# · SBRIMANT SARDAR CBANDROJIRAO ANGRE v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADF.SR

- **Citation:** [1968] 1 S.C.R. 761
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-10-04
- **Case number:** CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICilON: Civil Appeal No. 98 of 1965
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah ~ J. M. Shelat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sbrimant-sardar-cbandrojirao-angre-v-state-of-madhya-pradf-sr-4285
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act (Madh114 Bharat 28 of
1951), s. 5(b)(iv)-Grove, meaning of.
B
After the resumption of the appellant's J agir lands ID the State
by the enactment of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagln Act he
claimed the mango trees, planted by him on both sides of a fong c
road, as constituting a "grove" within the meaning of s. 5(b)(iv) of
the Act, and therefore continued to belong to him.
HELD: A grove irrespective of where it was situate, but belonging to or held by the jagirdar was to continue to belong to or to be
held by him. To secure the full and proper use and enjoyment of
such a grove, if it was on land other than that which was allowed
to be retained by him, sub-clause (iv) of s. 5(b) further provides that D
the land on which such a grove stood with the areas appurtenant
thereto also shall be settled upon him in accordance with the M. B.
Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy
Act Samvat 2007. The intention of the legislature appeared to be
that properties which the jagirdar was in personal use and posseirsion of or in respect of which he had paid valuable consideration
were to be retained by him. [764 H; 765 A].
B
The language of sec. 5(b) (iv) does not require that the tree.
need be fruit-bearing trees nor does it require that they should have
been planted by human labour or agency. But they must be sufficient in number and so standing in a group as to give them the
character of a grove and to retain that character the trees would
or when fully grown preclude the land on which they stand from
being primarily used for a purpose other 'than that of a grove-land
p
Cultivation of a patch here and a patch there would have no slgni~
ficance to deprive it of its character as a grove. Therefore, trees
standing in a file on the road side intended to furnish shade to the
road would not fulfil the requirements of a grove even as understood
in ordinary parlance. [766 C-E].
Darovadi v. Mannu Lal, A.I.R. 1929 All. ~7 Kashi v Jaaoo Bai
Al.R. 1934 All. 290r... Shiv Sllhai v, Hari Nandan: A.I.R. 1003 All. 413:
G
llasan v. State of t>ombay, 62 Born. L.R. 617, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICilON:
Civil Appeal No. 98 of
1965.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated the December 7, 1961 of the Madhya Pradesh Hi11h Court
(Gwalior Bench) in Civil Misc. Petition No, 77 of 1959. •
B
A. K. Sen, B. D. Gupta, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder
Narain, for the appellant.
1. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
761
762
SUPR1'~ME t:OUR'l' REPOR'l'S
[19GK] 1 s.c·.n.
A

## Text

-·
SBRIMANT SARDAR CBANDROJIRAO ANGRE
A
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADF.SR
October 4, 1967
[J. C. SHAH ~
J. M. SHELAT, JJ.]
Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act (Madh114 Bharat 28 of
1951), s. 5(b)(iv)-Grove, meaning of.
B
After the resumption of the appellant's J agir lands ID the State
by the enactment of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagln Act he
claimed the mango trees, planted by him on both sides of a fong c
road, as constituting a "grove" within the meaning of s. 5(b)(iv) of
the Act, and therefore continued to belong to him.
HELD: A grove irrespective of where it was situate, but belonging to or held by the jagirdar was to continue to belong to or to be
held by him. To secure the full and proper use and enjoyment of
such a grove, if it was on land other than that which was allowed
to be retained by him, sub-clause (iv) of s. 5(b) further provides that D
the land on which such a grove stood with the areas appurtenant
thereto also shall be settled upon him in accordance with the M. B.
Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy
Act Samvat 2007. The intention of the legislature appeared to be
that properties which the jagirdar was in personal use and posseirsion of or in respect of which he had paid valuable consideration
were to be retained by him. [764 H; 765 A].
B
The language of sec. 5(b) (iv) does not require that the tree.
need be fruit-bearing trees nor does it require that they should have
been planted by human labour or agency. But they must be sufficient in number and so standing in a group as to give them the
character of a grove and to retain that character the trees would
or when fully grown preclude the land on which they stand from
being primarily used for a purpose other 'than that of a grove-land
p
Cultivation of a patch here and a patch there would have no slgni~
ficance to deprive it of its character as a grove. Therefore, trees
standing in a file on the road side intended to furnish shade to the
road would not fulfil the requirements of a grove even as understood
in ordinary parlance. [766 C-E].
Darovadi v. Mannu Lal, A.I.R. 1929 All. ~7 Kashi v Jaaoo Bai
Al.R. 1934 All. 290r... Shiv Sllhai v, Hari Nandan: A.I.R. 1003 All. 413:
G
llasan v. State of t>ombay, 62 Born. L.R. 617, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICilON:
Civil Appeal No. 98 of
1965.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated the December 7, 1961 of the Madhya Pradesh Hi11h Court
(Gwalior Bench) in Civil Misc. Petition No, 77 of 1959. •
B
A. K. Sen, B. D. Gupta, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder
Narain, for the appellant.
1. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
761
762
SUPR1'~ME t:OUR'l' REPOR'l'S
[19GK] 1 s.c·.n.
A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shelat, J. The appellant is the ex-jagirdar of certain vil!:.:;c5
called Jagir Nevri Bhorasa. It appears that while the jagir was in his
possession he had constructed roads one of which is the road connecting Bhorasa with Dewas Astha Road. The road about 1 ! miles
in length was lined on both sides with mango trees. In 1951 the
B Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 28 of 1951 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) was passed for resumption of jagir lands in
the State. Under that Act, the right, title and interest of the appellant in his said jagir were extinguished and the jagir lands vested
in the State. In 1955. the Tehsildar put up the mangoes grown on
the said trees for public a.uction. By his application dated Febru0 ary 8, 1955 the appellant objected to the said auction claiming that
the said trees were planted and reared by him, that they constituted a "grove" within the meaning of s. 5(b)(ivl of the Act and
therefore continued to belong to him. The Tehsildar rejected the
application .. The appellant's appeal and thereafter a revision before
the Board of Revenue were also likewise rejected. The appellant
D then tiled a writ petition in the High 'Court of Madhya Pradesh
but that also was dismissed on the ground that the said trees could
not be said to constitute a "grove". The appellant has filed this
appeal after obtaining special leave.
The only question arising in this appeal is whether the said
trees standing on the two sides of the said road can be said to be a
E "grove" within the meaning of sec. 5(b)(iv).
The Act was passed for resumption of jagir-Iands in the State
and to carry out certain land reforms in the jagir areas. Section 3
provides for the date of resumption and sec. 4(1) lays down the
consequences of resumption. Under sub-section (I) of that section,
F the right, title and interest of a jagirdar in his jagir lands including
forests, trees. fisheries, tanks, wells, ponds, etc., stand resumed to
the State as from the date of resumption. The section also provides
for resumption of the right, title and interest of the jagirdar in all
buildings on jagir lands used for schools, hospitals and other P\lblic purposes. Section 5, however, provides that notwithstanding anyG thing contained in sec. 4 the jagirdar shall continue to remain in
p~ssion of land cultivated personally by him; of open enclosures
used'for agricultural or domestic purposes and in continuous
possession for twelve years immediately before the date of resumption, all open house-sites purchased for valuable consideration, all
private buildings, places of worship. and wells situated in, and
trees standing on lands included in the aforesaid enclosures and
H house sit.es ai;id (or hlan
1
~ ~pperftaii;i
1
i
1
ng of. such bbuil
1
din(.gs) orf place
5
s
of worship. w1thm t e 1m1ts o v1 age s1tes. Su -c . iv o sec.
1b) reads as under: -
"all groves wherever situate belonging to or held by the
Jagirdar or any other person, shall continue to belong to
or be held by such Jagirdar or other person, as the case
CHANDROJIHAO V, '!.P. STATE (Shelat, J.)
may be, and the land thereof with the areas appurtenant
thereto shall be settled on him by the Government accord·
ing to the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy
Act, Samva.t 2007."
76:J
Under cl. (c) also the jagirdar is allowed to continue to remain in
possession of all tanks, trees, wells and buildings in or on occupied
land belonging to or held by the jagirdar or any other person.
B
These provisions show clearly that the legislature has used
the word "trees" at three places in three different contexts, in secs.
4(a), 5(b) and 5(c) apart from the expression "all groves wherever
situate" in sub-cl. (iv) of sec. 5(b). Whereas under sec. 4(a) the trees
are to vest in the State Government along with the forests, fisher- C
ies etc., the trees mentioned in sec. 5(b)(iii) and (c) are aUowed to
continue to belong to and be held by the jagirdar.
Obviously,
the word "trees" in these provisions has not been used in any uniform sense and therefore has to be construed in the context in
which it is used. For instance, the word 'trees' in sec: 5(b)(iii) and
(c) is placed in juxtaposition with other properties such as private D
buildin~. places of worship, wells situated in lands included in
the said enclosures and house sites referred to in sub-els. (i) and
(ii). It appears that the policy of the legislature was that jagir lands
including forests, trees in such forests, fisheries, wells, tanks, ponds,
ferries, pathways, village sites etc., which were used by: the public
aind in which the members of the public were interested were re- E
sumed while the land in personal cultivation of the jagirdar, enclosures used for agricultural and domestic purposes, house sites
purchased for valuable consideration, private buildings, places of
worship, wells, trees standing on lands in such enclosures and
house sites and tanks, trees, private wells and buildings in or on
occupied land belonging to or held by the jagirdar were allowed l
to continue to belong to and be held by him. It will be seen that
groves in sub-cl.. (iv) of sec. (b) are included amongst properties
allowed to continue to belong to and be held by the jagirdar. Subclause (iv) also shows that such groves need not be of fruit trees
nor need the trees thereof have been planted by the jagirdar. The
words "wherever situate" indicate that it is not necessary that they G
should be on lands or properties allowed to be retained by the
jaigirdar under s. 5. If a grove belonged to or was held by him,
whether planted by him or of natural growth and wherever situate
it is allowed to continue to belong to him and be held by him.
the intention of the legislature appears therefore to be that properties which the jagirdar was in personal use and possession of or
in respect of which he had paid valuable consideration are to be H
retaim'd by him. It is in this context that we should construe subcl. (iv) of sec. 5(b). A grove irrespective of where it is situate, but
belonting to or held by the jagirdar is to continue to belong to
or to te held by him. To secure the full and proper use and enjoyment of such a grove, if it is on land other than that which is
76·1
SlJPRE~rn C0l11\'l' RliPOR'fo
[1968) l S,O.B.
A allowed to be retained by him, sub-clause (iv) further provides that
the land on which such a grove stands with the areas appurtenant
thereto also shall be settled upon him in accordance with the M.B.
Revenue Administraticn and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. Samvat 2007.
What then is the meaning of the word "grove" within the
meaning of sec. 5(b)(iv)?
Though the Act contains a definition
F. section the legisla lure has not chosen to include therein any definition of a "grove". It intended therefore that it should he understood
in its ordinary dictionary sense. In Webster's New World Dictionary, p. 641, a grove bas been defined as a small wood; groups
of trees standing together without
undergrowth.
The Shorter
C O.~ford English Dictionary, Vol. I, 838 also defines it as a small -
wood, a group of trees affording shade or forming a.venues or
walks, In Corpus Juris Secuntlum, Vol. 98, p. 688 a grove is defined to mean a cluster of trees not sufficiently extensive to he
called a wood; a group of trees of indefinite extent but not large
enough to constitute a forest; especially such a group considered
D as furnishing shade for avenues and walks. Though a grove in this
sense may consist of a group of trees of indefinite extent it cannot
he divorced from the idea of a homogeneous or at any rate a sut.
tantially homogeneous unit consisting of a cluster of trees close to
each other so as to serve as a shade to walks or avenues, Apart
from the meaning that the dictionaries offer the word "grove" has
E also been the subject-matter of a number of decisions. The case of
Daropadi v. Mannu Lal(') was, of course an extreme case of only
4 fruit trees in an area of 3 bighas and that too on the
boundaries. Ashworth J. could therefore easily discard the contention that the said trees formed a grove or that the land on which
they stood was a grove land within the meaning of sec. 3 of the
Agra Tenancy Act. 1926 which provided that so long as any
F considerable portion of a plot had a su·fficient number of trees to
prevent that plot from being cultivated, assuming the trees to have
reached their full size, the entire plot would retain the character
of grove but not otherwise. It is true that when the learned Judge
made this observation he bad in mind the definition of grove
in s. 3 of that Act. but he also observed that that was the sense
G in which a "grove" and "grove land" were ordinarily understood
and that the definition did no more than to bring out the sense
in which these terms were generally understood. In Kashi v. Jagoo
Bai(') also, Bennet J. held that isolated trees cannot be said to
constitute a grove. But unlike these two cases, the land in Shiv
Sahai v. Hari Nandan(') had 13 mango trees fully grown, big in
size and covering a major part of it. It was held that the Janel was
H a grove-land within the meaning of sec. 3(5) of the U. P. Tenancy
Act, 1939. in spile of the fact that there was some cultivation on
·the land. The Court there observed that the definition merely
(') A.LR. 1929 All 557.
(')A.LR. 1934 All 290.
(') AT.R. 1963 All 413.
t'KANUJ<OJ!RAO V.
M.P. STATE (S/ie/at, ./.)
76il
required that the trees must be in sufficiently large number to pre- A
elude the !and from b~ing u;cd primarily for a purpose other than
as grove-land. In Hasan v. State of Bombay(') the Hi~. Court was
concerned with s. 5(h) of the Madhya Pradesh Abohtton of Proprietory Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated ~ands) Act, I of 1951
which is in almost identical terms as s. 5(b)(1v) of the present Act.
The Court interpreted the word "grove" to mean an area covered B
by a cluster of trees specially planted by human agency but not
large enough to constitute a forest.
It would seem therefore that the word "grove" conveys compactness or at any rate substantial compactness to be recognized
as a unit by itself which must consist of a group of trees in suffiC
cient number to preclude the land on which they stand from being
primarily used for a purpose. such as cultivation, other than as a
gr<'ve-land. The language of sec. 5(b)(iv) does not require however
that the trees needs be fruit bearing trees nor does it require that
they should have been planted by human labour or agency. But
they must be sufficient in number and so standing in a group as D
to give them the character of a grove and to retain that chara1:ter
the trees would or when fully grown preclude the land on which
they stand from being primarily used for a purpose other than that
of a grove-land. Cultivation of a patch here and
a patch there
would have no significance to deprive it of its character as a grove.
Therefore, trees standing in a file on the road side intended to E
furnish shade to the road would not fulfil the requirements of a
grove even as understood in ordinary parlance.
Counsel, however, contended that although the trees in question are situate on the road sides along the said road there may
at some places be a group or groups of trees sufficiently F
large in number and closely standing together to preclude
that particular area from being used for cultivation or for any
other purpose. In that case. he argued. there was nothing in subcl. (iv) to prevent such a cluster of trees from being regarded as a
grove. We think there is some force in this argument which requires consideration. Neither the revenue authorities nor the High
Court approached the question from this point of view and no G
inquiry at any stage seems to have been made whether there are
at any place or places such group or groups of trees to constitute
a grove or groves. All of them appear to have dismissed the appellant's claim only because of the fact that the trees stand along the
two sides of the road. ft is possible that the road might have 'been
constructed in this particular area because of a number of trees
standing on both sides of it which would provide shade over it ancl H
form an avenue. In fairness to th_e appellant,_ we think it necessary
that he should have a~ opportumty to establish that at some place
or places along the said road there are trees sufficient in number
and proximity to constitute a grove or groves.
(') 62 Born. LR. 617
766
SUPREME COURT llBPOBTS
[1968) 1 e.0.11.
A
The appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the High
Court are set aside and the Case is remanded to the High Court
to decide the writ petition in the light of the observations hereinabove made after calling a finding from the Board of Revenue on
the question whether there are trees a.t any place or places along
the said road sufficient in number and proximity to constitute a
grove or groves. The Board will give an opportunity to the parties
B to adduce on the aforesaid question such further evidence as tbeY.
may think necessary. In the clircumstances, there will be no ordei
as to costs.
y;p,
Appeal allowed.