# SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS

- **Citation:** [2015] 7 S.C.R. 512
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2015-05-14
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 4506of2015
- **Bench:** H.L. Dattu, A.K. Sikri, Arun Mishra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/savitri-devi-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-30935
- **Pages:** 54

## Headnote

c
Land Acquisition Act, 1894- s. 5A and 17(1) and (4) -
Land acquisition by Notification dated 12.03.2008-lnvoking
urgency provisions dispensing with the right of objection uls.
5A - Challenged by the /and-owners - Some Land-owners
a/so challenged the Notifications of the years 1979or1980
D - High Court dismissed the cases challenging the
Notifications of 197911980 as barred by limitation- However
other cases were not dismissed on the ground of delay and
/aches- On merit High Court held that invocation of urgency
clause was unwarranted- But in view of the fact that substantial
E development work had been carried out, third party interest
was created, compensation was also paid, etc., High Court
in order to balance the equities, instead of quashing the
notification, enhanced the provisional compensation to
64. 7% and directed allotment of developed abadi Land to
F the extent of 10% of the acquired land- However, notification
in respect of three villages was quashed where no
development work had been carried out-Appeal of the Landholders - Held: In the facts of the case, the cases may not
have been maintainable on the ground of delay and /aches
G - But the High Court had gone an extra.mile in finding the
solutions and balancing the equities in a manner 'tlhich was
favourable to the /and-owners by adequately compensating
them - The directions of High Court are given in unique and
H
512
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
513
peculiar circumstances and hence would not form precedent A
- Interference u/Art. 136 not warranted in the present cases.
~ -
Disposing of the appeals and the contempt petitions,
the Court.
, )
HELD: 1. The appellants were not aggrieved by the B
acquisition per se in the manner it was done by the
respondents. As per their own case, they became
aggrieved only when they found that land was not
utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired namely c
industrial development, but a large portion thereof was
sought to be given away to the builders for development
of the land as residential. The High Court, acc~pted such
a plea of the land owners on the ground of'l~ches and
delay. [Para 35) [558-C-E]
·~
D
Nand Kishore Gupta and Ors. v. State of UP. and Ors.
2010 (11 ) SCR 356 = (2010) 10 SCC 282 - referred to.
2. After the land was acquired, which was of very
large quantity and in big chunks, further steps were taken E
by passing the award, taking possession and paying
compensation. In many cases, actual possession was
taken and in rest of the cases, paper possession was
taken where because of the land under Abadi, actual F
possession could not be taken on spot immediately.
Where possession was taken, these land owners/
appellants even received compensation. All these
petitions have been filed only thereafter which may not
be maintainable stricto sensu. Looking into the matter G
from the aforesaid prospective, the plea that giving away
of the land by allotment to the private developers for
construction of residential units gave them ·the fresh
cause of action, gets dented to a great extent. [Paras 37,
38] [560-A-F]
H
514
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 7 S.C.R.
A
Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors. 197 4
AIR 2077 = 1975 (1) SCR 802 - followed .
Murari and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 1996 ( 8 )
Suppl. SCR 313 = 1997 ( 1 ) SCC 15; Ravi Khullar and Anr.
B v. Union of India and Ors. 2007 (4) SCR 598 = 2007 (5) SCC
231; Anand Singh and Anr. v. State of U .P. and Ors. 201 O (9 )
SCR 133 = 2010 (11) SCC 242- relied on.
3. Though the High Court has not dismissed the writ
c petitions filed by the appellants on the ground of delay
and laches accepting the plea of the appellants that they
felt aggrieved on coming to know that the land was
sought to be given to the private persons for
development. In this way, discretion is exercised by the
D High Court in entertaining the writ petitions on merits.
Since such a discretion is exercised, this Court would
not interfere with that discretion, more so, when a

## Text

_Characters 0–39,738 of 98,037. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39738 for what follows._

A
B
[2015] 7 S.C.R. 512
SAVITRI DEVI
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 4506of2015 etc.)
May 14, 2015.
[H.L. DATTU, CJI, A.K. SIKRI AND ARUN MISHRA, JJ.]
c
Land Acquisition Act, 1894- s. 5A and 17(1) and (4) -
Land acquisition by Notification dated 12.03.2008-lnvoking
urgency provisions dispensing with the right of objection uls.
5A - Challenged by the /and-owners - Some Land-owners
a/so challenged the Notifications of the years 1979or1980
D - High Court dismissed the cases challenging the
Notifications of 197911980 as barred by limitation- However
other cases were not dismissed on the ground of delay and
/aches- On merit High Court held that invocation of urgency
clause was unwarranted- But in view of the fact that substantial
E development work had been carried out, third party interest
was created, compensation was also paid, etc., High Court
in order to balance the equities, instead of quashing the
notification, enhanced the provisional compensation to
64. 7% and directed allotment of developed abadi Land to
F the extent of 10% of the acquired land- However, notification
in respect of three villages was quashed where no
development work had been carried out-Appeal of the Landholders - Held: In the facts of the case, the cases may not
have been maintainable on the ground of delay and /aches
G - But the High Court had gone an extra.mile in finding the
solutions and balancing the equities in a manner 'tlhich was
favourable to the /and-owners by adequately compensating
them - The directions of High Court are given in unique and
H
512
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
513
peculiar circumstances and hence would not form precedent A
- Interference u/Art. 136 not warranted in the present cases.
~ -
Disposing of the appeals and the contempt petitions,
the Court.
, )
HELD: 1. The appellants were not aggrieved by the B
acquisition per se in the manner it was done by the
respondents. As per their own case, they became
aggrieved only when they found that land was not
utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired namely c
industrial development, but a large portion thereof was
sought to be given away to the builders for development
of the land as residential. The High Court, acc~pted such
a plea of the land owners on the ground of'l~ches and
delay. [Para 35) [558-C-E]
·~
D
Nand Kishore Gupta and Ors. v. State of UP. and Ors.
2010 (11 ) SCR 356 = (2010) 10 SCC 282 - referred to.
2. After the land was acquired, which was of very
large quantity and in big chunks, further steps were taken E
by passing the award, taking possession and paying
compensation. In many cases, actual possession was
taken and in rest of the cases, paper possession was
taken where because of the land under Abadi, actual F
possession could not be taken on spot immediately.
Where possession was taken, these land owners/
appellants even received compensation. All these
petitions have been filed only thereafter which may not
be maintainable stricto sensu. Looking into the matter G
from the aforesaid prospective, the plea that giving away
of the land by allotment to the private developers for
construction of residential units gave them ·the fresh
cause of action, gets dented to a great extent. [Paras 37,
38] [560-A-F]
H
514
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 7 S.C.R.
A
Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors. 197 4
AIR 2077 = 1975 (1) SCR 802 - followed .
Murari and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 1996 ( 8 )
Suppl. SCR 313 = 1997 ( 1 ) SCC 15; Ravi Khullar and Anr.
B v. Union of India and Ors. 2007 (4) SCR 598 = 2007 (5) SCC
231; Anand Singh and Anr. v. State of U .P. and Ors. 201 O (9 )
SCR 133 = 2010 (11) SCC 242- relied on.
3. Though the High Court has not dismissed the writ
c petitions filed by the appellants on the ground of delay
and laches accepting the plea of the appellants that they
felt aggrieved on coming to know that the land was
sought to be given to the private persons for
development. In this way, discretion is exercised by the
D High Court in entertaining the writ petitions on merits.
Since such a discretion is exercised, this Court would
not interfere with that discretion, more so, when a very
fair stand is taken by the NOi DA Authority. It was equally
possible to dismiss these writ petitions as the same were
E filed belatedly after passing of the award and when in
most of the cases, possession was taken and
compensation paid. Thus, the High Court has gone an
extra mile in finding the solution to the problem and
balancing the equities in a manner which is favourable
F to the land owners. [Para 38] [560-F-G; 561-A-C]
4. Many residents of Patwari village had entered into
agreement with the authorities agreeing to accept
enhanced compensation at the rate of 64. 7%. This
G additional compensation was, however, agreed to be
paid by the authorities only in respect of land owners of
Patwari village. The High Court has bound the authorities
with the said agreement by applying the same to all the
_ land owners thereby benefiting them with 64. 7%
H additional compensation. There could have been
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
515
argument that the authorities cannot be fastened with A
this additional compensation, more particularly, when
machinery for determination for just and fair
compensation is provided under the Land Acquisition
Act and the land owners had, in fact, invoked the said
machinery by seeking reference under Section 18 B
thereof. Likewise, the scheme for allotment of land to the
land owners provides for 5% and 6% developed land in
NOIDA and Greater NOIDA respectively. As against that,
the High Court has enhanced the said entitlement to 10%. -
It could be an arguable case as to whether High Court C
could grant additional land contrary to the policy.
Notwithstanding the same, the NOIDA Authority have
now accepted this part of the High Court judgment after
the dismissal of the appeals filed by the NOi Of' Authority. 0
[Para 39] [561-0-H; 562-A]
5. On the one hand, invocation of urgency
provisions u/s 17 of the Act and dispensing with the right
to file objection under Section 5A of the Act, is found to
be illegal by the High Court. On the other hand, because E
of delay in challenging these acquisitions by the land
owners, developments have taken place in these villages
and in most of the cases, third party rights have been
created. Faced with this situation, the High Court came F
out with the solution which is equitable to both sides.
Thus, the High Court considered the ground realities of
the matter and arrived at a more practical and workable
solution by adequately compensating the land owners
in the form of compensation as well as allotment of G
developed Abadi land at a higher rate i.e. 10% of the land
acquired of each of the land owners against the eligibility
and to the policy to- the extent of 5% and 6% of NOIOA
and Greater NOIOA land respectively. [Para 40] [562-H;
563-A-D]
H
516
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015]7 S.C.R.
A
Bondu Ramaswamy and Others v. Bangalore
Development Arthority 2010 (6) SCR 29 = 2010 (7) SCC 129
- referred to.
6. The allegation of some of the appellants that their
8 abadi land was acquired, is specifically denied. There is
specific averment made by the NOIDA Authority at so
many places that village abadi land was not acquired.
Abadi area is what was found in the survey conducted
prior to Section 4 Notification and not what is alleged or
c that which is far away from the dense village abadi. It
has been the consistent stand of the NOIDA Authority
that prior to the issuance of Section 4 Notification under
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, survey was conducted
and the abadi found in that survey was not acquired.
D There has been a long gap between acquisition of the
land and filing of the writ petitions in the High Court by
the appellants challenging the acquisition. If they have
undertaken some construction during this period they
cannot be allowed to take advantage thereof. Therefore,
E the plea of the appellants based on parity with three
villages in respect of which the High Court has given
relief by quashing the acquisition cannot be accepted.
[Para 41] [563-E-F, H; 564-A-C]
F
7. The present cases are not such, where this Court
should interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution.
However, it is clarified that directions of the High Court
are given in the unique and peculiar/specific background
of the cases and, therefore, it would not form precedent
G for future cases. [Para 43] [564-G-H; 565-A]
H.M. T. Housing Building Co-operative Society v. Syed
Khader & Ors. 1995 (2) SCR 200 = 1995 (2) SCC 677; H. M. T.
House
Building
Cooperative
Society
v.
M.
Venkataswamappa and others 1995 (3) SCC 128; Bangalore
H City Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. State of
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
517
Karnataka and others 2012 (3) SCR 295 = 2012 (3) SCC A
727; S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab 1964-SCR 73; S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and others 1993 (3)
Suppl.' SCR 422 = 1994 (1) SCC 1 ;r Vyalikaval
Housebuilding Coop. Society v. II. Chandrapp,a and others
B
2007 (2) SCR 277 = 2007 (9) SCC 304; Royal Orchid Hotels
Limited and Anr. v. G. Jayarama Reddy and Ors. 2011 (11)
SCR 701=2011 (10) SCC 608 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
c
1995 (2) SCR 200
referred to
para 27
1995 (3) sec 128
referred to. para 27
2012 (3) SCR 295
referred to
para 27
.. . ,,,.
D
1964 SCR 73
referred to
para 28
1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 422
referred to
para 29
2007 (2) SCR 277
referred to
para 29
E
2011 (11) SCR 701
referred to
para 30
2010 (11) SCR 356
referred to
para 36
1975 (1) SCR 802
followed
para 37
F
1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 313
relied on
para 37
2007 (4) SCR 598
relied on' ..,, para 37
2010 (9) SCR 133
relied on
Para 37
G
2010 (6) SCR 29
referred to
para 39
'
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
4506 of 2015 etc.
H
518
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 7 S.C.R.
A
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.10.2011 in
B
CMWP No. 62649 of 2008 of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad.
with
C.A. No. 4830, 4508-12, 4513-17, 4518-24, 4819, 452526, 4527, 4529-30, 4531, 4532, 4533, 4534, 4535, 4536,
4537,4538,4539,4540,4541,4543,4544,4545,4546,4547,
4548,4549,4550,4551,4552,4553,4554,4555,4556,4557,
c 4558, 4559, 4560, 4561, 4563, 4564-67, 4568-73, 4575-76,
4577, 4578, 4579-80, 4581-89, 4591, 4592, 4593, 4594,
4595,4596,4597-98,4599,4600,4601,4602,4603,4604,
4605-07, 4608, 4609, 4610, 4611, 4612, 4613-15, 4616,
4617,4618,4619,4620,4621,4622,4623,4624,4625-30,
D 4631,4632,4633,4634,4635,4636,4637,4638,4639,4640,
4641, 4642-4643, 4644, 4645, 4646-4647, 4648-4650, 4651,
4652, 4653-4660, 4661-4666, 4667, 4668, 4669, 4670, 4671,
4672,4673,4674,4675,4677,4678,4679,4680,4681,4682,
4683,4690-4691,4692,4693,4694,4695,4696-4697,4698,
E 4699, 4700, 4701-702, 4703-4704, 4705-4706, 4707-4709,
4710-4711,4712,4713,4714-4715,4716,4717,4718,4719,
4720, 4721, 4722, 4723, 4724, 4726, 4727, 4728, 4729,
4730-4731, 4732-4733, 4734, 4735-4736, 4737, 4738, 4739,
4740-4741,4742-45,4746,4747,4748,4749,4750,4751F 53,4754,4755,4756,4757,4758,4759-60,4761-63,476465, 4766-4768, 4769-4770, 4771, 4772-74, 4775, 4776,
4777,4778,4779,4780,4781,4782,4783,4784,4785,4786,
4787,4788,4789,4790,4791,4792,4793,4794-95,4796,
4797,4798-99,4800,4801,4802,4803,4804,4805,4806,
G 4807,4808,4809,4810-18,4837,4807,4809,4808,4809
of 2015
H
C.A. Nos. 2197,2195,2198,2199, 2225, 2226,2704,
2705, 3022 of 2013
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH
519
C.A. Nos. 4902, 4928 of 2014
A
Comtempt Petition ( c) Nos. 237-238 of 2013 in SLP (c)
Nos. 1082-1083 of2012.
Comtempt Petition (c) Nos. 444 of 2013 in SLP (c) No. B
5566of2012.
·
Comtempt Petition (c) No. 21 of 2015 in SLP (c) No.
27023of2012.
L.N. Rao, PN. Misra, Nagendra Rai, Pramod Kr. Jain, lndu C
Malhotra, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Kailash Vasdev, Mahabir Singh,
Pallav Shishodia, J.C. Gupta, Vijay Hansaria, S.C.
Maheshwari, Nidhesh Gupta, S. R. Singh, Rakesh Khanna,
Amrendra Saran, Ajay Kumar Misra, J.M. Sharma, Rakesh
Dwivedi, Jitendra Mohan Sharma, Rakesh Kr. Khanna, D
Pramod Swarup, Reena Singh, AAG, Ravindra Kumar,
Kedarnath Tripathi, Shashank Samru, Aakash Kumar, Prerna
Singh, Chandra Prakash, Sunder Khatri, Shital Khatri, Rajesh
Goyal, GauravYadav, Kuldip Singh, Chinmoy Khaladkar, B.K.
Pal, Manu Shanker Mishra, Nishant Kumar, Nitin Jain, Manish E
Kumar, A.A. Chaudhary, Alex Joseph, Amit Gupta,Sarwa ·
Mitter, for Mitter & Mitter Co., GautamAwasthi, Bhopal Singh,
Ayush Choudhary, Deep Shikha Bharati, Anish Kumar Gupta,
Prashant R. Dahat, Pu nit Yadav, R.K. Adsure, K.B. Rohatgi,
F
Mahesh Kasana, Aparna Rohatgi Jain, Preeti Singh,
Gagandeep Sharma,Abhishek Jain, RK. Gupta, S.K. Gupta,
M.K. Singh, B.P. Gupta, ShekharKumar, RahulVerma, Susmita
Lal,AdarshAgarwal, Wajeeh Shah, Sanjay K. Tyagi, Prabhat
K. Rai, Himanshu Tyagi, Asha Gopalan Nair, Dr. Rajeev G
Sharma, Pankaj Dubey, Raghuvir Sharma, Vipin Kumar
Sharma, Dharmendra Sharma, Karmendra Pratap Singh,
Rovin Babu, Rishu Mishra, Vikas Mahajan, Vined Sharma, B.Y.
Kulkarni, Vishal Mahajan, Anuradha Mutatkar, A.N. Singh,
Anisha Jain, V.P. Singh, Dr. Vipin Gupta, Prem Prakash, Anshul H
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 7 S.C.R.
A
Naf~yan, Ankur Prakash, Priyanka Singh, Piyush Singh, Aditya
Parolia, RD. Upadhyay, GiridharG Upadhyay,Asha Upadhyay,
Sanjay Sharma, Yogesh Tiwari, Sanjay K. Agrawal, Dinesh K.
Garg, Abhihek Garg, Dhananjay Garg, Deepak Mishra, B.S.
Billowria, Kumar Mihir, Vishal Gupta, Rakesh Kumar, Prabhat
B Kaushik, ManeeshArora, Gaurav Jain, Arjun Bhandari, Bimlesh
Kumar Singh, Rajeev Kumar Gupta, K.S. Rana, Dharm Singh,
Manoj Gorkela, Nagesh Gajghate, Priya Sharma, Rameshwar
Prasad Goyal, Manoj Kumar, Gopal Prasad, Dr. Surat Singh,
Brajesh Kumar Singh, Sudhansu Palo, Dr. Anil Kr. Tandale,
C Jetendra Singh, Gaurav Kumar, S.K. Sabharwal, Vikal Mudgal,
Ashok Kumar Sharma, D.N. Goburdhun, Prabal Bagchi, Lal
Singh Thakur, Tabrez Ahmed, Bhopal Singh, Syed Mehdi
Imam, Balraj Dewan, Zaki Khan, Mohd. Farhan Khan, Sandeep
D Sethi, Shirin Zaidim, Yashpal Dhingra, Sandhya Goswami,
M.P.S. Tomar, Jabar Singh, Nikhar Berry, Sanjay Krishna,
Ranvir Singh, Ravi Nanda, Pukhrambam Ramesh Kumar, Priya
Sahadeo, Mayank Pandey, Ravindra Kumar, D.K. Sharma,
Surya Nath Pandey, Ajay Kr. Singh, Rajesh Gupta, Harpreet
E Singh, Sumit R. Sharma, PuneetTaneja,Arun K. Sinha, Rakesh
Singh, Md. ShahidAnwar,Arvind Kumar, C.S. Chauhan, K. V.
Bharathi Upadhaya, Yogesh Tiwari, Sanjay K. Agrawal,
Gyanendra Singh, Nagendra Singh, Vishwa Pal Singh,Ankur
Prakash,Aditya Parolia, Piyush Singh, Dr. Shiva Sharma, D.K.
F Sharma, Manoj Gorkela, Shashi Kiran, Abhiuday Chandra, Jai
Singh, Rana S. Biswas, Sunil Kr. Sharma, Sharmila Upadhyay,
Deepak Goel, Sunando Raha, Ankit Goel, Devender Kumar
Go~I. N.P. Singh, S.K. Singh, Praveen Kumar Singh, Bal
Krishan Sharma, Md. Ziaudding Ahmad, Rajiv Shankar
G Dvivedi, Mohit Baksh.i, Dheeraj Nair, Himanshu Sharma,
Anuvrat Sharma, Sum it Bansal, Ateev Mathur, Jagriti Ahuja,
Gagan Gupta, Atul Bandhu, Rakesh K. Sharma, Tulika
Mukherjee, Anuradha D. Misra, Kumar Anurag Singh, For
Anuradha &Associates, Jatinder Kumar Bhatia,Ajai Kumar
H Bhatia, Sagar Bansal, F ateh Singh Chauhan, Arun Sharma,
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
521
Amiet Andlay, Tatini Basu, Mukul Kumar, Tulika Prai<ash, A
Sheeba Khan, Arvind Kumar Shukla, Amit Shukla, SWeta Rani,
Pradeep Verma, Himanshu, Praveen Swarup,' Sushma
Verma, Suvesh Kumar, Prashant Chaudhary, Pawanshree
Agrawal, S.K. Sinha, Tanmay Nagar,Ashok KumarYadav,Anil
Sharma, K.S. Rana, Ajit Sharma, Shikha Beri, Nitin Singh,
B
Sameer Singh, Akshat Sharma, Pulkit Manuja, Sanchit Garga,
For Col. P.S. Sharma, Tripurari Ray, B.S. Billowria, Vishnu
Sharma, R. Chandrachud, Rajnish Singh, Sansriti Pathak,
Utkarsh Kulvi, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Bina Madhavan, Bipin
Kumar, Suresh Chandra Sharma, For Lawyers Knit & Co., C
Farhan Khan, H.P. Sahu, Kamlesh Mishra, Shivkant Mishra,
V.K. Sidharthan, Ajai K. Bhatia, Sagar Bansal, J.K. Bhatia,
Amit Pawan, Abhishek Amritanshu, Shailendra Kumar,
Suryodaya Prakash Tiwari, Sudhakar Prasad Tiwari, Shashi D
Kiran, Meenakshi, Jyoti Sharma, Harshivir Pratap Sharma,
Naresh Kumar, Nitin Singh, Sanchit Garg, Akshat Sharma,
Pulkit, Ajit Sharma, Shikha Beari, Bhopal Singh Rawal,
Sandeep Singh Rawal, GautamAwasthi, S. Chauhan, K. S.
Rana, Anirudh Tanwar, Y. D. Nagar, Lalit Kumar, Gyanendra E
Singh, Vishwa Pal Singh, S.K. Sabharwal, Satpal Singh,
Dushyant Bhati, Vishwajit Singh, Abhindra ~.faheshwari, Veera
Kaul Singh, Pankaj Singh, Gau~av Singh, Atul Kumar, S.K.
Verma, Sudhir Kulshrestha, Sushma Singh, Sarvesh Bisaria,
P.C. Sharma, S. Usha Reddy, Anuvrat Sharma, Alka Sinha, F
Braham Singh, P.K. Bajaj, N.S. Vidhudi, R.D. Upadhyay, S.B.
Tripathi, AnkurYadav, Avnish Singh, Arvind Kumar Shukla, Alok
Shukla, Amit Shukla, NihalAhmad, Nayanak Shekhar Mishra,
. Mayank Singh Chauhan, Arvind Kumar Shukla, Rushi Khan,
Tripurari Ray, Anil Kaushik, Rajinder Singh, Vishnu Sharma, G
Charu Ambwani, Prashant Kumar, For A.P. & J. Chambers,
Anurag Tomar, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Sagar Bansal, J.K.
Bhatia, Shiv Kumar Suri, Shikhil Suri, Akriti Gupta, Satendra
Kumar, Ankur Yadav, Avnish Singh, Rajesh Srivastava, Yash
Pal Dhingra, Sonal Jain, Rajiv M. Brahma, Dr. Satish Chandra, H
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 7 S.C.R.
A Abhiuday Chandra, A.D.N. Rao, Annam Venkatesh, Sudipto
Sircar, Vaishali R., Neelam Jain, K.K.L. Gautam, Devavrat
Anand, Krishan Kumar R.S., Pardeep Gupta, Parinav Gupta,
Mansi Ajamani, M.A. Chinnasamy, V. Senthil Kumar, Nanita
Sharma, Vivek Sharma, Ajay Narain Mathur, Niranjana Singh,
B Ram Bhaj, Arti Singh, Namita Choudhary, Rabin Majumder,
Mahua Kalra, Mohd. lrshad Hanif, Pahlad Singh Sharma, Ajay
Kumar Singh, Vis ha I Gupta, San jay Kumar Tyagi, B. K. Satija,
Avinash Kr. Lakhanpal, Naresh Kumar, Brij Bhusan, Rishi
Malhotra, Ghan Shyam Vasisht, Jyoti Mendiratta, Sudarshan
C Rajan, Ajit Sharma, S. Usha Reddy, E.C. Agrawala,
Subramonium Prasad, Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, P.N. Gupta,
Sumit Attri, Abhishek Sharma, Rekha Pandey, Shiv Sagar
Tiwari, Dinesh Kr. Tiwary, Chandan Kumar, Santosh Kumar
0 Tripathi, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, Prakhar Sharma, Dipankar
Das, Vijaya Lakshmi, Devesh Singh, Anu Gupta, Pramod
Dayal, Rakesh Dahiya, lrshadAhmad, SamirAli Khan, Sunil
Kumar Jain, Ashok K. Mahajan, Subhash Chandra Jain,
Rajesh Goyal, Amit Sharma, S.M. Jadhav & Company, Dinesh
E Kumar Garg, Ravindra Kumar, Sarla Chandra, Daya Krishan
Sharma, Bimlesh Kumar Singh, Nitin Kumar Thakur, Aditi
Gupta, Aftab Ali Khan, Devesh Kumar, Ritesh Agrawal,
Ashwani Bhardwaj, Venkateswara RaoAnumolu, Liz Mathew,
Shrish Kumar Misra, C.S.N. Mohan Rao,AnkolekarGurudatta,
F Shomila Bakshi, Binu Tamta, Vikas Mahajan, Vinod Sharma,
Bhaskar Y. Kulkarnim, Dheeraj Nair, Sanjay Kumar Visen,
Saravesh Singh Baghel, Gunnam Venkateswara Rao, 8.
Sunita Rao, Brahm S. Nagar,Ashok Mathur, Surya Kant, for
G
the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A.K. SIKRI, J. 1. These matters were heard in detail for
few days and hearing was concluded on 05.02.2015.
H Thereupon, we communicated the result in the open Court by
pronouncing that appeals were dismissed and the reasons
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
523
[AK. SIKRI, J.]
shall follow. These are, thus, our reasons for dismissing the A
appeals.
Leave is granted in all the special leave petitions.
PROLOGUE:
B
(2) The subject matter of most of these appeals are the
Notifications dated 12-03-2008 issued by the State of U.P.
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act ("Act" for short)
read with Section 17 of the Act as well as declaration issued
under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred C
to as the 'Act') vide Notification dated 30.06.2008. Land
situate in various villages of Naida and Greater Naida in Tehsil
Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagarwas acquired. Some other
Notifications under same provisions of the Act rn respect of D
lands of these villages was also acqufred by earlier
Notifications. The purpose stated in the notifications was
'Planned Industrial Development'. Urgency provisions under
Section 17(1) and 17(4). of the Act were invoked thereby
dispensing vvith the right 9f objection otherwise given to the E
land holds rs under Section SA of the Act. The total land which
was acquired by these notification was S89.188 hectares.
Some writ petitions were initially filed in the High Court of
Allahabad challenging the said Notifications, with primary
contention that invocation of emergency provision and taking F
away valuable right of the land holders under Section SA of the
Act was illegal, ma/a fide, arbitrary and colourable exercise of
power. Some of the writ petitions came up before the Division
Bench of the said High Court. One was Writ Petition (C) 4S777
of 2008 in the case of Harish Chand and Others v. State of G
U.P. and Others wherein the High Court upholding the very
same Notifications, on arriving at the conclusion that invocation
of Section 17 of the Act was justified, dismissed that writ
petition. It so happened that another Division Bench of the
same High Court decided Writ Petition (C) No. 17068 of 2009; H
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 7 S.C.R.
A titled Karan Singh v. State of U.P. and others. The Division
Bench rendered its judgment dated 19-07-2011 in the said
case accepting the aforesaid contention of the writ petitioners
and holding that invocation of provisions of Section 17 of the
Act was notjustified.Accordingly, the Division Bench quashed
B these Notifications.
(3) As a sequel, spate of writ petitions came to be filed
challenging the lands acquired not only by the notification dated
12-03-2008 but even by earlier notifications as well. When
C these petitions came up before another Division Bench it
noticed the aforesaid two conflicting views expressed by two
different Division Benches. This led the said Division Bench
to refer the matter to the larger Bench and orders dated 2607-2011 were passed in this behalf. This is how the matters
D were placed before the Full Bench and by that time as many
as 471 writ petitions had accumulated. All these writ petitions
were taken up analogously by the Full Bench and disposed of
vide judgment dated 21.10.2011 with leading case known as
Gajraj vs. State of U.P. (W.P. (C) 37443 of201 !). The Full Bench
E of the High Court has accepted the plea of the land holders
that invocation of emergency clause contained in Section 17
of the Act was impermissible and unwarranted. At the same
time, the High Court also noticed that in respect of land of many
F villages, possession had already been taken and substantial
development work carried out. Even compensation was paid
in such cases, the High Court, instead of quashing the
Notifications in respect of those villages, chose to adopt the
middle path in an endeavour to balance the equities of both
G sides. Thus, it enhanced the provisional compensation and
also directed allotment of developed Abadi land to the extent
10% of their acquired land subject to maximum of 2500 sq.
mtrs. However, in respect of three villages, when it found that
no development work had been carried out at all by the
H Authorities during the intervening period, the High Court chose
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH
525
[AK. SIKRI, J.]
to quash the Notifications including consequential actions and A
directed restoration of the land to the respective land owners.
(4) It may also be noticed at this stage that when there
was flurry of writ petitions in the High Court challenging the
invocation of Section 17 and the Division Bench of the High B
Court in Harkaran Singh (supra) had held invocation of urgency
powers to be bad in law, some land owners whose land was
acquired much earlier by invoking clause (some of the
Notifications of such land date back to 1979 or early 1980s as
'
~·
well) took adventurous step to file the writ petitions in the year C
2011 challenging those Notifications. All these writ petitions,
however, have been dismissed by tJle impugned judgment of
the High Court on the ground that they are filed with inordinate
delay and laches.
D
(5) From the aforesaid, it is clear that three sets of
directions are issued by the High Court, namely, (I} dismissing
writ petitions filed with unexplained delays and laches; (ii)
quashing the Notification in respect of three villages where no
development work had taken place; and (iii) in respect of other E
villages, instead of quashing the action of acquisition of land
in spite of accepting the plea that Section 17 was wrongly
invoked, it has enhanced the compensation as well as extent
of entitlement for allotment of developed Abadi plot. ·
(6) The State GovernmenVU.P. Development Board as well
F
as many land owners have challenged the said Full Bench
decision of the High Court. Insofar as special leave petitioners/
appeals of the Government and Authority are concerned, they
have already been dismissed. In these batches of matters, G
thus, we are concerned with the appeals of the land owners.
(7) Most of these appeals are filed against the Full Bench.
However, some of the appeals arise. against the earlier Division
Bench judgment dated 25-11-2008 whereby the High Court H
526
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 7 S.C.R.
A had upheld the same Notifications and rejected the challenge
to the acquisition of land. Some appeals are filed by the NOIDA
authority where the Division Bench had quashed the
notification.
B
(8)After narrating these preliminaries of the matters, we
c
advert to the facts and events of the cases. For the sake of
convenience, we will refer to the facts appearing in the writ
petition of Gajraj as that was the lead case before the High
Court as well.
FACTUAL MATRIX
(9) This writ petition was filed by 27 writ petitioners claiming
themselves to be Bhumidaars with transferable right and
0 owners of different plots of land situate in Village Patwari,
Pargana, Tehsil - Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar. The
Notification dated 12-03-2008 was issued by the State
Government under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 notifying that the land mentioned
E in the schedule is needed for the public purpose namely, for
the "planned industrial development" in Gautam Buddha Nagar.
Inquiry under Section 5A having been dispensed with vide
Notification dated 12-03-2008, State Government proceeded
to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition
F Act dated 30-06-2008.
(10) The petitioners had pleaded in the writ petition that
dispensation of the inquiry under Section 5A can only be an
exception where the urgency cannot brook the delay. The
G respondents, without application of mind, dispensed with the
inquiry. The acquisition proceedings were deprecated as void,
unconstitutional, tainted with malafide, abuse of authority/power
and non application of mind. It was pleaded that the procedure
under Section 5A is mandatory which embodies a just and _
H wholesome principle that a person whose property is being
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
527
[A.K. SIKRI, J.]
acquired or intended to be acquired should have occasion to A
persuade the authorities that his property be not touched for
acquisition. !twas also argued that land use of village Patwari
was changed in the Master Plan 2021 after the issuance of
notifications under sections 4 and 6, which is colourable
exercise of powers and entire exercise is arbitrary, illegal and B
infringes rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14,
19 and 300A of the Constitution of India. These petitioners
also stated in the writ petition that though there was some delay
in filing the writ petition if counted from the date of notification
but the writ petition was filed only when it came to their C
knowledge that the land use of village Patwari was changed in
the Master Plan 2021 after the notifications under Sections 4
and 6 and land was sought to be allotted to the private builders,
thereby giving go by to the objective for which the land was D
acquired. The petitioners further claimed that the part of the
property of the petitioners is situate in village Abadi. It was
pleaded that the authority had executed a lease deed dated
31-03-2010 in favour of respondent no. 4 M/s. Supertech Ltd,
a company engaged in the construction, allotting 2,40,00 E
square meters land for constructing multi-storied complexes.
It was also stated that although land was acquired for industrial
development but the same had now been allotted to the
builders by the Authority which clearly indicates that neither
there was any appropriate plan and scheme for industrial F
development nor there was any urgency in the matter and the
whole proceeding amounted to colourable exercise of power.
( 11) The State Government as well as Authority contested
the matter by putting its justification to the invocation of Section G
17 of the Act. It was pleaded that land was acquired for the
purpose of industrial development. It was also stated that the
Authority had been constituted vide Notification dated 28-011998 issued under the U.P. lndustrialArea DevelopmentAct,
1976 (hereafter referred to as the '1976 Act') and the land H
528
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 7 S.C.R.
A was to be developed in accordance with the aims and
objectives contained in the said Act included development of
the land forresidential and other purposes as well and was
not confined to industrial development alone. Objection was
raised to the maintainability of the writ petitions by contending
B that except few petitioners, all other had received
compensation on various dates and, therefore, they were
estopped from challenging the acquisition, once the
possession of the land was taken, award was passed and
compensation received. The Authorities also stated that land
C owner of about 83% of the land area had already been paid
the compensation. In terms of numbers, out of 1605 persons,
1403 persons had accepted the compensation. Development
works had been carried out in the area in question which had
0 already been demarcated into various sectors. The nature of
development carried out was stated in detail in the affidavit.
Invocation of urgency clause was also sought to be justified.
(12) M/s. Supertech Limited, to whom certain area was
allotted for development of the housing colony was also
E impleaded as the respondent. On its impleadment, this
respondent also filed its counter affidavit stating the
circumstances under which it was allotted the land for
development of residential units. It also contended that the
F substantial work had already been undertaken by the said
Company. So much so, out of 6000 residential units which were
proposed to be constructed, 4471 units had already been
booked by the members of public and paid part considerations.
It was pleaded that in this manner third party interest had also
G been created. It would be relevant to point out here that apart
from M/s. Supertech Limited, there were at least 10 more such
developers who had been allotted the various chunks of
acquired land for similar housing projects etc.
H
JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH
529
[A.K. SIKRI, J.]
( 13) After noticing the aforesaid facts and the contentions A
and having regard to the plethora of writ petitions which were
filed pertaining to different villages, the High Court·deemed it
appropriate to categorize these writ petitions in different
groups, village wise. 65 village wise categories were,
accordingly, carved out. Out of these group 1-41 pertained to B
different villages of Greater NOIDA whereas villages in group
42-65 fell in NOIDA. Village Patwari was taken up as group 1.
The High Court, thereafter, discussed the factual position in
respect of each group which need not be mentioned, as
unnecessary for our purposes. However, wherever this C
exercise is deemed proper, we would be referring to such
factual details at the relevant steps.
(14) Keeping in view the various s.ubmissions made by
the writ petitioners in their petitions, the High Cour:t framed as D
many as 17 issues or1he points of consideration which had
fallen for its discussion and decision. It would be apposite to
take note of those issues at this juncture:
"(i) Object and Purpose of the 1976 Act: Whether the E
development of industries is the dominant purpose and
object of U.P. lndustrialArea Developmer:itAct, 1976.
(ii) Whether Acquisition Compulsory: Whether for carrying
out the development of industrial area under 1976 Act, it F
is compulsory and necessary to acquire the land by the
Authority?
(iii) Delay and Laches : Whether the delay and laches in
the facts of the present case can bar the invocation or G
Constitutional remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
(iv) National Capital Regional Planning Board Act, 1985,
its Consequences: Whether the Authority can carry out H
530
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 7 S.C.R.
A
development, utilise the land acquired as per its Master
Plan 2021 without its approval/clearance by National
Capital Regional Planning Board, and what is effect on
its function of land acquisition after enforcement of 1985
Act?
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
(v) Invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4): Whether
invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land
Acquisition Act and dispensation of inquiry under section
5A was in accordance with law in the cases which are
under consideration?
(vi) Pre-notification and Post-notification delay: Whether
delay caused before issuance of notification under
Section 4 and delay caused subsequent to notification
under Section 4 can be relied for determining as to
whether urgency was such t,b.at invocation of Section
17(1) and 17(4) was necessary?
(vii) Colourable Exercise of Power: Whether acquisition
of land are vitiated due to mala fide and colourable
exercise of powers?
(viii) Taking of possession: Whether the possession of
the land acquired was taken under Section 17(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act in accordance with law?
(ix) Vesting: Whether after taking possession under
Section 17(A) of the Act the challenge to the notifications
under Section 4 read with 17(1) and 17(4) and Section
6 cannot be entertained due to the reason that land which
has already been vested in the State cannot be divested?
(x) Section 11A; Whether acquisition under challenge has
lapOsed under Section 11A of the Act due to nondeclaration of the award within two years from the date
of publication of the declaration made under section 6?
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH
531
[A.K. SIKRI, J.]
(xi) Section 17(3A): Whether non payment of 8~% of the A
compensation as required by Section 17(3A) ofthe Land
Acquisition Act is fatal to the acquisition o pr~~~edings?
(xii) Waiver: Whether the petitioners who have accepted
compensation by agreement have waived their right to B
challenge the acquisition proceedings?
(xiii) Acquiescence: Whether the petitioners due to having
accepted the compensation by agreement have
acquiesced to the proceedings of land acquisition and c
they are estopped from challenging the acquisition
proceedings at this stage?
(xiv) Third Party Rights, Development and Construction:
Whether due to creation of third party rights, development D
carried out by the Authority and developments and
coOnstructions made by the allottees on the acquired land
subsequent to the acquisition, the petitioners are not
entitled for the relief of quashing the notifications under
I•
Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and 17(4) and Section E
6oftheAct?
(xv) Effect of Upholding of some of the notifications in
some writ petitions earlier decided: What are the
consequences and effect of earlier Division Bench F
judgment upholding several notifications which are
subject matter of challenge in some of these writ
petitions?
.. ,.,
(xvi) Conflicts in views of Division Benches: Which of the
Division Bench decisions i.e. Harkaran Singh's case G
holding that invocation of Section 17(1) and 17(4) was
invalid or earlier Division Bench judgment in Harish
Chand's case holding that invocation of Section 17(1)
and 17(4) was in accordance with law, has to be H
approved?
532
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 7 S.C.R.
A
(xvii) Relief: To what relief, if any, the petitioners are
entitled in these writ petition?"
(15) We are purposely eschewing the detailed discussion
by the High Court on all the aforesaid issues. Suffice it to state
B here that after noticing the object and purpose of 1976 Act
and discussing its provisions contained in this Act with
reference to case law explaining the legal position of such
statutory authorities entrusted with the task of development
works, the High Court concluded that the stand of the Authority
C that unless the land is acquired by it. It cannot carry out any
development works until the 1976 Act was misconceived and
incorrect. The High Court remarked that the Authority was
labouring under the aforesaid misconception and, therefore,
concentrated only on acquisition of the land without taking care
D of other modes and means of industrial development and
excessive acquisition of fertile agriculture land was due to the
above mindset of the Authority. Insofar as issues pertaining to
compulsive acquisition and invocation of Section 17(1) and
17(4) are concerned, the High Court has arrived at a finding
E that such invocation of emergency/urgency clauses, thereby
depriving the land owners of their most invaluable right to file
objections under Section 5A of the Act, was illegal and
unwarranted. As this issue is decided in favour of the land
F owners and against this finding appeals preferred by the State
as well as the Authority have already been dismissed, it is not
necessary to explain the raison d'etre behind these findings.
We would be proceeding on the basis that invocation of
Section 17(1) and Section 17(4) was wrong. Similarly, the
G findings of:the High Court that exercise of power by the State
was colourable and arbitrary need not be restated in detail,
the same reason.
(16)As far as the issue no. 4 pertaining the NCR planning
H Board Act is concerned, the High Court has held that land could
not be acquired without the permission of the Board. Opinion
SAVITRI DEVI v. STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH
533
[A.K. SIKRI, J.]
of the High Court on this aspect was questioned by the State A
of U. P. as well as Authority in its appeals. However, it was found
that as. a matter of fact, insofar as these cases are concerned
consent of the Board had been obtained. Havfifg regard to
this position, while dismissing the appeals of the State/
Authority, we have left the said question of law open, namely,
B
whether permission of the deemed under the Act of 1985 is a
pre-condition before acquisition of the land. Therefore, that
aspect also needs no elaboratio;i at our end in these appeals.
(17) It becomes clear from the above that the High Court C
arrived at a conclusion that since invocation of Section 17 ( 1)
and 17(4) was uncalled for and unwarranted, the acquisition
of the land of the appellants herein was illegal. Notwithstanding,
the same, the High Court did not grant the relief of setting aside
the entire acquisition and restoring the land to the appellants. D
After the aforesaid findings, the High Court observed that
insofar as grant of particular relief to the land owners in land
acquisition proceedings is concerned, it depends on several
important factors. Thus, the issue of 'reliefs
1 has been
discussed specifically and independently under the aforesaid E
caption. Here, the High Court has observed that the creation
of third party rights, development undertaken over the land in
dispute as well as the steps taken by the land owners after
declaration made under Section 6 of the Act would be the F
relevant consideration in determining the kind of-relief that is
to be granted to the land owners.