# September 17. Appeal dismissed. MANGOO SINGH v. THE ELECTION TRIBUNAL, BAREILL Y AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 418
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-02-03
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1957
- **Bench:** Bhagwati, S.K. Das, Gajendragadkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/september-17-appeal-dismissed-mangoo-singh-v-the-election-tribunal-bareill-y-1471
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Election
dispute-Municipal election-Disqualification
for
membership-Arrears of tax-Payment after nomination but before
po/1-"For being chosen as", "D8fnand", meaning of-U. P. Municipalities ·Act, 1916 (U. P. ll of 1916), ss. 13-D, cl. (g), 166, 168U. P. Municipalities (Condcuct of Election of Members) Order, 1953,
para. 22(2).
The appellant was elected to the Municipal Board under the
U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. He was in arrears in the payment
of Municipal tax in excess of one year's demand, to which s. 166
of the Act applied, at the time of the filing of nominations, but
made the payment before the date of the poll. Under section 130,
cl. (g) of the Act "a person shall be disqualified for being chosen
as, and for being a member of a board if he is in arrears in the
payment of Municipal tax or other dues in excess of one year's
demand to which s. 166 applies, provided that the disqualification
shall cease as soon as the arrears are paid." On an election ·petition filed by a defeated candidate, the election was set aside by
the Election Tribunal on the ground that the appellant was not
entitled to the benefit of the proviso to s. 13-D, cl. (g) of the Act.
It was contended for the appellant that the relevant date for the
operation of the disqualification was the date of the poll and that
in any case, he did not come within the mischief of the disqualification clause in that section, as a bill for payment of the tax was
not presented to him, nor a notice of demand served on him under
s. 168.
.
Held : (1) that if a person is disqualified on the date of nomination, he cannot be chosen as a candidate within the meaning of
s. 13-D of the U.P. Municipalities Act. 1916, because the disqualification attaches to him on that date and the process of choosing
consist of a series of steps starting with nomination and ending
with the announcement of the election, The wiping off of the
S.C.R.
SUPEREME COURT REPORTS
419
disqualification has no retrospective effect, and the disqualifica1957
tion which subsisted on the date of the nomination cannot cease to
Mangoo Singh
subsist on that day by reason .of a. subsequent .payment of the
v.
arrears of Municipal tax.
•
Th• Ekction
•
·
·
·
Tribunal, Bareilly
ChatturbhuJ Vltha/das Jasam v. Moreshwar Parashram and
and Others
Others, (1954) S.C.R. 817, N. P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning
Officer, Namakka/ Constitutency and Others, (1952) S.C.R: 218 and
Harford v. Linskey, (1899) I Q. B. 852, relied on.
Ahmed Hossain v.
Aswini Kumar, A.I.R. 1953
Cal. 542,
approved.
(2) that the expression "to which s. 166 applies" in s. 13-D,
d. (g) of the Act merely describes the nature or type of dues
mentioned in tha~ section and that the effect is that the demand
referred to in s. 13-D cl. (g) must be of that nature or type.
(3) that the word "demand" in s. 13-D, cl. (g) of the Act
means "claim" or "due" and only refers to the amount of arrears
or dues on which the disqualification depends and does not attract
the operation of s. 168.

## Text

418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1958
1957
of this case.
The erroneous view that the learned
Bakshish Singh Sessions Judge took of the dying declaration and of
Tile srat:·of Punjab the oral evidence were compelling enough reasons for
-
the reversal of that judgment.
Ka~r~
,
We therefore dismiss this appeal.
1957
September 17.
Appeal dismissed.
MANGOO SINGH
v.
THE ELECTION TRIBUNAL, BAREILL Y
AND OTHERS
(BHAGWATI, S.K. DAS and GAJENDRAGADKAR; JJ.)
Election
dispute-Municipal election-Disqualification
for
membership-Arrears of tax-Payment after nomination but before
po/1-"For being chosen as", "D8fnand", meaning of-U. P. Municipalities ·Act, 1916 (U. P. ll of 1916), ss. 13-D, cl. (g), 166, 168U. P. Municipalities (Condcuct of Election of Members) Order, 1953,
para. 22(2).
The appellant was elected to the Municipal Board under the
U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. He was in arrears in the payment
of Municipal tax in excess of one year's demand, to which s. 166
of the Act applied, at the time of the filing of nominations, but
made the payment before the date of the poll. Under section 130,
cl. (g) of the Act "a person shall be disqualified for being chosen
as, and for being a member of a board if he is in arrears in the
payment of Municipal tax or other dues in excess of one year's
demand to which s. 166 applies, provided that the disqualification
shall cease as soon as the arrears are paid." On an election ·petition filed by a defeated candidate, the election was set aside by
the Election Tribunal on the ground that the appellant was not
entitled to the benefit of the proviso to s. 13-D, cl. (g) of the Act.
It was contended for the appellant that the relevant date for the
operation of the disqualification was the date of the poll and that
in any case, he did not come within the mischief of the disqualification clause in that section, as a bill for payment of the tax was
not presented to him, nor a notice of demand served on him under
s. 168.
.
Held : (1) that if a person is disqualified on the date of nomination, he cannot be chosen as a candidate within the meaning of
s. 13-D of the U.P. Municipalities Act. 1916, because the disqualification attaches to him on that date and the process of choosing
consist of a series of steps starting with nomination and ending
with the announcement of the election, The wiping off of the
S.C.R.
SUPEREME COURT REPORTS
419
disqualification has no retrospective effect, and the disqualifica1957
tion which subsisted on the date of the nomination cannot cease to
Mangoo Singh
subsist on that day by reason .of a. subsequent .payment of the
v.
arrears of Municipal tax.
•
Th• Ekction
•
·
·
·
Tribunal, Bareilly
ChatturbhuJ Vltha/das Jasam v. Moreshwar Parashram and
and Others
Others, (1954) S.C.R. 817, N. P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning
Officer, Namakka/ Constitutency and Others, (1952) S.C.R: 218 and
Harford v. Linskey, (1899) I Q. B. 852, relied on.
Ahmed Hossain v.
Aswini Kumar, A.I.R. 1953
Cal. 542,
approved.
(2) that the expression "to which s. 166 applies" in s. 13-D,
d. (g) of the Act merely describes the nature or type of dues
mentioned in tha~ section and that the effect is that the demand
referred to in s. 13-D cl. (g) must be of that nature or type.
(3) that the word "demand" in s. 13-D, cl. (g) of the Act
means "claim" or "due" and only refers to the amount of arrears
or dues on which the disqualification depends and does not attract
the operation of s. 168.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
8 of 1957.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated the 30th
August, 1955, of the Allahabad High Court in SpeCial
Appeal No.8 of f955 arising out of the Judgment and
order dated the lOth December, 1954, of the ·Single
Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ
No. 1245 of 1954.
R.S. Narula,, for the appellant.
B.B. Tawa~ley and K. P. Gupta, for the respondent.
1957. September 17. The following Judgmc-nt of
the court was delivered by
·
S.K. DAs, J.-This appeal has been preferred to .this
s. K. Das J.
Court on the strength of a certificate granted by the
High Court of Allahabad on February 3, 1956, to the
effect that the case is a fit one for appeal to the
Supreme Court under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. The question that falls for 4ecision is the true
scope, meaning and effect of cl. (g) of s. 13-D of the
U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (U.P. II of 1916), hereinafter referred to as the Act.
The relevant facts, which are not now in dispute, are
these. There was a general election to the Municipal
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
1957
Board of Bareilly in October, 1953. The appellant,.
Mangoo Singh Mangoo Singh, and respondent No.3, Jmdad Husain,.
Thl! ;;ectlon
along with. several others, were candidates at the said
Tribunal, Bareilly election from Ward No. 15. The date fixed for filing
and Others
nominations was October 5, 1953, and the date for
s. K. Das J.
scrutiny of the nominations filed was October 7, 1953.
The appe11ant and respondent No. 3 both filed their
nominations on the due date, and at the time of scrutiny
Imdad Husian raised an objection to the nomination
of the appellant on ·the ground that the latter was
disqualifi~d under cl. (g) of s. 13-D of the Act for
being chosen as a member of the said Municipal Board
because he was in arrears in the payment of municipal
tax in excess of one year's demand. This objection
was dismissed, and the nomination of the appellant
was accepted by the Assistant Returning Officer. The
poll took place on October 26, 1953 and the counting
of votes was done on October 29, 1953. Four persons
were to be elected from the said Ward, and the appellant was the third in the list by reason of the number
of votes which he had obtained.
lmdad Husain was
fifth in the list. Accordingly, the appellant was declared as one of the returned candidates, and lmdadl
Husian was at the top of the unsuccessful candidates ..
Imdad Husain then filed an election ·petition to set
aside the election of the present appellant on various.
grounds. The only grounds with which we are now
concerned is the disqualification under cl. (g) of s.l3-D
of the Act. This election petition was heard by the
Election Tribunal and by its judgment dated October
20, 1954, the Election Tribunal held that the appellant
was in arrears in the payment of municipal tax in
excess of one year's demand to which s. 166 of the
Act applied and, therefore, came under the disqualification in cl. (g) of s. 13-D of the Act. It further held
that the payment of a sum of Rs. 115-3-0 on October
10, 1953, five days after the date fixed for the filing of
nominations, did not wipe off that disqualification, and
the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the
second proviso to s. 13-D of the Act. It may be here
stated that the Election Tribunal also held that no bill
for payment of the tax was presented to the appellant
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
as required by s. 166, nor was any demand notice
t9S7
-served on him as required by s. 168 of the Act. On Mangoo Singh
the. 3:bove findi!Jgs, the Trib?nal aHowed the election
The Eiection
petition, set aside the electron of the appellant and Tribunal, Bareilly
declared a casual vacancy under cl. (a) of sub-s. (2) of
and Others
s. 25 of the Act, which vacancy was subsequent])
s. K. Das :1.
, filled up by the election of the third respondent on
April 5, 1955.
The next general election in the
Municipality is due in October, 1957.
Against the decision of the Election Tribunal, the
appellant moved the High Court of Allahabad for the
issue of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The
main point urged by the appellant was that the Election Tribunal was in error in its interpretation of
cl. (g) of s. 13-D of the Act. Chaturvedi J. who dealt
with the application of the appellant, agree with the
view of the law as expressed .by the Election Tribunal
and dismissed the application.
The appellant then
preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of the said
High Court.
This appeal
was aJso dismissed by
Agarwala and Sahai JJ. by their judgment dated
August 30, 1955.
The appellant then moved and
obtained a certificate of fitness under Art. 133(1) (c) of
the Constitution from the said High Court.
Learned counsel for the appellant has not contested
any of the findings of fact arrived at by the Election
Tribunal and has confined his submissions to the
question of the true construction of cl. (g) of s. 13-D
of the Act.
Therefore, it is nece~sary to read that
section in so far as it is relevant for our purpose:
"13-D. Disqualifications for membership.- A person,
notwithstanding that he is otherwise qualified, shall
be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a ·
member of a board if he-
( a) ..... .. . .. .. . .. .... . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . ... ... .
(cb)) .... . .... .. ...... . . ..... . ........... . .... .
(
.... ... .. .. ... ... .......... .............. .
(d) ..................... . ... . ..... · . . ... . ... . .
(e) ..... . ............. . .. . . . .... ... . ........ .
(f) . ........•......... . ... . .. .... . . . .........
1957
Mangoo Singh
v.
The Election
Tribunal, Bareilly
and Others
S. K. Das J.
422
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958)
(g) is in arrears in the payment of municipal tax or
other dues in excess of one year's demand to which
section 166 applies:
Provided further that in the case of (g) the disqualification shaH cease as soon as the arrears are
paid."
The first contention of learned counsel for the appellant relates to and arises out of the expression "for
being chosen as" occurring in the section. The argument is this. It is submitted that a person is "chosen
as a member of a board" when the poll takes place
and a majority of voters vote for him as their chosen
candidate; therefore, the relevant date for the operation of the disqualification is the date of the poll, and
inasmuch as on October 10, 1953, which was several
days before the date of the poll, the appellant was n()
longer in arrears of municipal tax in excess of one
year's demand by reason of the payment made on
that date, the disqualification did not attach to him
on the d~e of the poll. We are unable to accept this
argument. It is worthy of note that an identical
expression ~'shall be disqualified for being chosen as"
occurs in Art. 102 of the Constitution and s. 7 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951. This expression occurring in s. 7 of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951,
was~considered by this Court in
Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Para3hram
and Others(~). In that case the question was when the
disqualification mentioned in cl. (d) of s. 7 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, arose and it
was held that the date for putting in the nominations.
was one of the crucial dates. On this point, the foltow-
·ing observations made in that case are apposite:
"Now the words of the section are "shall be
disqualified for being chosen". The choice is made by
a series of steps starting with the nomination and
ending with the announcement of the election. It
follows that if a disqualification
attaches to a
candidate at any one of these stages, he cannot be
chosen."
(•) [1954] S.C.R. 817, 821.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
423
It wasApointed out in N.P. Ponnuswami v. The Returnt957
ing Ojftcer, Namakka/ Constituency and Others(!) that Mangoo Sing/1
'election' is a continuous process consisting of several
.
v.
d
b
·
f h' h
·
·
The Election
stages an em racmg many steps o w 1c nommat10n Tribunal &reilly
is one; nomination is the foundation of a candidate's
and Others
right to go to the polls and must be treated as an
S. K. Das J.
integral part of the election. If a person is disqualified
on the date of nomination, he cannot be chosen as a
candidate because the -disqualification mentioned in
s. 13-D attaches to him on that .date.
This is also clear from para. 22(2) of the U .P.
Municipalities (Conduct of Election of Members)
Order, 1953, That sub-para. states-
"22(2)-The Returning Officer shall then examine
the nomination papers and shall decide all objections,
which may be made to any nomination, and may,
either on such objection or on his own motion, after
such suinmary inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary,.
refuse any nomination on any ofth~ following grounds:
(a) that the candidate is not qualified to be
chosen to fill the seat under the Act; or
(b) that the candidate is disqualified for being
chosen to fill the seat under the Act; or
(c) that there has been any failure to comply
with any of the provisions of paras. 16 and 17; or
(d) that the signature of the· candidate. or any·
proposer or seconder is not genuine or has been
·obtained by fraud."
If the disqualification of cl. (g) of s. 13-D of the Act iS.
to come into operation only on the day of the poll,
then it is quite unnecessary for the Returning Officer
to consider that disqualification at the time of
scrutiny; and indeed it will be improper for him to
refuse nomination on the ground of such disqualification. Clause (b) of para. 22(2) uses the same expres-·
sion "disqualified for being chosen"-showing clearly
enough that the starting point of the act of choosing
is not on the date of the poll only. The process of
choosing commences on the date of filing nominations.
(t) [1952] S.C.R. 218.
424
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
!957
We now tum to the second proviso to s. 13-D. The
Mangoo
Si~rgll submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that,
orr
Evl. 1.
as Stated in the proviso, the disqualification is transient
J rl~
~C /On
•
Tribrmnt, Bareilly and ceases to operate as soon as the arears are patd ;
arzd Others
on October 10, _1953, the appellant was no longer
s. K. Das J.
disqualified and, therefore, he could be chosen on the
date of the poll, that is, on October 26, 1953.
The
argument is that in the case of such a transient disqualification, the second proviso must be so read as to
mean that a disqualification subsisting on the day of
nomination can be wiped off completely by subsequent
payment of arrears of tax; otherwise a disqualification
at the time of nomination will disentitle a person to
stand for election; even though it ceases to operate
before the day of the poll.
This argument also we
cannot accept as correct; it is really the first argument in a different form.
The wiping off of the
disqualification under the second proviso has no
retrospective effect,
and the disqualification which
subsisted on the day of filing nominations did not
cease to subsist on that day by reason of a subsequent
payment of the arrears of municipal tax.
On this
point
we accept as correct the view expressed in
Ahmed Hossain v. Aswini Kumar (1), where a similar
question under the Bengal Municipal Act (Ben. XV
of 1932), fell for consideration. The question was if a
person disqualified on the date of nomination could
shake off his pre-existing disqualification by acquiring
a new right between the date of nomination and thedate of scrutiny. What happened in that case was
this: on the material date, that is, the last date for
submission of nominations, a person was in arrears for
more than three months in payment ·of the tax which
he was liable to pay, and he came within the mischief
of cl. (g) of amended s. 22(1) of the Bengal Municipal
Act. The contention was that the name of the Press
of which the candidate was the proprietor and not his
name was recorded in the books of the Municipality as
the assessee and that the name of the candidate was
in the electoral roll by reason of his educational qualifications, This contention was repelled and it was
(1) A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 542.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
observed that if a person was disqualified on the date
1957
of the nomination, he could not shake off his preMangoo s;,11h
existing disqualification by acquiring a new right
<r'
Evl. 1• ,
b
h d
f
.
.
d
h d
f
, tze
ec 101
etween t e
ate o nommatlon an
t e
ate o
Tribu11al, Bareilly
scrutiny. There is also other judicial authority which
aad Others
supports the same view. In Harford v. Linskey(!), a
s. K. Das J.
similar question arose for decision under the Municipal
Corporations A~t, 1882, s. 12 whereof enacted that '~a
person shall be disqualified for being elected and for
being a councillor" if and while he is interested in
-contracts with the Corporation.
The petitioner in
that case admitted that at the time of his nomination
he was interested in contracts with the Corporation;
but contended that he could and would have got rid
of his disqualification before the day fixed for the poll,
and was therefore not disqualified for nomination.
The question was whether he was so disqualified.
Wright J. delivering the judgment of the Court
observed-
" In the absence of any guide, we think it safest
to hold that in cases of elections under the Municipal
Corporations Acts a person, who at the time of
nomination is disqualified for election in the manner
in which this petitioner was disqualified, is disqualified
also for nomination.
The nomination is for this
purpose an essential part of the election, and if there
are no competitors it of itself constitutes the election
by virtue of the express words of s. 56. A different
construction might .produce much confusion. On the
nomination day no ·one· could know whether the
persons nominated will at the poll be effective candidates or not. It is true that in the case put the
disqualification may be removed before the election is
completed, but what is to be the effect if the
disqualification continues until the poll begins, or
until the middle of the polling day, or until the close
of the poll ? Will votes given before the removal of the
disqualification be valid? If not, how is the number
of them to be ascertained? It seems to us unreasonable to hold that the Act means to leave the matter
in such a state of uncertainty, and for these reasons,
(1}(1899) I Q .B. 852, 858.
426
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[195&
1957
we think that this petitioner
was disqualified
for
Mangoo Singh nomination or election."
The mecrion
The same state of uncertainty and confusion, to which
Tribnnal, Bareilly a reference has been made in the aforesaid observaand Others
.
.11
·
'f h
·
h' h
1
d
twns, w1
anse 1 t e constructiOn w tc
earne
s. K. Das J.
counsel for the appellant has pressed for our aceeptance is adopted in the case before us.
Lastly, it has been argued on behalf of the appellant
that the expression 'to which s. 166 applies' in cl. (g)
of s. 13-D means that a bill of the sum due must be
presented to the person liable for it, as required by
that section, before he can come within ·the mischief
of the clause; furthermore, the use of tht! expression
'demand' makes it essential that a demand notice
must also be served as required by s. 168 of the Act.
As on the finding of the Election Tribunal neither a
bill was presented to the appellant, nor was he served
with a demand notice, learned counsel contends that
the appe1lant does not come within the mischief
of the clause.
Sections 166 and 168 are in these terms-
''S. 166. Presentation of bill-(1) As· soon as a
person becomes liable for the payment of-
(a) any sum on account of a tax, other than an
octroi or toll or any similar tax payable upon
immediate demand, or
(b) any sum payable under clause (c) of section
196 or section 229 or section 230 in respect of the
supply of water, or payable in respect of any other
municipal service or undertaking, or
(c) any other· sum declared by this Act
or
by rule (or bye-law) to be
recoverable
in the
manner provided by this chapter,
the board shall~
with all convenient speed, cause a bill to be presented
to· the persons so liable.
(2) Unless otherwise provided by rule, a person
shall be deemed to become liable for the payment of
every tax and licence fee upon the commencement of
the period in respect of which such tax or fee is payable".
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
427
"S. 168. Notice of demand.-If the sum for which
t957
a bill has been presented as aforesaid is not paid in Mangoo Singh·
municipal office,
or to a person empowered by
,..,,
Ev1•
•
1 .
·
}
· h'
fif
uU!
t!CfiOn
regu atwn to :receive sue 1 payments, Wlt m
teen Tribu11al, Btrrem,.
days from the presentation thereof, the board may
and Otlters
cat!se to be served upon the person liable for the
s. K. Das J.
payment of the said sum a notice of demand in the
form set forth in schedule IV, or to the like effect."
We are clearly of the view that the expression 'to
which s. 166 applies' cannot beat the meaning sought
to be given to it on behalf of the appellant.
That
expression merely describes the nature of the demand
refered to in cl. (g). Section 166 refers to three types
of dues; cl. (a) of sub-s. (I) refers to any sum on account
of a tax other than an octroi or toll or any' similar
tax payable upon immediate demand; cl. (b) refers sums
payable under ·cl. (c) of s. 196 or s. 229 or s. 230 in
respect of the supply of water, etc., and cl. (c) refers to
any other sum declared by the Act or by rule or byelaw to be recoverable in the manner
provided by
Chapter VI. The demand to which s. 166 applies
must be a demand of the nature or type mentioned in
one or other of the aforesaid three clauses, · ~nd the
demand referred to incl. (g) of s. 13-D must be of that
nature or type; this, in our view, is the true meaning
and effect of the expression 'to which s. 166 applies'.
Nor do we think that the word 'demand' attracts
the operation of s. 168. It .may be readily con~eded
that the word 'demand' ordinarily means something
more than what is due; it means something which has
'Qeen demanded, called for or asked for.
But the
meaning of a word musf take colour from the context
in which it is used. In cl. (g) the context in which the
word 'demand' is used has .a very obvious and clear
reference to the amount of arrears or dues on· which
the disqualification depends; therefore, the expression
used is-'arrears in the payment of municipal tax or
other dues in excess of one year's demand'. The word
'demand' in that contest and in the collocation of
words in which it has been used can only mean 'in
excess of one year's municipal tax or other dues'. We
have been referred to sevetal meanings of the word
55
428
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
1957
'demand' in standard English dictionaries and law
Mangoo Singh lexicons. When the context makes the meaning of a
The liection
word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for
Tdhunal, Bareilly and select a particular meaning out of the diverse
attrl Others
meanings a word is capable of, according to lexicoS. K. Das J.
1957
September 17.
graphers. It is sufficient for our purpose to state that
even in standard dictionaries and law lexicons, it is
weil recognised that the word 'demand' may mean
simply a 'claim' or 'due' without importing any further
meaning of caiJing upon the person liable to pay the
claim or due.
For the reasons given above, we hold that not one
of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant is
worthy. of a~ceptance.
The election petition was
rightly decided, as the appellant was disqualified for
being chosen as a member of the Municipal Board in
question on the day he filed his nomination, under
cl. (g) s. 13-D of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal is
dimissed with costs in favour of respondent 3 who
alone constested the appeal before us.
Appeal dismissed.
SUBRAMANIA GOUNDAN
v.
THE STATE OF MADRAS
(B.P. SINHA, GOVINDA MENON and J.L. KAPUR, JJ.)
Crfmina//aw-Retracted confession-Corroboration, requirement
of-Question by recording magistrate-If an inducement.
The appellant was charged with murder. The eye witnesses
against him were not relied upon. He made a confession before a
magistrate. One of the questions put by the magistrate to . the
appellant before recording the confession was : ·"For what pur~
pose are you going to make a statement ?" To this he replied,
"Others will be implicated in the case for murder, I alone have
committed murder." It was argued that an inducement was
given by the magistrate by the manner in which the question was
put. The next day after the murder "a drawer, a baniyan and a
bed~sheet", all stained with human blood were recovered from the
appellant, for which no explanation was given by him. The confession was retracted before the Court of Session. These recoveries