# SESHARATHAMMA v. MANIKYAMMA

- **Citation:** [1991] 3 S.C.R. 717
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1991-08-23
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 630 G of 1981
- **Bench:** N.M. Kasliwal, K. Ramaswamy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sesharathamma-v-manikyamma-11179
- **Pages:** 25

## Headnote

B
Hindu Succession Act, 1956--Section 14( 1), (2)-App/ication
and object of-Whether life estate of a widow under a will becomes
absolute estate.
Hindu Succession Act, 1956--Section 14( 1), (2)-ConstructionWhether retrospective-Acquisition of property by female HinduC
Methods-Widow's estate-L,0u1te's entitlement-Whether restrictive
cu1·en1111t stands as impedin1ent to section 14( /).
Will-Widow ·s estate-Resttictions--'-Right to maintenance-Pree.u;//ng right over the property-"Res ad rem'-Obliteration of testaD
111entar.J· succession with restrictive conditions w.e.f. 17.6.1956 by
i11!1llll Siiccesswn Act, 1956--Ejjecl of
C.A. 630 of 1981.
Plaintiff's case was that as the defendant and her husband had no E
issue they brought up the plaintiff as their foster son from the age of
eight years and thereafter the plaintiff continued to live with them and
was brought up treating him as their own son.
Defendant's husband died on 14.1.1932 and before his death he
executed a will beq\)eathing the suit properties in favour of his wife, for F
her life with a vested remainder in favour of the plaintiff.
Both the parties lived together with perfect understanding but
after some time there was misunderstanding and the defendant assumed
hostile attitude towards the plaintiff and began to claim the suit property as her absolute property.
G
· The plaintiff claimed absolute right in the suit properties after the
lifetime of the defendant and challenged the right of the defendant to
execute any will in respect of the suit properties.
The defem•e 1t look the plea that her husband died issueless and H
717
A
B
c
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991] 3 S.C.R.
intestate and did not .execnte any will at any time. Neither she nor her
hnsband brought up the plaintiff as their foster son nor did they educate
him. The defendant had brought up her nephew from his childhood and
performed his marriage. On account of love and affection for him and
his children, the defendant executed a registered will on 26.10.69
bequeathing all her properties in his favour.
The Trial Court held the will dated 14.1.1932 proved and decreed
the plaintiff's suit.
The First Appellate Court upheld the Judgment and decree of
theTrial Court.
The defendant preferred a second appeal in the High Court. Dur-.
ing the pendeocy of the Second Appeal in the High Court the plaintiff
died and his legal representatives were brought on record. The High
Court allowed the second appeal.
D
The legal representatives of the plaintiff came to this Coor! by
grant of Special Leave.
S.L.P. (C) No. 438/ 1979.
Married life between '0' and his wife, 'M' was not happy and
E
cordial. '0' executed a registered will dated 21.3.1921 bequeathing all
his properties including the suit properties in favour of his mother and
sister for their li.fetime and thereafter in favour of 'R' and 'D' -two sons
of his sister and their issues. In the said will reference was made regarding the conduct of 'M' in deserting him and in any event if she changed
her mind and agreed to live under the protection of the legatees she was
p
allowed to enjoy the income from item I of the suit properties and that
she should construct a house in item referred to in the will and to .live
there during her lifetime and after her death the said Item I and the
house site with the ho.use shall go to his sister's sons.
'0' died in 1922 and thereafter the legatees under the will entered
G
into possession of all the properties. 'M' put obstruction to the legatee~
in getting possession.
'M' filed a suit in 1923 praying for a declaration that the will made
by her husband was not valid and as such be cancelled and for possession
and mesne profits and in the alternative she claimed for maintenance
H
both past and future.
·~.
.·~.
l.
SESHARATHAMMA v. MANIKYAMMA
719
In the said suit the parties entered into a compromise and a compromise decree was passed on 5.3.1924.
A
U oder the terms of the said compromise the execution of the will
was accepted and the same was

## Text

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THOTA SESHARATHAMMA AND ANR.
v.
A
THOTA MANIKYAMMA (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS.
AUGUST 23, 1991
[N.M. KASLIWAL AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.]
B
Hindu Succession Act, 1956--Section 14( 1), (2)-App/ication
and object of-Whether life estate of a widow under a will becomes
absolute estate.
Hindu Succession Act, 1956--Section 14( 1), (2)-ConstructionWhether retrospective-Acquisition of property by female HinduC
Methods-Widow's estate-L,0u1te's entitlement-Whether restrictive
cu1·en1111t stands as impedin1ent to section 14( /).
Will-Widow ·s estate-Resttictions--'-Right to maintenance-Pree.u;//ng right over the property-"Res ad rem'-Obliteration of testaD
111entar.J· succession with restrictive conditions w.e.f. 17.6.1956 by
i11!1llll Siiccesswn Act, 1956--Ejjecl of
C.A. 630 of 1981.
Plaintiff's case was that as the defendant and her husband had no E
issue they brought up the plaintiff as their foster son from the age of
eight years and thereafter the plaintiff continued to live with them and
was brought up treating him as their own son.
Defendant's husband died on 14.1.1932 and before his death he
executed a will beq\)eathing the suit properties in favour of his wife, for F
her life with a vested remainder in favour of the plaintiff.
Both the parties lived together with perfect understanding but
after some time there was misunderstanding and the defendant assumed
hostile attitude towards the plaintiff and began to claim the suit property as her absolute property.
G
· The plaintiff claimed absolute right in the suit properties after the
lifetime of the defendant and challenged the right of the defendant to
execute any will in respect of the suit properties.
The defem•e 1t look the plea that her husband died issueless and H
717
A
B
c
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991] 3 S.C.R.
intestate and did not .execnte any will at any time. Neither she nor her
hnsband brought up the plaintiff as their foster son nor did they educate
him. The defendant had brought up her nephew from his childhood and
performed his marriage. On account of love and affection for him and
his children, the defendant executed a registered will on 26.10.69
bequeathing all her properties in his favour.
The Trial Court held the will dated 14.1.1932 proved and decreed
the plaintiff's suit.
The First Appellate Court upheld the Judgment and decree of
theTrial Court.
The defendant preferred a second appeal in the High Court. Dur-.
ing the pendeocy of the Second Appeal in the High Court the plaintiff
died and his legal representatives were brought on record. The High
Court allowed the second appeal.
D
The legal representatives of the plaintiff came to this Coor! by
grant of Special Leave.
S.L.P. (C) No. 438/ 1979.
Married life between '0' and his wife, 'M' was not happy and
E
cordial. '0' executed a registered will dated 21.3.1921 bequeathing all
his properties including the suit properties in favour of his mother and
sister for their li.fetime and thereafter in favour of 'R' and 'D' -two sons
of his sister and their issues. In the said will reference was made regarding the conduct of 'M' in deserting him and in any event if she changed
her mind and agreed to live under the protection of the legatees she was
p
allowed to enjoy the income from item I of the suit properties and that
she should construct a house in item referred to in the will and to .live
there during her lifetime and after her death the said Item I and the
house site with the ho.use shall go to his sister's sons.
'0' died in 1922 and thereafter the legatees under the will entered
G
into possession of all the properties. 'M' put obstruction to the legatee~
in getting possession.
'M' filed a suit in 1923 praying for a declaration that the will made
by her husband was not valid and as such be cancelled and for possession
and mesne profits and in the alternative she claimed for maintenance
H
both past and future.
·~.
.·~.
l.
SESHARATHAMMA v. MANIKYAMMA
719
In the said suit the parties entered into a compromise and a compromise decree was passed on 5.3.1924.
A
U oder the terms of the said compromise the execution of the will
was accepted and the same was made subject to the terms of the com-·
promise decree. Under the compromise decree it was agreed that ;M'
would enjoy items l & 2 of the properties mentioned in the will and also
B
SO cents of land during her lifetime. She would also have an enjoyment
of the house site during her lifetime without any right of alienation.
'D' died unmarried in 1930 but during his lifetime h.e sold his
interest in the properties in favour of'R', his brother, who died in 1962.
On his death the petitioners being his sons and daughters claimed to
have become entitled for all their father's properties including the
rights in the suit property. 'M' during her life time executed a settlement deed in favour of the respondents giving absolute rights in the suit
properties.
c
The petitioners filed a suit against M and the respondents for o
declaration that the settlement deed executed by 'M' will not enure
beyond the lifetime of 'M'. 'M' took the plea that the limited interest
given to her under the compromise decree had become enlarged into
· absolute right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act.
The Trial Court decreed the suit and it was affirmed in first
E
appeal.
'M' having died, the respondents preferred a.second appeal in the
High Court. The High Court allowed the second appeal against which,
the petiti?ners filed the S.L.P.
S. L. P. (C) No. 2113 of 1980
·'R'did not have any issue from 'A' and 'S', bis wives. He being
attached with the petitioner, executed a will on 2.7.1945 bequeathing
his properties in favour of his second wife 'S' for her lifetime and
. thereafter, absolutely in favour of the petitioner. A provision was also G
made for the payment of Rs.68 and a direction to make available 18
kalams of paddy in favour of' A' for her lifetime. In order to ensure the
payment of the maintenance and delivery of paddy a charge was also
created over the properties to go ultimately in favour of the petitioner.
As the petitioner was a minor at that time the second wife was H
A
B
c
720
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991] 3 S.C.R.
appointed as his guardian. 'R' died on 8. 7 .45 and subsequently his firs£
wife 'A' was awarded 50 kalarns of paddy and a sum of Rs.250 in cash
per annum by way of maintenance.
On appeal the High Court modified the decree of the Trial Court
and enhanced the maintenance to Rs.480 per annum and directed the
petitioner, the legatee under the will to give one building for the residence of' A'. Thereafter in 1951 'A' sought the recovery of possession of
one of the buildings. The Executing Court allotted to her the eastern
house backyard and the shops, against which the second wife preferred
an appeal to the High Court.
A compromise was entered into between the parties in the High \.
Court. According to the terms of compromise 'A' was permitted to
occupy the eastern house together with the two shops but the backyard
portion was not given. Later on 'S' was removed from the guardianship
of the petitioner, and natural father was appointed as his guardian.
D
The respondents were brother's grandsons of 'A' who died on
E
2.2.1966, had settled the suit properties in favour of one 'C' claiming title
to the same in pursuance to a compromise in A.A.O. 5'67 of 1950. 'R'
another respondent initially took on le!IS!' the properties from 'C' and ·<
later on purchased the eastern half of the building and backyard
portion.
The petitioner, challenging the transactions on the grounds that
'A' was given a right of residence only in the building and the same
lasted till her lifetime and such right could never be enlarged into an
.ij
absolute right; that the settlement deed made by her in favour of 'C'
~
and the sale made by 'C' in favour of 'R', a respondent were invalid and no
F
title could be conveyed by 'A' in their favour, filed a suit for recovery of
possession of the suit properties with mesne profits.
G
The Trial Court held that 'A' was not the absolute owner of !he
suit properties as contemplated under Section 14(2) of the Act and
decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff.
Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appeal. On a Letters
Patent Appeal the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal
and dismissed the snit.
The plaintiff-petitioner has filed the S.t.P. under Article 136 of
H
the Constitution oflndia.
SESHARATHAMMA v. MANIKYAMMA
721
Whether, the life estate given to a widow under the will of her
A
husband becomes an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu
Succession Act was the controversy raised in these cas·· '·
The contmtion raised was that if a female Hindu acquires any
property under a will which gives her a restricted estate in such property then provisions of sub-section (2) will override, the provisions of a
sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act which makes a female Hindu as
fuUowner.
· Dismissing the appeal and the S.L.Ps. this Court,
HELD: PER N.M. KASLlWAL, J. nn his behalf and on behalf of K.
RAMASWAMY, J.
1. Sec. 14(2) of the Aci is in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Sec. 14 and comes into operation only if acquisition in any of the
methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being
c
any pre-existing right in the female Hindu to the property. If the case D
falls under the provisions of Sec. 14(1) of the Act then the female Hindu
shall be held to be full owner of the property and sub-section (2) of
Section 14 will only apply where the property is acquired without there
being any pre-existing right of the female Hindu in such property. (7300-E]
2. Sub-section (2) of Sec. 14 will be construed more in the nature
E
of a proviso or an exception to sub-s. (1) of Sec. 14 of the Act. This view
lends support to the object of the section which was to remove the
disability on women imposed by law and to achieve a social purpose by
bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in
Hindu society. [730E-F]
Mst. Karmi v. Amru and Ors .. [1972] 4 SCC 86; Badri Pershad v.
Smt. Kanso Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95; V. Tulsamma & Ors. v. Sesha
Reddy (dead) by L.Rs., ll977] 3 SCR 26l; Bai Vajia (dead) by L.Rs. v.
Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 291; Jagannath Pillai v.
Kunjithapadam Pillai & Ors., [1987] 2 SCC 572; Gopal Singh & Anr.
F
v. Dill Ram (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., [1988] l SCC 47; Gu/want Kaur
G
and Others v. Mohinder Singh and Others, [1987] 3 sec 674 and
Jaswant Kaur v. Major Harpal Singh, [1989] 3 SCC 572, referred to.
PERK. RAMASWAMY. J.
1. The Act revolutionised the status of a Hindu female; used
H
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1991] 3 S.C.R.
A s. 14(1) as a tool to undo past injustice to elevate her to equal status with
dignity of person on par with man; extinguished pre-existing limitation
of woman's estate, or wid~w's estate known to Shastric law removed all
. the fetters to blossom the same into full ownership. The discrimination
suffered by Hindu female under Shastric law was exterminated by
B legisiative fiat. The social change thus envisaged must be endeavoured
to be given full vigour, thrust and efficacy. [739F-G]
2. Section 14(1) enlarges the restricted estate into full ownership
when the Hindu female has pre-existing right to maintenance etc. Subsec. (2) operates when the grant was made for the first time under the
document with no pre-existing right. Sub sec. (2) therefore, must be
c read as an exception or a proviso to sub-sec. (1). Both the sub-sections
read with the explanation to be pragmaticably considered as a constituent integral scheme. [739G-740A]
3. S. 1.4 is not retroactive in its operation. Devolution of the proD perty under the will would take effect after the demise of the testator
and the legatee would be bound by the terms of gift over etc. The
stranger legatee cannot take shelter under subsequent change of law to
enlarge the operation of restrictive covenant to claim absolute ownership in the property be11ueathed to her. But socio-economic amelioralion under the Act engulfs an instrument under the sweep of s. 14(1)
E
thereof, it extinguishes lhe pre-existing limited estate or restrictive condition and confer absolute and full ownership of the property possessed
by a Hindu female as on the date when the Act had come into force,
namely, June 17, 1956. The courts are not giving retrospective operalion to s. 14(1) or to the instrument. The courts only would be applying
the law to the facts found as on the date when the question arose to find
whether legatee has pre-existing vistage of title under law; and the nature
F
of possession of the property held by her and whether the legatee would
get the benefit of s. 14(1) of the Act. There need be no express recital
even in the will of the enjoyment of the property devised under the will
in lieu or maintenance as a limited owner for her. life. Even if so
mentfoned, it would be a reflection or restatment of the law existing as
G
in 1932 when the will was executed. [740G-741C]
4. A legatee under a testamentary disposition is bound by the
restrictive covenants contained therein. But distinction should be
maintained between an ordinary legatee and a legatee/Hindu fen.tale
coupled with vistage of pre-existing title to the property but wil!h a
H limited estate known lo Shastric law. [740F-G)
.....
~
...
~.
i--\
.,,_
SESHARATHAMMA v. MANIKYAMMA
723
5. As per existing law as in 1932 the widow as a legatee was
A
entitled to widow's estate and she remained in possession of the date of
the Act came into force and was in enjoyment of the income derived
therefrom for her life. No one had a right to interdict it. The restrictive
covenant, therefore, does not stand an impediment to s. 14(1) to have
full play to extinguish the same and enlarge the limited e.state of widow
into an absolute ownership. [7410-E)
B
6. The restrictions contained in the will, though falls both under
sub-sec. (2) as well as snb-sec. (1) of s, 14, the right to maintenance
_bein~ a pre-existing right over property "res ad rem" s. 14(1) would
apply. The testamentary ~
with a restrictive conditions in the will was
obliterated. She became absolute owner on or after June 17, 1956. [741E·F)
Sir Main Henry: Earlier History of Institutions, at P. 339; E.S.
c
Shivaswamy Iyer: Revolution of Hindu Women, [1935) Edn. P. 64;
Manu Smriti, Chapter III verses 55-57, Chapter IX verses 18, 149, 45,
416, 299, Chapter XI verse 67; Mahatma Gandhiji's (article) Young
India. dated October 17. 1929; Ravindra Nath Tagore, (his speech in. D
1913 reprinted in) To the'women, P. 18. The Position of Woman in
Hindu civilisation, 1955 Edn. By Altaken, referred to.
State of Madras v. Srimati Chal[lpakam Dorairajan. [1951) SCR
525; C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India & Ors., [i980) 1SCR668; Air
India v. Nergesh Meerza & Ors., [19821 1 SCR 438; Pratap Sinf!.h
v. Union of India, ll985) Suppl. 2 SCR 773; Seth Badri Prasad v. Smt.
E
Kanso Devi, [1969) 2 SCR 586; V. Tulasanima v. Sesha Reddy (dead)
by L.Rs., [1977) 3 SCR 261; Bai Vajia (dead) by L.Rs. v. Thakorbhai
Chela/)hai & Ors., [1979) 3 SCR 291; Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunithapadam Pillai & Ors., [1987) 2SCR1070; Gu/want Kaur & Anr. v. Mohinder Singh & Anr., [1987) 3 SCR 576; Maharaja Pillai Lakshmi Amma/
v. Maharaja Pillai Thillanayakom Pillai & Anr., [1988) 1 SCR 730;
F
laswant Kaur v. Major Harpa/ Singh, [1989) 3 SCC 572; Munshi Singh
v. Smt. Sohan Bai (dead) by L.Rs., [1989) 2 SCR 1012; Pearey Lal v.
Rameshwar Das, [1963) Suppl. 2 SCR 834; Karmi·v. Amru, AIR 1971 SC
745 and Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai & Ors., [1991) 3 S_CC 410, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 630
G
of 1981.
From the Judgment and Decree dated 24.8.1979 of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 358 of 1977.
WITH
S.L.P. Nos. 438/79 & 2113/80.
H
A
B
c
724
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991] 3 S.C.R.
T.S. Krishnamurty Iyer, G. Narasimhalu. G.S. Narayana, K.
Ram Kumar, Mrs. Anjani, Mrs. J. Ramachandran, T.T. Kunhikannan, S. Srinivasan and A.T.M. Sampath for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KASLIWAL, J. In the above appeal and Special Leave Petitions
questipn has been raised about the ambit and scope of Sec. 14(1) and
14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the
'Act'). Before adverting to the legal question, it would be proper to
narrate in short the facts of each case.
Civil Appeal No. 630 of 1981
Thota Madhav Rao, the plaintiff filed ·a suit against Thota
Manikyamma on the allegation that the plaintiff's father Yellamanda
and the defendant's husband Late Venkata Subbayya·were brothers.
As the defendant and her husband had no issue they brought up the
D plaintiff as their foster son from the age of eight years and thereafter
the plaintiff continued to live with them and was brought up treating
him as their own son. Venkata Subb~yya died on 14.1.1932 and before
his death he executed a will beq ,,cathing the suit properties'.in favour
of his wife Smt. Thota Manikyamma for her life with a vested remainder in favour of the plaintiff. Both the parties lived together with
E perfect understanding but after some time there was misunderstanding
and the defendant assumed hostile attitude towards the plaintiff and
began to claim the suit property as her absolute property. the
defendant also executed a registered will on 26.10.69 bequeathing the
suit properties in favour of one Ramisetti Koteswar Rao. T\te plaintiff
in these circumstances claimed absolute right in. the suit properties
f' after the lifetime of the defendant and challenged the right of the
defendant to execute any will in respect of the suit properties. The
defendant took the plea that her husband died issueless and intestate
and did not execute any will at any time. Neither she nor her husband
brought up the plaintiff as their foster son nor did they educate him.
The defendant had brought up Ramisetti Koteswar Rao, who is her
G nephew, from his childhood and performed his marriage. On account of
love and affection for him and his children, the defendant executed a
registered will on 26.10.69 bequeathing all her properties in his favour..
The Trial Court held the will dated 14.1.1932 proved and decreed the
plaintiff's suit. The First Appellate Court upheld the Judgment and
decree of the Trial Court. The defendant preferred a second appeal in
H the High Court. During the pendency of the Second Appeal in the
{. . .
·j ..
SESHARATHAMMA v. MANIKYAMMA [KASLIWAL. J.J
725
High Court the plaintiff died and his legal representatives were A
brought on record. The High Court by Judgment dated 24.8.1979
allowed the second appeal and dismissed the suit with costs throughout.
--t The legal representatives of the plaintiff have come to this Court by
grant of special leave. The question \nvolved is whether the life
interest in the property acquired by Thota Manikyamma under the will
executed by her husband and continued to be in her possession became
her absolute property under' Sec. 14(1) of the Act.
B
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 438 of 1979
~·
One Meenammal is the wife of Ovi Reddiar. Married life between Ovi Reddiar and his wife was not happy and cordial. Ovi Red- c
diar executed a registered will exhibit A-4 dated 21.3.1921 bequeathing all his properties including the suit properties in favour of his
mother and sister for their lifetime and thereafter in favour ,,f
Ramalinga Reddiar and Dhanush Koti Reddiar, the two sons of his
sister and their issues. In the said will reference was made rer;arding
the conduct of Meenammal in deserting him and in any event if she D
changed her mind and agreed to live under the protection of the.
l ",-
legatees she was allowed to enjoy the income from item I of the suit
properties and that she should construct a house in item referred to in
the will and to live there during her lifetime and after her death the
said Item I and the house site with the house shall go to the above
mentioned Ramalinga Reddiar and Dhanush Koti Reddiar.
E
Ovi Reddiar died in 1922 and thereafter the legatees under the
l
will entered into possession of all the properties. Smt. Meenammal put
obstruction to the legatees in getting possession.
There was some criminal litigation between Smt. Meenammal
F
and the legatees under Sec. 145 Cr.P.C. which resulted in favour of the
legatees (exhibit A-1). Smt. Meenammal then filed a suit in 1923 praying for a declaration that the will made by her husband was not valid
and as such be cancelled and for possession and mesne profits and in
the alternative she claimed for maintenance both past and future. In
the said suit the parties entered into .a compromise and a compromise
G
...._ decree was passed on 5 .3.1924, vide (exhibit A-1). Under the terms of
said compromise the execution of the will was accepted and the same
was made subject to the terms of the compromise decree. Under the
compromise decree it was agreed that Smt. Meenammal would enjoy
items 1 & 2 of the properties mentioned in the will and also 50 cents of
land during her lifetime. She would also have an enjoyment of the
H
726
5\;PRf.ME COURT REPORTS
[1991] 3 S.C.R.
A
house site during he, 1;. i.mc without any right of alienation. Dhanush
Koti died unmarriecl i11
·1.1.1 but during his lifttime he sold his interest
in the properties in fa HM. of Ramalinga Reddiar. Ramalinga Reddiar
. died in 1962. On his dGatll the petitioners before this Court being the
sons and daughters of Ramalinga Reddiar daimed to have become • {....
entitled for all the properties of Ramalinga Reddiar including the
rights in the suit property. Smt. Meenammal during her lifetime
B
c
executed a settlement deed in favour of the respondents before this
Court giving absolute rights in the suit oroputies. The petitioners
before this Court filed a suit against Smt. Meenammal and the respondents for declaration that the settlement deed (exhibit A-10) executed
hy Smt. Meenammal will not enure beyond the lifetime of Smt.
Meenammal. Smt. Meenammal contested the suit and took the plea ....
that the limited interest given to her under the compromise decree had 'i
become enlarged into absolute right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the
Act. The Trial Court decreed the suit and it was affirmed in first
appeal. Smt. Meenammal having died, the respondents in this COurt
D
preferred a second appeal in the High Court of Judicature at Madros.
The High Court allowed the Second Appeal and dismissed.the suit filed
by the petitioners. The petitioners in these circumstances have filed the '
S. L.P. under Article 136 of the Constitution ofindia.
E
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S.L.P. (C) No. 2113 of 1980
The suit properties as well as some other properties originally
belonged to one Ramalinga Udayar. He had two wives, namely,
Alamolu and Saraswati. the first wife Alamolu was living awa~ from
her husband. Ramalinga dtd not have any issue from both the wives.
Ramalinga being attached with one Siva Subramania the petitioner
before us executed a will on 2. 7. 1945 bequeathing his properties in
favour of his second wife Saraswati for her lifetime and thereafter,
absolutely in favour of Siva Subramania. A provision was also made
for the payment of Rs.68 and a direction to make available 18 kalams
of paddy in favour of Alamolu for her lifetime. In order to ensure the
payment of the maintenance and delivery of paddy a charge was also
created over the properties to go ultimately in favour of Siva Subramania Udayar. As Siva Subramania Udayar was a minor at that time
the second wife Smt. Saraswati was appointed as his guardian.
Ramalinga died on 8.7.45 and subsequently his first wife Alamolu was
awarded 50 kalams of paddy and a sum o!Rs.250 in cash per annum by
way of maintenance. On appeal the High Court modified the decree of
the Trial Court and enhanced the maintenance to Rs.480 per annum
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SESHARATHAMMA v. MANIKYAMMA IKASLIWAL, J.)
727
and directed Siva Subramania the legatee under the will to give one
building for the residence of Alamolu. Thereafter in 1951 Alamolu
sought the recovery of possession of one of the buildings and the
Executing Court allotted to her the eastern house backyard and the
shops. The second wife Saraswati preferred an appeal to the High
Court against the above order of the executing court. A compromise
was entered into between the parties in the High Court. According to
the terms of compromise Alamolu was permitted to occupy the eastern
house together with the two shops but the backyard portion was not
given. Alamolu, however remained in possession of that portion as
well, where some coconut trees were standing. Lateron Saraswati was
removed from the guardianship of Siva Subramania Udayar, and
natural father was appointed as his guardian. Alamolu died on
2.2.1966. The respondents before us are brother's grandsons of
Alamolu. Alamolu settled the suit properties in favour of one
Chandrashekhar Udayar claiming title to the same in pursuance to a
compromise in A.A.0. 567 of 1950. Ramayya Mudaliar another
respondent before us initially took on lease the properties from
Chandrashekhar and lateron purchased the eastern half of the building
and backyard portion. Siva Subramania Udayar challenged these
transactions on the grounds that Alal)lolu was given a right of residence only in the building and the same lasted till her lifetime and such
right could never be enlarged into an absolute right. The settlement
deed made by her in favour of Chandrashekhar Udayar and the sale
made by Chandrashekhar in favour of Ramaiah were invalid and no
title could be conveyed by Alamolu in their favour. Siva Subramania
U dayar as such filed a suit for recovery of possession of the suit properties with mesne profits. The Trial Court held that Alamolu was not
the absolute owner of the suit properties as contemplated under
Section 14(2) of the Act. The suit as such was decreed in favour of the
plaintiff Siva Subramania Udayar. Learned Single Judge of the High
Court dismissed the appeal. On a Letters Patent Appeal the Division
Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.
The plaintiff Siva Subramania Udayar has filed the S.L.P. under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
The controversy raised in these cases is almost settled by a
number of decisions of this Court. However, Learned counsel for the
appellant in the appeal as well as Learned counsel for the petitioners in
the Special Leave Petitions have raised an argument, placing reliance,
on Mst. Karmi v. Amru and Ors., [ 1972] 4 SCC 86 that the life estate
given to a widow under the will of her husband cannot become an
absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu succession Act, as
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such we consider it proper to deal with this case in the light of other
cases decided by this Court. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 reads as under:
14"(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether
acquired before or after the commencement of this Act,
shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a
limited owner.
Explanation--In this sub-section, "property" includes both
movable and immovable property acquired by a female
Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu
of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from
any person. Whether'a relative or not, before, at or after.
her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purcbase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana
immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply
to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or
any other instrument or under a decree or order or a civil
court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or
other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a
restricted estate in such property".
The contention raised is that if a female Hindu acquires any property
under a will which gives her a restricted estate in such property then
provisions of sub-section (2) will override, the provisions of subJ .~
section (1) of Section 14 of,the Act which makes a female Hindu as full
F owner.
In Badri Persiuzd v. Smt. Kan.so Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95 a Bench
of three Judges considered the questio!1 in detail. In the above case a
Hindu having self acquired properties, died in 1947 leaving five sons
and a widow. On a dispute between the parties an Arbitrator was
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appointed in 1950. The Arbitrator gave an award and a decree was
passed in terms of award. Under the award the widow was given
widow's estate. It was held that the widow inherited the property
under Section 3 (1) of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937
and was in possession of it within the meaning of the word possession
in Section 14( 1) of the Act and when by an award her share was
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separated by metes and bounds, she also acquired the property within
SESHARATHAMMA v. MANIKYAMMA [KASLIWAL, J.[
729
the meaning of that section. It was held that she had become full owner
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of the property in her possession under Section 14(i) on the coming
. .:tinto force of the Hindu Succession Act, even though previously she
was a limited owner.
It was clearly held in the above case that Section 14(2) of the Act
is in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Section 14( 1) and comes
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into operation only if acqu,isiti!>n in any of the methods indicated
therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing
right in .the female Hindu to the property. The Bench consisted of
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Hon. J.C. Shah, V. Ramaswamy andA.N. Grover, JJ.
..(
The case of Mst. Karmi v·. Amru and Others, (supra) .on which
reliance has now been placed by Learned Counsel for the appellant c
and petitioners was also decided by a Bench of three Judges Hon. J.C.
Shah, K.S. Hegde and A.N. Grover, JJ. It may be noted that two
Hon'ble Judges, namely, J.C. Shah and A.N. Grover were common to
both the cases. In Mst. Karmi v. Amru an4 Others,. one Jaimal died in
1938 leaving his wife Nihali. His son Ditta pre-deceased him. AppelD
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!ant in the above case was the daughter of Ditta and the respondents
were collaterals of Jaimal. J aimal first executed a will dated 18.12.1935
.....,
and by a subsequent will dated 13.11.1937 revoked the first will. By
the second will a life estate was given to Nihali and thereafter the
property was made to devolve on Bhagtu and Armu collaterals. On the
death of Jaimal in· 1938, properties were mutuated in the uame of
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Nihali. Nihali died in 1960/61. The appellant Mst. Karmi claimed right
on the basis of a will dated 25.4.1958 executed by Nihali in h.er favour.
__ \
It was held that the life estate given to a widow under the will of her
husband cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the
Hindu Succession Act. Thereafter, the appellant cann~t claim title to
the properties on the basis of the will executed by the Widow Nihali in F
her favour. It is a short Judgment without adverting to any provisions
of Sections 14(1) or 14(2) of .the Act. The Judgment neither makes any
mention of any argument raised in this regard nor there is any mention
of the earlier decision in Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, (supra}.
The decision in Mst. Karmi & Anr. cannot be considered as an autho-
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rity on the ambit and scope of Sections 14( I} and (2) of the Act.
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The controversy regarding sub-Section (1) and (2) of Section 14
of the Act again came up for consideration in V. Tu/samma & Ors. v.
V. Sesha Reddy (dead) by Lrs., [1977] 3 SCR 261. This case was also.
decided by a Bench of three Judges. In this case the controversy now
raised before us was considered in detail. All the earlier cases were
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considered including Badri Prasad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, (supra) and the
ratio of this case was followed and approved in V. Tulsamma'; case.
Hon'ble Bhagwati, J. who wrote the leading judgment dealt with the
question in detail and after applying the mind to the controversy
decided the same in a well considered manner. V. Tulsamma'; case
again was discussed in extenso and followed in Bai Vajia (dead) b)\
L.Rs. v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors., (1979] 3 SCR 291, by a Bench
of three Judges. The same view has been consistently adopted in long
series of cases of this Court and to mention a few of them are Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai & Ors., [ 1987] 2 SCC 572; Copa/
Singh & Anr. v. Dill Ram (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., (1988] 1SCC47;
Gu/want Kaur and Others v. Mohinder Singh and Others, (1987] 3 SCC
674 andlaswant.Kaurv. Major Harpal Singh, (1989] 3 SCC 572.
A mention of all the above cases shows that this Court in a long
series of cases has taken a consistent view that Sec. 14(2) of the Act is
in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Sec. 14 and comes into
operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is
made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the
female Hindu to the property. If the case falls under the provisions of
Sec. 14( 1) of the A~t then the female Hindu shall be held to be full
owner of the property and sub-section (2) of Section 14 will only apply
where the property is acquired without there being any pre-existing
right of the female Hindu in such property. Thus we aftirm and reiterate that sub-section (2) of Sec. 14 will be construed more in the
nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-s. ( 1) of Sec. 1:, of the Act.
This view lends support to the object of the section which was to
remove the disability on women imposed by law and to achieve a social
purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position
of women in Hindu society.
In the result we find no force in all the above cases and the same
are dismissed with cost.
K. RAMASWAMY, J. I have had the advantage to read the
draft judgment of my learned brother. I fully agree with the reasoning
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and conclusions. The repeated attempts to reopen the ratio in
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Tulasamma's case, in particular, from its proponent i.e. Sri Krishna
Murthy Iyar made me to tread the route through which I reached the
same result thus:
Sir Main Henry in his "Earlier History of Institutions" at p. 339
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stated that, "the degree in which personal immunity and proprietary
SESHARATHAMMA 11. MANIKYAMMA [RAMASWAMY, J.]
731
capacity of women are recognised in a particular state or community is
a test of the degree of the advance of its civilisation. It is, therefore,
clear that the esteem in which woman is held, the status occupied by
her in society and the treatment meted out to her are regarded as index
to the degree of civilisation and culture attained in a country. Manu in
his Smriti, Chapter III Verses 55 to 57 stated that where women are
honoured and adorned there Gods are pleased, but where women are
not honoured no sacred fire yields rewards. What is the status held by
women in the Hindu society is a matter of history reflected from Vedic
culture, Smrities, the Shastric law, the statutory privision and ultimately converged and recognised in the supreme law of the land, i.e.
egalitarian socialist Indian Constitution.
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E.S. Shivaswamy Iyer in his "Revolution of Hindu Women," 1935 · C
Edn. p. 64 stated that the ideals of the society as to womanhood
includes not merely the relations of husband and wife or mother and
children or the other intimate relationship of family life, but also the
notions we find about her capacity, her character, her claim to equality,
independence and freedom for developing, her rights to personal ownD
ership and control of property, to the choice of her vocation and other
rights as well as duties as member of the society. Status and rights of
Hindu woman fluctuated and swung like a pendulum with ups and
downs from period to period starting from 4000 B.C. uptodate. How,
ever esteem for women remained constantly high in the society.
In Vedic society woman en joyed equal status economically,
socially and culturally with men, vide p. 335, 339 and 409 of The Position of Woman in Hindu Civilization, 1955 Edn. by Altakar. He stated
that initiation to education upanayanam was performed in Vedic period
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to the girls as well as boys. Women studied the Vedas, even composed
Vedic rhymes. They participated in public life freely. Vishvavara, ,..p
Apala, Lopamudra and Shashayasi are only few examples in the initial
Vedic period. Thereafter Ghosha, Maitrai and Gargi occupied price of
place for equality in intellectual excellence and equal status with men.
Selfishness and male chauvanism made woman to gradually degrade
and were given no voice even in the settlement of their marriages or so
on. She was denied participation in public affairs. Though YajnavalG .
kya was a proponent to her economic status but ultimately Manu
Smriti took firm hold and in Chapter IX Verse 18, Manu stated that
woman had no right to study the Vedas. Thereby, denied the right to
education, fundamental human right to acquire knowledge and
cultural and intellectual excellence. In Chapter IX Verse 149, he ·
stated that woman must not seek separation from father, husband or
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. son and bondaged her for ever. In Chapter IX Verse 45, the husband
was declared to be one· with the wife that the wife can seek no divorce
but allowed immunity to a male· to discard an unwanted wife. All
through the ages till Hindu Marriage Act was made a male was allowed
polyandry. In Chapter IX Verse 416, he stated that a wife, a son and a
slave are declared to have no property and if they happened to acquire
it would belong to male under whom she is in protection. Thus she was
denuded or her right to property or incentive to decent and.independent living and made her. a dependent only to rare children and bear
the burdens·. When she becomes a widow, she was declared to have
only maintenance and if in po-ssession of her husband's property or
coparcenery, to be a widow's estate with reversionery right to the heirs
of last male holder. Fidality was a condition precedent to receive
maintenance. In Chapter IX Verse 299, he prescribed corporeal
punishment to a wife who commits faults, should be beaten.with a rope
or a- split bamboo. If she was murdered it was declared to be an
Up:ipattaka that is a minor offence vide Chapter XI Verse 67. I did not
adhere to literal translation but attempted to portray their sweep and
deep incursion on social order. Thus laid firm fouridation to deny a
Hindu female of equality of status, opportunity and dignity of person
with no independent right to property and made her a subservient,'
socially, educationally and cillturally. Widows were murdered by inhuman Sati and now by bride burnings.
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Gautam Budha gave her equality of staius and opportunity.
Efforts of social reformers like Raja Ram Mohan Rai, Kandukuri
Veeresalingam and a host of other enlightened made the British Rulers
gradually to make statute law, given her right to separate residence
and maintenance and a right over property o( her husband or joint
family for mainteriance and a charge by a decree of court. Mahatma
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Gandhiji, the father of the nation, in Young India on October 17,
1929 had written thus: "I am uncompromising in the matters of
women's rights: In my opinion she should live 'under no legal disability, no suffenng by men, we should treat the daughters and sons on
the footing of. perfect equality": Shri Ravindra Nath Tagore, _the
Noble laureate in his speech in 1913 reprinted in "To the Women" at
G page 18 stated "that women is the champion of man, gifted with equal
mental capacity. She has a right to participate in any minutest activity
of men and she has equal.right of freedom and liberty with him".
The Constitution of India accords socio-economic and political
· justice, equality of status and of opportunity a·ssuring the dignity of
!fl person with stated freedoms. Article 14 gu~rantees _ _equality. In, other .
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SESHARATHAMMA v.