# SHA VNAGAR UNIVERSITY v. PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT, LTD. AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2002] Supp. 4 S.C.R. 517
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2002-12-03
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 8003 of2002
- **Bench:** G.B. Pattanaik, Balakrishnan, S.B. Sinha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sha-vnagar-university-v-palitana-sugar-mill-pvt-ltd-and-ors-18772
- **Pages:** 26

## Headnote

land laws:
A
B
Gztjarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976-Sections C
20(/) and (2) and 21 (/)-Reservation of land under the Act/or r:cquisitionFailure to acquire for more than I 0 years despite service of notice uls
20(2)-/ssuance of draft revised pla1>-Whether the land stood de-reserved/
de-designated or whether the term of I 0 years stood extended in view of draft
revised pla1>-Held, the land stands de-reserved/de-designated upon expiry D
of specified period-Duration of reservation/designation which has lapsed,
would not get extended by reason of revised plan-land Acquisition Act,
1894.
Interpretation of Statute-Recourse to construction of statute-Need
for-Held, is required only in case of ambiguity, obscurity or inconsistency E
in the statute and not otherwise-True meaning of a provision has. to he
determined from its clear language with due regard to the scheme of lawScope of legislation or intention of legislature cannot be enlarged when
language of provision is unambiguous-A beneficent provision must be
liberally construed
law of Precedence-Decision is an authority for which it is decided
and not what can logically be deduced-A /iule difference in facts and
additional facts may make difference in Precedential value of decision.
Practice & Procedure:
Plea before Supreme Court that contentions raised before High Court
not taken into consideration-Held, cannot be gone into-Appropriate
remedy lies before High Court in its review jurisdiction.
F
G
State reserved certain land u/s 20 of Gujarat Tm'Jn Planning and Urban H
517
518
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A Development Act, 1976. The development plan, on expiry of 10 years from the
dale of its publication lapsed. Respondents, the owners of the lands issued
notices in terms of Section 20(2) of the Act asking the State to acquire the
properties. Draft of revised development plan was issued.
The question for consideration in the cases was whether by reason of
B inaction on the part of the State to acquire the lands for more than 10 years
under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 despite service of notice, the same stood
de-reserved/de-designated; or in view of issuance of draft revised plan the term
of 10 years stood extended.
High Court had held that issuance of draft revised plan by itself does
C not put an embargo on the application of Section 20(2) of the Act. Hence the
present appeals.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
D
HELD: 1.1. Sections 20 and 21 of Gujarat Town Planning and Urban
Development Act, 1976 are required to be read conjunctively with Sections
12 and 17 of the Act. Whereas in terms of Sections-12 and 17, the reservation
and designation have been provided, Section 20(1) only enables the authorities
to acquire the land designated or reserved for the purpose specifically
mentioned in Section 12(2) (b) and (n) as also other clauses specified therefor
E either by acquisition or agreement or in terms of the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 20(1) is merely an enabling provision in terms
whereof the State become entitled to acquire the land either by agreement or
taking recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. If by reason of
revised plan, any other area is sought to be b~ought within the purview of the
F
development, evidently in relation thereto the State will be entitled to exercise
its jurisdiction under Section 20(1) but it will bear repetition to state that th.e
same would not confer any other or further power upon the State to get the
duratio.n of designation of land, which has been lapsed, extended. What is
contemplated under Section 21 is to meet the changed situation and
contingencies which might not have been contemplated while preparing the
G first final development plan. The power of the State enumerated under Section
20(1) does not become ipso facto applicable in the event of issuance ofa revised
. plan as the said provision has been specifically mentioned therein so that the
state may use the same p

## Text

_Characters 0–39,952 of 62,266. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39952 for what follows._

SHA VNAGAR UNIVERSITY
v.
PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT, LTD. AND ORS.
DECEMBER 3, 2002
[G.B. PATTANAIK, CJ., K.G, BALAKRISHNAN AND
S.B. SINHA, JJ.]
land laws:
A
B
Gztjarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976-Sections C
20(/) and (2) and 21 (/)-Reservation of land under the Act/or r:cquisitionFailure to acquire for more than I 0 years despite service of notice uls
20(2)-/ssuance of draft revised pla1>-Whether the land stood de-reserved/
de-designated or whether the term of I 0 years stood extended in view of draft
revised pla1>-Held, the land stands de-reserved/de-designated upon expiry D
of specified period-Duration of reservation/designation which has lapsed,
would not get extended by reason of revised plan-land Acquisition Act,
1894.
Interpretation of Statute-Recourse to construction of statute-Need
for-Held, is required only in case of ambiguity, obscurity or inconsistency E
in the statute and not otherwise-True meaning of a provision has. to he
determined from its clear language with due regard to the scheme of lawScope of legislation or intention of legislature cannot be enlarged when
language of provision is unambiguous-A beneficent provision must be
liberally construed
law of Precedence-Decision is an authority for which it is decided
and not what can logically be deduced-A /iule difference in facts and
additional facts may make difference in Precedential value of decision.
Practice & Procedure:
Plea before Supreme Court that contentions raised before High Court
not taken into consideration-Held, cannot be gone into-Appropriate
remedy lies before High Court in its review jurisdiction.
F
G
State reserved certain land u/s 20 of Gujarat Tm'Jn Planning and Urban H
517
518
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A Development Act, 1976. The development plan, on expiry of 10 years from the
dale of its publication lapsed. Respondents, the owners of the lands issued
notices in terms of Section 20(2) of the Act asking the State to acquire the
properties. Draft of revised development plan was issued.
The question for consideration in the cases was whether by reason of
B inaction on the part of the State to acquire the lands for more than 10 years
under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 despite service of notice, the same stood
de-reserved/de-designated; or in view of issuance of draft revised plan the term
of 10 years stood extended.
High Court had held that issuance of draft revised plan by itself does
C not put an embargo on the application of Section 20(2) of the Act. Hence the
present appeals.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
D
HELD: 1.1. Sections 20 and 21 of Gujarat Town Planning and Urban
Development Act, 1976 are required to be read conjunctively with Sections
12 and 17 of the Act. Whereas in terms of Sections-12 and 17, the reservation
and designation have been provided, Section 20(1) only enables the authorities
to acquire the land designated or reserved for the purpose specifically
mentioned in Section 12(2) (b) and (n) as also other clauses specified therefor
E either by acquisition or agreement or in terms of the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 20(1) is merely an enabling provision in terms
whereof the State become entitled to acquire the land either by agreement or
taking recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. If by reason of
revised plan, any other area is sought to be b~ought within the purview of the
F
development, evidently in relation thereto the State will be entitled to exercise
its jurisdiction under Section 20(1) but it will bear repetition to state that th.e
same would not confer any other or further power upon the State to get the
duratio.n of designation of land, which has been lapsed, extended. What is
contemplated under Section 21 is to meet the changed situation and
contingencies which might not have been contemplated while preparing the
G first final development plan. The power of the State enumerated under Section
20(1) does not become ipso facto applicable in the event of issuance ofa revised
. plan as the said provision has been specifically mentioned therein so that the
state may use the same power in a changed situation.
1530-D, F, G; 533-H; 534-A-Cj
H
1.2. Section 20(2), however, carves out an exception to the exercise of
BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITYv. PALIT ANA SUGAR MILL PVT. L TO.
519
"
powers by the State as regards acquisition of the land for the purpose of A
carrying out the development of the area in the manner provided for therein.
In the event the land referred to under Section 20(1) thereof is not acquired
or proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are not commenced and
further in the event an owner or a person interested in the land serves a notice
in the manner specified therein, certain consequences ensue, namely, the
designation of the land shall be deemed to have lapsed. A. legal fiction, B
therefore, has been created in the said provision. (530-G, H; 531-A]
1.3. The relevant provisions of the Act are absolutely clear, unambiguous
and implicit. A plain meaning of the said provisions, would lead to only one
conclusion, namely, that in the event a notice is issued by the owner of the C
land or other person interested therein asking the authority to acquire the
land upon expiry of the period specified therein viz. ten years from the date of
issuance of final development plan and in the event pursuant to or in
furtherance thereof no action for acquisition thereof is taken, the designation
shall lapse. (531-F, G]
D
1.4. It is true that Section 21 of the Act imposes a statutory obligation
on the part of the State and the appropriate auth()rlties to revise the
development plan and for the said purpose Sections 9 to 20 'so far as may be'
would be applicable thereto, but thereby the rights of the owners in terms of
Section 20(2) are not taken away. Only because the provision of Section 20
has been referred to therein, it would not mean that thereby the Legislature E
contemplated that the time often years specified by the Legislature for the
purpose of acquisition of the land would get automatically extended. Following
the principle of interpretation that all words must be given its full effect, the
words "so far as may be" applied to such revision must be given full effect to.
(533-B-D) p
1.5. The words "so far as may be" indicated the intention of the
Legislature to the effect that by providing revision of final development plan
from time to time and at least once in ten years, only the procedure or
preparation thereof as provided therein, is required to be followed. Such
procedural requirements must be followed so far as it is reasonably possible. G
Section 21 of the Act, does not and cannot mean that the substantial right
conferred upon the owner of the land or the person interested therein shall
be taken away. It is not and cannot be the intention of the Legislature that
what is given by one hand should be taken away by the other. )533-D-F]
1.6. Section 21 does not envisage that despite the fact that in terms of H
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.CR.
A Section 20(2), the designation of land shall lapse, the same, only because a
draft revised plan is m~de, would automatically give rise to revival thereof.
Section 20 does not manifest a Legislative intent to curtail or take away the
right acquired by a landowner under Section 22 vf getting the land defreezed.
(533-G)
B
1. 7. The statutory interdict of use and enjoyment of the property must
be strictly construed. When a statutory authority is required to do a thing in
a particular manner, the same must be done in that manner or not at all. The
State and other authorities while acting under the said Act are only creature
of statui.e. They must act within the four-corners thereof. By reason of the
C provision of the Act, a reasonable restriction, has been imposed upon the
owner on the user of his property. An owner of a property, subject to reasonable
restrictions which may be imposed by the Legislature, is entitled to enjoy the
l>roperty in any manner he likes. A right to use a property in a particular
manner or in other words a restriction imposed on user thereof except in the
mode and manner laid down under statute would not be presumed.
D
(534-D; 529-G; 529-C]
1.8. However, despite statutory lapse of designation of the land, the State
is not denuded of its power of eminent domain under the general law, namely,
Land Acquisition Act in the event an exigency arises therefor. (534-E)
E
KL. Gupta and Ors. v. The Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors.,
(1968) 1 SCR 274; Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Manila/
Gordhandas and Ors., (1996) ll SCC 482 and Murari and Ors. v. Union of
India and Ors., [1997) 1SCC15, distin.guished.
F
Municipal Corporation of Grerater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants'
Association and Ors., (1988) Supp. SCC 55, referred to.
2.1. It is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same
should be read as a whole chapter by chapter, section by section and words by
words. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when
G there is ambiguity, obscurity, or-inconsistency therein and not otherwise. An
effort must be made to give effect to all parts of statute and unless absolutely
necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered surplusage or redundant. True
meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what it
provides by its clear language, with due regard to the scheme oflaw. (528-F-G)
H
2.2. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot
-
BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY v. PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT. LTD
521
be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In A
other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to
its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it
is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible,
absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconciliable with the rest of
the statute. 1528-H; 529-AI
2.3. A beneficient provision of legislation must be liberally construed
so as to fulfill the statutory purpose and not to frustrate it. 1529-BI
legislation and Interpretation by Jagdish Swarup, page 479 referred
to.
3. The purpose and object of creating a legal fiction in the statute is
well-known. When a legal fiction is created, it must be given its full effect.
1531-B]
B
c
M Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of D
India, Machilipatnam, A.P. and Anr., (1994] 2 SCC 323; Indian Oil
Corporation limited v. Chief Inspector of Factories and Ors. etc., (19981 5
SCC 738; Valtas Limited Bombay v. Union of India and Ors., (1995) Supp. 2
SCC 498; Harish Tandon v. Addi. District Magistrate, Allahabad, U.P. and
Ors., (1995] l SCC 537 and G. Viswanathan etc. v. Hon'bleSpeaker, Tamil
Nadu legislative Assembly, Madras and Anr., [1996) 2 sec 353, referred to. E
East End Dwelling Co. ltd v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1951) 2 All
ER 587, referred to.
4. When a public functionary is required to do a certain thing within a
specified time, the same is ordinarily directory but when consequence for F
inaction on the part of the Statutory authorities within such specified time is
expressly provided, it must be held to be imperative. (534-F]
Datta/rays v. State of Bombay, AIR (1952) SC 181, referred to.
Sutherland, Statutory Construction 3rd edition, Vo/.3 p.102; Crawford G
on Statutory Construction, Article 269 p.535; Craies on Statute law VIJI
Edn. page 262 and Interpretation and Application of Statutes by Reed
Dickerson page 7, referred to.
5. A decision is an authority for which it is decided and not what can
logically be deduced therefrom. A little difference in facts or additional facts H
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. [540-F]
Smt. Ram Rakhi v. Union of India and Ors. AIR (2002) Delhi 458; Delhi
Administration (NCT of Delhi) ·v. Manoharlal, AIR (2002) SC 3088; Haryana
Financial Corporation and Anr. v. Mis. Jagdamba Oil Mills and Anr., JT 2002
1SC482 and Dr. Nalini Mahajan etc. v. Director of Income Tax (Investigation)
B and Ors., (2002) 257 ITR 123, referred to.
c
6. The contention that various other points had been raised before High
Court which were not taken into consideration, cannot be gone into in as much
as assuming the same to be correct, the remedy of the appellants would lie in
filing appropriate application for review before the High Court. [541-A]
State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Anr., AIR (1982)
SC 1249, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8003 of2002.
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.11.2000 of the High Court of
Gujarat in SCA 1032 of 1996.
WITH
Civil Appeal Nos. 1539, 1540, 1541 of2001 and Civil Appeal Nos. 8004-.
E 8012 of2002.
Kirit N. Rawal, SG, Gopal Subramanium, Bhaskar Tanna, T.R.
Andhyarujina, Ashok H. Desai, P.N. Mishra, Yatin Oza, H.N. Salve, S.H.
Sanjanwala, S. Muralidhar, Rashmin Chaya, Umesh Trivedi, Shreys Jayasimha,
Anip Sachthey, Ms. H. Wahi, Janak Shah, V.D. Khanna, Jatin Zeveri, P.H.
F Parekh, Rohit Alex, Huzefa Ahmadi, Amit Dhingra, Arun Francis, Ms. Sweety
Manchanda, Ms. J.S. Wad, Ashish Wad and Ms. Niharika Bahl, for Mis. J.S.
Wad & Co., Ms. Alka Agarwal, for M/s. l.M. Nanavati Associates, B.V. Desai,
Ms. Vanita Mehta, P.K. Manohar, Ms. Anu Mohla and M.N. Shroff for the
appearing parties.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted in special leave petitions.
This batch of appeals arising out of common Judgment and Order of the
Gujarat High Court at Ahmedal>!td'fo SCA Nos. 10108/94, 4427/92, 4733/92,
H 4847 /92, 3537 /95, 8882/99, 8~88/99, 6461196 EJtd 6519/98 involving the. question
t'
•
..
•
-
BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY 1·. PA LIT ANA SUGAR MILL PVT.LTD. [M.B. SHAH, J.J 523
as regard to interpretation of Sections 20 and 21 of the Gujarat Town Planning A
and Urban Development Act, 1976 (for brevity. hereinafter referred to as the
'Said Act'), \Vere taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by
this com1non judg1nent.
The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.
The State of Gujarat in exercise of its power conferred upon it under
Section 20 of the said Act reserved certain areas of which the respondents
herein amongst others are the owners.
On or about 3.3.1986 a development plan was finally published in terms
B
of the provisions of the said Act, and the period of I 0 years therefrom lapsed C
on 2.3.1996. A revised Development plan however came into being on 20th
February, 1996. It is not in dispute that respondents who claim ownership of
the lands in question issued notices in terms of sub-section 2 of Section 20
of the said Act, asking the State Government to acquire the properties in
terms thereof.
The short question which arises for consideration in these matters is as
to whether by reason of inaction on the part of the State and its authorities
under t~e Town Planning Act to acquire the lands for a period of more than
D
10 years, in terms of the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 despite
service of notice, the same stood de-reserved/de-designated or in view of E
issuance of draft revised plan under Section 21 thereof, the term of 10 years
stood extended?
The contention of the respondents before the High Court was that on
a plain reading of the provisions of Section 20 of the said Act, it would appear
that the appellants were under a statutory obligation to take steps for F
acquisition of land on receipt of the requisite notice in terms of sub-section
(2) of Section 20 of the Act and on their failure to do so the reservation/
designation in respect of land in question would lapse.
Per contra the contention of the Appellant was that the provisions of
Section 20(2) of the Act although enables service of notice by land owners G
for acquisition within six moths from the expiry of I 0 years from the date of
final development plan but the same would not come into operation when the
final development plan is in the process of revision under Section 21 of the
said Act read with sub~section 1 of section 20 thereof.
The High Court upon taking into consideration the provisions of the H
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A said Act and upon consideration of the rival contentions raised therein came
to the conclusion that issuance of a draft revised plan by itself does not put
an embargo on the application of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the said Act.
B
The appellants were represented by Mr. Kirit N. Raw al. Solicitor General
and Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel appearing for the Gujarat
University and Mr. Tanna for the South Gujarat University. The contention
of the learned counsel for the appellant was that having regard to the scope
and purport of the said Act, the High Court must be held to have erred in
so f~r as it failed to take into consideration that the objects of an integrated,
incorporated and interdependent development plan, cannot be fully achieved
C within a period of 10 years and in that view of the matter when steps are taken
for revision of the final development plan, the period specified in sub-section
(2) of Section 20 w.ould get automatically extended. Strong reliance in this
behalf has been placed on K.L. Gupta and Ors. v. The Bombay Municipal
Corporation and Ors., [1968] l SCR 274, Ahmedabad Urban Development
Authority v. Manila/ Gordhandas and Ors., [1996] 11 SCC 482 and Murari
D and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1997] I SCC 15.
On the other hand, the submissions of learned counsel for the
respondents led by Mr. Ashok Desai the learned senior counsel is that in the
event the interpretation of the provisions of Sections 20 and 21 as suggested
E by the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, the same· would render
sub-section 2 of Section 20 otiose and redundant. According to learned
counsel the right of an owner of the land cannot be kept under suspension
for a long time and the period of I 0 years specified by the legislature must
be held to be a reasonable one, and thus by n<? stretch of imagination only
by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 21 of the said Act, the period
F specified therein can be extended. Strong reliance in support of the said
contention has been placed on Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay
v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants' Association and Ors., [1988] Supp. SCC 55.
Mr. Desai would urge that the expression 'so far as may be' occurring
G in Section 21 of the Act must be given a proper meaning and thus in the event
the interpretation of the provisions put-forth by the learned counsel for the
appellant is accepted, the same will lead to an anomalous and absurd situation;
which was not contemplated by the Legislature.
Reliance in this connection has been placed in The Land Acquisition
H Officer, City Improvement Trust Board v. H Narayanaiah and Ors., [ 1976] 4
SCC9.
•
..
...
BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY, .. PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT.LTD [M.B SHAH . .I] 525
Before we advert to the rival contentions, as noticed hereinbefore, \Ve A
may look to the relevant provision of the said Act.
The preamble suggests that the said Act \vas enacted to consolidate
and amend the law relating to making and execution of .development plans and
town planning schemes in the State of Gujarat. It is not in dispute that the
said Act came into force with effect from 1.2.1978 in terms of an appropriate B
notification issued in this behalf under sub-section (3) of Section I thereof.
Section 2 of the said Act contains definition clause. 'Development Plan'
has been defined in Section 2(x) to mean a plan for development or
redevelopment or improvement of a development area.
Section 3, postulates issuance of a notification by the State Government
'pecifying a development area.
In term of Section 4 of the said Act, the State Government by issuing
c
a notification is empowered to exclude the whole or part of a development D
area from the operation thereof. Section 5 provides for constitution of Area
Development Authorities consisting of two Nominees of the Government and
Local Authorities as specified therein. The State Government in terms of
Section 6 of the Act is empowered to designate any Local Authority
functioning in the development area as an Area Development Authority in
State. The State Government has been conferred with the powers, which E
amongst others, include preparation of Development Plan, Town Planning
Schemes and to control the development activities in terms of Section 7 of
the Act. Section 9 provides that not later than three years after the declaration
of such area as a development area or within such time as the State Government,
may from time to time, extend, the authority shall prepare and submit to the p
State Government a draft development plan for the whole or any part oi the
development area". The State Government on the failure of development
authority to prepare such a plan is required to do so within a period of three
years thereafter. A draft development plan has to be kept open for public
inspection in terms of Section 10. Section 12 provides for the contents of draft
development plan, the relevant portions whereof read as under:-
G
"Contents of draft de\'elopment plan :
(I) A draft development.plan shall generally indicate the manner in
which the use of land in the area covered by it shall be regulated and
also indicate the manner in which the development therein shall be H
526
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
carried out.
(2) In particular, it shall provide, so far as may be necessary, for all
or any of the following matters. namely :-
(a)
xxxx
B
(b)
proposals for the reservation of land for public purposes, such
as schools, colleges and other educational institutions, medical
and public health institutions, markets, social welfare and cultural
institutions, theatres and places for public entertainment, public
assembly, museums, art galleries, religious buildings, playgrounds,
C
stadium, open spaces, dairies and for such other purposes as
may, from time to time, be specified by the State· Government;
(c)
xxxx
(d) transport and communications, such as roads, highways,
parkways, railways, waterways, canals and airport, including their
D
extension and development.
E
F
G
H
(e)
xxxx
(f)
reservation of land for community facilities and services;
(g)
JOOOC
(h)
XlOO(
(i)
XlOO(
(j)
XlOO(
(k)
proposals for the reservation of land for the purpose of Union,
any State, local authority or any other authority or body
established by or under any law for the time being in force;
(I)
XlOO(
(m) xxxx
(n) provision for preventing or removing pollution of water or air
caused by the discharge of waste or other means as a result of
the use of land;
(o)
such other proposals for public pr other purposes as may from
time to· time be approved by the area development authority or
as may·be directed by the State Government in this behalf."
(
r
1 .. ,
BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY'· PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT.LTD. [M.B. SHAH, l.l 527
Section 13 specifies publication of draft development plan for the purpose A
of inviting suggestions and objections from public and affected parties, which
are required to be considered in terms of Section 14 thereof. Necessary
modifications may be made therein as provided under Section 15. A modified
draft plan prepared in terms of Section 15 is required to be submitted to the
State Government for sanction, which in exercise of its power under Section B
17 of the Act may grant the same with further notifications as deemed
necessary, after publishing the same again inviting suggestions and shall be
notified in the official gazette.
In terms of sub clause (d) of sub-section(!) of Section 17, the sanction
accorded to the draft development plan by the State Government shall be C
notified in the Official Gazette, and on such sanction, it shall be ·called "the
final development plan" which shall come into force from a date to be notified,
but the same shali be not earlier than one month from the date of publication
of such sanction. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 requires the State Government
to take certain precautions with regard to the reservation of land for specific D
purposes mentioned in Section 12, but only on the satisfaction that the land,
so reserved, is likely to be acquired within ten years from the publication of
final development plan.
Sub-section (2) of Section 17 reads as under :-
"17(2) Where the draft development plan submitted by an area E
development authority or, as the case may be, the authorized officer
contains any proposals for the reservation of any land for a purpose
specified in clause (b) or clause (n) or clause (o) of sub-section (2)
of Section 12 and such land does not vest in the area development
authority, the State Government shall not include the said reservation F
in the development plan, unless it is satisfied that such authority
would acquire the land, whether by agreement or compulsory
acquisition, within ten years from the date on which the final
development plan comes into force."
Under Section 18, the State Government has been empowered even to G
amend the final development .plan, by extending or reducing its area. Under
Section 19, the State Government is empowered to vary the final development
plan, but, only after inviting suggestions and objections in the manner laid
down therein. Section 20 provides for acquisition of land designated or
reserved for specified purposes mentioned in Section 12. As the said provision H
528
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A is material for thikl case, the same is reproduced hereunder :-
"Section 20 Acquisition of land :
(I) The area development authority or any other authority for whose
purpose land is designated in the final development plan for any
B
purpose specified in clause (b), clause (d), clause (f), clause (k), clause
(n) or clause (o) of sub-section (2) of Section 12, may acquire the land
either by agreement or under the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894.
(2) If the land referred to in sub-section (I) is not acquired by agreement
C
within a period of ten years from the date of the coming into force of
the final development plan or if proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, are not commenced within such p~riod, the
owner or any person interested in the land may serve a notice on the
authority concerned requiring it to. acquire the land and if within six
D
months from the date of service of such notice the land is not acquired
or no steps are commenced for its acquisition, the designation of land
as aforesaid shall be deemed to have lapsed."
E
Section 21 of the Act provides for the revision of development plan and
reads as under :-
"Section 21. Revision of development plan :
At least once in ten years from the date on which a final development
plan comes into force, the area development authority shall revise the
development plan after carrying out, if necessary, a fresh survey and
F
the provisions of Sections 9 to 20, shall, so far as may be, apply to
such revision."
It "is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should
be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and words
by words. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary
G when there is ambiguity, obscurity, or inconsistency therein and not otherwise.
An effort must ue made to give effect to all parts of statute and unless
absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered surplusage or
redundant.
H
True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis
BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY"· PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT.LTD. [M.B SHAH. J] 529
of what provides by its clear language, with due regard to the scheme of law. A
Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be
enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In
other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to
its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it
is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, B
absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the
statute.
It is also well settled that a beneficient provision of legislation must be
liberally construed so as to fulfill the statutory purpose and not to frustrate C
it.
An owner ·of a property, subject to reasonable restrictions which may
be imposed by the Legislature, is entitled to enjoy the property in any manner
he likes. A right to use a property in a particular manner or in other words
a restriction imposed on user thereof except in the mode and manner laid D
down under statute would not be presumed.
In Legislation and Interpretation by Jagdish Swarup, at page 479, it is
stated
"We ought not to assume without the clearest language that the
legislature intends to destroy common law rights. The presumption is
that the legislature intends not to interfere with any legal rights or any
legitimate expectations of any person whatsoev-er. Rights, whether
private or public, cannot be taken away or hampered by implication
from the language employed in a statute, unless ihe legislature clearly
and distinctly authorises the doing of a thing which is physically
inconsistent with the continuance 0f an existing right. In order to take
away the right it is not sufficient to show that the thing sanctioned
in the Act, it done, will of a slleer physical necessity, put an end to
that right; it must also be shown that the legislature has authorised
E
F
the thing to be done at all events, and irrespective of its possible G
interference with existing rights. An Act should be so interpreted as
in no respect to interfere with or prejudice a clear private right or title
unless that, priv.ate right or title is taken away per directum"
By reason of the provision of the said Act, a reasonable restriction, has
been imposed upon the owner on the user of his property. In terms of Section H
530
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A 12 of the said Act, town planning is contemplated through preparation of
draft development plan which contains not only proposals for designating
certain area for residential, industrial, commercial, agricultural or recreational
purposes but also for the purposes for maintaining environment and ecological
balance by setting up zoological gardens, green belts, natural reserves and
sanctuaries . In terms of such development plan ·reservation of certain land
B for public use is also provided .. From the relevant provisions of the said Act,
as noticed hereinbefore, it is absolutely clear that in terms thereof the State
Government is made the ultimate authority to publish a development plan,
inter alia, providing for designation or reservation of the land. The State
Government while arriving at its ~onclusion as regards public interest involved
C in the matter is required' to arrive at its satisfaction on objective basis as
provided in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 17 to the effect that the lands
in respect whereof reservation is proposed to be made can be acquired for
the fulfilment of the object therefor either by agreement or compulsory
acquisition within the period specified therein. It has not been disputed
before us nor is it necessary to consider in the facts and circumstances of
· D this case as to whether establishment of the educational institutions or
universities would be covered by the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section
12 thereof?
Sections 20 and 21 of the said Act are required to be read conjunctively
with Sections 12 and 17. We may notice that clause (k) of sub-section (2) of
E Section 12 does not find mention in sub-section (2) of Section 17 as regards
proposed reservation for the ·State and other statutory authorities but clauses
(n) and (b) of sub-section (2) of S·~ction 12 are specifically mentioned in
Section 20. In Section 20, provisions of clauses (b ), ( d), (t), (k) and ( o) of subsection (2) of Section 12 have specifically been mentioned. The High Court
F has proceeded on the basis that the words 'designation' or 'reservation' are
interchangeable for the purpose of the Act. The said finding of the High
Court is not in question.
Whereas in terms of Sections 12 and 17 of the said Act, the reservation
and designation have been provided, sub-section (I) of Section 20 thereof
G only enables the authorities to acquire the land designated or reserved for the
purpose specifically mentioned in clauses (b) and (n) of sub-section (2) of
Section 12 as also other clauses specified therefor eitner by acquisition or
agreement or in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Subsection (1) of Section 20 is merely an enabling provision.
H
Sub-section (2) of Section 20, however, carves out an exception to the
BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY 1·. PALITANA SUGAR rvtJLL PVT.LTD [M.B. SHAH. J J 531
exercise of powers by the State as regards acquisition of the land for the A
purpose of 'carrying out the develop111ent of the area in the 1nanner provided
for therein: a bare reading \vhereof leaves no 1nanner of doubt that in the
event the land referred to under sub-section (I) of Section 20 thereof is not
acquired or proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are not con11nenced
and further in the event an owner or a person interested in the land serves
a notice in the nianner specified therein, certain consequences ensue, namely,
the designation of the land shall be deemed to have lapsed. A legal fiction,
therefore, has been created in the said provision.
B
The purpose and object of creating a legal fiction in the statute is wellknown. When a legal fiction is created, it must be given its full effect. In East C
End Dwelling Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1951) 2 All.E.R 587,
Lord Asquith, J. stated the law in the following terms:-
"If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you
must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the
consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had D
in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it.
One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents.
The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it
does not say that having done so, you must cause or pennit your
imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of
that state of affairs."
E
The said principle has been reiterated by this Court in M. Venugopal v.
Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnan1,
A.P. and Anr. [1994] 2 SCC 323. See also Indian Oil Co1poration limited v.
Chief Inspector of Factories and Ors.etc., [1998] 5 SCC 738, Voltas limited,
Bombay v. Union of India and Ors.,[1995] Supp. 2 SCC 498, Harish Tandon
v. Addi. District Magistrate, Allahabad, UP. and Ors. [1995] l SCC 537 and
G. Viswanathan etc. v. Hon 'ble Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly,
Madras and Anr., [1996] 2 SCC 353.
F
The relevant provisions of the Act are absolutely clear, unambiguous G
and implicit. A plain meaning of the said provisions, in our considered view,
would lead to only one conclusion, namely, that in the event a notice is issued
by the owner of the land or other person interested therein asking the
authority to acquire the land upon expiry of the period specified therein viz.
ten years from the date of issuance offinijl development plan and in the event
pursuant to or in furtherance thereof no action for-acquisition thereof is taken, H
532
SUPREME COURT Rl::PORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A the designation shall lapse.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
This Court in Municipal Corporation q{Greater Bo111bay's case (supra),
in no uncertain terms while construil1g the pr·ovisions of Section 127 of the
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 held the period of ten
years as reasonable in the following words :·
"While the contention of learned counsel appearing for the appellant
that the words 'six months from the date of service of such notice'·
in Section 127 of the Act were not susceptible of a literal construction,
must be accepted, it must be borne in mind that the period of six
months provided by Section 127 upon the expiry of which the
reservation of the land under a Development Plan lapses, is a valuable
safeguard to the citizen against arbitrary and irrational executive action.
Section 127 of the Act is a fetter upon the power of eminent domain.
By enacting Section 127 the legislature has struck a balance between
the competing claims of the interests of the general public as regards
the rights of a11 individual."
It was observed that :
"The Act lays down the principles of fixation by providing first, by
the proviso to Section 126(2) that no such declaration under subsection (2) shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date
of publication of the draft regional plan, development plan or any
other plan, secondly, by enacting sub-section (4) of Section 126 that
if a declaration is not made within the period referred to in sub-section
(2), the State Government may make a fresh declaration but, in that
event, the market value of the land shall be the market value at the
date of the declaration under Section 6 and not the market value at
the date of the notification under Section 4, and thirdly, by Section
127 that if any land reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose
in any development plan is not acquired by agreement within l 0 years
from ~he date on which a final regional plan or development plan
comes into force or if proceedings for the acquisition of such land
under the Land Acquisition Act are not commenced within such
period, such land shall be deemed to be released from such reservation,
allotment or designation and become available to the owner for the
purpose of development on the failure of the Appropriate Authority
to initiate any steps for its acquisition within a period of six months
from the date of service of a notice by the owner or any person
BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY v. PALITANA SUGAR MILL PVT.LTD. [M.B. SHAH. J] 533
interested in the land. It cannot be doubted that a period of 10 years A
is long enough., The Development or the Planoing Authority must
take recourse. to acquisition with some amount of promptitude in order
that the compensation paid to the expropriated owner bears a just
relation to the real value of the land as otherwise, the compensation
paid for the acquisition would be wholly illusory. Such fetter on B
statutory powers is in the interest of the general public and the
conditions subject to which they can be exercised must be strictly
followed."
It is true that Section 21 of the Act imposes a statutory obligation on the part
of the State and the appropriate authorities to revise the development plan C
and for the said purpose Sections 9 to 20 'so far as may be' would be
applicable thereto, but thereby the rights of the owners in terms of subsection (2) of Section 20 are not taken away.
The question, however, is as to whether only because the provision of
Section 20 has been referred to therein; would it mean that thereby the D
Legislature contemplated that the time often years specified by the Legislature
for the purpose of acquisition of the land would get automatically extended?
The answer to the said question must be rendered in the negative. Following
the principle of interpretation that all words must be given its full effect, we
must also give full effect to the words "so far as may be" applied to such
revision.
E
The said words indicate the intention of the Legislature to the effect
that by providing revision of final development plan from time to time and at
least once in ten years, only the procedure or preparation thereof as provided
therein, is required to be followed. Such procedural requirements must be F
followed so far as it is reasonably possible.