squatting/hawking so that every squatter/hawker has an opportunity to file his objections. If any, to the proposed
scheme. The advertisement would also state that if no objection is received
on or before the stipulated date, the concerned squatter/hawker will not be
heard in the matter. The objections or suggestions received will be tabulated H
250
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992] 2 S.C.R.
A and considered by the Committee and a final decision will be taken thereon
B
expeditiously and the same will be placed before this Court for approval of
Y
the scheme will or without modification. [ 263H-264C]
2.05. The Committee appointed under the MCD Scheme may process
the objections already received. The claims of squatters/hawkers who have
already responded can be scrutinised from the viewpoint of the eligibility
criteria laid down under scheme so that their priorities can be determined.
[264D]
3.01. The claims of those who have petitioned this Court and whose
C petitions are pending can also be finalised to save time. [264D]
3.02. Henceforth if any new petition is filed in regard to MCD area,
the Registry will direct copy of the petition to be delivered to standing
counsel of MCD and the matter will be listed not earlier than 10 days
before the senice of the copy unless otherwise directed by the Court. No
D such mention will be made in Court unless the Registrar has been intimated in advance who on such intimation will indicate if there is such
urgency that the matter cannot wait usual listing time. [264E]
E
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 15257 of 1987 etc. etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.4.1987 of the Delhi High
Court in C.W.P. No. 268 of 1987.
P.H. Parekh, Ms. Sunita Sharma, J.P. Pathak and Bishwanatha Aggarwal for the Petitioners.
B. Sen, Govinda Mukhoty, R.K. Jain, R.K. Maheshwari, S.C. Sharma,
Sudhanshu Atre, Pradeep Aggarwal, S.K. Dubey, L.K. Gupta, D.K. Garg,
)-
R.P. Bhardwaj, Ms. A. Subhashini, A.P. Singh, K.N. Rai, M.M. Kashyap,
l
Ms. Mridula Ray, Ms. Indra Sawhney, V.K. Verma, Rishi Kesh, P.K.
G Manohar, A.S. Pundir, V.B. Saharya, S.N. Bhatt, N. Ganpathy, Ms. Bina
Gupta, Ms. Rani Jethmalani and Ms. V.L. Menon for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
AHMADI, J. A_ large number of writ petitions were filed in this
H
Court by persons claiming a right to trade on the pavements situate within
/
SAUDAN SINGH v. N.D.M.C. [AHMADI, J.]
251
the areas under the control of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) A
and the New Delhi Municipal Committee (NDMC) in different parts of
the city of Delhi. These writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution and certain appeals brought under Article 136 of the Consititution
against adverse judgments of the Delhi High Court were referred to a
Constitution Bench of this Court for deciding on the grievance of the B
pavement-traders that the Municipal Authorities were violating their funT
damental rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and/or 21 of the Constitution
by refusing to permit them to trade on streets and footpaths in different
localities of the city of Delhi. The Constitution Bench by its judgement
dated 30th August, 19~9 in Sodan Singh & Others v. New Delhi Municipal
~
Committee & Others, (1989) 4 SCC 155 came to the conclusion that the right c
to carry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19(1)(g) of the ConstituI
tion on street pavements, if properly regulated, cannot be denied on the
-+
ground that the street pavements are meant exclusively for pedestrians and
cannot be put to any other use. Proper regulation is, however, a necessary
condition, for otherwise the very object of laying roads would be defeated. D
While conceding that au public streets and roads in the country vest in the
State, the Constitution Bench held that the State holds them as trustee on
behalf of the public and the members of the public are entitled as
beneficiaries to use them for trading as a matter of right subject of course
to similar rights possessed by every other citizen including pedestrians. The
right of a pavement-hawker is, however, subject to reasonable restrictions E
_ _..(
under clause (6) of Article 19 of the ConstitJtion and the State as trustee
is entitled to impose all necessary limitations on the character and extent
of user by such pavement-hawkers. The Constitution Bench, however,
clarified that there cannot be a fundamental right of a citizen to occupy a
particular place on the pavement where he can squat and engage in trading F
business. Nor can the hawker assert a fundamental right to occupy per-
"(
manently specific pfares on any pavement. It recognised the right under
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution but negatived the submission based on
>-
Arlicle 21. It held that the right to carry on any trade or business and the
..:..
concept of life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 have no
connection whatsoever and, therefore, Article 21 has no application. In G
paragraph 17 Sharma, J. speaking for the majority observed as under :
>--
"So far as right of a hawker to transact business while going
from place to place is concerned, it has been admittedly recognised for a long period. Of course, that also is subject to proper H
A
B
ID
...
252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992] 2 S.C.R.
regulation 'in the interest of general covenience of the public
including health and security considerations. What about the
right to squat on the roadside for engaging in trading business?
As was stated by this Court in Bombay Hawkers' Union v.
Bombay Municipal Corporation, [1985] 3 SCC 528 the public
streets by their nomenclature and definition are meant for the
use of general public; they are not laid to facilitate the carrying
on of private business. If hawkers were to be conceded the right
claimed by them, they could hold the society to ransom by
sqatting on the busy thoroughfares, thereby paralysing all civic
life. This is one side of the picture. On the other hand if
properly regulated according to the exigency of the circumstances, the small traders on the sidewalks could considerably add
to the comfort and convenience of general public by making
available ordinary articles of every day use for a comparatively
lesser price."
Kuldip Singh, J. who wrote a separate judgment concurred with the
view taken by the majority for reasons of his own.
It is, therefore, settled law that every citizen has a right to the use of
a public street vested in the State as a beneficiary but this right is subject
to such reasonable restrictions as the State may choose to impose. Streettrading is albeit a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution but it is subject to reasonable restrictions which the State may choose
to impose by virtue of clause ( 6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. The right
to street-trading under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution does not,
however, extend to a citizen occupying or squatting on any specific place
of his choice on the pavement regardless of the rights of others, including
pedestrians, to make use of the pavements. In other words the law laid
down by the Constitution Bench permits a citizen to hawk on the street
pavements by moving from one place to another without being stationary
on any part of the pavement vested in the State. After laying down the law
J
on the point in the context of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution,
the Constitution Bench remitted all the petitions to a proper Division
Bench of this Court for final disposal.
After the petitions were referred to the Constitution Bench for
H determining the challenge based on Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the
SAUDAN SINGH v. N.D.M.C. [AHMADI, J.]
253
Constitution several other writ petitions came to be filed in this Court and A
interim orders were made thereon from time to time. NDMC had prepared
a scheme, vide Resolution No. 28 dated 10th November, 1989. Pursuant to
the recommendation made by the Lok-Adalat on 19th November, 1989, this
Court by its order dated 21st December, 1989 appointed a Committee to
examine the claims made by the squatters in the light of the said scheme B
and the decision in Sodan Singh and identify street pavements in different
areas where street hawking could be regulated without being a hindrance
to other users. The salient features of the NDMC scheme may he set out
at this stage as under :
"A. A squatter upto 1977 shall be eligible for the allotment of C
a stalVkiosk while the squatters pertaining to the years 1978
till 1980 shall be eligible for tehbazari site, if no shop/kiosk
is available. The squatters squatting since between 1981 to
1987 shall be considered for allotment for a tehbazari site
subject to availability of vacant space.
B. The eligibility of a squatter shall be determined by documents such as receipts issued by the NDMC, Challans by
Police and Toleration Permission etc.
D
C. Only non-licensable trades excluding sophisticated luxury E
items, imported or smuggled goods shall be permitted i.e.
pan, biri, cigarettes, chana, moongfali, hosiery items, toys,
small stationery items, lottery tickets, fresh vegetables, uncut
fruits, packed bakery items etc. will be allowed. No cooking
and sale of food items exposing dust causing health hazards
shall be allowed. Open space measuring 6' x 4' for doing F
non-licensable traders and 4' x 3' for the trade of pan, biri,
cigarettes will be allowed.
D. Not more than one member of the family, as defined by the
NDMC, will be eligible for benefit under the Scheme.
E. The following percentage shall be allowed for the purpose
of reservation in the allotment.
(a) General Category
(b) Schedule Caste/Schedule Tribe
60%
12-1/2%
G
H
254
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1992] 2 S.C.R.
A
( c) Physically Handicapped
10%
1
( d) Ex-serviceman
2-1/2%
(e) WaI Widows
2%
(f) Freedom Fighters
3%
(g) Extreme Haidship and Humanitaiian
B
grounds
10%"
On several pavements laige number of such traders were carrying on
business since quite sometime;· many of them were stationary, some had
raised wooden 'takhats' while others were sq.iatting on the pavements in
front of shops and neaI public places. 'Tehbazari' was being recovered
c from them by the NDMC. The Committee was required to scrutinise the
'7claims of the pavement hawkers and at ·the same time look into their
grievances. This was a time consuming exercise. Keeping that in view
+..
interim directions were issued on 23rd February, 1990 to the following
effect:
D
"We are of the view that until the scheme drawn up pursuant
to the. directions of the Constitution Bench is finalised, the
petitioners in the several writ petitions placed before us as a
group today should be permitted to .hawk in the aiea where
they claim to be Cairying on the operation without a right to
E
either sit down with or without their merchandise to be sold
on the pavements in front of licensed shops or on the pavements
as such but as soon as the shops close down in the evening it
shall be open to them to-settle down with their goods and squat
on the pavements and sell their goods. On holidays and spe..;ial
F
festival occasions as per the prevailing practice they shall be
entitled to squat throughout the day. This order is totally
interim in nature without prejudice to the stance of both parties
~
and shall not create any right nor prejudice any right, if any."
l
After this interim order was made a direction was given by the order of
...
G 23rd March, 1990 that pending receipt of the report from the Committee
hawking will be permitted subject to the same being regulated in sensitive
areas. During preliminary scrutiny, however, it was found that 'takhats'
were given on hire by those who claimed to possess them on rentals vaIYffig
--f
from Rs.300 to Rs.1,000 per day depending on the season or the 'takhatH holders' used to carry on business at the said 'takhats' through servants
SAUDAN SINGH v. N.D.M.C. [AHMADI, J.]
255
while they themselves attended to their business elsewhere and at certain Jt..
places the 'takhat-holders' whose names appeared in the petitions were
non-existent i.e. the orders were in fictitious names. That being the position
the Committee considered it imperative to undertake a strict scrutiny to
ensure that the benefit of the scheme percolated to the deserving and not
to those who were merely exploiting and fluid stituation by obtaining court
orders on distorted and inaccurate facts. The Committee, therefore, invited B
claims in the form of statement on oath coupled with original genuine
documents in support of it. This was done by public notices at the spot
and .through counsel in case of pending cases. In addition local visits were '
made to verify presence of the claimant at the site where he professed to
carry on business and if not found at such visits he was asked to substanC
tiate his claim by proof of challan, fine receipts or tehbazari receipts. The .
underlying idea was to eliminate bogus and fictitious claims. Records of
NDMC were also checked for cross verification.
A grievance wa~ however, made that the procedure adopted by the D
Committee for scrutinising the claims made by the pavement-traders was
too strict and resulted in injustice even to genuine claimants. According to
the petitioners the strict standard adopted by the Thareja Committee for
recognising the claim of a pavement-hawker overlooked the fact that most
of the pavement-hawkers were poor and illiterate persons who could not
be expected to have maintained proper r~cords of receipts, challans, etc., E
issued by the police or other local authorities to support their claims.
Counsel for the pavement-hawkers, therefore, submitted that the standard
of proof expected by the Thareja Committee was unrealistic and it was
essential to modify the same to do complete justice to the concerned
parties. It was also submitted that the deadline prescribed by the Thareja F
Committee was strictly enforced with the result that many of the rightful
claimants were denied the opportunity of submitting their claims to the
Thareja Committee and having the same duly scrutinised and verified by
him. Apart from those whose claims were rejected on the insistence of the
strict standard of proof prescribed by the Thareja Committee, counsel
submitted that several pavement- hawkers who were unaware of the conG
stitution of such a Committee and to whom a cause of action for seeking
redress through court had not arisen were left out from consideration and
as such such pavement-hawkers are likely to .be denied their rightful place
in the scheme if the scheme is finalised without their knowledge. Seores of
writ petitions have been filed after the Constitution Bench rendered its H
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992) 2 S.C.R.
· A
decision and most of these were not before the Thareja Committee.
B
c
Now it must be realised that under Resolution No. 28 itself the
Committee was eXJ>ected to scrutinise the claims on the basis of the
receipts of removal charges, police challans, toleration slips, tehbazari
receipts, etc. All the same time it is essential to bear in mind that such
minimum proof as would enable the Committee to weed out bogus claims
from genuine ones had to be insisted upon to maintain credibility in regard
to the scrutiny. As stated earlier preliminary enquiry had revealed large
scale manipulation and fabrication of documents by bogus and unscrupulous claimants who desired to make a windfall by abusing the
process. It was, therefore, essential to lay down the minimum proof which
the Committee would expect for accepting any claim put forth before it. It ·
cannot, therefore, be said that the minimum proof expected by the Committee in the form of atleast one genuine receipt, police challans, toleration
slip, tehbazari receipt, etc., during a gap of one year or so was unrealistic.
D An exception was made by the Committee in the case of a claimant who
produced a large number of such documents for a regular period even
though the same was not available in a given year where satisfactory
explanation was offered. This was absolutely necessary as large scale
irregularities had surfaced during the preliminary survey undertaken by the
E
Committee. In the circumstances we are not inclined to think that the
standard of proof required by the Committee was unduly harsh or unrealistic.
Of the 460 claims registered with the Committee, 458 related to
Resolution No. 28 while the remaining two concerned contempt proceedF
ings. Out of the 458 claims the Committee scrutinised 440 claims out of
which it upheld as many as 114 claims for allotment of stalls/ kiosks/sites,
etc., (area mentioned for each claimant) and 110 claims for other reliefs
referred to in Resolution No. 28. Seventeen claims in respect of Sarojini
Nagar area could not be verified as the claimants contended that they were
G not in a position to meet the minimum proof standard of producing atleast
one genuine document in a time gap of one year as they were under the
patronage of one Arjan Dass, a local politician, and hence they were never
disturbed by the police or any other authority and, therefore, they were not
in a position to offer proof of the type insisted upon by the Committee.
The non-cooperation by the N.D.M.C. added to the problems of the
H Committee. The Committee has, therefore, sought the guidance of the
SAUDAN SINGH v. N.D.M.C. [AHMADI, J.]
257
Court to resolve this deadlock. In view of the peculiar circumstances A
mentioned by the 17 claimants, the Committee need not feel inhibited by
the nature of proof laid down in Resolution No. 28. We would, therefore, · direct the Committee to examine the claims of these 17 claimants
closely in the light of any other evidence that they may choose to tender
and on being satisfied about the genuineness and dependability of the
proof so tendered by the claimants, the Committee may dispose of their B
claims.
Under Annexure A squatting is permitted in the entire area exept
Connaught Place/Circus area because of its special characterstics although
Tehbazari permission already granted in respecc of that area has to conC
tinue. Squatters were agreed to be continued in other areas subject to
availability of space. Even in Connaught Circus area NDMC agreed to
accommodate squatters provided their presence there did not interfere
with the smooth movement of pedestrians. No squatting could be permitted
in zones 2, 3 and 4 because of security considerations but shops and kiosks D
already in existence were to continue. So far as zone 5 is concerned
squatting was agreed to be permitted leaving a margin of 30 Meters on
either side of public utility institutions, e.g. hospitals etc. Kiosks, stalls etc.
situate in the said areas were to continue. In addition 228 open tehbazari
permission. were agreed upon. Further 106 squatters were to be accommodated on compassionate grounds. In addition squatters rehabilitated in E
zone 1 and existing milk-booths were to be continued. In this manner the
needs of those in NDMC area have been adequately attended to. Yet there
exist a large number of squatters in different parts of NDMC area, some
of whom have the protection of stay orders secured from courts, and their
cases were to be worked out on the basis of the eligibility criteria to be F
formulated by a Sub-Committee of NDMC.
The grievance made by counsel for squatters/hawkers has been twofold. In the first place they complain against the strict standard of proof
insisted upon by Mr. Thareja in support of the claim and secondly against G
the area identified for carrying on business by these squatters and hawkers
being considerably restricted. It is pointed out that on account of the strict
standard of proof expected by the Thareja Committee, out of 440 claims
examined by that body only 224 claims (114 for kiosks/sites, etc. + 110 for
other reliefs) have been cleared and the rest have been rejected. But as
pointed out earlier the standard and nature of proof was determined under H
258
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992} 2 S.C.R.
A
Resolution No. 28 and the Thareja Committee had merely gone by it. This
difficulty,· however, manifested itself when it came to scrutinising the 17
claims concerning the Sarojini Nagar area. Some directions in this behalf
have to be given. It was contended that if strict proof as provided by the
guidelines of Resolution No. 28 is not insisted upon in respect of Sarojini
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
Nagar area claimants, there is no reason why it should not be relaxed in
respect of the other claimants whose claims have been rejected. Counsel
for NDMC, however, pointed out that the ground situation in Sarojini
Nagar is completely different land 'uncomparable with other areas in view
of the peculiarity of the circumstance relied on.
We have given our anxious consideration to the rival points of view
and having regard to the fact that we are dealing with the question of
livelihood and survival of large number of families, we do not think we
would not be justified if we adopt a compassionate approach so as to
ensure that genuine squatters/hawkers are not denied their daily bread at
the alter of technicalities while at the Slll11e time· ensuring that those who
are out to exploit and abuse the process of law do not succeed. We must
also realise that a large number of squatters/hawkers have since filed
proceedings which await scrutiny. In order to ensure that genuine claims
are not defeated and in order to further ensure that the situation in the
five zones identified earlier does not remain in a state of flux for all times
to come, we deem it necessary to give appropriate directions, ·here and
now, in regard to NDMC cases. We accordingly direct:
(1) Out of th_e 440 claimants, the one-member Thareja Committee will review the cases of those claimants whose claims
have been rejected for non-compliance of the standard of
proof laid down by Resolution No. 28, if the claiinant
adduces any other authentic proof in the form of government or local authority records, the genuineness whereof is
unimpeachable, and the Committee considers such proof
presented to it to be adequate for review. If on peru5al such
proof is found to be unacceptable, the Committee may ·
refuse to review its decision;
""
(2) In regard to the Sarojini Nagar claims, the Committee may
evolve its own criteria or standard of proof dehors the one
laid down by Resolution No.28 and. proceed to dispose of
~~
+
~
-j
l_
-(
-- x
SAUDAN SINGH v. N.D.M.C. [AHMADI, J.]
259
the claims on the basis thereof. In doing so fresh claims, if A
any, received may also be scrutinised;
B
(3) Public advertise~ents will be issued by the Committee in
local newspapers having wide circulation inviting claims
from squatters/hawkers who have not preferred claims or
filed proceedings in court by a date to be stipulated therein,
such claims must of course be consistent with the eligibility
criteria laid down in Resolution No.28. In addition to such
public advertisement to be issued in newspapers of different
languages such as English, Hindi, Urdu, South-Indian languages, etc., to be determined by the Committee, handbills C
and pamphlets shall also be printed and distributed and
pasted in different parts of the five zones selected for
squatting/hawking inviting claims by the stipulated date. The
advertisements/pamphlets, etc.