# Shamrao Parulekar v. The District 1J1agistrate, Thana and

- **Citation:** [1953] 1 S.C.R. 210
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1952-09-30
- **Bench:** Patanjali Sastri C.J, Mukherjea, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shamrao-parulekar-v-the-district-1j1agistrate-thana-and-123
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Preventive Detention Act, 1950, a§ amended by the Preventive
Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, s. 11-A-Wiwther discriminatory-Validity-Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 14, 22 (7)
(b)-"Unless a shorter period is specified in the order", meaning of.
Section 11-A which was inserted in the Preventive Detention
Act of 1950 by the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act
1952, p!ovided that the maximum period for which any perso~
m-ay be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has
been confirmed under section 11 shall be twelve months :from the
date of detention. But sub-s. (2) qualified this by dividing detentions into two classes : (a) those in which the detentWn order
W..s confirmed before the 30th September, 1952, and (b) those in
~hich the confirmation V.'as after that date, and it provided that
in the former case, unless a shorter period was specified in the
order, the detention shall continue either till the 1st of April, 1953,
or for twelve months from the date of detention, \vbichever expires
later:
Held, (i) that' the section did not contravene art. 14 or art. 22
(7) (b) of the Constitution merely because it introduced a fresh
classification which divided detentions into those before the Act
and those thereafter, as the classification was a reasonable one.
The section did not involve any discrimination between persons
whose detentions were confirmed b"1ore the 30th September, 1952,
merely because, as a result of the section, in the case of some per~
sons the period of detention may be longer and in the case of
others it may be shorter;
Shamrao Parulekar v. The District 1J1agistrate, Thana and
Others ( [1952] S.C.R. 683) followed.
(ii) that a detention order made on the 16th October, 1951,
which did not specify any period of detention was not a case where·
"a shorter period was specified in the order
11 within the meaning
of s. 11-A (2) merely because the detention would have expired.
either on the 31st March, 1952, or on 30th September, 1952, but
for the Amendment Act.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTIOl!: Petition No. 399 of 1952.
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India
for a writ iu the nature of habeas corpus.
.... -
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
211
Godavari Parulekar, the petitioner, in person.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (G.N.
Joshi and P. A. Mehta, with him) for the respon!\ent.
1952
Godavari
Parulekar
v.
1952.
December 5.
was delivered by
The Judgment of the Court Stats of Bombay
and Others.
BOSE J.-This is a habeas corpus petition under
Bose J.
article 32 of the Constitution.
The petitioner was detained on the 16th of
October, 1951, under the
Preventive 'Detention
Act of 1950 as amended in 1951.
Her detention was
actually longer than this but the earlier detentions
were under a different set of orders which are not
relevant to the present matter. The present detention
. is based on an order of the District Magistrate,
Thana, and merely says that the petitiop.er be detained, without specifying any period.
The order of
confirmation was passed on the 4th of January, 1952,
and the"re again no period was specified.
The
petitioner's case is that as no period was specified in
the order her period of detention expired on the 31st
of March, 1952, because of the amending Act of
1951 ; or at the outside on the 30th of September,
1952, because of Act XXXIV of 1952 which effected
a further amendment.
The reply on behalf of the State of Bombay is that
the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 was again •
amended by Act LXI of 1952 and th~t the effect of
.'-
this amendment was to carry the petitioner's detention on to the 31st of March, 1953, because of section
-
11-A which was added to the original Act of 1950.
The petitioner counters by saying that the new Act
does not apply to cases in which the order of detention is not silent about its duration and so section
11-A does not serve to extend the period of her
detention.
She relies on the following portion of
section 11-A (2) :
" ... every dete

## Text

1952
Dec. 5.
~10
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953]
GODAVARI PARULEKAR
•
v .
STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS.
[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BOSE and
GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
Preventive Detention Act, 1950, a§ amended by the Preventive
Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, s. 11-A-Wiwther discriminatory-Validity-Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 14, 22 (7)
(b)-"Unless a shorter period is specified in the order", meaning of.
Section 11-A which was inserted in the Preventive Detention
Act of 1950 by the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act
1952, p!ovided that the maximum period for which any perso~
m-ay be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has
been confirmed under section 11 shall be twelve months :from the
date of detention. But sub-s. (2) qualified this by dividing detentions into two classes : (a) those in which the detentWn order
W..s confirmed before the 30th September, 1952, and (b) those in
~hich the confirmation V.'as after that date, and it provided that
in the former case, unless a shorter period was specified in the
order, the detention shall continue either till the 1st of April, 1953,
or for twelve months from the date of detention, \vbichever expires
later:
Held, (i) that' the section did not contravene art. 14 or art. 22
(7) (b) of the Constitution merely because it introduced a fresh
classification which divided detentions into those before the Act
and those thereafter, as the classification was a reasonable one.
The section did not involve any discrimination between persons
whose detentions were confirmed b"1ore the 30th September, 1952,
merely because, as a result of the section, in the case of some per~
sons the period of detention may be longer and in the case of
others it may be shorter;
Shamrao Parulekar v. The District 1J1agistrate, Thana and
Others ( [1952] S.C.R. 683) followed.
(ii) that a detention order made on the 16th October, 1951,
which did not specify any period of detention was not a case where·
"a shorter period was specified in the order
11 within the meaning
of s. 11-A (2) merely because the detention would have expired.
either on the 31st March, 1952, or on 30th September, 1952, but
for the Amendment Act.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTIOl!: Petition No. 399 of 1952.
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India
for a writ iu the nature of habeas corpus.
.... -
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
211
Godavari Parulekar, the petitioner, in person.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (G.N.
Joshi and P. A. Mehta, with him) for the respon!\ent.
1952
Godavari
Parulekar
v.
1952.
December 5.
was delivered by
The Judgment of the Court Stats of Bombay
and Others.
BOSE J.-This is a habeas corpus petition under
Bose J.
article 32 of the Constitution.
The petitioner was detained on the 16th of
October, 1951, under the
Preventive 'Detention
Act of 1950 as amended in 1951.
Her detention was
actually longer than this but the earlier detentions
were under a different set of orders which are not
relevant to the present matter. The present detention
. is based on an order of the District Magistrate,
Thana, and merely says that the petitiop.er be detained, without specifying any period.
The order of
confirmation was passed on the 4th of January, 1952,
and the"re again no period was specified.
The
petitioner's case is that as no period was specified in
the order her period of detention expired on the 31st
of March, 1952, because of the amending Act of
1951 ; or at the outside on the 30th of September,
1952, because of Act XXXIV of 1952 which effected
a further amendment.
The reply on behalf of the State of Bombay is that
the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 was again •
amended by Act LXI of 1952 and th~t the effect of
.'-
this amendment was to carry the petitioner's detention on to the 31st of March, 1953, because of section
-
11-A which was added to the original Act of 1950.
The petitioner counters by saying that the new Act
does not apply to cases in which the order of detention is not silent about its duration and so section
11-A does not serve to extend the period of her
detention.
She relies on the following portion of
section 11-A (2) :
" ... every detention order which has been confirmed
under section 11 before the commencement of the
Preventive Detention (Second l\mendment) Act,
'2L!
8UPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1952
1952, shall, unless a shorter period is specified in the
Godavari
order, continue to remain in force until the 1st day
Parulekar
Of Jipril, 1953 ... "
v.
The petitioner concedes that no shorter period is
State of Bombay specified in her order Of detention but contends that
andOthus.
h
d
•·
ldh
· d · h
h 3
as er etent1on won
ave expire eit er on t e 1st
Bose J.
of March, 1952, or on the 30th of September, 1952,
one of those two dates must now be read into the
order and when that is done we have an order which
specifies a shorter period, therefore section 11-A (2)
does not serve to extend her detention.
We are unable to accept this contention. The section is clear and nnless a shorter period is specified in
the order, section 11-A(2) applies. We cannot add the
words "or must be deemed to have been specified by
reason of the expiry of the earlier Act" into the section.
We hold therefore .that section ll-A(2) vaJidly
extended the period of detention till the 1st of
April, 1953.
The petitioner's next point is based on articles 14
and 22(7)(b) of the Constitution. It arises in this
way. Section 3 (1) (a) of the Preventive Detention
Act of 1950 classifies grounds of permissible detention
into three categories. Article 22 (7) (b) empowers
Parliament to prescribe the maximum period for
which any person may "in any class or classes of
• cases" be detained.
The petitioner argues that this
permits only op.e maximum for each class and that if
different maxima are provided for "equals" within a
class it offends not only article 22 (7) (b) but also
article 14 as interpreted by the decisions of this
Court.
She next argues that section 11-A, now introduced by the second amending Act ol 1952
(Act LXI of 1952), does just that and so is ultra vires.
Her point is put as follows.
Sub-section (1) of section 11-A states that the
maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has
been confirmed under section 11 shall be twelve months
from the date of detention. But sub-s"ection (2)
qualifies this by dividing detentioqs into two classes;
..
... ..
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~13
(a) those in which the detention order was confirmed
1952
before 30th of September, 1952, and (b) those in which
Godavar>
the confirmation was after that date, and it provides
Parulekar
that in the former case, unless a shorter period is
v.
specified in the order, the detention shall continue State 01 Bombay
either till the 1st of April, 1953, orfortwelvemonths
and Others.
from the date of detention, whichever expires later.
Bose J.
This, she says, introduces a fresh classification which
divides detentions into those before the Act and those
after.
That, she says, is ultra vires, first, because it
introduces a discriminatory classification in the class
to which she belongs under section 3 of the Act and,
second, because it entails discrimination even in the
fresh class into which she has been thrown by the
new sub-division made by the second amending Act
of 1952.
As regards the first point, the ratio decidendi in
Shamrao V. Parulekar v. The District Magistrate,
Thana, and Others(1) applies here. In that case, detentions were divided into those which had already been
considered by an Advisory Board and those which
had not. This was upheld. The dividing line here is
different, namely a certain date, but the principle is
the same and its reasonableness is apparent from a
consideration of the various amendments which have
been made from time to time.
The life of the Act of 1950, which was the
principal Act, was extended till the 1st of October,
1952, by section 2 of the amending Act (Act XXXIV
of 1952), and the effect of section 3 was to prolong
the life of all detentions in force on 14th of March
1952, (provided they had been confirmed before that
date) for so long as the principal Act was in force.
At that date this meant till the 1st of October, 1952.
But the second amending Act of 1952 extended the
life of the principa~ Act till the 31st of December,
1954.
Therefore, m the absence of section 11-A all
those detentions would have been e~tended till that
date.
But section 11-A modified that and put 1st of
April, 1953, as the latest date for these old detention,s,
(1) [1952) S.C.R. 68~ at 691 and 69~.
J&
..
214
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
1959
It therefore conferred a benefit and cannot be deemed unreasonable.
Sub-section (3)
of
section 11-A
Goilavari
Parulekar
shows that that was the object.
v.
But the petitioner attacked the provisions on the
State of Bombay ground of discrimination. She said that even assumand Othm.
ing the new classification of detentions into those
Bose J.
before and after the 30th of September, 1952, to be
good, section 11-A is nevertheless discriminatory
because it discriminates amongst those in her class,
namely those whose detentions were made and con·
firmed before the 30th of September.
She put it in
this way.
Taking the case of her own detention, she pointed
out that, if section 11-A is good, it will continue till
the 1st of April, 1953, that is to say, her detention
will have been for a period of 17 l months from the
16th of October, 1951, till the 1st of April, 1953. On
the other hand, a person detained after her on, say,
tl:ie 1st of September, 1952, would also be due for
release on the 1st of April, 1953, and so would have
had only six months' detention.
This, in our opinion, is not discrimination within
the meaning of article 14.
A maximum can be
fixed, either by specifying a particular period,
such as twelve months, or by setting an outside limit,
and it is inevitable in such a case that the length
of detention will vary in eaci::i individual case. Those
taken into detention at a later date are bound to be
detained for a shorter time. Government is not bound
to detain everybody for the same length of time. It
has a discretion.· Moreover, the appropriate Government has been left power to Tevoke or modify the
detention order at any earlier time.
This point was
considered in Shamrao V. Parulekar v. The District
Magistrate, Thana, & Others (1) and was decided against
the detenu.
The petitioner endeavoured to have her application
· reopened on the merits contending again that the
grounds of· detention are vague.
She relies on Shamrao V. Parulekar v. The State of Bombay(') where
(1) [195z] S.C,R. 68~ at 691 at 69l·
(2) Petition No. SQ of 19~2,
-
..
... -
•
•
" -
-
/
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
215
1952
another de ten u was released by another Bench of this
Court in circumstances which, according to her, are
very similar.
We are unable to allow this as her
::::~~::
petition has already been rejected on the merits. -She
v.
/
was only allowed to appear on constitutional points. State of Bombay
We understand that in the other petition this fact
and Others.
was not brought to the notice of the Court.
'rhe application is dismissed.
Application dismissed.
Agent for the respondents: G. H. Raiadhyaksha.
,.
In re 'rHE EDITOR, PRINTER AND
PUBLISHER OF
" 'rHE TIMES OF INDIA "
and
In re ASWINI KUMAR GROSE AND ANOTHER
v.
ARABINDA BOSE AND ANOTHER.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHEHJEA. DAs,
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and BHAGWATI JJ.]
Contempt of Court-Article imputing ?notives to jwlges-Gross
ran.tempt-Apology-Practice of Supreme Coitrt.
It is not the practice of the Supreme Court to issue a rule for
contempt of Court except in very grave and serious cases and it is
never over-sensitive to public criticism; but when there is danger
of grave mischief being done in the matter of administration of
justice, the animadversion will not be ignored and viewed with
placid equanimity.
A leading article in the " Times of India" on .the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Aswini K1tmar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose and
Another ( [1953] S.C.R. 1) contained the following statements: "the
fact of the· matter is that in the higher legal latitudes in Delhi the
dual system was regarded as obsolete and anomalous ......... There
is a tell-tale note at the top of the rules framed by the Supreme
Court for enrolment of advocates and agents to the effect that the
::tulm1 were subject to revision and the Judges had under consideration a proposal for abolishing the dual system ......... To achieve a
dubious or even a laudable purpose by straining the law is hardly
Bos1 J.
195!3