# SETH BALGOPAL DAS v. THE STATE OF U.P. & ORS

- **Citation:** [1976] 3 S.C.R. 1092
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-04-08
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 222 of 1975
- **Bench:** A. N. Ray, M. H. Beg, JAsWANT SINGH
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/seth-balgopal-das-v-the-state-of-u-p-ors-6732
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

U.P. (Ten1porary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, S.3(2), rcquiren1ent of-Receipt of revision application by Additional District
Mngisrrate,
whether validated by practice in absence of rules or specific authorisation bv
Con~missioner.
·
The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Dehradun. granted permission to
the respondent landlady under s. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and
Eviction Act, to file a suit for eviction of the appellant tenant, on the ground
that the accommodation was required for her personal residence.
The tenant
filed a revision application under s. 3 (2) of the Act, purporting to be made to the
Commissioner,
Meerut Division, but actually filed before the Additional Distr~ct ~fagistrate who rejected it as time barred. The appellant tenant's further
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revision application, made under s. 7F of the Act, v,.ras rejected by the State
\
Government, and then his petition under Article 226 was rejected by a Single
Judge of the Allahabad High Court cin two grounds:
Firstly that neither the'
Act, nor the rules made thereunder had any provision enabling the Additional
District Magistrate to receive the tenant's application under s. 3 (2); and secondly,
that the time spent in obtaining the certified copy of the Distri..:t ~tagistrate's
order could not be excluded under s. 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The
appellant's special appeal was summarily rejected by a Division Bench of the
High Court.
In appeal by special leave, the appellant contended before the Court that,
as a pra.ctice had grown up in Dehradun, that the Additional District A-Iagistrate
receives the revision applications made to the Commissioner, the requirements
of s. 3(2) should l]e deemed to have been sufficiently complied with.
l)ismissing the appeal, the Court,
HELD : There is not even a rule on this subject made by the State Government.
A wrong practice cannot possibly modify what naturally follo-w'S from
the language if s. 3 (2) of the Act, that the party must apply to the Commissioner
directly and not through some other authority· or official,
For that pur!'ose,
proof of at least specific authorisation by the Commissioner, after the introduction of s. 3(2), was required.
[1094C; 1095A & Fl

## Text

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1092
SETH BALGOPAL DAS
v.
THE STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
April 8, 1976
[A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND JAsWANT SINGH, JJ.}
U.P. (Ten1porary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, S.3(2), rcquiren1ent of-Receipt of revision application by Additional District
Mngisrrate,
whether validated by practice in absence of rules or specific authorisation bv
Con~missioner.
·
The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Dehradun. granted permission to
the respondent landlady under s. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and
Eviction Act, to file a suit for eviction of the appellant tenant, on the ground
that the accommodation was required for her personal residence.
The tenant
filed a revision application under s. 3 (2) of the Act, purporting to be made to the
Commissioner,
Meerut Division, but actually filed before the Additional Distr~ct ~fagistrate who rejected it as time barred. The appellant tenant's further
..l
revision application, made under s. 7F of the Act, v,.ras rejected by the State
\
Government, and then his petition under Article 226 was rejected by a Single
Judge of the Allahabad High Court cin two grounds:
Firstly that neither the'
Act, nor the rules made thereunder had any provision enabling the Additional
District Magistrate to receive the tenant's application under s. 3 (2); and secondly,
that the time spent in obtaining the certified copy of the Distri..:t ~tagistrate's
order could not be excluded under s. 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The
appellant's special appeal was summarily rejected by a Division Bench of the
High Court.
In appeal by special leave, the appellant contended before the Court that,
as a pra.ctice had grown up in Dehradun, that the Additional District A-Iagistrate
receives the revision applications made to the Commissioner, the requirements
of s. 3(2) should l]e deemed to have been sufficiently complied with.
l)ismissing the appeal, the Court,
HELD : There is not even a rule on this subject made by the State Government.
A wrong practice cannot possibly modify what naturally follo-w'S from
the language if s. 3 (2) of the Act, that the party must apply to the Commissioner
directly and not through some other authority· or official,
For that pur!'ose,
proof of at least specific authorisation by the Commissioner, after the introduction of s. 3(2), was required.
[1094C; 1095A & Fl
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 222 of 1975.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 8th
August, 1973 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 189
1
of 1972.
B. Sen, Mrs. Leila Seth, B. Mohan, Parveen Kumar and 0. P.
Khaitan for the appellant.
T. S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer and P. K. Pillai for Respondent No. 4
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG, J. The appellant, here, by special leave, is a tenant of premises
in Dehradun in respect of which the landlord respondent No. 4 had
sought permission, under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control
of Rent & Eviction Act III of 194 7 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
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BALGOPAL DAS V. U.P. STATE (Beg, J.)
I 093
Act'), to sue for his eviction.
The permission was granted by the
Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Dehradun, as long ago as 11 August,
1969, and, there:j.fter, the suit for ejectment of the appellant was filed
on 19th November, 1969.
Section 3, sub. sec. (I) of the Act had merely imposed a bar on
suits in Civil Courts filed without the permission of the District Magistrate except on certain grounds which are given there. The plaintiffrespondent, one Mrs. Sheila Ka1ha wife of a retired army officer, was
given permission to file her suit on the ground that she required the
accommodation for personal residence. She is said to have been living
at considerable expense to her at New Delhi due to inability to live
in her own house at Dehradun as it has been occupied by the appellant.
The tenant had applied on 19th August, 1969, for a certified copy
of the order of the Rent Control Officer granting the landlord permission to sue and got its copy on 25th August, 1969. Thereafter, the
tenant filed a revision application
under section 3(2) of the Act,
purporting to be made to the Commissioner, Meerut D.i~ision, but
actually filed on 16th September, 1969, before an Add1t10nal District Magistrate of Dehradun who had forwarded it on to the Commissioner.
The Revision Application was received in the Commissioner's Office on 24th September,
1969. It was rejected by the
Commissioner on the ground that it was filed beyond the time prescribed by Section 3(2) of the Act which reads as follows:
"(2) Where any application has been made to the District Magistrate for permission to sue a tenant for eviction
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from any accommodation and the District Magistrate, grants
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or refuses to grant the permission, the party aggrieved by
his order may within 30 days from the date on which the
order is communicated to him apply to the Commissioner
to revise the order."
The State Government also rejected the rev1s10n application of
the appellant tenant, filed under section 7F of the Act, against the
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Commissioner's order.
The appellant tenant then approached the Allahabad High Court
with a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The petition
was rejected by a learned Judge on 21st October,
1972, on two
grounds : firstly, under Section 3 (2) of the Act; and, secondly, that
the time spent on obtaining the certified
copy of the order of the
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District Magistrate could not be excluded under Section 12(2) of
the Limitation Act of 1963.
For the second proposition
reliance
was placed upon Shyam Sunder Bajpai v. Commissioner Allahabad
Division, Allahabad & Anr.(I) and Ram Lakhan v. Commissioner,
Varanasi Division, Varanasi & Ors. (').
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court had rejected the
tenant's Special Appeal summarily.
This Court,
however,
granted
special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution on 20th
(I) 1965 A.L.J. 211.
(2)
1970 A.L.J. 909.
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109 4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 3 S.C.R.
July, 1975.
We need not express any opinion on the correctness of
the second proposition here if we agree with the High Court's view
on the first point because, in that case, the tenant's application would
be time barred even if the time
spent in obtaining the copy was
exclqded.
The only contention, put forward by Mr. B. Sen on behalf of the
temnl-appe!Jant, on the first point, is that there is a practice in Dehradun, acting on so1ne instruction of the Commissioner, Meerut Division,
to receive revision applications to the Commissioner through an Additional District Magistrate of Dehradun, who has, therefore, the Commissioner's authority to receive these applications. It was urged that
the filing of the Revision application before an Additional District
Magistrate should be deemed, in these circumstances, to be sufficient
compliance with the requirements of Section 3(2) of the Act which
provides, as it clear from a bare look at it, that the revision application
lies before the Commissioner.
It is difficult to sec how a practice could possibly modify the provisions of the Act. There is not even a rule on this subject made by the
State Govt. under the provisions of Section
17 of the
Act which
authorises the Govt. to "make rules to give effect to the purposes of
this Act." There are rules on other matters but not on such a matter.
Mr. B. Sen relied on a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad
High Court in T. C. Pasricha & Anr. v. The State of U.P.( 1 ) where it
was held :
"It appears that the Commissioner had authorised the
District Magistrate to receive revisions meant for him. By
so authorising, the Commissioner was
only indicating the
place and, the manner of representation of the revisions.
Since the Rent Control Act did not either by itself or rules
framed under it lay down the precise procedure in regard to
the presentation of the revision, the Commissioner who was
the authority entitled to entertain and decide the revisions was
within- his rights to prescribe the procedure in respect of representation of the revisions. The direction given by the Commissioner in 1946 with regard to the presentation of revision
was valid and enforceable".
In Pasricha's case (supra), the Single Judge decision in
Seth
Bal Gopal Das v. State of U.P.(') on the case now before us, was
noticed by the Division Bench and distinguished on the ground that
there was no evidence here to prove that there was any such practice.
Both Pasricha' s case (supra) and the case now before us come from the
Dehradun District.
We think it is difficult to reconcile the Division
Bench decision in Pasricha's case, decided on 5th April, 1973,
with
the summary rejection of the Special Appeal No. 180 of 1973 on 8th
August, 1973, which is under appeal before us, al'.h?'!gh we find that
one of the learned Judges is common to both the D1v1S1on Benches.
·-·(ll- Special Appeal No. 744 of 1971 decided on 5th April, 1973.
(2)
1973 A.L.J. 120.
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BALGOPAL DAS V. U.P. STATE (Beg, J.)
I 09 5
We prefer the reasoning ·of the learned Single Judge in Seth Bal
·Gvpal Das v. Stat~ of U.P. (supra) to the reasoning of the Division
Bench m Pasncha s case (supra). A wrong practice cannot possibly
modify what naturally and fog,call)'. follows trom the Ja~guage m Section 3_\2) of the Act.
Thi.s prov1s10n sa~s that the party aggrieved
must apply to the Comm1ss10ncr to revise the order".
The natural
inference is that the party must apply to the Commissioner directly and
not through some other authority or official.
It is true that Section 3(2) does not prescribe the manner and
place of presentation of applications.
But, unless there is some rule
made to confer authority, upon the District Magistrate or the Additional District Magistrate concerned or his office to act as the agent
of the Commissioner, or a clear and specific auth~risation by the Commissioner is proved, we fail to sec how filing a revision application before the Additional District Magistrate can be deemed to amount to
making the application to the Commissioner.
In Pasricha's case (supra), the Division Bench had gone to
the
.extent of hold;ng that some communication made by the Commissioner
in 1946 to the D:strict Magistrate of Dehradun, even a copy of which
was not placed before the Court, could be ~hown by means of an affidavit of a party, to have been both established and to be enough to confer
.an authority on an Additional District Magistrate of Dehradun to receive applications on behalf of the Commissioner under the provisions
of Section 3 ( 2) of the Act which were introduced after 1946 according to the statement of facts in Pasricha's case (supra) itself.
Prima
facie, an authorisation cannot relate to a power or right conferred by
a provision which could not be present to the mind of the Commissioner at all at the time when he is supposed to have made some communication to the District Magistrate as the provision for a revision in
sueh a case did not even exist then.
We, therefore, think that the
reasoning of the Division Bench in Pasricha's case (supra) is
unacceptable.
The alleged practice cannot be held to have been even
established. And, in any event, such a practice was not enough to confer
.authority to receive petitions on. behalf of .the. Commissioner. 'for that
purpose, proof of at least specific authonsation by the Comm1ssiom:r,
after the introduction of the new provision, was required.
The result is that we are unable to find any merit in the case of the
appellant who has been able to hold up proceedings for his evic.tion
Jong enough in respect of accommodation which, on the allegations
made on behalf of the landlord (this term includes the "land-lady .. ),
has been required to meet the landlord's dire personal needs since at
least 1969. We hope that the trial of the suit in such a case will not
be delayed now.
We dismiss this appeal with costs throughout.
M.R.
Appeal dismissed.
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