# September 10 The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed. KANAI LAL SUR v. PARAMNIDHI SADHUKHAN

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 360
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1955-03-29
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 291 of 1955
- **Bench:** Bhagwati, S.K. Das, Gajendragadkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/september-10-the-appeal-is-accordingly-dismissed-appeal-dismissed-kanai-lal-sur-1462
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Thika tenant-Decree for ejectment-Execution applicationIf lies in civil Coirt-Welfare legis/ation-lnterpretation-Ca/c11tta
Thika Senancy Act, 1949 (W. B. Tl of 1949), s. 5(1).
Respondent" obtained a decree for
ejectment against the
appellant, a thika tenant, and filed an application for execution
of the decree before the civil Court, Appellant resisted
the
application on the ground that inview of s. 5(1) of the Calcutta
Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. the civil Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the application. Section 5(1) provides that a landlord
wishing to eject a thika tenant on the grounds specified in s. 3
shall apply to the Controller in that behalf.
Held, that s. 5(1) did not apply to a case where the landlord
had already obtained a decree for ejectment against his
thika
tenant and consequently the civil
Court had jurisdiction
to
entertain the execution application.
The operative provisions of welfare legislation should receive
a beneficent construction from the Courts. But the words used
in a statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical
meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two
constructions that the question of adopting the construction which
is more consistent with the policy of the Act arises.
· Heydo11's case, (1984) 3 Co. Rep. 8, referred to.

## Text

360
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958[
1957
and third counts. As a result, the total imprisonment
Moborik Ali Ahmed Which has been awarded against the appellant would
v.
be a period of three years and ten months. We are
Thi,!'t,~y 01
not prepared to say that the discretion of the trial
court in awarding
that sentence has been wrongly
Jogonnadhodas J. exercised.
1957
September 10
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
KANAI LAL SUR
v.
PARAMNIDHI SADHUKHAN
(BHAGWATI, S.K. DAS and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)
Thika tenant-Decree for ejectment-Execution applicationIf lies in civil Coirt-Welfare legis/ation-lnterpretation-Ca/c11tta
Thika Senancy Act, 1949 (W. B. Tl of 1949), s. 5(1).
Respondent" obtained a decree for
ejectment against the
appellant, a thika tenant, and filed an application for execution
of the decree before the civil Court, Appellant resisted
the
application on the ground that inview of s. 5(1) of the Calcutta
Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. the civil Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the application. Section 5(1) provides that a landlord
wishing to eject a thika tenant on the grounds specified in s. 3
shall apply to the Controller in that behalf.
Held, that s. 5(1) did not apply to a case where the landlord
had already obtained a decree for ejectment against his
thika
tenant and consequently the civil
Court had jurisdiction
to
entertain the execution application.
The operative provisions of welfare legislation should receive
a beneficent construction from the Courts. But the words used
in a statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical
meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two
constructions that the question of adopting the construction which
is more consistent with the policy of the Act arises.
· Heydo11's case, (1984) 3 Co. Rep. 8, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 291 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated March 29 1955, of the Calcutta High Court
in appeal from Appellate Order No. 134 of 1954,
affirming the appeal against the judgement and order
S. C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
361
dated July 29, 1954, of the Court of the District Judge
of 24-Parganas in Misc. Appeal No. 87of1954, arising
out of the order of the 1st Additional Court of the
Munsif at Sealdah dated February 2, 1954, in Misc.
Judicial Case No. 96 of 1953.
·
N.C. Chatterjee
and S.N. ,lfukerjee,
for
the
appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and D. N. Muke1jee, for
the respondent.
1957 September 10. The following Judgment of
the Court was delivered
by
1957
Kanai Lal Sur
v.
Paramnidhi
Sadhukhan
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-This is an appeal by special Gajendragadkar J.
leave in execution proceedings and the short point
which the appellant has raised before us is that, under
s. 5(1) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, J949 (West
Bengal II of 1949) as amended by the Calcutta Thika
Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1953 (West Bengal VI
of 1953), execution proceedings taken out by the decreeholder against him could be entertained only. by the
controller and not by the civil courts.
This point
arises in this way. The appellant is a thika tenant in
respect of a portion of the premises No. 28, R.G. Kar
Road in Calcutta. In Suit No. 46 of 1948 a decree for
ejectment was passed against him and in favour of the
respondent on March 16, 1949.
This
decree was
challenged by the appellant by preferring an appeal
before the District Court and a second appeal before
the High Court at Calcutta; but both those appeals
failed and the decree for ejectment passed by the trial
court was confirmed. Then followed sev'eral proceedings between the parties and the course of litigation
between them turned out to be protracted and tortuous.
Ultimately on May 22, 1953, the respondent filed an
execution case before
the First Additional Court,
Sealdah (Title Execution Case No. 34 of 1953). By
this application the respondent claimed
that the
possession of the property covered by the decree should
be delivered to him. Thereupon the appellant field a
Miscellaneous Judicial Case under s. 47 of Code of
Civil Procedure in the court raising several objections
to the decree-holder's claimforexecution(Miscellaneous
1957
Kanai Lal Sur
v.
Pararnnidhi
Sadhukhan
362
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
Judicial Case No. 96 of 1953). This case was dismissed
by the executing court on February 2, 1954. A miscellaneous appeal preferred by the appellant before the
learned District Judge, 24-Parganas, as well as the
second miscellaneous appeal preferred by him before
the High Court at Calcutta were likewise dismissed.
The appellant then applied for leave to prefer an
appeal under the Letters Patent.
This application
was rejected by Mr. Justice Renupada Mukerjee who
had heard the second appeal. On May 10, 1955, the
appellant filed a petition for special leave to appeal to
this Court and special leave was granted to him on
May 18, 1955. The courts below have held that the
decree-holder's application for execution of the decree
passed in his favour can and ought to be entertained
by the civil courts and an order has been
passed
against the appellant that he should vacate the
premises in question before the end of Jaistha 1362 B.S.
(15th June, 1955), failing which execution will proceed
according to law. The appellant's contention is that the
view taken by the courts below about the competence
of the civil courts to entertain the decree-holder's
execution application proceeds on a mis-construction
of s. 5 (1) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. That
is how the only question which arises for our decision is
about the construction of the said relevant section.
Before dealing with this point, it would be useful to
consider briefly the history of legislation passed by the
West Bengal Legislature with the object of affording
protection to the thika tenants. Until 1948 the rights
and liabilities of the landlords and their thika tenants
were governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. On October 26, 1948, the Calcutta Thika
Tenancy Ordinance XI of 1948, was promulgated
because it was thought expedient, pending the enactment of appropriate
legislation to provide for the
temporary stay of the execution of certain decrees and
orders of ejectment of thika tenants in
Calcqtta.
Section 2 of the Ordinance defined the thika tenant.
Section 3 provided that no decree or order for the ejectment of a thika tenant shall be executed during the
continuance in operation of the Ordinance. From the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
363
operation of this section were excluded
decrees or
1957
orders for ejectment passed against thika tenants on · Kanai Lal Sur
the ground of non-payment of rent unless the tenants
Para~;nidhi
deposited in court the amount of the decree J.>r order
sadhukhan
as required by the proviso. The object of the Ordi- G . c1i
dk
J
nance clearly appears to be to give protection to the a}en raga ar
.
thika tenants in Calcutta and to afford them interim
relief by staying execution of certain decrees and
orders as mentioned in s. 3 until an appropriate Act
was passed by the Legislature in that behalf.
Then followed Act II of 1949 on February 28, 1-949.
Section 2, sub-s.
(5) of this Act defines a thika
tenant. Section 3 lays down the grounds on which a
thika tenant may be ejected. The effect of this section
is that it is only where one or more of the six grounds
recognized by s. 3 is proved against a thika tenant that
a decree for ejectment against him can be passed.
In
other words, grounds other than those mentioned in
s. 3 on which a landlord would have been entitled to
eject his thika tenant under the provisions
of the
Transfer of Property Act became inapplicable to the
case of the thika tenants by virtue of s. 3. Section 5,
sub-s. (1) reads thus:
"S. 5. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force, a landlord
wishing to eject a thika tenant on one or more of the
grounds specified in section 3 shall apply in the prescribed manner to the Controller for an order in that
behalf and, on receipt of such applfoation, the Controller shall, after giving the thika tenant a notice to show
cause within thirty days from the date of service of
the notice why the application shall not be allowed
and after making an inquiry in the prescribed manner
either allow the application or reject it after recording
the reasons for making such order, and, if he allows
the application, shall make an order directing the thika
tenant to vacate the holding and, subject to the provisions of section 10, to put the landlord in possession
thereof."
This section requires the landlord wishing to eject
his thik a tenant on one or more of the grounds specified
in s. 3 to apply in the prescribed manner to the Contro47
1957
A.·a11ai Lal Sur
v.
Paramnidhi
Sadhukhan
l1ojendragadkar J.
364
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
lier for an order in that behalf. This section further provides for the procedure to be followed by the Controller
in dealing with such an application. Two other sections
of this Act need to be considered. Section 28 deals
with cases where decrees or orders for the recovery
of possession of any holding from a thika tenant have
been passed before the date of the commencement of
the Act and it lays down that if possession has not
been obtained by the decree-holder in execution of
such decrees or orders the court may consider whether
the decree or order in question is or is not in conformity
with any of the provisions of the Act other than subs. (I) of s. 5 or s. 27. On considering this matter juridiction is given to the curt to rescind or vary the decree
or the order for the purpose of giving effect to the
relevant provisions of this Act. A decree or order so
varied has then to be sent to the Controller for
execution as if it were an order made under and in
accordance with the provisions of the Act.
Having
thus dealt with decrees and orders for ejectment passed
against thika tenants prior to the commencement of
this Act, s. 29 proceeds to deal with pending proceedings for ejectment between the landlords and the thika
tenants.
This
section lays down that all pending
proceedings of this character shall be transferred to
the Controller who shall thereupon deal with them in
accordance with the provisions of this Act as if this
Act had been in operation of the date of the institution
of the suit or proceeding. The proviso to this section
exempts the application of s. 4 of this Act to such
proceedings for obvious reasons.
.
It appears that the definition of the expression
"thika tenant" contained in the Act gave rise to some
difficulties and it was discovered that some of the
tenants in Calcutta
who were in substance
thika
tenants failed to obtain the protection of the Act owing
to some words used in the said definition.
In order to
afford protection to the whole class of thika tenants in
Calcutta, West Bengal Ordinance No. XV of 1952 was
promulgated on October 21, 1952. Accordingly. s. 2
of this Ordinance amended s.2, sub-s. (5) of the Calcutta
Thika Tenancy Act II of 1949. This is one important
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
365
change introduced by this Ordinance.
The other
1957
important change introduced by this Ordinance is to Kanai Lal s'!'
be found ins. 5 of the Ordinance. Section 5. sub-s. (I)
Para~idhi
lays down that all cases pending before a court or
Sadhukhan
Controller on the date of the commencement of this G . nd -;;;ik
J
Ordinance shall be governed by the provisions of Act II aJe
rag
0
'
•
of 1949, as amended by this Ordinance. Sub-section (2)
of s. 5 then deals with cases where decrees or orders
have been passed for the recovery of possession at any
time between the commencement of the said Act and
this Ordinance. In the present appeal we are dealing
with a decree falling under s. 5. sub-s. (2) of this
Ordinance. In respect of such decrees this sub-section
lays down that the judgment-debtor could apply within
three months of the commencement of the ordinance
to the court or the Controller as the case may be and
invite his decision on the question of his status as
thika tenant; according to the provisions of this subsection; the status of the judgment-debtor as a thika
tenant would then have to be determined under the
amended definition of the expression "thika tenant".
If the finding on the question of status is in favour of
the judgment-debtor then the decree or order would
have to
be set aside and execution
proceedings
annulled, and the matter sent back to the court or
Controller for disposal in acGordance with law. Subsection (3) of s. 5 enables the court or the Controller to
stay proceedings, if any, in execution pending the
disposal of an application made under .sub-s. (2). In
other words, the effect of sub-s. (2) 9f s. 5 clearly
appears to be that, in regard to decrees passed during
the period mentioned by this sub-section, a judgmentdebtor was given a right to challenge the validity of
the said decree or order on the ground that he was a
thika tenant under the amended definition of the said
expression and this right could be exercised by making
and appropriate application within the prescribed
period of three months. If no such application is
made by the judgment-debtor within the prescribed
period, then the decree or order for ejectment passed
against him would be executed under the ordinary
law.
1957
K!fnai Lal Sur
v.
Paramnidhi
Sadhukhan
1.1aje11dragadkar J.
366
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958J
This Ordinance was followed by the Calcutta Thika
Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1953 (West Bengal VI of
1953). This Act came into force immediately on the
Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1952
(West Bengal Ordinance No. XV or 1952), ceasing to
operate. Under the proviso to s. J, sub-s. (2) of this
Act, the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy
Act II of 1949, as amended by this Act, shall also
apply and be deemed to always
apply to all suits,
appeals and proceedings pending before any court or
before the Controller or before a person deciding an
appeal under s. 27 of this Act on the date of the
commencement of the said
Ordinance of I 952.
It
must, however, be added that this proviso was subject
to the provisions of s. 9 of this Act. We will presently
refer to s. 9. Section of 2 this Act adopted the amendment of the definition of the
expression, "thika
tenancy" introduced by the amending Ordinance of
1952. Section 4 of this amending Act has amended
s. 5, sub-s. (1) of the original Act by deleting the
words
~'.but subject · to the provisions of s.
28"
which occurred in the said section. By s. 8 of this
Act, ss. 28 and 29 in the original Act II of 1949 have
been omitted and by s. 9 it is laid down that any
proceedings commenced under sub-s. (2) of s. 5 of the
amending Ordinance of 1952
shall,
on the said
Ordinance ceasing to operate be continued as if sub-ss.
(2), (3) and (4) of that section and the explanations to
that section were in force. It would thus appear that
though the ordinance ceased to be operative the
remedy provided by s. 5, sub-s. (2) of the Ordinance to
judgment-debtors continued to be available to them
and the applications made by them to seek the
protection of the said provision had to be dealt with
as if the material provisions of the Ordinance were
in operation. It is true that s. 9. of the amending
Act has not been incorporated in the original Act II
of 1949 but it is conceded that the omission ,to include
this section in the original Act does not make any
difference.
Mr. N. C.
Chatterjee, for the
appellant,
has
contt;nded that the object in enacting the relevant
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
367
Thika Tenancy Acts
and Ordinances is absolutely
1957
clear. It is a piece of welfare legislation and as sucfi
Kanai Lal Sur
its operative provisions should receive a . beneficent
Para'/;,nidhi
construction from the courts. If the scheme of the
sadhukhan
Act an~ the ohbjecht"k underlying it isMto aCfthord
run Gaje11dragadkar J.
protection to t e t 1 a tenants, says
r.
atterJee,
courts should be slow to reach the conclusion that any
class of thika tenants are excluded from the benefit of
the
said
Act. In
support
of his argument
Mr. Chatterjee has naturally relied on the observations
made by Barons of the Exchequer in Heydon's case (1).
Indeed these observations have been so frequently
cited with approval by courts administering provisions
of welfare enactments that they have now attained
the status of a classic on the subject and their validity
cannot be challenged.
However, in applying these
observations to the provisions of any statute, it must
always be borne in mind that the first and primary
rule of construction is that the intention of the
Legislature must be found in the words used by the
Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of
one construction only then it would not be open to the
courts to. adopt any other hypothetical construction
on the ground that such hypothetical construction is
more consistent with the alleged object and policy of
the Act. The words used in the material provisions.
of the statute must be interpreted in their plain
grammatical meaning and it is only when such words.
are capable of two constructions that the question of
giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can
legitimately arise.
When the material words are
capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to
defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other
construction is likely to assist the achievement of the
said poi.icy, then the courts would prefer to adoptthe
latter construction. It is only in such cases that it
becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect
which
the Act purports to remedy and correct.
Indeed Mr. Chatterjee himself fairly conceded that he
would not be justified in asking the court to put an
undue strain on the words used in the section in order
(1) (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 8.
368
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
that a construction favourable to the thika tenants
i<anai Lal Sur should be deduced. It is in the eight of this legal
Par;;,,,.w,;
position that we must now consider s.5, sub-s. (I) of
Sadliukhan
West Bengal Act II of 1949,
amended
by
West
r. . a,--;,,,k 1 Bengal Act VI of 1953 .
. ~aien ra~
ar ·
Under the provision of ss. 5 and 28 of the original
West Bengal Act II of 1949, the position was clear.
If a landlord wished to eject his tenant he could have
obtained an order for ejectment only if his claim was
justified on one or more of the grounds recognized by
s. 3 of the Act. If, after the commencement of the
Act, the landlord wanted to enforce his claim for
ejectment, he had to apply for the said relief before
the Controller under s. 5 in the prescribed manner.
The application of s. 5, sub-s. (I) was, however,
subject to the provisions of s. 28. As we have already
pointed out, s. 28 dealt with decrees or orders already
passed whereas s. 29 dealt with suits and proceedings
pending
at the commencement of the
Act.
The
appellant's contention is that the effect of ss. 5, 28
and 29 was to submit the claims of landlords for ejectment of the thika tenants to a scrutiny in the light of
the provisions of s. 3 and other relevant sections of
the Act. Whether the claim had merged in a decree
or was pending in a proceeding at the time when the
Act came into force or it was made after the commencement of the Act, in every case the test laid down
by s. 3 had to be applied; and the argument is that
this position is not altered by the amendments made
by Act. VI of 1953. In our opinion this argument
cannot be accepted. Section 3 clearly refers to the
claim for ejectment made by the landlord in a proceeding instituted by him: It is difficult to understand
how s. 3 could be invoked against a landlord who has
-0btained a decree for ejectment of his thika tenant. It
is quite plain that when a decree-holder seeks to obtain
possession of his property in execution of a decree he
cannot be said to obtain such possession on any of the
grounds mentioned in. s. 3. All that he does is to rely
upon the decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction and to insist upon its execution. Similarly the
proceedings contemplated by s. 5, sub-s. (1), cannot in
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
369
our opinion , be said to include execution proceedings
1957
of this
ty.l?e. Section- 5, sub-s. (1) deals with cases
Kanai Lal Sur
where the landlord initiates original proceedings for
Parav,;,,,idhi
ejecting his thika tenant.' This sub-section refers to a
sadhukhan
landlord wishing to eject a thika tenant on one or G . l-dk 1
more of the grounds specified in s. 3. Now this desa;emraga ar •
cription is wholly inapplicable to a landlord who holds
a decree for ejectment in his favour. That is why we
feel no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that landlords who have obtained decrees of ejectment against
their thika tenants cannot be required to apply under
the provisions of s. 5, sub-s. (1) of the Act. That is one
aspect
of the matter. The other provisions of the
said sub-section also point to the same conclusion.
When an application for ejectment is made under s. 5,
sub-s. (1 ), notice is ordered to be issued to the thika
tenant and enquiry follows in the light of the provision of s. 3. It is only if the Controller is satisfied
that one or more of the grounds recognized by s. 3 is
proved by the landlord that an order for ejectment
would be passed by him and this order would be
followed by a direction in consequence of which the
landlord would be put in possession of the premises.
Section 5, sub-s. (1) thus provides for a self-contained
procedure for dealing with applications for ejectment
made by a landlord against his thika tenant before
the Controller.
Mr. Chatterjee, however, suggests that the deletion
of the words "subject to the provisions of s. 28" which
originally occurred in s. 5 indicates that the Controller
has been given jurisdiction not only to
entertain
original applications for ejectment made by the landlords but also to deal with decrees already passed in
their favour. Whether or not the use of the deleted
words in the original s. 5 (1) served any useful purpose
and what exactly was their denotation are matters on
which. it is unnecessary to pronounce a judgment in
the present case. It is clear that since s. 28 along
with s. 29 has been deleted from the Act by the subseqmmt amending Act VI of 1953, any.reference to s. 28
in s. 5 (1) would have been entirely out of place. But
the deletion of the material words does not enlarge the
M2SC/61-5
370
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
[1958]
1957
jurisdiction of the Controller to reopen disputes bctKanai Lal sur ween the landlords and their thika tenants when in
v.
respect of such disputes decrees have already been
~~'dh.:J:~'!
passed by courts of competent jurisdiction in favour of
. -
landlords. All the relevant provisions of s. 5, sub-s. (I)
Ga1endragadkar 1· are absolutely inapplicable to cases of such decrees
and so we are unable to accept the argument that even
where a decree has been passed in favour of the landlord a claim for the execution of the decree would have
to be entertained and considered by the Controller
under s. 5, sub-s. (!).
Then it is urged that it would be unreasonable to
hold that a certain class ofthika tenants was precluded
from obtaining the benefit of the Act merely because
decrees for ejectment were passed before the Act came
into force; and it is emphasised that the scheme of the
original Act as evidenced by ss. 5, 28 and 29 clearly
was to afford protection to all thika tenants even
where decrees for ejectment had been passed against
them. It must be conceded that under the original
Act, s. 28 purported to give protection to judgmentdebtors and required that the decrees passed against
thika tenants should be examined by the courts that
passed the decrees in the light of the provisions of the
Thika Tenancy Act. But, later on, it appears to have
been thought prudent to limit the protection to such
judgment-debtors in the manner contemplated by s. 5,
sub-s. (2) of the amending Ordinance of 1952. Such
jud~ent-debtors were allowed liberty to apply for
setting aside the decrees passed against them within
three months after the commencement of the said
Ordinance and such applications were required to be
dealt with according to Jaw even after the Ordinance
ceased to be operative. As we have already pointed
out, the decree with which we are concerned in the
present appeal falls within the purview of the provision
of s. 5, sub-s. (2) of the Ordinance. If the judgmentdebtor did not avail himself of the right conferred on
him by this provision, he cannot now seek to rectify
the omission by relying
on the provisions of s. 5,
sub-s. (I) as amended. It may be unfortunate that
owing to the steps that he was taking in several
S.C.R. SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
371
proceedings adopted by him in the present litigation
1957
he was probably not advised to make a proper appliKanai Lal Sur
cation under s .. 5. sub-s .. (2) of the Ordinance; but that
Para';;;nidhi
is the only protection that he and judgment-debtors of
sadhukhan
his class were entitled to after the amending Ordinance c . d-dk J
of 1952 came into force. It would, therefore, not be
a,en raga
ar .
reasonable to complain that no protection whatever
has been given to this .class of thika tenants. It may
be that the extent of the protection now afforded to
this class may not be as wide as it originally was
under s. 28 of Act II .of 1949 but the deletion of s. 28
clearly indicates that the Legislature wanted to revise
its policy in this matter. The position, therefore, is
that the conclusion which follows from a reasonable
construction of s. 5, sub-s. (1) is corroborated by the
"deletion of s. 28 from the Act and by the provision of
s. 5, sub-s. (2) of the amending Ordinance of 1952 and
s. 9 of the amending Act VI of 1953. We must,
accordingly, hold that the Calcutta High Court was
right in rejecting the appellant's argument that civil
courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the execution
petition filed by the respondent against the appellant.
Jn the result, the appeal fails and must be dismissed
with costs.
·
Appeal dismissed.
THE COUNClL OF THE INSTITUTE OF
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF
INDIA & ANOTHER·
1'.
B. MUKHERJEA
(BHAGWATI, S.K. DAS and GAJENDRAGADKAR, JJ.)
Chartered Accou11(ant-Misco11d11ct during appoimment as
liquidator by
Court-~/' amounts to prof'essional . misconductReference-Po\l'er ff' High Court-Chartered Acco1111ta11ts Act, 1949
(XXXV/JI of 1949) s.1·. 2(2), 21 and 22.
Respondent, a chartered accountant and a member of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants.
was appointed liquidator of
three insurance companies in pursuance of the orders of the High
1957
September 10