# SHAKTI BHOG FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD v. THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA & ANR

- **Citation:** [2020] 6 S.C.R. 538
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2020-06-05
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2514 of 2020
- **Bench:** A. M. Khanwilkar, Indira Banerjee, Dinesh Maheshwari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shakti-bhog-food-industries-ltd-v-the-central-bank-of-india-anr-34100
- **Pages:** 26

## Headnote

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.7, r.11(d) - Limitation
Act, 1963 - Art.113 - The appellant filed suit on 23.02.2005 for a
decree for rendition of true and correct accounts in respect of the
interest/commission charged and deducted by the respondent-Bank
- The plaint was rejected by the Trial Court u/Or.7, r.11(d) of CPC
on the ground that it was barred by law of limitation as it was filed
beyond the period of three years prescribed u/Art.113 of the
Limitation Act - It held that right to sue accrued in favour of plaintiff
in October, 2000 and plaintiff could have filed the present suit till
October, 2003 as the excessive charging by the Bank was till October,
2000 - The First Appellate Court and the High Court affirmed the
decision of the Trial Court - On appeal, held: The appellant noticed
the discrepancy in July, 2000 and immediately took the matter with
officials of the Bank - The Bank wrote on 09.07.2001 that
appellant's representation was being examined - Thereafter, a letter
was received on 08.05.2002 from bank informing appellant that
the cheques were purchased at the prevailing rates and another
letter was received on 19.02.2002 from bank informing appellant
that all actions taken by the bank were as per rules and therefore,
the appellant need not pursue the matter any further - The appellant
had sent legal notice on 28.11.2003 and 07.01.2005 and then finally
proceeded to file suit on 23.02.2005 - The Article 113 uses the
expression 'when the right to sue accrues' and not 'when the right
to sue "first" accrues' - Reckoning these dates, the plaint filed on
23.02.2005 was within limitation - Resultantly, the question of
rejecting plaint u/Or.7, r.11 of CPC does not arise and the decisions
of the Trial Court, the First Appellate Court and the High Court
cannot be sustained.
[2020] 6 S.C.R. 538
538
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Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. It is well established position that the cause of
action for filing a suit would consist of bundle of facts. Further,
the factum of suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be
a mixed question of fact and law. Even for that reason, invoking
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC is ruled out. In the present case,
the assertion in the plaint is that the appellant verily believed
that its claim was being processed by the Regional Office and the
Regional Office would be taking appropriate decision at the
earliest. That belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the
Senior Manager of the Bank, dated 8.5.2002 followed by another
letter dated 19.9.2002 to the effect that the action taken by the
Bank was in accordance with the rules and the appellant need
not correspond with the Bank in that regard any further. This
firm response from the respondent-Bank could trigger the right
of the appellant to sue the respondent-Bank. Moreover, the fact
that the appellant had eventually sent a legal notice on 28.11.2003
and again on 7.1.2005 and then filed the suit on 23.2.2005, is also
invoked as giving rise to cause of action. Whether this plea taken
by the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed
question of fact and law, depending on the response of the
respondents. [Para 13][556-F-H; 557-A]
2. Reverting to the argument that exchange of letters or
correspondence between the parties cannot be the basis to extend
the period of limitation, in opinion of this Court, for the view
taken by us hitherto, the same need not be dilated further.
Inasmuch as, having noticed from the averments in the plaint
that the right to sue accrued to the appellant on receiving letter
from the Senior Manager, dated 8.5.2002, and in particular letter
dated 19.9.2002, and again on firm refusal by the respondents
vide Advocate's letter dated 23.12.2003 in response to the legal
notice sent by the appellant on 28.11.2003; and once again on
the follow up legal notice on 7.1.2005, the plaint filed in February,
2005 would be well within limitation. Considering the former
events of firm response by

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 6 S.C.R.
SHAKTI BHOG FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD.
v.
THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 2514 of 2020)
JUNE 05, 2020
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, INDIRA BANERJEE
AND DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.7, r.11(d) - Limitation
Act, 1963 - Art.113 - The appellant filed suit on 23.02.2005 for a
decree for rendition of true and correct accounts in respect of the
interest/commission charged and deducted by the respondent-Bank
- The plaint was rejected by the Trial Court u/Or.7, r.11(d) of CPC
on the ground that it was barred by law of limitation as it was filed
beyond the period of three years prescribed u/Art.113 of the
Limitation Act - It held that right to sue accrued in favour of plaintiff
in October, 2000 and plaintiff could have filed the present suit till
October, 2003 as the excessive charging by the Bank was till October,
2000 - The First Appellate Court and the High Court affirmed the
decision of the Trial Court - On appeal, held: The appellant noticed
the discrepancy in July, 2000 and immediately took the matter with
officials of the Bank - The Bank wrote on 09.07.2001 that
appellant's representation was being examined - Thereafter, a letter
was received on 08.05.2002 from bank informing appellant that
the cheques were purchased at the prevailing rates and another
letter was received on 19.02.2002 from bank informing appellant
that all actions taken by the bank were as per rules and therefore,
the appellant need not pursue the matter any further - The appellant
had sent legal notice on 28.11.2003 and 07.01.2005 and then finally
proceeded to file suit on 23.02.2005 - The Article 113 uses the
expression 'when the right to sue accrues' and not 'when the right
to sue "first" accrues' - Reckoning these dates, the plaint filed on
23.02.2005 was within limitation - Resultantly, the question of
rejecting plaint u/Or.7, r.11 of CPC does not arise and the decisions
of the Trial Court, the First Appellate Court and the High Court
cannot be sustained.
[2020] 6 S.C.R. 538
538
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Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. It is well established position that the cause of
action for filing a suit would consist of bundle of facts. Further,
the factum of suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be
a mixed question of fact and law. Even for that reason, invoking
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC is ruled out. In the present case,
the assertion in the plaint is that the appellant verily believed
that its claim was being processed by the Regional Office and the
Regional Office would be taking appropriate decision at the
earliest. That belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the
Senior Manager of the Bank, dated 8.5.2002 followed by another
letter dated 19.9.2002 to the effect that the action taken by the
Bank was in accordance with the rules and the appellant need
not correspond with the Bank in that regard any further. This
firm response from the respondent-Bank could trigger the right
of the appellant to sue the respondent-Bank. Moreover, the fact
that the appellant had eventually sent a legal notice on 28.11.2003
and again on 7.1.2005 and then filed the suit on 23.2.2005, is also
invoked as giving rise to cause of action. Whether this plea taken
by the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed
question of fact and law, depending on the response of the
respondents. [Para 13][556-F-H; 557-A]
2. Reverting to the argument that exchange of letters or
correspondence between the parties cannot be the basis to extend
the period of limitation, in opinion of this Court, for the view
taken by us hitherto, the same need not be dilated further.
Inasmuch as, having noticed from the averments in the plaint
that the right to sue accrued to the appellant on receiving letter
from the Senior Manager, dated 8.5.2002, and in particular letter
dated 19.9.2002, and again on firm refusal by the respondents
vide Advocate's letter dated 23.12.2003 in response to the legal
notice sent by the appellant on 28.11.2003; and once again on
the follow up legal notice on 7.1.2005, the plaint filed in February,
2005 would be well within limitation. Considering the former
events of firm response by the respondents on 8.5.2002 and in
particular, 19.9.2002, the correspondence ensued thereafter
including the two legal notices sent by the appellant, even if
disregarded, the plaint/suit filed on 23.2.2005 would be within
limitation in terms of Article 113. [Para 14][557-B-D]
SHAKTI BHOG FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD. v. THE CENTRAL
BANK OF INDIA & ANR.
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Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta & Ors.
(2007) 10 SCC 59 : [2007] 10 SCR 520; Church of
Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable
Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (2012) 8 SCC
706 : [2012] 6 SCR 404; Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra
Murthy v. Syed Jalal (2017) 13 SCC 174 : [2017] 5
SCR 294; Union of India & Ors. v. West Coast Paper
Mills Ltd. & Anr. (2004) 2 SCC 747 : [2004] 2 SCR
145; Khatri Hotels Private Limited & Anr. v. Union of
India & Anr. (2011) 9 SCC 126 : [2011] 15 SCR 299 -
relied on.
Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede and Company (2007) 5
SCC 614 : [2007] 6 SCR 608; The East and West
Steamship, Georgetown, Madras v. S.K. Ramalingam
Chettiar AIR 1960 SC 1058 : [1960] 3 SCR 820; Boota
Mal v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 1716 : [1963] 1
SCR 70; S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(1989) 4 SCC 582 : [1989] 1 Suppl. SCR 43 -
inapplicable.
Venkappa Gurappa Hosur v. Kasawwa C/o Rangappa
Kulgod (1997) 10 SCC 66 : [1997] 3 SCR 579;
Kandimalla Raghavaiah & Company v. National
Insurance Company & Anr. (2009) 7 SCC 768 : [2009]
10 SCR 870; Fatehji And Company & Anr. v. L.M.
Nagpal & Ors. (2015) 8 SCC 390 : [2015] 6 SCR 389
- referred to.
C.P. Kapur v. The Chairman & Ors. (2013) 198 DLT
56 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2007] 10 SCR 520
relied on
Para 6
[2012] 6 SCR 404
relied on
Para 6
[2017] 5 SCR 294
relied on
Para 6
[2004] 2 SCR 145
relied on
Para 11
[2011] 15 SCR 299
relied on
Para 12
[2007] 6 SCR 608
inapplicable
Para 17
[1960] 3 SCR 820
inapplicable
Para 18
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[1963] 1 SCR 70
inapplicable
Para 15
[1989] 1 Suppl. SCR 43
inapplicable
Para 15
[1997] 3 SCR 579
referred to
Para 15
[2009] 10 SCR 870
referred to
Para 15
[2015] 6 SCR 389
referred to
Para 16
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.2514 of
2020.
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.01.2017 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in RSA No.391 of 2016.
WITH
Civil Appeal No.2515 of 2020
Nischal Kumar Neeraj, Adv. for the Appellant.
Yash Pal Dhingra, Adv. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2514 OF 2020
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 30209/2017)
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal takes exception to the judgment and order dated
2.1.2017 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi (for short,
"the High Court") in R.S.A. No. 391/2016, whereby the High Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Civil Judge-05, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, dated 6.1.2016 in C.S. No. 950/2014 allowing
the application filed by the respondents/defendants for rejection of the
plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for
short, "the CPC"), instituted by the appellant/plaintiff. The Additional
District & Sessions Judge, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, vide order
dated 23.7.2016 in R.C.A. No. 61794/2016 had also affirmed the order
of rejecting the plaint. The appellant had filed the stated suit on 23.2.2005
for a decree for rendition of true and correct accounts in respect of the
interest/commission charged and deducted by the respondent-Bank
relating to current account No. CCM 20225 of the appellant for the
SHAKTI BHOG FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD. v. THE CENTRAL
BANK OF INDIA & ANR.
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period between 1.4.1997 and 31.12.2000 and also for recovery of the
excess amount charged by the respondent-Bank consequent to rendition
of accounts with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of
deduction including interest pendente lite realization of the amount and
future interest.
3. The plaint came to be rejected by the trial Court under Order
VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC on the ground that it was barred by law of
limitation, as it was filed beyond the period of three years prescribed in
Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, "the 1963 Act"), as
applicable to the present case, from the date when the right to sue accrued
to the appellant in October, 2000. The entire discussion of the trial Court
in that regard can be traced to paragraphs 10 and 11, which read thus: -
''10. As stated above the plaintiff by way of present suit has
sought two reliefs i.e. rendition of account and repayment of excess
money. Limitation Act, 1963 does not provide any specific article
with regard to time period within which accounts can be sought
by party from its bank. As such, Article 113 of Limitation Act
came into picture which provides a limitation period of three years
for suits for which no limitation period is provided, from the date
when right to sue accrues.
11. In the present case in hand, as per averments made by the
plaintiff in his plaint, the facility was availed by the plaintiff from
the defendants till October 2000. Further as per averments made
in the plaint the alleged amount so charged by the defendant from
the plaintiff, in excess from agreed amount, was till October, 2000.
As such, at best can be said right to sue accrues in favour of the
plaintiff in October, 2000. Considering the law as stated in above
paragraph, plaintiff could have filed the present suit i.e. for rendition
of account and repayment of excess amount till October 2003.
..."
After so observing, the trial Court considered the submission of
the appellant that the cause of action had accrued to the appellant only
upon rejection of the representation by the respondent-Bank entailing in
refusal or denial of liability, communicated to the appellant vide letters
dated 19.9.2002 and 3.6.2003 and after the final legal notice was served
upon the respondents on 7.1.2005. That contention has been rejected by
adverting to the decision of the same High Court in C.P. Kapur vs. The
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Chairman & Ors.1, wherein it is held that exchange of correspondence
between the parties cannot extend the limitation period for institution of
a suit, once the right to sue had accrued, which in this case had accrued
in October, 2000, as has been asserted even in the plaint. Whereas, the
suit was filed in February, 2005 beyond the period of three years from
the date on which right to sue accrued to the appellant, as prescribed in
Article 113 of the 1963 Act. The view so taken by the trial Court
commended to the District Court in first appeal and also the High Court
in second appeal, which judgment is the subject matter of challenge in
the present appeal.
4. We have heard Mr. Nischal Kumar Neeraj, learned counsel
for the appellant and Mr. Anuj Jain, learned counsel for the respondents.
5. Be it noted that the appellant had relied on Articles 2, 3 and 22
of the 1963 Act to urge that the suit filed in February, 2005 was within
limitation. This plea, however, did not impress the trial Court, the first
appellate Court or the High Court. The Courts proceeded on the basis
that Article 113 is attracted in the facts of the present case, as the reliefs
claimed by the appellant were not covered under any specific Article
with regard to time period within which accounts can be sought by party
from its bank, as noted by the trial Court in paragraph 10 of its judgment
reproduced above.
6. The central question is: whether the plaint as filed by the
appellant could have been rejected by invoking Order VII Rule 11(d) of
the CPC? Indeed, Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC gives ample power to
the Court to reject the plaint, if from the averments in the plaint, it is
evident that the suit is barred by any law including the law of limitation.
This position is no more res integra. We may usefully refer to the decision
of this Court in Ram Prakash Gupta vs. Rajiv Kumar Gupta & Ors.2.
In paragraph Nos. 13 to 20 of the reported decision, the Court observed
as follows: -
"13. As per Order 7 Rule 11, the plaint is liable to be rejected in
the following cases:
"(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
1 (2013) 198 DLT 56
2 (2007) 10 SCC 59
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(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on
being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time
to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is
written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on
being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper
within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be
barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule
9."
14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1 SCC 557]
it was held with reference to Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code that
"9. ... the relevant facts which need to be looked into for
deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the
plaint. The trial court can exercise the power ... at any stage
of the suit - before registering the plaint or after issuing
summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion
of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under
Clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC, the averments
in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in
the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that
stage,..." (SCC p. 560, para 9).
15. In I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [(1998)
2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question to be decided while
dealing with an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the
Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the
plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to
get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code.
16. "The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful-no
formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless
in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise
its power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the
ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created
the illusion of a cause of action, [it has to be nipped] in the bud at
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the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order
10 CPC."
(See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467], SCC
p. 468.).
17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered,
and the whole plaint has to be read. As was observed by this
Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC
487], only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause
of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be rejected.
18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998)
7 SCC 184] it was observed that the averments in the plaint as a
whole have to be seen to find out whether Clause (d) of Rule 11
of Order 7 was applicable.
19. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Asstt. Charity Commr. [(2004)
3 SCC 137] this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 146-47, para 15)
"15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection,
segregation and inversions of the language of various
paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would
run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according
to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its
true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a
passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although
it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked
into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition
or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical
sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered
primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a
whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no
pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hairsplitting technicalities."
20. For our purpose, Clause (d) is relevant. It makes it clear that
if the plaint does not contain necessary averments relating to
limitation, the same is liable to be rejected. For the said purpose, it
is the duty of the person who files such an application to satisfy
the court that the plaint does not disclose how the same is in time.
In order to answer the said question, it is incumbent on the part of
SHAKTI BHOG FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD. v. THE CENTRAL
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the court to verify the entire plaint. Order 7 Rule 12 mandates
where a plaint is rejected, the court has to record the order to that
effect with the reasons for such order."
On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ Charitable
Trust & Educational Charitable Society vs. Ponniamman
Educational Trust3, observed as follows: -
"10 ... It is clear from the above that where the plaint does not
disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is undervalued and
not corrected within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently
stamped and not rectified within the time fixed by the court, barred
by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff
fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no
other option except to reject the same. A reading of the above
provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7 Rule 11 of
the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before
registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the
defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial.
11. This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai vs.
State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557, in which, while
considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under:
(SCC p. 560, para 9)
"9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the
relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an
application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The
trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC
at any stage of the suit - before registering the plaint or after
issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the
conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an
application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7
CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken
by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly
irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written
statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule
11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the
exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court."
3 (2012) 8 SCC 706
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It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has
to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be
exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear
that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it
is the duty of the Court to scrutinize the averments/pleas in the
plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding
such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage,
the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are
wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint
averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos
Brett & Co. Ltd. vs. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184 and
Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. vs. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3
SCC 100.
12. It is also useful to refer the judgment in T. Arivandandam vs.
T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, wherein while considering the
very same provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial
court in considering such application, this Court has reminded the
trial Judges with the following observation: (SCC p. 470, para 5)
"5. ... The learned Munsif must remember that if on a
meaningful - not formal - reading of the plaint it is manifestly
vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear
right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7, Rule
11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein
is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a
cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining
the party searchingly under Order 10, C.P.C. An activist Judge
is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would
insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing
so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage.
The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men,
(Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them."
It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and
not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of
the trial Judge to exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11. If
clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action as
observed by Krishna Iyer J., in the above referred decision, it
should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the
parties under Order 10 of the Code."
SHAKTI BHOG FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD. v. THE CENTRAL
BANK OF INDIA & ANR. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
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We may also advert to the exposition of this Court in Madanuri
Sri Rama Chandra Murthy vs. Syed Jalal4. In paragraph 7 of the
said decision, this Court has succinctly restated the legal position as
follows: -
"7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions
enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to
observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC can be
exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts
which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the
averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading
of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and
meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court
should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Since the
power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the
threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule
11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be
strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as
a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of
action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to
observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any
law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the
contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while
considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint.
Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct
as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred
by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for
rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order
7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint
has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in
the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier
stage."
Keeping in mind the well settled legal position, we may now
proceed to analyse the averments in the plaint, as filed by the appellant,
to discern whether it was a fit case for rejection of the plaint under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC. As noticed from the trial Court
judgment, it is evident that the trial Court did not make any attempt to
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analyse the plaint in the manner predicated in the aforesaid decisions.
Even the District Court dealing with first appeal and the High Court with
second appeal omitted to do so. It is the bounden duty of the Court to
examine the plaint as a whole and not selected averments therein. For
that, we need to advert to the averments in the plaint. Paragraphs 8 to
15 of the plaint, which according to us, are the relevant averments, read
as follows:-
''8. That the facility as referred to in the foregoing paras was
extended with effect from 01.04.1997 and somewhere in the month
of July, 2000 it was noticed by the Plaintiff that the Defendants
were charging interest/commission @ Rs.4/- per thousand rupees
on local cheques and drafts in an arbitrary manner in violation of
the assurance given to the Plaintiff.
9. That after the detection of the above overcharging of
interest/commission the Plaintiff sent a letter to the
Defendants on 21.07.2000 complaining about the
overcharging and thereafter the interest/commission was
charged as per assurance given.
10. That the amount overcharged as commission/interest was not
refunded to the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff sent the following letters
addressed to the Bank i.e. General Manager and Senior Manager
indicating therein that amount overcharged should be refunded to
the Plaintiff with interest thereon: -
Letter dated 12.10.2000, 24.10.2000, 30.10.2000, 7.11.2000,
24.12.2000, 01.03.2001, 28.03.2001, 22.5.2001 and 20.06.2001.
In all the above letters requests were made to clarify as to how
the commission were calculated and deducted from the Plaintiff.
11. That the Assistant General Manager, Sh. P.S. Bawa of
Regional Office-B, Delhi vide letter dated 9.7.2001 informed
the Plaintiff that the comments of the Branch Office have
been invited on the representation of the Plaintiff in respect
of the local cheques/DDs discounted during the relevant
period and the matter will be decided as early as possible.
No progress was made in the matter and the Plaintiff had to
submit letter dated 31.10.2001 to the Hon'ble Finance
Minister, Govt. of India, New Delhi.
SHAKTI BHOG FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD. v. THE CENTRAL
BANK OF INDIA & ANR. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 6 S.C.R.
12. That the Defendants have charged interest for some time for
the actual number of days for the Defendants remained out of
funds.
13. That vide letter dated 08.05.2002, the Senior Manager
informed the Plaintiff that the cheques were being
purchased at the prevailing rates. That reply was given to
sidetrack the real issue in respect of which letter dated
09.07.2001 was received from Shri P.S. Bawa, Assistant
General Manager of Regional Office as referred to in the
foregoing paras.
14. That, thereafter, the Plaintiff sent letters dated 12.07.2002,
22.09.2002, 24.3.2003 alongwith which the details of the proposed/
estimated excess amount charged were given and it was requested
that a sum of Rs.31,57,484/- approximately appears to have been
charged in excess of what should have been actually charged and
the exact amount should be calculated and refunded to the Plaintiff.
No reply was given by the Bank to these letters.
15. That Senior Manager of the Defendant No. 2 vide letter
dated 19.09.2002 had informed that everything was done
according to rules and the matters need not to be pursued
any further and thereafter the Plaintiff sent another letter
dated 03.06.2003."
(emphasis supplied)
Again, in paragraph 28 of the plaint, it is stated as follows: -
"28. That the cause of action to file the suit accrued in favour of
the Plaintiff and against the Defendants when the illegal recoveries
were noticed and letter dated 21.07.2000 was sent to the
Defendants to clarify as to how the interest was being calculated
and recovered and on various other dates when the letters were
sent to the Defendants with request for refund of the excess
amounts charged and on 9.7.2001 when assurance for proper
calculation and refund was conveyed to the Plaintiff and on
8.5.2002, 12.7.2002 and 22.9.2002 when requests were again made
to settle the matter on 19.9.2002, 3.6.2003 and the cause of action
arose on 23.12.2003 when the legal notice was served upon the
Defendant and on 28.12.2003 when the reply to the notice was
received and finally on 07.01.2005. When the legal notice for
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rendition of accounts was served upon the Defendants and the
cause of action still subsists as the accounts have not been rendered
so far nor the excess amount charged has been refunded by the
Defendants."
From the averments in the plaint, if read as a whole, it would
appear that the assertion of the appellant is that the respondents had
extended financial facility with effect from 1.4.1997 till October, 2007,
but somewhere in the month of July, 2000, the appellant noticed that the
respondents were unilaterally charging interest/commission at the rate
of Rs.4 per thousand rupees on local cheques and drafts in an arbitrary
manner in violation of the assurance given to the appellant. Immediately
thereafter, the appellant wrote to the respondent-Bank vide letter dated
21.7.2000 for taking corrective steps in the matter. Then correspondence
ensued between the parties in that regard and the appellant was assured
by the Regional Office of the respondent-Bank that an appropriate
decision will be taken at the earliest. The relevant assertion in that regard
is found in paragraph 11 of the plaint, wherein it is mentioned that the
Assistant General Manager - Shri P.S. Bawa of Regional Office-B,
Delhi, vide letter dated 9.7.2001 informed the appellant that comments
from the concerned Branch Office have been invited and appropriate
decision will be taken on its representation as early as possible.
Thereafter, on 8.5.2002, the Senior Manager of the respondent-Bank
informed the appellant that the cheques were being purchased at the
prevailing rates; which plea, according to the appellant, was to deviate
from the position stated by the Assistant General Manager of Regional
Office in his letter dated 9.7.2001 referred to earlier. Resultantly, the
appellant wrote to the officials of the respondent-Bank vide letters dated
12.7.2002, 22.9.2002 and 24.3.2003. Notably, it is averred in paragraph
15 of the plaint that the Senior Manager of the respondent-Bank vide
letter dated 19.9.2002 had informed the appellant that everything was
being done in accordance with the rules and the appellant need not pursue
the matter any further. It is asserted that despite this intimation, the
appellant continued to correspond with the respondent-Bank with a
sanguine hope that the issue will be resolved at the appropriate level by
the Bank and finally issued a legal notice on 28.11.2003, which was duly
responded to by the respondent-Bank vide Advocate's letter dated
23.12.2003. Nevertheless, the appellant gave another legal notice on
7.1.2005 and thereafter, proceeded to file the subject suit in February,
2005.
SHAKTI BHOG FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD. v. THE CENTRAL
BANK OF INDIA & ANR. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
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7. All these events have been reiterated in paragraph 28 of the
plaint, dealing with the cause of action for filing of the suit. Indeed, the
said paragraph opens with the expression "the cause of action to file the
suit accrued in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants when
the illegal recoveries were noticed and letter dated 21.7.2000 was sent
to the defendants to clarify as to how the interest was being calculated."
This averment cannot be read in isolation. As aforesaid, on reading the
plaint as a whole, it is seen that the gravamen of the case made out in
the plaint is that the appellant noticed the discrepancy in July, 2000 and
immediately took up the matter with the officials of the respondentBank at different levels and in response, the Assistant General Manager
of Regional Office of the Bank had communicated in writing to the
appellant vide letter dated 9.7.2001 that its representation was being
examined and comments of the Branch Office have been invited and
after receipt thereof the matter will be decided as early as possible. As
no further communication was received by the appellant, it had to make
a representation to the Finance Minister, Government of India, vide letter
dated 31.10.2001 and presumably because of that, the appellant received
a communication from the Senior Manager vide letter dated 8.5.2002
informing the appellant that the cheques were being purchased at the
prevailing rates. This stand taken by the Senior Manager was to sidetrack the issue pending consideration before the Assistant General
Manager, Regional Office referred to in his letter dated 9.7.2001. The
case made out by the appellant is that no communication was received
by the appellant from the Assistant General Manager, Regional Office
and instead, for the first time it was informed vide letter dated 19.9.2002
sent by the Senior Manager of the respondent-Bank, that all actions
taken by the Bank are as per the rules and, therefore, the appellant need
not correspond in this regard any further. This response of the Bank
could also be regarded as a firm denial or refusal by the authorised
official of the Bank, giving rise to cause of action to sue the Bank.
8. Thus understood, the letter dated 8.5.2002 sent by the Senior
Manager of the respondent-Bank, at best, be reckoned as accrual of the
cause of action to the appellant to sue the respondent-Bank. It is then
stated that the appellant received a communication dated 19.9.2002,
informing the appellant that it should not carry on any further
correspondence with the Bank relating to the subject matter. Until then,
the appellant was having a sanguine hope of favourable resolution of its
claim including by the Regional Office of the respondents. The appellant,
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therefore, had to send a legal notice on 28.11.2003, to which the Bank
responded on 23.12.2003. Reckoning these dates, the plaint filed on
23.2.2005 was within limitation, as stated in paragraph 28 of the plaint.
Resultantly, the question of rejecting such a plaint under Order VII Rule
11(d) of the CPC did not arise.
9. The expression used in Article 113 of the 1963 Act is "when
the right to sue accrues", which is markedly distinct from the expression
used in other Articles in First Division of the Schedule dealing with suits,
which unambiguously refer to the happening of a specified event.
Whereas, Article 113 being a residuary clause and which has been invoked
by all the three Courts in this case, does not specify happening of
particular event as such, but merely refers to the accrual of cause of
action on the basis of which the right to sue would accrue.
10. Concededly, the expression used in Article 113 is distinct from
the expressions used in other Articles in the First Division dealing with
suits such as Article 58 (when the right to sue "first" accrues), Article
59 (when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree
cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded "first" become known
to him) and Article 104 (when the plaintiff is "first" refused the enjoyment
of the right). The view taken by the trial Court, which commended to the
first appellate Court and the High Court in second appeal, would inevitably
entail in reading the expression in Article 113 as - when the right to sue
(first) accrues. This would be re-writing of that provision and doing
violence to the legislative intent. We must assume that the Parliament
was conscious of the distinction between the provisions referred to above
and had advisedly used generic expression "when the right to sue
accrues" in Article 113 of the 1963 Act. Inasmuch as, it would also
cover cases falling under Section 22 of the 1963 Act, to wit, continuing
breaches and torts.
11. We may usefully refer to the dictum of a three-Judge Bench
of this Court in Union of India & Ors. vs. West Coast Paper Mills
Ltd. & Anr.5, which has had an occasion to examine the expression
used in Article 58 in contradistinction to Article 113 of the 1963 Act. We
may advert to paragraphs 19 to 21 of the said decision, which read thus:-
"19. Articles 58 and 113 of the Limitation Act read thus:
5 (2004) 2 SCC 747
SHAKTI BHOG FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD. v. THE CENTRAL
BANK OF INDIA & ANR. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
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Description of suit
Period
of
limitation
Time
from
which
period begins to run
58.
To obtain any other
declaration.
Three years
When the right to sue
first accrues.
*
*
*
113.
Any suit for which no
period of limitation is
provided elsewhere in
this Schedule.
Three years
When the right to sue
accrues.
20. It was not a case where the respondents prayed for a
declaration of their rights. The declaration sought for by them as
regards unreasonableness in the levy of freight was granted by
the Tribunal.
21. A distinction furthermore, which is required to be noticed is
that whereas in terms of Article 58 the period of three years is to
be counted from the date when "the right to sue first accrues", in
terms of Article 113 thereof, the period of limitation would be
counted from the date "when the right to sue accrues". The
distinction between Article 58 and Article 113 is, thus,
apparent inasmuch as the right to sue may accrue to a suitor
in a given case at different points of time and, thus, whereas
in terms of Article 58 the period of limitation would be
reckoned from the date on which the cause of action arose
first, in the latter the period of limitation would be differently
computed depending upon the last day when the cause of
action therefor arose."
(emphasis supplied)
12. Similarly, in Khatri Hotels Private Limited & Anr. Vs. Union
of India & Anr.6, this Court considered the expression used in Article
58 in contradistinction to Article 120 of the old Limitation Act (the Indian
Limitation Act, 1908). In paragraph 24, the Court noted thus: -
"24. The Limitation Act, 1963 (for short "the 1963 Act") prescribes
time limit for all conceivable suits, appeals, etc. Section 2(j) of
that Act defines the expression "period of limitation" to mean the
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period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suit, appeal or
application. Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted, appeal
preferred or application made after the prescribed period shall,
subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 24, be dismissed even
though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. If a suit
is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall within
the residuary article. In other words, the residuary article
is applicable to every kind of suit not otherwise provided
for in the Schedule."
(emphasis supplied)
The distinction between the two Articles (Article 58 and Article
120) has been expounded in paragraphs 27 to 30 of the reported decision,
which read thus: -
"27. The differences which are discernible from the language of
the above reproduced two articles are:
(i) The period of limitation prescribed under Article 120 of the
1908 Act was six years whereas the period of limitation
prescribed under the 1963 Act is three years and,
(ii) Under Article 120 of the 1908 Act, the period of
limitation commenced when the right to sue accrues. As
against this, the period prescribed under Article 58
begins to run when the right to sue first accrues.
28. Article 120 of the 1908 Act was interpreted by the Judicial
Committee in Bolo v. Koklan [(1929-30) 57 IA 325: AIR 1930
PC 270] and it was held: (IA p. 331)
"There can be no 'right to sue' until there is an accrual
of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or at least
a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right, by the
defendant against whom the suit is instituted." The same view
was reiterated in Annamalai Chettiar v.