# SETH NANO LAL & ANR v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS

- **Citation:** [1980] 3 S.C.R. 1181
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1980-05-09
- **Case number:** CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1361 Of 1977
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/seth-nano-lal-anr-v-state-of-haryana-ors-7957
- **Pages:** 28

## Headnote

•
1181
SETH NANO LAL & ANR.
v.
STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.
May 9, 1980
1(Y .. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA hER,
V. D. TuLZAPURKAR & A. P. SEN, JJ.]
•
Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (Haryana Act 26 of 1972)-
.c~nstitutional validity of-Artificial definition of family unit-Sections
4(1),
4(3), 7, 8, 9, 11(1) and (2), whetill?r violate Article 14 of the Consti111tion.
The Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (Act 26 of 1972) received the assent of the President on 22-12·1972 and was publish\xl in the Oflicial
Gazette on 23-12-72. Section 2 contained and even now contains the requisite
deda.ation that it was enacfed for giving effect to the policy of the
State
towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Art. 39 of
the Constitution. The' Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution on 7·9-1974 a.nd, thereby, it came under the protective um1'rella of Art. 31B
of the c·onstitution.
In Saroj Kuniari's case A.LR. 1975 Punjab & Haryana 353 relying on an
·earlier decision of that Court in Sucha Singh's case A.LR. 1974 P & H 162, the
Punjab & Haryana High Court, being ·unaware of the inclusion of Act 26 of
1972 in the Ninth Schedule struck down certadn provisions of th:e Act on the
ground that these provisions violated the rights guaranteed by Part III of the
Constitution. •The Full Bench decision in Sucha Singh's case A.I.R. 1974 Punjab
& Hary~na 162 was reversed by the Supreme Court in Sucha Singh's case A.I.R.
1977 S.C. 915, taking the view that the provisions of Punjab Land Reforms Act
.are saved by both Articles 31A and 31B of the Constitution.
However, after the decision in Saroj Kumari's case, Act 26 of 1972 and--the
Rules framed under ~. 31, thereof were amended extensively; the Act was first
amended by Haryana Act 17 of 1976 which Amending Act was also put in the
Ninth Schedule; the Act was further a.nended by Harya.na Acts Nos. 40 and
47 of 1976, 14 of 1977 and 18' of 1978, but the last four Amending Acts were
not put in the Ninth S<:hedule.
Aft'el- the Principal Act was amended as above, several writ petitions were
, filed in the Punjab & Haryana High Court challeng"1g the vires of some of the
provisions of the Act.
The Division Bench dismissed all the writ petitions and
upheld the validity of all the provisions exC'ept •· WA which barred the appearance of any legal practitioner before any officer of authority other than the
Financial Commissioner in proceedings under the Act
Th'e Court took
the
view that such a provision was repugnant to s. 14 of the Indian Bar Councils
Act (which had continued in force in view of s. 30 of the Advocates Act 1961
not having come into force), and therefote ultra vires and invalid.
In their appeals by special leave the appellants have challenged some of the
provi!dons of the Act on the grounds substantially different from those that were
utged before the High Court. Besides their appeals, a large number of writ
A
B
c
D
E
F
G"
H
1182
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1980] 3 S.C.R.
A
petitions and also special leave petitions have b"een filed raising almost identical
grounds of challenge to the provisions of the Principal Act (26 of 1972)
as
amended from time to time.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
Dismissing the appeals and the JX!titions, the Court
HELD : 1. The amendments effected in the Principal Act by Amending Act
17 ol 1976 will receive the protective umbrella of Art. 3!B but not the amend·
ments effected by Acts Nos. 40 & 47 of 1976, 14 of 1977 and 18 of 1978.
Moreover, though the Principal Act as amended by Act 17 of 1976, will be
under the protective umbrella of Art. 31B, the Haryana Ceiling on
I...aLJ
Holdings Rules, 1973 as originally framed or eve" after amendments,
being
subordinate legislation and not specified in the Ninth Schedule may not receive
such protection.
Prag Ice and Oil Mills & Anr. v. Union of India, [1978]
3 S.C.R.
293,
applied.
2. The Principal Act (Act 26 of 1972) together with all the amendments
made therein which essen

## Text

_Characters 0–39,969 of 81,090. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39969 for what follows._

•
1181
SETH NANO LAL & ANR.
v.
STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.
May 9, 1980
1(Y .. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA hER,
V. D. TuLZAPURKAR & A. P. SEN, JJ.]
•
Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (Haryana Act 26 of 1972)-
.c~nstitutional validity of-Artificial definition of family unit-Sections
4(1),
4(3), 7, 8, 9, 11(1) and (2), whetill?r violate Article 14 of the Consti111tion.
The Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (Act 26 of 1972) received the assent of the President on 22-12·1972 and was publish\xl in the Oflicial
Gazette on 23-12-72. Section 2 contained and even now contains the requisite
deda.ation that it was enacfed for giving effect to the policy of the
State
towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Art. 39 of
the Constitution. The' Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution on 7·9-1974 a.nd, thereby, it came under the protective um1'rella of Art. 31B
of the c·onstitution.
In Saroj Kuniari's case A.LR. 1975 Punjab & Haryana 353 relying on an
·earlier decision of that Court in Sucha Singh's case A.LR. 1974 P & H 162, the
Punjab & Haryana High Court, being ·unaware of the inclusion of Act 26 of
1972 in the Ninth Schedule struck down certadn provisions of th:e Act on the
ground that these provisions violated the rights guaranteed by Part III of the
Constitution. •The Full Bench decision in Sucha Singh's case A.I.R. 1974 Punjab
& Hary~na 162 was reversed by the Supreme Court in Sucha Singh's case A.I.R.
1977 S.C. 915, taking the view that the provisions of Punjab Land Reforms Act
.are saved by both Articles 31A and 31B of the Constitution.
However, after the decision in Saroj Kumari's case, Act 26 of 1972 and--the
Rules framed under ~. 31, thereof were amended extensively; the Act was first
amended by Haryana Act 17 of 1976 which Amending Act was also put in the
Ninth Schedule; the Act was further a.nended by Harya.na Acts Nos. 40 and
47 of 1976, 14 of 1977 and 18' of 1978, but the last four Amending Acts were
not put in the Ninth S<:hedule.
Aft'el- the Principal Act was amended as above, several writ petitions were
, filed in the Punjab & Haryana High Court challeng"1g the vires of some of the
provisions of the Act.
The Division Bench dismissed all the writ petitions and
upheld the validity of all the provisions exC'ept •· WA which barred the appearance of any legal practitioner before any officer of authority other than the
Financial Commissioner in proceedings under the Act
Th'e Court took
the
view that such a provision was repugnant to s. 14 of the Indian Bar Councils
Act (which had continued in force in view of s. 30 of the Advocates Act 1961
not having come into force), and therefote ultra vires and invalid.
In their appeals by special leave the appellants have challenged some of the
provi!dons of the Act on the grounds substantially different from those that were
utged before the High Court. Besides their appeals, a large number of writ
A
B
c
D
E
F
G"
H
1182
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1980] 3 S.C.R.
A
petitions and also special leave petitions have b"een filed raising almost identical
grounds of challenge to the provisions of the Principal Act (26 of 1972)
as
amended from time to time.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
Dismissing the appeals and the JX!titions, the Court
HELD : 1. The amendments effected in the Principal Act by Amending Act
17 ol 1976 will receive the protective umbrella of Art. 3!B but not the amend·
ments effected by Acts Nos. 40 & 47 of 1976, 14 of 1977 and 18 of 1978.
Moreover, though the Principal Act as amended by Act 17 of 1976, will be
under the protective umbrella of Art. 31B, the Haryana Ceiling on
I...aLJ
Holdings Rules, 1973 as originally framed or eve" after amendments,
being
subordinate legislation and not specified in the Ninth Schedule may not receive
such protection.
Prag Ice and Oil Mills & Anr. v. Union of India, [1978]
3 S.C.R.
293,
applied.
2. The Principal Act (Act 26 of 1972) together with all the amendments
made therein which essentially is meant for imposition of ceiling on agricultural
holdings and acquisition and distribution of the surplus area to landless and
\veaker sections of the society is in substance and reality an enactment dealing
with agrarian reform and squarely falls within Art. 31A of the Constitution and
as. such will enjoy the immunity from the attack on the ground of inconsistency
with or abridgments of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Arts. 14,
1' and 31.
[1192 H, 1193 A-C]
Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v.
U11io11 of India etc. etc. [1952] 3 S.C.R. 89~'
Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, [1973] Suppl. S.C.R. I, State of Bil1ar
v. Kameshwar Singh, (1952] 3 S.C.R. 252 followed.
3. A reading of ss. 4(1), 4(3), 7, 8, 9 and 11 (I) and (2) makes two or
three aspects very clear, namely, (i) there is no doubt that for the purpose of
the Act the concept of family has been defined in an artificial manner as meaning
husband, wife and their minor children and exclusive of major sons and unmarried daughters. (ii) Under s. 4(1) "the primary unit of family .. is confined to
five metnbers, namely, husband, wife and their minor children upto three with
reference to Which permissible area has been prescribed, but under s. 4(2) the
permissible area is said to increase by one-fifth of the permissible area of the
primary unit for each additional member of the fan1ily, such as the fourth or
fifth minor c-hild etc. but subject to the maximum limit prescribed in the proviso,
namely, che permissible area shall not exceed ·twice the permissible area of the
primary unit of the family and (iii) in respect of each unit, namely, each adult
son living with his parents the permissible area will be 'further increased up to
the permissible area of the primary unit of a family under s. 4(3 ), provided
that where the adult son also owns any.la.nd the same shall be taken into account
for calculating the permissible area. In other words, in cases where the primar;:
units of family owns or holds land [say 54 acres under cl. (I) (c) of s. 4] and
an adult son living with the family also owns or holds similar 1and of his ov;'n
(say acfes) then the permissible area for the family will be 108 acres after
clubbing the two holdings under s. 4(3) and there will be no question of any
augmcnt:l!tion of area for the family but in cases where the separate unit (•<lult
son) owns or bolds no land of his own but is living with the family the primary
unit's holding gets augmented up to two units, that is to say, the family will be
entitled to retain 1081 acres and the balance will be surplus simply because the
• •
•
"'
• •
NAND LAL V. HARYANA
1183
adult son is living with the family; but no such augmentation will occur if
A.
unmarried daughter or daughters are living with the family or if the adult son is
living away separately from the family. [1195 C-H, 1196 A]
4. It is true tbat provisions pertaining to artificial definition of family and
the adoption of double standard for fixation of ceiling contained in the instant
Act are similar to those w~ich obtained in the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act,
1961 and the M'1dras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961,
but even so, there are two . distinguishing features which would make the ratio
of these two decisions dealing with those Acts reported in 1962 Sup. 2 SCR 829
and 1964 (7) · SCR 82 inapplicable to the instant case. In the first place, in
both these decisions it was an admitted position that the concerned enactments
were not governed by or protected under Art. 3 lA of the Constitution s.nd it
was in the absence of such protection that the attack to the material provisions
of !be enactments on the ground of violation of Art. 14 was entertained by this
Court. At page 833 of the Report in the first case, there is a categorical statement made to the effect that the concerned Act, so far as it affected the petitioners therein, V{as not protected under Art. 3 lA and it was open to assail it as
violative of the rights conferred on them by Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Similarly at page 84 of the Report in the second case, there is a Statement
to the similar effect that the Madras Act was not protected under Art. 31A of
the Constitution and it was in that background that the Court considered the
attack based on Art. 14 on the two main provisions of the Act relating to ceiling
area under s. 5 and compensation under s. 50 read with Schedule III of the Act.
In the instant case it caunot be disputed that Principal Act (26 of 1972) as
· amended subs~ently is a piece of agrarian reform legislation squarely falling
with Art. 3 lA of the Constitution and, therefore, the Act,. and the concerned
provisions would be immune from attack based on Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the
Constitution. Secondly, in both these decisions, no material by ~ay of justification was put before the Court on behalf of the State for the adoption of the
doubie standard in the matter of fixing the ceiling read with the artificial definition of the family which resulted in discriminatory results-and this has been
specifically mentioned by the Court in both the judgments, while in the instant
case on behalf of the State of Haryana ample material has been produced before
the Court justifying the adoption of the artificial definition of family and the
double standard for fixing the ceiling negativing the violation of Art. 14.
[1197 C-H, 1198 Al
The materials produced before the Court make it clear that the State had
applied its nund seriously to these questions : whether family should be adopted
as a unit instead of an individual for applying ceiling on land holdings, what
should be the size of the family, why artificial definition of the family should be
adopted and why adoption of double standard-one for the primary unit of the
family and another in respect of a separate ·unit when living with, the family
was felt necessary, what type of and in what cases clubbing should be prescribed
etc. All these questions were considered having regard to the social and economic realities of our rural life and with a view to nullifying the transfers effected
in favour of close relations for the purpose· of avoiding the impact of ceiling
legislation. [1198 D-H, 1199 Al
Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kera/a, [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 829; A. P.
c
E
F
G
Krishnasami Naidu v. State of Madras [1964] 7 S.C.R. 82; explained and
distinguished.
H
5. An enactment .particularly the enactment dealing with agrarian reform
whieh has been put on the Statute Book with the avowed purpose of bringing
A
B
c
D
E
1184
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1980) 3 S.C.R.
about equality or rather reducing the· inequality between the haves and have~nois
cannot be struck down as being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution simply
because it has failed to make a provision for what was regarded as an exceptional case or a rare contingency. The material furnished on behalf of the
State Government by way of justification for adopting an artificial definition of
family and double standard for fixing ceiling is sufficient to repel the attack on
these provisions under Art. 14. [1199 E-G]
Adopting "family'~ as a unit as against "an individual" was
considered
necessary as that would reduce the scope for evasion of law by effecting 1nala fide
partitions and transfers since such transactions are usually made in favour of
family members, that normally in rur3.1 agricultural set up in our country the
family is the operative unit and all the lands of a family constitute a single
operational holding and that therefore ceiling should be related to the capacity
of a family to cultivate the lands personally.
(1198 G-H, 1199 Al
In fact, a provision like s. 4(3) which makes for the augmentation of the
permissible area for a family when the adult sons do not on or hold lands of
their own but are living with the family has one virtue, that it ~nsures such
augmentation in the case of every family irrespective of by what personal law
it is governed, and no discrimination is made between major sons governed by
different systems of personal laws. So far as an adult son living separately
from the family is concerned, he is rightly regarded as a separate unit who wilJ
have to file a separate· declaration in respect of his holding under s. 9 of the Act
and since he is living separately and would not be contributing his capacity to
the family io cultivate the family lands personally there is no justification for
increasing the permissible area of the primary unit of the family. , The case
of an unmarried daughter or daughters living with the family, was probably
considered to be a rare case and it was presuriled that daughters \\'ou!d become
members of their husband's units, and that is why no separate provisi1Jn was
made for giving additional land for every unmarried major daughter living with
the family.
[1199 A-E, 1199 G-H, 1200 Al
6. There is no question of any discrimination resulting to the wife from
the right of selection being given to the husband under s. 9(4)(c) of the
Act. In the first place, the selection of permissible area which is desired to _
F
be retained will ordinarily be guided by the consideration of retaining
the
best quality land with the family, be it of the husband or of the \Vife or even
of the minor children, and not by the consideration as to whose land should
be sacrificed.
But, apart from this aspect of the matter, it is precisely to meet
1
~
such situation that s. 11 (2) has been enacted which provides that the land
as retained as permissible area of the family and the separate unit shall be
owned or held by the members of the family .nnd also separate unit in the
G
same proportion in which they owned or held land before the selection of the
permissible area. In other words if out of sheer cussedness, the husband
were to select his land which he desires to retain as the permissible
area
and gives away his wife's land as surplus, he· will do so at his peril, for in
• •
the land so retained as permissible
area he and his wife shall have a share
1'~-~
H
in the same proportion in which they owned or held their lands before the
selection of the permissible area.
[1200 D. E-H]
7. Section 8 of the A.ct is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Under sub-s. (3) it is provided that if any person transfers any land after the
appointed day in contravention of sub-s. (1), the land as tmnsferred shall be
•
• •
•'(
NAND LAL V. HARYANA
1185
·deemed to be owned or held by that person in calculating the permissible
A
...area and his surph~s area over and above the permissible area will be determined
by ignoring the transfer and in case the area left with him after such transfet
is equal
to the
surplus
area
as: .calculated, the entire area left with
him sha11
be deemed to be · the surplus area meaning thereby the same
shall vest in the State Government. Here again, if tire husband's behaviour
is guided by self-interest, as it would normally be, he would be indulging
in the type of activity complained of at his own peril for he
would
B
not only be putting his own land into jeopardy of litigation but also lose the
wife's Ialtd which will become surplus and vest in the State Government.
[1201 A·D]
8. It is s. 7 of the Act which imposes a ceiling on agricultural land ·oy
providing that no person shall be entitled to hold, whether as a ta·ndowner
·or as a tenant or as a mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity or
partly in other, within the State of Haryana exceeding the permissible area on
C
or after the ap11ointed day (24-1-1971). "Permissible area" u'nder s. 3(1) means
the extent of land specified as such in s. 4. For the purpose of determination
·Of permissible area s.
( 4) divide land
into three categories and prescribes
the permissible area in respect of each of ·the said categories A, B & C. For
evaluation of the larids held by a person for determining his permissible area
.~one is required to turn to the Rules made in that behalf being Rules 5(1)
and 5(2) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules 1973, for s. 4(4)
D
-o~ says that evaluation is to be made. in the 'manner prescribed'
which
must mean the manner prescribed by Rules. Fixation of the extent of permi~
ssible area has been actually done by s.4(1) itself inasmuch as the said provi'Sion apart from dividing land into three categories prescribCs and fixes the
-extent of permissible area in respect of each of the three categ-0ries, the extent being mdntioned against each iand it is merely the basis of evaluation to
be made for determining the permissible area that is left for being presE
cribed by Rules.
[1202 A-C, p-H, 1204 D-E]
9. It is fairly clear that the three -categories into which s.4 (1) divides
land for determination of permissible area are mutually exclusive and ordi-
.narily if a land-holder is able to establish that the land hold by him exclusively
·falls within one or the other category his permissible area would get straightaway determiD.ed by the extent specified in the section against each category
and it is only when a land-holder has lands of more than one category that
F
his permissible area shall have to be determined on t'he basis of evaluation
to be made in the prescribed nxmner under s. 4(4) read with Rules
5(1)
and 5(2). This is made clear by the opening words of Rule 5(1), namely,
"the land held by a person shall be evaluated by converting various cate·
gorics. Prescribed lnanner is to be tfound in Qoth the Ru1es, namely, Rules
5(1) and 5(2) and not merely in one or the other, but it is celar that the
two Rules deal with different topies and operate in different fields; whereas
G
Rule 5(1) indicates the inter relation betweeri different categories of land by
prescribing the equating formula, Rule 5(2) provides for mathematical formula for arriving at the correct figures of different categories of
lands by
reference to irrigation intensity ratio speci~ed against each of the Government
canals or tubewells mentioned iii the Schedule as also in case of land irrigated
·by private tube·wellS: and pumping sets. It is not correct to say that while
furnishing illustrations under Rule 5(2) Rule 5(1) has been ignored; in faet,
B
the lint illustration giyen. under Rule 5(2)(a), while applying the mathemati-
.cal formula takes into
consideration the inter-relation
mentioned in Rule
5(1) and tllere is no question of Rule 5(2)(a) in its application doing reverse
A
B
c
D
E
1186
SUPll.EME COURT REPORTS
[1980] 3 S.C.R.
of what Rule 5(1) lays down. Further, if the first illus.tration given below Rule
5(2)(a) is carefully analysed it will be clear there is nothing like Rule 5(2)
(a) going beyond s. 4(1) of the Act and there is no question of reducing the·
permissible area of a person from 21.8 hectares to only 13.88 hectares.
In
that illustration certain basic facts are assume(i to exist, namely, the person
is holding 25 hectares of land command.ed for irrigation by a pere~ial canal
the irrigation intensity ratio where of is 57% and on these facts the illustra~
tion works out his permissible area.
First by applying the matheill0.tical formula given in Rule 5(2) (a) the extent of 'A category land' is computed nt
7.12 hectares.
(Incidentally the very fact that 25 hectares of land commanded
for irrigation by a
perennial canal
having the
irrigation
intensity ratio of
51%
can
comprise
'A
category
land'
upto
7.12
hectares
negatives.
the contention that to have
'A category land' the canal must have
intensity
ratio
of 200%
per annum or to
have
'B
category
land'·
tlle canal must have intensity ratio of 100%
per annum or that any
land' irrigated by a canal having less than l OO!f0 per annum ~ intensity ratio
must be categorised as 'C category land'). Therefore, after ·deducting 7 .12
hectares as 'A category land' out of 25 hectares, the balance 17.88 hectares
is said to be 'C category land'. Then by applying the equating formula
in;·
Rule 5 ( 1) his entire holding of 25 hectares
is converted into national 'C
category land' (7.12 x 3 would give 21.36 to which 17.88 is added)
whic~
comes to 39.24. But in reality he holds only 25
hectares. Therefore,
by
applying the rule of three his permissible area in 'C category land' would be
13.88 hectares and the balance of 11.12 hectares is declared to be surplils.
There is no reduction of 'C category land' from 21.8 hectares to 13.88 hectar~, for if out of 25 hectares 21.8 hectares were to be allowed to the landholder as 'C' category land by invoking s. 4(1) or only Rule 5(1) that will
be ignoring the fact that out of his total holding an area to the extent of 7.12'
hectares has the potential of 'A' category land and, therefore., giving him 21.8
hectares as 'C' category land would be clearly wrong. Therefore, Rule 5(2)
of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holding Rules 1973 is valid. [1204 H, 1205
A-H, 1206 A-D]
10. The amount payable for such
surplus land that vests in
the State'
F
Government is to be calculated at the rates shown in the Table given below
s. 16 ( 1) and it is clear that the rates a~ based on the actual quality of the·
'soil and its yield and the same cannot be said' to be illusory.
[1206 D-E]
H
11. The right of appeal is a creature of a statute and there is no reasonwhy the legislature while granting the righr cannot impose conditions for the·
exercise of such right so long as the
conditions
are not so onerous
as
to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right
almost
illusory.
[1207 F]
Neither the amended s. 18(7) is onerous in nat~re nor do that sub-section
a_nd sub-s~ction (8~ of s. 18 put any fetter on the right of appeal and revision provided for 1n s. 18(1) and (2) as originally enaCted in 1972.
In the·
first plate, the obj:ct of imposing the condition is obviously to prevent frivolous appeal.s revision thar impede the implementation of the ceiling policy;
secondly, having regard to ·sub-ss.
(5) EJ.nd (9) it is clear that the
cash
deposit or bank guarantee is not by way of any exaction but in the nature
of securing mesne profits
from the person who is ultimately found to be in
unlawful possession of the land; thirdly, the deposit or the guarantee
is soreleted to the land holdings tax (30 times the tax) which, varies in the State·
I
...
• •
>
•
• •
NANO LAL V. HARYANA
1187
of Haryana around a paltry amount of Rs. 8/- per acre annually; fourthly,
A
the deposit to be made or bank guarantee to be furnished is confined to the
Jaod holdings tax payable .in re~ct of the disputed area i.e., the area or part
tha'eof which is declared a surplus after leaving the pelllllifible area to the
appellant or petitioner.
Having
regard t'o these aspects,
particularly the
meagre rate of the annual land tax payable, the fetter imposed on the right
of appeal/revision, even in the absence .of a provision_ conferring discretion
OQ the appellate/revisional authority to relax or waive the condition, cannot
B
be regarded as onerous or unreasonable. [1207 G-H, 1208 A-DJ
Anant Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat A.LR. 1975 S.C. 1234 applied .
12. Section 8 (3) of the Act does not violate the second proviso of s. 31A.
The Act including -
the said provision having been included in the Ninth
Schedule will receive the protection of Art. 3JB. [1208 D-E]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1361 Of 1977
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
the 17-3-1977 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in
Writ Petition No. 4766of1976
AND
CIVIL APPEALS NOS. 2785-86, 2935-38, 2893, 2823-25,
2235, 1348, 1362~74, 1525-27, 2022-23, 2144, 22:t4, 2707, 2710, 2831,
2723-24, 2423-26, 2805--09/77,976, 843-44, 1263, 56--67, 1010-1014,
1076, 1898-1901, 1902-16,2043-47, 2064, 1674-76, 120-27, 1079,
291, 318-19, 132, 546, 547, 671, 941-45, 946, 949, 1650, 1876, 18781895, 1813, 1829, 176-77, 139, 276, 576, 581-83, 1645-48, 1554,
992-998, 1789-1803, 1831-33, 2071-74, 2162, 2216, 2233, 2234,
2294, 2436-39 of 1978 & 2725 of 1977.
WITH
S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 3498-99, 4270, 4419, 4420, 4455, 4735, 5205,
5238/77, 63, 64, 65, 99, 352-353, 442, 443, 454, 455, 608, 635, 622,
623, 778-79, 1819, 1303, 1312, 1414, 1404, 1573, 1576-79, 1715, 1842,
1849-50, 1959, 2370, 2013-14, 2414, 2462, 2491-92, 3102·03, 3225-26,
3569, 3413, 3476, 1423, 4072, 3519, 3521, .3541-44, 3715, 3746, 3819,
3857-58, 3891-96, 4052, 4539, 4500-11, *4655-67, 4617, 4815-17,
4818, 4830, 4831-34, 4836-37, 4849, 4864-76, 4966, 4972, *4973-81,
4983A-5002, 5004-7, 5030, 4850-51, 4863, 5008-22, 5024, 5025,
5049, 512£-29, '5174-84, 5272, 5211, 5250-57, 5271, 5290-93,
53~46, 5385, 5402-08, 541;l-15, 5454, 5460-72, 5516-19, 5628,
5625, 5634-36, 5637-44, 5646-47, 5786'87, 5788-90, 5869-72,
5873, 5907-24, 5939-40, '597C-74,*5975-84, 6C02, 6120, 6126-33,
6158-62, 6208, 6209, 6240, 621£-18, 6246-47, 6361-62, 6395, 6421,
6449-53, 6582, 6645-49, 6677-78, 6654, 6656, 6669/78 and 200-214
& 215/80 ( *4662/78, 4974/98 and 5975-5977/78 Withdrawn)
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B
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D
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1188
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1980] 3 s.C.R.
WITH
WRIT PETITION NOS. 4306, 4312, 43.77 & 4507 of 78.
M.N. Phadke, Nisha! Singh, B.P. Maheshwari, Sureslz Sethi,
V.M. Tarkunde, Naunit Lal and Naurang Singh, for the appellant/
petitioners in Civil Appeals 2785-86, 2935-38, 2234-35, 2707-10, 2831
2805-9/77, 120-22, 318-19, 671, 176, 276, 2071-84/78, 177, 2216/78,
SLPS. 91-93/78 3541--44, 5126-29, 6216-18, 6421, 5308/78 and
WP 4377, tA 2893/77.,
R.K Mohan and Mrs. Geetanja/i Mohan for th~ appellants/petitioners in CAs. 2823-25, 1525-27, 2022-23/77, 2069-70/78, 1813/78,
2144, 2423-26/77, 1263, 56-67, 1010-14, 1898-1901, 1902--16,
2064--68, 1392, 291, 546-47, 941--45, 946-49, 139, 576, 1789-1803
1828, 2436-39/78, SLPs. 442, 443, 454, 608, 635, 778, 779, 1819, 1401,
1414, 1573, 1576-79, 1849-50, 2013-14, 2414, 2462, 3102-3,!3225-26,
3369, 3746, 5272, 3819, 3857-58, 3891-96, 4052, 4500-11, 4655--67
4983A-5002, 5174--84, 5460-72, 5907-24, 5970-74, 6126-33,
6645--49, 6677-78/78 4270, 4455, 4735, 5205 & 5238/77 & 5030/78.
V.M. Tarkunde, O.P. Malhotra, P.R. Mridul, H.K. Puri, for
the appellant in CAs. 1348, 1362-74/77 & petitioners in SLPs. 4539
and 562/78.
NC. Sikri for the appellants in CAs. 2723-24/77 & 2725/77.
Lakshmi Arvind for the appellants in CAs. 976, 1076/78 &
petitioners in SLPs. 622, 623, 1715/78 and WP No. 4312.
S.K. Mehta for the appellants in CAs. 843-44, 546/78& petitioners
in SLPs. 4815-17, 5008-22, 5024, 5025, 5290-93, 5340-46, 5869-72 !
of 1978, 4419-20/77.
S.M. Ashri S.S. Sharma for the appellants in CAs. 2043--47,
1831-34/78 & petitioners in SLPs. 4617, 4830, 5454, 5628, 6246-47/78
& 4863/78.
R.S. Mittal and A. Minocha for the appellants in CAs. 1674-76,
1554/78 & petitioners in SLPs. 5873/78, 5646-47/78.
M.B. Lal for the appellants in CA. 1079/78.
B.P. Maheshwari and S. Grewal for the appellants in CA. 132/78
& petitioners. in SLPs. 63-65, 99, 352, 353, 455/78, 208-14/80,
209-245/80.
Sarva Mitter. for the appellants in CAs. 1650, 1878-89/78,
H
1890-95/78, and petitioners in SLPs. 4831-34,.4836, 4837, 4864, 76,
4966, 5250-57, 5402-8, 5634-44, 5646-47, 5975-5984, 6158--62,
6449-6453, 6654/78, 5271/78.
•
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NAND LAL v. HARYANA (Tulzapurkar, !.)
1189
S.K. Sabharwal for the appellants in CAs. 1876, 1645-48/78
A
and petitioners in SLPs. 3519, 4972, 5004-5007, 6120/78 and WP.
4507/78.
)
S.C. Patel for the appellants in~CAs. 581-83/78, and petitioners
in SLPs.(C). 1842/78, 3521, 4849, 4850-51/78.
Manoj Kumar for the appellants in CAs. 992-98/78,
S.K. Dhingra for the appellants in CAs.2162/78 and .petitioners
m SLPs. 4973-81, 6361-62, 6395, 5413-5415/78.
D. Goburdhan for the appellants in CAs. 02233, 2234/78 and petitioners in SLPs. 5309-10/78.
Ramesh Chand for the appellants in CA. 2294/78.
C-
/.S. Ratta, Vimal Dave and Miss K. Mehta for the petitioners in
· WP. 4306/77 and SLPs. 3498-99/77.
R. Bana for the petitioners in SLPs.1303/78, 2370, 3413, 3476,
6002, 1423, 4072/78 & 1312/78.
Harbans Singh for the petitioners in SLPs. 1959/78, 5939-40/78.
Rameshwar Nath for the petitioners in SLP.'.3715f78.
R.C. Kohli for the petitioners in SLP. 5049/78.
S.R. Srivastava for the petitioners in SLP.5211/78.
'
· S.K. Bagga for the petitioners in SLP. 5385/78.
J.D. Jain for the petitioners in SLPs. 5516-19, 5786-90, 6208,
6656, 6669/78, 4818, 6239-40/78 ..
K.K
Vem'!_opal, B. Datta, M.N. Shroff, Hemantika Wahi,
Anup Sachthey, Miss A. Subhashini, for appearing respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
TuLZAPURKAR, J. These appeals, by special leave, directed against
the Full Bench d.;;cision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Jaswant Kaur' s (') dse, seek to challenge the vires of some of the proE
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visions of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1972 (26 of
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1972) and accor~ing to the appellants some of the provisions are
pivotal and run through the whole Act and. therefore. the entire Act
~
is liable lo be Strl/Ck down.
The Act (26 of 1972) received the assent
of the President on
22-12-1972 and ~as published in the Official Gazette on 23-12-1972.
B
Section 2 contained and even now contains the requisite declaration
(!) A.l.R. 1977 Punjab & Haryana 221.
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1190
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1980] 3 S.C.R.
that it was enacted for giving effect to the policy of the State towards
securing the principles specified in els. (b) and (c) of Art. 39 of
the Constitution.
The Act was included in the Ninth Schedule
to
the Constitution on 7-9-1974 (vide: Item 72), and,
thereby.
it
came under the protective umbrella of Art. -31-B of the Constitution;
however, on 9-9-1974 in Saroj Kumari's(') case a Division Bench
of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, being apparently unaware of
such inclusion, struck down certain provisions of the
Act on the
ground that those provisions violated the rights guaranteed by Part
III of the Constitution.
The Division Bench also held that the provisions were not saved by Art. 31-A of the Constitution as those
provision which mainly related to 'Family Unit', could not be said
to be in furtherance of Art. 3 9 (b) and ( c) of the Constitution. In
so holding, the Division . Bench relied on a Full Bench decision of
that Court in Sucha Singh's( 2 ) case where similar provisions of the
Punjab Land Reforms Act (Act 10 of 1973) had been struck down.
The Full Bench decision in Sucha Singh's case (supra) has
since
been reversed by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 1040 of 1976 (reported in AIR 1977 SC 915). This Court has taken the view that
the provisions of Punjab Land Reforms Act are saved by both Aris·
31-A and 31-B of the Constitution. The foundation on which the
decision in Saroj Kumari's case (supra) striking down certain provisions of the Haryana Act (26 of 1972) rested
has thus disE
appeared.
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However, after the decision in Saroj Kumari's case (supra) the
Act (26 of 1972) and the Rules framed under s.
31 thereof were
amended extensively; the Act was
first amended by Haryana Act
17 of 1976 which Amending Act was also put in the Ninth Schedule
(vide : Item No. 137); the Act was further amended by Haryana
Acts Nos. 40 and 47 of 1976, 14 of 1977 and 18 of 1978, but the
last four Amending Acts have not been put in the Ninth Schedule.
It is, therefore,
clear that the amendments effected in the Principal
Act by Amending Act 17 of 1976 will
receive the protective
umbrella of Art. 31-B but not the amendments effected by the last
four Acts.
Moreover, though the Principal Act as amended by Act
17 of 1976 will be under the protective umbrella of Art. 31-B, the
Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973 as originally framed
or even after
amendments, being subordinate
legislation and not
specified in the Ninth Schednle may not
receive such
protection
(Vide : Prag lee & Oil Mills(8) case) .
(1) A.I.R. 1975 Punjab & Haryana 353.
(2) AIR 1974 P & H. 162,
(3) [1978] 3 SCR 293.
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Ill
NANb LAL v. HARYANA (Tulzapurkar, J.)
1191
'
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After the Pi!incipal Act (26 of 1972) was
amended as above,
several writ petifions were filed in the High Court. ~ Punjab & Har· ·
yana challenging the 'vires of some of the
prov1Sions of the Act.
Since the Princit. al Act as well as the Amending Act 17 of 1976
had been put i
Ninth Schedule, the
challenge was based on the
ground that tho e . provisions were vague, uncertain, ambiguous and
.mutually incons~tent and, therefore, should be struck down
~nd
neither Art. 31-{\ nor Art. 31-B of the Constitution co~d save s~ch
provisionsThe!, High Court rejected the
plea, and m our
view
.rightly, on the g/-ound that a statute enacted by a Legislature fallin!l
within its compeience which did not offend any Fundamental Rights
guaranteed by Pint ill of the Constitution arid which did not contravene any othe~ provision of the Constitution could not be declared
.ultra vires eithe~r'. on the ground tha~ its ~rovisions were vague'. or
uncertain or am guous or mutually mcons1stent. The Court pointed
out that unlike
e American Constitution,. there was no 'due process'
-clause in our Cqnstitution and, therefore. Indian Courts could not
declare a statute 1invalid on the ground that it contained vague, un-
·certain, ambigum\s or muluany inconsistent pmvisions, and that it
was the duty an4 function of the Indian Court in relation to each
forensic situationj to examine the language of the law, the context
in which it was inade, to discover the intenticn of 1]ie Legislature
·and to the interprpt the law to make effective and not to frustrate the
legislative intent 'nd in that behalf it could always call in aid wellknown canons of1 interpretation and even where the provisions of a
statute appeared ~ be mutually inconsistent there were several wellknown rules of itj.terpretation to guide the Court in giving a proper
meaning to the provisions of a statute, such a1;, the rule of harmonious constructio~j _the rule th~t special shall pn~vail over the general
etc.
After negatrying the mam plea, the Court went on to examine
the concerned pr9visions which were said to be vague or uncertain
and mutually incqnsistent and came to the conclusion that certain
expressions which i were said to be vague were not so vague but had
d~ite import a~4 conn?tation and that apparently inconsistent proVIs1ons were not ujrcconc1lable and all of them fitted
well into the
general scheme of I the Act.
The only provision in respect of which
relief was granted ~y the_ ~ourt was s. 20A which barred the appearance of any legal I practitioner before any officer of authority other
than the Financial' C~mmissioner in proceedings under the Act, and
the Court took th~ VIew that such a provision was repugnant to s.
1_4 of the lhdian ~ar Councils Act (which had mntinued in force in
view ef s. 30 ~f t~~
Advo~ates Act not havin1~ come into force)
and, ~erefore, mvahd.
Sub1ect to holding s. 20A of the Act to be
ultra vires and, ther~fore, issuing a direction to the State not to enforce
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1192
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1980] 3 s.c.R.
A
the said provision and subject to giving some further directions in
the matter of filing declarations etc. before the authorities nnder the
Act, the Court dismissed all the writ petitions. In these appeals the
appellants have challenged some
of the provisions of the
Act on
gronnds substantially different from those that were urged before the
High Court.
B
c
Besides these Civil Appeals, a large number of writ petitions as
also petitions for special leave have been filed listed before us
where in almost identical points have been raised challenging the provisions of the Principal Act (26 of 1972) as amended from time to
time and those also will sta'nd disposed of by this judgment.
lti is true that since the Principal Act (26 of 1972) as also the
first Amending Act 17 of 1976 have been put in the Ninth Schedule,
connsel for the appellants !)ave challenged the constitutional validity
of Art. 31-B as
also of the' Constitution
(34th Amendment) Act
D
1974 and the Constitution (40th Amendment) Act 1976 whereby
the Principal Act as well as the first Amending Act were put in t!!e
Ninth Schedule on the ground that Art. 31-B and these Constitutional.
Amendments violated the basic structure or features of the Constitution. Sinn1arly since the Principal Act contains the requisite declaration nnder s.2 thereof th~t the enactment is for the purpose of giving
E effect to the directive principles enshrined in Art. 39 (b) and
( c),
counsel for the appellants have also challenged the
constitutional
validity of Art. 31-C as being violative of the basic features of the
Constitution.
However, apart from these aspects, it cam1ot be gainsaid that the Principal Act (26 of 1972) as amended from time to
Jl
time, if it falls within Art. 31-A of the Constitution, would be immune
from the attack on the ground of inconsistency with or abridgement
of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 and 31.
The constitutional validity of Art. 31-A has all along been upheld
by this Court since Sankar Prasad's(') case and its validity was not put
in issue in Keshavananda Bharati's(2 ) case but the constitutional validity of Art. 31C was sought to be canvassed by reference to Art. 31A.
Moreover, consequent upon the introduction of Art. 3 lA in the Constitution in 1951 this Court has repelled the challenge to land reform
laws as violative of fnndamental rights conferred by Arts.14, 19 or
31 in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh( 3).
In our view, it is
manifestly clear that the Principal Act (26 of 1972) together with•
G
H
(I) [1952] 3 SCR 89.
· (2) [1973] Suppl. SCR I,
(3) A1ll 1952 SC 252.
,..
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el'<
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I
·;.j;{
_if.
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NAND LAL v. llMlYANA (Tulzapurkar, !.)
1193
all the amendments made therein which essentially is meant for imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings and acquisition and distribution ()f the surplus area to landless and weaker sections of the society
is in substance and reality an en11Ctrnent dealing with agrarian reform
an\! squarely falls within Art. 3 lA of the Constitution and as such
will enjoy the immunity mentioned above. The challenges made before
us to some specific provisions of the Act will, therefore. assume
different complexion and will have to be dealt with accordingly.
·
The principal attack made against the Act is that it enacts an artificial definition of 'family' in s.3(f), which does not conform to any
kind of natural families prevalent in the State like a Hindu Undivided
Family known to Hindu Law or any family under Muslim Law etc.
and that a double standard has been adopted in s. 4 in the matter of
providing ceiling which leads to gross inequalities and as such these
provisions are violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Counsel for
the appellants urged
that this artificial definition of 'family' given
in s. 3 ( f) is required to be read with two other definitions, namely;
the definition of 'permissible area' given in s.3 (1) ahd the definition
of 'separate unit' given in s. 3 ( q) and read in that fashion the artificial
definition of family alongwith s.4, which prescribes permissible area
by adopting double standard for fixing ceiling in the case of 'primary
unit of family' and 'separate unit' produces discriminatory results and
according to him since the definition of family is pivotal and occurs
in major provisions of the Act such as sections 4(1), 4(3). 7, 8, 9,
and 11 ( 1) , it wm render the whole Act unconstitutional as being
· violative of Art. 14i of the Constitution. He also _ urged that these
major provisions thr_ough which the artificial definition of family runs
are not severable and, therefore, the whole Act will have to be struck
down. In order to appreciate this contention it will be necessary to
examine the relevant provisions of the Act.
Section 3 ( f) defines 'family' thus :
"3. (f) 'family' means husband, wife and their minor
children or any two or more of them.
Explanation I-A married minor daughter shall not be
treated as a child."
Explanation II is not material for the · purpose of the
point under consideration.
Section 3 ( 1) defines 'permissible area' thus :
"3. (1) .