# Seth Gopal Das Moh/a v. Union of India

- **Citation:** [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1952-02-21
- **Case number:** Civil No. 145 of 1952
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/seth-gopal-das-moh-a-v-union-of-india-1200
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
777
was not binding and could not be enforced. Whatever
be the merits of such a contention, it obviously cannot
be raised in an application made under the provisions
of article 32 of the
Constitution.
The
forum
for
investigating such allegations is elsewhere.
The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed
with costs.
Petition dismissed.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
v.
BHANJI MUNJI AND ANOTHER.
I MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS
and VENKATARAMA AvYAR JJ.]
Constitution
of India,
Arts. 19(1) (f), 31(2)-Bombay Land
Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIll of 1948), ss. 5(1) and
6(4) (a) as amended by Bombay Act II of 1950 and Bombay Act
XXXIX of 1950-Whether ultra vires the
Cons1;1e<tion-Requisition of premises under s. 4(3) of the
Act-Validity-Onus-Statute
-
l-F hether must contain in express terms the
publtc purposeI<cqurstiiu,, af 1u·orn1,,-Validity.
Sections 5(1) and 6(4) (a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act,
194/i (Bombay Act XXX!II of
19t8) as amended are not
ultra
vr;·.J Arts. 19( I) (f), and 31 (2) of the Constitution.
Article 19(1) (£) read with clause (5) postulates the existence
of property which can be enjoyed and over which rights can be
exercised because
otherwise the reasonable
restrictions contemplated by clause (5) cannot be brought
into play. In ·the present
case the right to occupy the premises has gone, as also the right to
transfer, assign, let or sub-let.
What is left is merely the husk of
title in the lease-hold.
Art. 19(1) (£), therefore, is not attracted.
The Bombay Larid Requisition Act, 1948, provides for compensation in
s. 8 and the requisitions were
made for
a public
purpese. Therefore, the provisions of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution are complied with .
. A statute is_ not in~~l!d for . the reason that the purpose
for
which prol":r'Y is reqmslt!oned 1s not stated in express terms
in
the statute 1:self provided from the whole tenor and
intendment
.. ,
of the Act it can_ be gathered that the property is acquired either
for th_c: p.irpose ot the State or for any public pnrpose and that the
mtentlo1' was to benefit the community at large.
1954
Seth Gopal Das
Moh/a
v.
Union of India.
and Anolhtr
Mahtifan C. ].
1954
October 12.
I95f
The State ef
Bern.hoy
v.
Bhanji Munji
anf/ Anothtr
778
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1955]
When prima facie an order complies with the provisions
of
the statute and is not illegal the onus
lies
on the
person
who
challenges the validity of the order to sho\v that it is illegal.
Under the
Act only premises-to v.·hich a special meaning is
given natncly pre1nises which were "let" or "intended to be let"
-within the meaning of s. 4(3) can be
requisitioned and
the
Government requisitioned
the premises in exercise of the
po\vers
under the Act, the onus rested on the person \Vho alleged that the
premises in this case were not pre1njses within
the
n1ean1ng of
the definition and could not be requisitioned.
The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose ((1954] S.C.R.
587), Dwarkadas Shrinivas of
Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning
and Weaving Co. Ltd. l• Others ([1954J S.C.R. 674), A. K. Gopalan
v. The State of Madras ([1950] S.C.R. 88). The State of llihar v.
Maharnjadhiraja
Sir
Kameshwor
Singh of Darbhanga ([1952]
S.C.R. 889) and Biswabhusan Naik v. The
State of Orissa ([1955J
I S.C.R. 92) referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION :
Civil
No. 145 of 1952.
Appeal
Appeal under article 132(1) of the Constitution of
India
from
t'.1e

## Text

-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
777
was not binding and could not be enforced. Whatever
be the merits of such a contention, it obviously cannot
be raised in an application made under the provisions
of article 32 of the
Constitution.
The
forum
for
investigating such allegations is elsewhere.
The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed
with costs.
Petition dismissed.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
v.
BHANJI MUNJI AND ANOTHER.
I MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS
and VENKATARAMA AvYAR JJ.]
Constitution
of India,
Arts. 19(1) (f), 31(2)-Bombay Land
Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIll of 1948), ss. 5(1) and
6(4) (a) as amended by Bombay Act II of 1950 and Bombay Act
XXXIX of 1950-Whether ultra vires the
Cons1;1e<tion-Requisition of premises under s. 4(3) of the
Act-Validity-Onus-Statute
-
l-F hether must contain in express terms the
publtc purposeI<cqurstiiu,, af 1u·orn1,,-Validity.
Sections 5(1) and 6(4) (a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act,
194/i (Bombay Act XXX!II of
19t8) as amended are not
ultra
vr;·.J Arts. 19( I) (f), and 31 (2) of the Constitution.
Article 19(1) (£) read with clause (5) postulates the existence
of property which can be enjoyed and over which rights can be
exercised because
otherwise the reasonable
restrictions contemplated by clause (5) cannot be brought
into play. In ·the present
case the right to occupy the premises has gone, as also the right to
transfer, assign, let or sub-let.
What is left is merely the husk of
title in the lease-hold.
Art. 19(1) (£), therefore, is not attracted.
The Bombay Larid Requisition Act, 1948, provides for compensation in
s. 8 and the requisitions were
made for
a public
purpese. Therefore, the provisions of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution are complied with .
. A statute is_ not in~~l!d for . the reason that the purpose
for
which prol":r'Y is reqmslt!oned 1s not stated in express terms
in
the statute 1:self provided from the whole tenor and
intendment
.. ,
of the Act it can_ be gathered that the property is acquired either
for th_c: p.irpose ot the State or for any public pnrpose and that the
mtentlo1' was to benefit the community at large.
1954
Seth Gopal Das
Moh/a
v.
Union of India.
and Anolhtr
Mahtifan C. ].
1954
October 12.
I95f
The State ef
Bern.hoy
v.
Bhanji Munji
anf/ Anothtr
778
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1955]
When prima facie an order complies with the provisions
of
the statute and is not illegal the onus
lies
on the
person
who
challenges the validity of the order to sho\v that it is illegal.
Under the
Act only premises-to v.·hich a special meaning is
given natncly pre1nises which were "let" or "intended to be let"
-within the meaning of s. 4(3) can be
requisitioned and
the
Government requisitioned
the premises in exercise of the
po\vers
under the Act, the onus rested on the person \Vho alleged that the
premises in this case were not pre1njses within
the
n1ean1ng of
the definition and could not be requisitioned.
The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose ((1954] S.C.R.
587), Dwarkadas Shrinivas of
Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning
and Weaving Co. Ltd. l• Others ([1954J S.C.R. 674), A. K. Gopalan
v. The State of Madras ([1950] S.C.R. 88). The State of llihar v.
Maharnjadhiraja
Sir
Kameshwor
Singh of Darbhanga ([1952]
S.C.R. 889) and Biswabhusan Naik v. The
State of Orissa ([1955J
I S.C.R. 92) referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION :
Civil
No. 145 of 1952.
Appeal
Appeal under article 132(1) of the Constitution of
India
from
t'.1e
Judgment
and
Order,
dated 21st
February, 1952, of the Bombay High Court in Appeal
No. 8 of 1952 arising out of Miscellaneous Application
No. 118 of 1951.
M.
C.
Setalvad,
Attorney-General
of
India,
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of Tnd;,, (J.l. J.I. Sccrvai, P. A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with them) for the
appellant.
B. Sen, N. A. Palkhitoala and I. N.
Shroff for the
respondents.
1954. October 12. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
BosE J .-This judgment will govern
Civil Appeals
Nos. 146 and 147 of 1952 as well. We will first deal
. with the questions that are coinmnn to them all. They
arise out of three petitions made in the: Bombay High
Court for writs of mandamus under article 226 of the
Constitution. The writs have been gra.nted
and
the
State of Bombay appeals.
The facts are these. The
Governor
oi
Boxnbay,
acting through the Assistant Controller of Atcommodation issued orders under section 6( 4) (a) of the Bombay
Land Requisition Act, 1948, in
Civil Appeals Nos. 145
+
.•
•
-.
-
-
-
•
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
779
and 146 of 1952 and under section 5(1) in Civil Appeal
No. 147 of 1952, requisitioning the premises of the three
respondents. The question is whether these orders are
ultra vire. They are attacked on a number of grounds
the first of which goes to the root of the matter. It is
contended
that these
two
sections
are ultra
vires
articles 19(1) (f) and 31(2) of the
Constitution.
The respondents are either the owners or the tenants
of the premises requisitioned. In Civil Appeal No. 145
of 1952 the
respondents are
uncle and nephew.
The
uncle, who is the first respondent, is the tenant. The
second respondent is his
nephew.
He and his family
live >:Nith
the
first respondent in
the
requisitioned
premises. In
Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1952 the premises
are owned by a trust. The first
and second respondents
are the trustees and the third respondent claims to
be
a licensee living on the premises. The State of
Bombay
contends that he is a tenant but that is no longer of
consequence because of the assurance
given
by the
learned Attorney-General that
the
possession
of the
petitioners in this case will not be disturbed for any
reason arising
out
of
these proceedings.
In
Civil
Appeal No. 147 of 1952 there is only one respondent, a
private limited company which
occupies
the requisitioned
premises as a tenant for
the
purposes of its
business.
The Act of 1948 would have expired in April, 1950,
but its life was extended by Bombay Act II of
1950.
Later, sections 5 and 6 were amended by Bombay Act
XXXIX of 1950. As
the later Acts were
after the
Constitution and as the
life
of the main
Act was
extended after the
Constitution came into force, it is
said that they are all hit by articles 19(1) (f) and 31 (2),
firstly,
b~cause the restrictions imposed on the right to
hold, acquire and dispose of
property
are
neither
reasonable nor in the interests of the general public
and, secondly, because the
Act does not require that
there should be a public purpose.
We will fi,rst deal with Civil Appeals Nos. 145 and
146 of 1952 where tenants and licensees are concerned.
In our opinion, article 19(1) (f) does
not
apply to
them. In The State of West Bengal v. Subodh
Gopal
1954
Tht State of
Bombay
v.
Bhanji Munji
and Anothtr
Bose J.
1954
Th< State of
Bomba)
v.
Bhan.Ji MunJi
and Anothtr
Bose J.
780
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Bose('), and Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The
Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. & Others ('),
the majority of the Judges were agreed
that articles
19(1) (f) and 31 deal with different subjects and cover
different
fields.
There was some disagreement
about
the nature and scope of the difference
but all were
agreed that
there was no overlapping. We need not
examine those differences here because it is enough to
say that article 19(1) (f) read with clause (5) postulates
the exist<;_nce of property which
can
be enjoyed and
over which rights can be exercised
because otherwise
the reasonable restrictions
contemplated by clause
(5)
could not be brought into play. If there is no property
which can be acquired, held or disposed of, no restriction
can be placed on the exercise of the right to acquire,
hold and dispose of it. and as clause (5) contemplates
the placing of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of
those rights it must follow that the article
postulates
the existence of property over which these rights can
be exercised. In our opinion, this was
decided in
principle in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, (3),
where it was held that the
freedoms relating to the
person of a citizen guaranteed by article 19 assume the
existence of a free citizen and can no longer Le enjoyed
if a citizen is deprived of his liberty
"Y
the law of
preventive or punitive
detention. In the same way,
when there is a substantially total deprivation of pre>-
perty which is already
held and enjoyed, one must
turn to article 31 to see how far that is justified.
It was argued as against this that this rule can only
apply when there is a total deprivation of property and
article 19(1) (f) cannot . be
excluded
if there is the
slightest vestige of a right on
which the article cm
operate. This has also been answered in substance in
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of
Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. & Others (2). These articles
deal with substantial and substantive rights and
not
with illusory phantoms of title. When every form of
enjoyment which normally accompanies an interest in
this kind. of property is taken away leaving
the mere
(') ['954] S. C.R. 587.
c.) ['954] S. C.R. 674.
(3) [1950] 0 • C.R. 88.
-
•
•
•
-
..
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
781
husk of title, article 19(1) (f) is not attracted. As was
said by one of us in Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v.
The
Sholapur
Spinning
and
Weaving
Co. Ltd. &
Others( i ), at page 734-
"By substantial deprivation is meant the sort of
-deprivation
that
substantially robs a man
of those
:attributes of enjoyment
which
normally
accompany
rights to, or an interest in, property. The form is
unessential. It is the substance that one must seek."
In the present case, the right to occupy the premises
has gone as also the right to transfer, assign, let or
sub-let. What is left is but the mere husk of title in
the leasehold intertst : a forlorn hope that the force of
this law will somehow expend itself before
the lease
runs out.
That brings us to article 31. The Act provides for
compensation in section 8, so all we have to see is
whether the requisition was for a public purpose.
The main
Act is pre-Constitution and at that time
there
were
no
fundamental rights, accordingly it is
understandable that the Act as then framed
did not
require or specify a public purpose but despite that it
<lid say, in the preamble.
"whereas
it is expedient
to
provide
for
the
requisition of land",
and sections 5 and 6 as now amended contain the
words
"for the purpose of the
State or any other public
purpose."
Our present Chief
Justice (Mahajan J. as he then
was) pointed out in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga (2 ) that-
"It is unnecessary to state in express terms in the
statute itself the precise purpose for which property
is
being taken,
provided
from
the whole tenor and
intendment of the Act it could be gathered that the
property was being acquired either for purposes of the
State or for purposes of the public and that the intention was to benefit the community at large."
Following that decision we hold that the Act is not
invalid for this reason.
. ( 1) (1954) S. C.R. 674.
(') (1952) S. C.R. 889, 940
1954'
TM Stal• of
Bombay
v.
Bhanji Munji
and Anoth<r
Bos<].
1954
Tht State of
Bomboy
v.
Bhmdi Munji
and Another
Bose J.
782
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1955J
We now turn to the orders of requisition. They can
only be upheld if they conform to the provisions
of
the Act. The first question, therefore, is, whether they·
were made for a
State or public purpose as set out in
sections 5(1) and 6(4) ? Civil Appeals Nos. 145 and 146
of 1952 have
similar orders. We will examine them
first.
They are of different dates but in each case the
order runs:
"Whereas, on inquiry, it is found that the premises
specified below had
become
vacant
on/ or after-the
month of May 1950.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred
by clause (a) of sub-section
( 4)
of section 6 of the
Bombay
Land
Requisition Act, 1948 (Born. XXXIII
of 1948)
the
Government of
Bombay is pleased to
requisition the said premises etc."
The petitions in these two
cases were filed on the
30th and 4th of April, 1951, respectively. Affidavits in
reply were made on the 18th and 19th of June,
and
then in August, 1951, the following order was served on
the petitioners :
"In continuation of the
order dated etc. . ..... the
Government of Bombay is pleased to declare that the
premises
mentioned in that
order' were requisitioned
for a public purpose, namely
housing a person, having
no housing accommodation
on
the
date of the said
order cited above."
It was argued that this subsequent
specification of
the purpose is of no avail and that in any case it is an
evident afterthought and not true.
In our opinion, it is not necessary
to
set out the
purpose
of the
requisition
in the order. The desirability of such a course is obvious because when it is
not done proof of the purpose must be given in other
ways and that exposes the authorities
to the kind of
charges we find here and to the danger that the Courts
will consider them well
founded.
But in itself
an
om1ss1011
to
set out the purpose in the
order is not
fatal so long as the facts are established to the satisfaction of the
Court in some other way. The underlying
principle of our decision in Biswabhusan Naik_ v. The;
State of Orissa(') applies here.
(') [1955] ' s. a. R. 92.
•
•
•
•
•
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
783
. In the present set of cases there is proof of a public
purpose. It is given in the affidavits made on behalf
of the
State and in the subsequent orders just quoted,
namely to house the homeless. At that time the housing
situation in
Bombay
was
acute,
largely due to the
influx of refugees.
Questions of public decency, public
morals, public health and the temptation to lawlessness
and crime, which such a situation
brings in its train,
at once arose ; and the public conscience was aroused
on the ground of plain humanity. A race of proprietors
in the shape of rapacious landlords who thrived on the
misery of those
who
could find no decent
roof over
their heads
sprang into being. Even the efficiency of
the administration was threatened
because
Government servants could
not find proper
accommodation.
Milder efforts to cope with the evil proved ineffective.
It was necessary therefore for
Government take more
drastic steps and in doing so they acted for the public
weal. There was consequently a clear
public purpose
and an undoubted oublic benefit.
An attempt was made in argument to view the matter
nanowly by concentrating on the individual and picking holes in isolated passages in the affidavit in reply.
The argument
was as follows. The facts are taken
from· the affidavit.
In the year 1947 the Government of Bombay passed
the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance and invited
applications for the allotment of vacancies from the
general public.
So far a general public purpose for the
public good may be inferred. But the proper working
of this scheme
depended on the co-operation
of the
" • landlords and tenants who were required by the law to
give notice of vacancies in occupation as they arose.
It was found that in a very large number of cases this
was not done with the result that much of the accommodation
which
should
have
been
available
for
•
distribution was suppressed.
Government accordingly
introduced another class of beneficiaries, namely, those
who gave information about what it called "suppressed
vacancies" and "Nominal occupation".
It was decided
to allot premises thus discovered to be
vacant
to
{') [19i;5] I s. c. R. 92.
12-88 S. C. India/59
1954
The State of
Bombay
v.
Bhanji Mun.ii
and .Another.
Bost J.
1954
The Stale of
Bomb'!J
v.
Bhanji Munji
and Anothn.
Bose].
784
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the
first
informant provided he genuinely
needed
accommodation.
The allottees in the present appeals
are from that class.
Despite this it was found that the number of applications so far exceeded the number of vacancies that
there
was
not
enough
accommodation
even for
Government
servants
and
Government
purposes.
Accordingly, in 1949, and again in 1950,
Government
declared that it would not consider further
applications from the
public as it had decided to restrict
the
allotments to
Government
and
other
public
purposes.
The result is
that at the time of
the
present allotments there was
no intention to benefit
the public at large but to keep a privileged preserve
for
Government
servants,
and
in
order
to put
pressure on landlords and tenants to disclose vacancies
which could be added to this privileged pool rewards
were handed out to houseless first informers by giving
them the
vacancies
they
were instrumental in discovering. This, it was hoped,
would
show landlords
and tenants that suppression did not pay and so they
might as well obey the law, and that, in turn, would
enable
Government to benefit the only privileged class
.of persons
it had any
real intention of benefiting,
namely its own officers and servants. This conclusion
is strengthened by
the fact that when the decision
.about suppressed
vacancies and first informers
was
made in 1947, and
again when the Bombay Land
Requisition Act was passed in 1948, there was no need
for a public purpose. So runs the argument.
Another argument was that in the affidavit in reply
'
·the
State of
llombay says that the purpose of the • •
legislation was to effect an equitable distribution.
"The policy of the
Government was that having
regard
to
the fact that
but for such intimation a
vacancy would not have
come to light at all, it was
fair and just and conducive
to an equitable distribution
.of accommodation that the premises should be allotted
to the first informant provided he genuinely needs
.accommodation."
It was contended,
and the
contention prevailed in
the High Court, that a decision to set apart a section
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-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
785
of the much needed vacancies for the use of spies and
informers as a reward
for
their
services,
whether
their need was as great as that of other houseless persons
Qr not, was not equitable, and as the
purpose of the
legislation was said to be the equitable distribution of
vacant accommodation this fell outside its scope.
In our opinion, this is not a proper approach to the
problem. The Constitution authorises requisitions for
a public purpose. The purpose here is finding accommodation for
the homeless. If therefore a vacancy 1s
allotted to
a person who 1s m fact houseless, the
purpose is fulfilled.
It might
be possible
to attack a
given allottment
on
other
grounds, such
as fraud,
invidious discrimination, nepotism,
bribery or corruption, but none of that is alleged here. All that is said
is that there was no public purpose.
A wide discretion must be left to
Government to
carry out the
policy
of the Act.
If the number of
vacancies is small and the number
of
the
homeless
large, it is evident that
there must be some picking
and choosing. So long
as this is done on broad lines of
principle and reasonably, the
Courts
cannot interfere
simply
because
other methods are also possible,
even
if the Courts think they are better, for in the end
Government must
be left to
determine
which
of
many
possible
schemes
is the
best.
Government
had to weigh
many conflicting factors : the
urgency
of
the situation,
the need
of reasonable
dispatch,
the expenditure
of
public
funds which would be
inevitable
on long
and protracted
enqumes
about
the
private
affairs
of thousands
of applicants
for
accommodation, the maintenance of public
morale by
ensuring that the honest landlord who did his duty did
not
suffer as against the dishonest person
who suppressed his vacancies and made large and illicit profits
under his "puggree"; and
in addition the equitable
maxim that "equity helps the vigilant".
We hold that
neither the order of requisition nor the order of allotment in
Civil
Appeals Nos. 145 and 146 of 1952 is
ultra vires.
In Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1952 a further question
.anses. Under the Act only premises (to which a special
1954
The State of
Bomhig
v.
Bhanji Munji
and Another,
Bose].
1954
The State of
Bombay
v.
Bkanji Mwiji
and Anothtr.
Bose].
786
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
meaning is given) within the meaning of section 4(3)
can be requisitioned. It was urged that the premises
in this case were
not premises within
the meaning of
that
definition,
so
it was
said they could not be
requisitioned. The question turns on
whether
the
premises
were "let" or "intended
to
be let". The
learned trial Judge threw the burden of proof on the
State
Government and told its learned counsel that he
should proceed to prove this fact if he so desired. He
replied that he did not intend to lead any evidence. It
was explained to, us
that
Government took up this
attitude as it wanted a decision about where. the burden
lay as the question
arises
continually
and cannot be
decided
when both
parties
adduce
evidence.
The
learned Attorney-General
gave an assurance
that the
possession of the petitioners in this case
would not be
disturbed ; all he wanted was a decision on the point.
In the absence of any counter evidence the learned trial
Judge accepted the
facts proved
by the petitioners'
affidavit and decided the matter in their favour.
On appeal the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay
High Court and
Bhagwati J. upheld the view of the
learned trial
Judge Tendolkar J.
In our opinion, the
burden was wrongly placed. Th<; petitioners came to
Court with the allegation that Government had passed
an illegal order against them. On the face of it, the
order is not illegal.
Government has authority under
the law to make such orders, and prima facie the order
complies with
the provisions of the statute.
It was
therefore the duty of the petitioners to show that the
order was illegal. This is particularly so here as the
question whether the petitioners had let or had intended
to let the building or a part of it was a matter on which
they had special means
of knowledge. However, m
view of the learned
Attorney-General's assurance, there
is no need to go into
this matter any further. This
appeal will accordingly be dismissed because
of
the
assurance given and there will be no order about costs
throughout.
In Civil Appeal No. 147 of 1952, the order of requisition was under section 5 ( 1) but the same questions
anse.
As in the other two cases, no public purpose is
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
787
mentioned and, as before, a second order setting out
the purpose, housing a person without accommodation,
was made in
August, 1951. For the
reasons already
given, we hold that
there was
a public purpose and
that the orders here were valid.
The
only
other
question,
namely
whether a
mandamus can issue now, becomes unnecessary.
Civil
Appeals Nos. 145
and 147 of
1952 are allowed and
the
petitions in these
two
cases
will be dismissed
but here also there
will be
no order about costs
throughout.
Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1952 will be dismissed because
of the undertaking
given
by the learned AttorneyGeneral, and the order of the
High
Court will stand.
In view of this we need not decide. whether a mandamus
can or should have been issued.
As we have said, this
appeal will be dismissed but there will be no order
about costs throughout.
Appeal dismissed.
SHREE
MEENAKSHI
MILLS LTD.,
MADURAI
v.
SRI A. V. VISVANATHA SASTRI
AND ANOTHER.
(With Connected Petitions.)
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., s. R. DAS,
GHULAM HASAN, BHAGWATI
and VENKATARAMA
AYYAR JJ.]
Constitution of India, Art. 14-Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of 1947), s. 5(1)-Whether ultra
vires the Constitution-S. 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 and Indian
Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 34 as amended by Indian Incometax (Amendment)
Act, 1954-Whether cover the same field-Discriminatory procedure before the date of Constitution and after the
date of Constitution-Validity thereof.
Parliament by amending s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax
Act,
1922, by passing the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act (XXXIII
of 1954) has now provided that cases of those very persons who
originally fell within the ambit of s. 5(1) of Taxation on Income
(Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of 1947) and who, it
1954
The State of
Bombay
v.
Bhanji Munji
and Anothn-.
Bose].
1954
October 21.