# SHAMRAO VISHNU PARULEKAR v. THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, THANA

- **Citation:** [1956] 1 S.C.R. 644
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-01-27
- **Bench:** S. R. Das C. J, Venkatarama Ayyar, B. P. Sinha, S. K. Das, GovINDA MENON
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shamrao-vishnu-parulekar-v-the-district-magistrate-thana-1253
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Preventive detention-Order of detention by the District Magistrate-Report sent to the State Government-Approval by the StatcGro1tndsfor the order sent later-Validity of detention-" Grounds on
which the order has been made", Interpretation of-Preventive Deten·
tion Act, 1950 (IV of 19~0), ss. 8(2)(8), 7.
Sub-section (3) of s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950,
provides that when an order oJ detention is me.de under sub-Section
(2) by an officer mentioned therein, he shall forthwith report the
fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the
order has been ma.de ... and no such order ... shall remain in force for
more than twelve days alter the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government.
Under s. 7(1) "when a person is detained in pursuance of a
detention order, the authority making the order shall ... communicate
to him the grounds on which the order has been made, and shall
afford him the earliest opportunity of makin~ a representation
against the order to the appropriate Government' .
The petitioners were arrested on 27th January 1956 in pursuance of the orders of detention passed under s. 3(2) of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950, by the District Magistrate who sent his report
the next day to the State Government which approved of the same
on 3rd February 1956. Meantime, the grounds on which the orders
of detention were made were formulated by the District Magistrate
who furnished the same to the petitioners on 31st January 1956
under s. 7 of the Act. A copy of these grounds was sent to the State
Government on 6th February 1956. The petitioners challenged the
validity of the detention and contended, inter alia, that as the
expression "grounds on which the order bas been m&de" occurring
in s. 3(3) is word for word, the same as in s. 7 of the Act, it must
have the same ineaning a.nd as the copy of the grounds referred to
in s. 7 had not been sent along with the report under s. 3(3) to the
State Government before it had approved of the orders of detention
there was a violation of the procedure prescribed by the statute and
consequently the detention became illegal. It was found that the
report sent by the District Magistrate set out not merely the fact of
the making of the order of detention but also the materials on which
he had made the order.
Held, that the failure on the part of the District Magistrate to
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
645
send a.long with his report under s. 3(3) the very grounds which he
1956
subsequently furnished the detenu under s. 7, is not e. brae.ch of the
requirements of the.t sub-section and that it was sufficiently complied Shamrao Vis/111,.
with when he reported the materials on which he made the order.
Parulekar
fl
v.
The scope and intendment of the expression the grounds on
The Distrh·t
which the order has been made" in ss. 3(3) e.nd 7 of the Act a.re Magistrate Thana
quite different and it is not essential that the grounds which are
'
furnished to the detenu must have been before the State Government before it approves of the order.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petitions Nos.
100
and 101 of 1956.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution
for writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus.
N. 0. Chatterjee, Sadhan Chandra Gupta and
Janardhan Sharma, for the petitioners.
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, Porus
A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents.
1956.
September 17.
The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
v ENKATARAMA AYY AR J .-These are petitions under
article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ
in the nature of habeas corpus. On 26th January 1956
the District Magistrate, Thana, passed orders under
section 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act IV of
1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the detention of the petitioners~ and in execution of the
orders, they were arrested on 27th January 1956. The
next day, the District Magistrate sent his report to
the State Government which on 3rd February 1956
app

## Text

1956
September 17
644
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
SHAMRAO VISHNU PARULEKAR
v.
THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, THANA
(and connected petition)
(S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR,
B. P. SINHA, S. K. DAS and GovINDA MENON JJ.)
Preventive detention-Order of detention by the District Magistrate-Report sent to the State Government-Approval by the StatcGro1tndsfor the order sent later-Validity of detention-" Grounds on
which the order has been made", Interpretation of-Preventive Deten·
tion Act, 1950 (IV of 19~0), ss. 8(2)(8), 7.
Sub-section (3) of s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950,
provides that when an order oJ detention is me.de under sub-Section
(2) by an officer mentioned therein, he shall forthwith report the
fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the
order has been ma.de ... and no such order ... shall remain in force for
more than twelve days alter the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government.
Under s. 7(1) "when a person is detained in pursuance of a
detention order, the authority making the order shall ... communicate
to him the grounds on which the order has been made, and shall
afford him the earliest opportunity of makin~ a representation
against the order to the appropriate Government' .
The petitioners were arrested on 27th January 1956 in pursuance of the orders of detention passed under s. 3(2) of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950, by the District Magistrate who sent his report
the next day to the State Government which approved of the same
on 3rd February 1956. Meantime, the grounds on which the orders
of detention were made were formulated by the District Magistrate
who furnished the same to the petitioners on 31st January 1956
under s. 7 of the Act. A copy of these grounds was sent to the State
Government on 6th February 1956. The petitioners challenged the
validity of the detention and contended, inter alia, that as the
expression "grounds on which the order bas been m&de" occurring
in s. 3(3) is word for word, the same as in s. 7 of the Act, it must
have the same ineaning a.nd as the copy of the grounds referred to
in s. 7 had not been sent along with the report under s. 3(3) to the
State Government before it had approved of the orders of detention
there was a violation of the procedure prescribed by the statute and
consequently the detention became illegal. It was found that the
report sent by the District Magistrate set out not merely the fact of
the making of the order of detention but also the materials on which
he had made the order.
Held, that the failure on the part of the District Magistrate to
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
645
send a.long with his report under s. 3(3) the very grounds which he
1956
subsequently furnished the detenu under s. 7, is not e. brae.ch of the
requirements of the.t sub-section and that it was sufficiently complied Shamrao Vis/111,.
with when he reported the materials on which he made the order.
Parulekar
fl
v.
The scope and intendment of the expression the grounds on
The Distrh·t
which the order has been made" in ss. 3(3) e.nd 7 of the Act a.re Magistrate Thana
quite different and it is not essential that the grounds which are
'
furnished to the detenu must have been before the State Government before it approves of the order.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petitions Nos.
100
and 101 of 1956.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution
for writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus.
N. 0. Chatterjee, Sadhan Chandra Gupta and
Janardhan Sharma, for the petitioners.
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, Porus
A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents.
1956.
September 17.
The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
v ENKATARAMA AYY AR J .-These are petitions under
article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ
in the nature of habeas corpus. On 26th January 1956
the District Magistrate, Thana, passed orders under
section 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act IV of
1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the detention of the petitioners~ and in execution of the
orders, they were arrested on 27th January 1956. The
next day, the District Magistrate sent his report to
the State Government which on 3rd February 1956
approved of the samE'.
Meantime, on 30th January
1956 the District Magistrate formulated the grounds
on which the orders of detention were made, and the
same were communicated to the petitioners on 31st
,January 1956.
A copy of these grounds was sent to
the State Government on 6th February 1956.
The petitioners challenge the validity of the detention .on two grounds.
They contend firstly that the
grounds for the order of detention which were furnished to them under section 7 of the Act are vague,
646
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
1956
and secondly that the requirements of section 3(3) of
Shamrao v;,1,,,,. the Act had not been complied with, in that those
Panitekar
grounds had been sent to the State Government by
v.
the District Magistrate, not along with his report on
The Distrid
28th January 1956, but on 6th February 1956, after
Magist.-ate, Thana the State Government had approved of the order.
-
There is no substance whatsoever in the first conVenkataran1a
AyyarJ.
tention. The communication sent to the petitioners
runs as follows:
"During the monsoon season in the year 1955,
you held secret meeting of Adivasis in Umbergaon,
Dhanu, Palghar and Jawhar Talukas of Thana District at which you incited and instigated them to
have recourse to intimidation, violence and arson in
order to prevent the labourers from outside villages
hired by landlords from working for landlords. As a
direct result of your incitement and instigation, there
were several cases of intimidation, violence and arson
in which the Adivasis from these Talukas indulged.
Some of these cases are described below ........ ".
Then follows a detailed statement of the cases. It is
argued for the petitioners that no particulars were
given as to when and where the secret meetings were
held in which they are alleged to liave participated,
and •that the bald statement that they took place
during the monsoon season was too wide and vague
to be capable of being refuted.
But then, the particulars which follow give the dates on which the several incidents took place, and it is obvious that the
meetings must have been held near about those dates.
The communication further states that it is not in the
public interests to disclose further facts.
Reading
the communication as a whole, we are of opinion that
it is sufficiently definite to apprise the petitioners of
what they were charged with and to enable them to
give their explanation therefor.
That was the view
taken by Chagla, d. J. in the applications for habea8
corpuB, which the petitioners moved in the High Court
of Bombay under article 226 of the Constitution, and
we are in agreement with it. · Tl:e complaint that the
grounds are vague must therefore fail.
As regards the second contention, it will be usefu
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
647
to set out the relevant sections of the Act bearing on
1955
the question:
Shamrao Vishnu
Section 3(1) "The Central Government or the
Parulekar
State Government may--
v.
(a) if satisfied with respect to any person t~at
The District
with a view to preventing him from acting in any Magistrate, Tha11a
manner preJ"udicial to-
-
Venkatarama
(i) the defence of India, the relations of India
Ayyar J.
with foreign powers, or the security of India, or
(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or
(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the community; or
(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who
is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners
Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view
to making arrangements for his expulsion from India,
it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that
such person be detained.
(2) Any of the following officers, -namely,-
(a) District Magistrates,
(b) Additional District Magistrates specially
empowered in this behalf by the State Government,
( c) the Commissioner of Police for Born bay,
Calcutta, Madras or Hyderabad,
(d) Collector in the State of Hyderabad
may if satisfied as provided in sub-clauses (ii) and
(iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) exercise powers
conferred by the said sub-section.
(3) When any order is made under this section
by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) be shall
forthwith report the fact to the State Government
to which he is subordinate together with the grounds
on which the order has been made and such other
particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the
matter, and no such order made after the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall remain in force for more than
twelve days after the making thereof unless in the
meantime it has been approved by the State Gov·
ernment.
648
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
1956
(4) Where any order is made or approved by
the State Government under this section, the State
Shauirao Vishn11
Parulekar
Government shall, as soon as may be, report the fact
v.
to the Central Government together with the grounds
The District
on. which the order has been made and such other
Magistrate, T/la"a particulars as in the opinion of the State Govern-
-
ment have bearing on the necessity for the order".
v~nktrtara11ia
Ayyar J.
Section 7(1) "Where a person is detained in pursU·
ance of a detention order, the authority making the
order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five
days from the date of detention, communicate to him
the grounds on which the order has been made, and
shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a
representation against the order to the appropriate
Government.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the
authority to disclose facts which it considers to be
against the public interest to disclose''.
On these sections, the argument of Mr. Chatterjee for
the petitioners is that section 3(3) requires that when
an order of detention is made by one of the authorities mentioned in section 3(2)-in this case it was
so made- that authority should forthwith report the
fact to the State Government together with the
grounds on which the order was made; that this provision is clearly intended to safeguard the rights of
the detenu, as it is on a consideration of these grounds
that the Government has to decide whether it will
approve of the order or not; that when therefore the
grounds had not been made available to the State
Government before they had approved of the order,
as happened in the present case, there was a clear
violation of the proeedure prescribed by the statute,
and that the detention became illegal.
Now, it is clear from the affidavit filed on behalf of
the respondent that when the District Magistrate
sent a report under section 3(3) on 28th January
1956, he did send a report not merely of the fact of
the making of the order of detention, but also of the
materials on which he had made the order. The contention of the petitioner is that the grounds which
I
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
649
were formulated on 30th January 1956 and communi1956
cated to them on 31st January 1956 should also have Shamrao Vishnu
been sent along with the report. The question is wheParulekar
ther what the District Magistrate did was sufficient
v.
compliance with the requirements of section 3(3), and
The District
that will depend upon the interpretation to be put Magistrate, Thana
upon the words "grounds on which the order has
Venkatarama
been made" occurring in that section. Construing
AyyarJ.
these wotds in their naturi:tl and ordinary sense, they
would include any informii tion or material on which
the order was based. The Oxford Concise Dictionary
gives the following meanings to the word "ground":
'Base, foundation, motive, valid reason'. On this
definition, the materials on which the District
Magistrate considered that an order of detention
should be made could properly be described as grounds
therefor. But it is contended by Mr. Chatterjee that
the expression "grounds on which the order has been
made" occurring in section 3(3) is, word for word, the
same as in section 7, that the same expression occurring in the same statute must receive the same construction, that what section 3 requires is that on the
making of an order for detention, the authority is to
formulate the grounds for that order, and send the
same to the State Government under section 3(3) and
to the detenu under section 7, and that therefore it
was not sufficient merely to send to the State Government a report of the materials on which the order
was made.
Reliance was placed on the following
passage in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 10th
Edition, page 522:
"It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that
the same meaning is implied by the use of the same
expression in every part of an Act".
The rule of construction contended for by the petitioners is well-settled, but that is only one element
in deciding what the true import of the enactment
is, to ascertain which it is necessary to have regard
to the purpose behind the particular provision and
its setting in the scheme of the statute. "The presumption", says Craies, "that the same words are
used in the same meaning is however very slight, and
84
650
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
7956
it is proper 'if sufficient reason can be assigned, to
construe a word in one part of an Act in a different
Sha111rao Vi1hnu
Parrilekar
sense from that which it bears in another part of
v.
an Act'"
(Statute Law, 5th Edition, page 159).
The District
And Maxwell, on whose statement of the law the
Magistrate. Thana petitioners rely, observes further on;
"But the presumption is not of much weight.
Ven-katara1na
d
d
ff
Ayyar J.
The same wor may be use in di erent senses in 1he
same statute, and even in the same section". (Interpretation of Statutes, page 322).
Examining the two provisions in their context, it
will be seen that section 3(1) confers on the Central
-
Government and the State Government the power to
•
pass an order of detention, when the grounds mentioned in that sub-clause exist.
When an order is
made under this provision, the right of the detenu
nuder section 7 is to be informed of the grounds of
detention, as soon as may be, and that is to enable
him to make a representation against that order,
which is a fundamental right guaranteed under article 22(5).
Coming next to section 3(2), it provides
for the power which is conferred on the State Government under section 3(1) being exercised by certain
authorities with reference to the matters specified
therein. This being a delegation of the power conferred on the State Government under section 3(1),
with a view to ensure that the delegate acts within
his authority and fairly and properly and that the
State exercises due and effective control and supervision over him, section 3(3) enacts a special procedure to be observed when action is taken under section 3(2).
The authority making the order under
section 3(2) is accordingly required to report the fact
of the order forthwith to the State along with the
grounds therefor, and if the State does not approve
of the order within twelve days, it is automatically
to lapse. These provisions are intended to regulate
the course of business between the State Government
and the authorities subordinate to it exercising its
power under statutory delegation; and their scope is
altogether different from that of section 7 which deals
with the right of the detenue as against the State
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
6'51
Government and its subordinate authorities. Sec7956
tion 3(3) requires the authority to communicate the Shamrao Vis/mt<
grounds of its order to the State Government, so that
Parulekar
the latter might satisfy itself whether detention
v.
should be approved. Section 7 requires the statement
The District
of grounds to be sent to the detenu, so that he might Magistrate, Tha"a
make a representation against the order. The pur-
-
•
Venkataran1a
pose of the two sections is so different that it cannot
Ayyar J.
be presumed that the expression "the grounds on
which the order has been made" is used in section
3(3) in the same sense which it bears in section 7:
That the legislature could not have contemplated
that the grounds mentioned in section 3(3) should be
identical with those referred to in section 7 could also
be seen from the fact that whereas under section 7(2)
it is open to the authority not to disclose to the
detenu facts if it considers that it would be against
public interests so to do, it is these facts that will
figure prominently in a report by the subordinate
authority to the State Government under section
3(3), and form the basis for approval. If the grounds
which are furnished under section 3(3) could contain
matters which need not be communicated to the
detenu under section 7, the expression "grounds on
which the order has been made" cannot bear the same
meaning in both the sections.
There is also another reason in support of this conclusion. When the authority mentioned in section
3(2) decides, on a consifi}eration of the materials
placed before it, to act under that section and orders
detention, it is required by section 3(3) to report that
fact with the grounds therefor to the State Government forthwith.
But under section 7, the duty of
the authority is to communicate the grounds to the
detenu, as soon as may be. Now, it bas been held that
as the object of this provision is to give the detenu
an opportunity to make a representation against the
order, the grounds must be sufficiently definite and
detailed to enable him to do so.
It is obvious that
the communication that has to be served on the
detenu under section 7 of the Act is a formal document setting out the grounds for the order and the
6132
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
1956
particulars in support thereof, subject, of course,
to section 7(2); whereas the report to the State under
Slta1nrao Vishnu
Parulekar
section 3(3) is a less formal document in the nature
v.
of a confidential inter-departmental communication,
The District
which is to contain the particulars on which the order
Magistrate, Thana was made. It could not have been intended that the
contents of the two communications which are so
Vcnkatal'ama
Ii
AyyarJ.
dissimilar in t eir scope and intendment should be
identical.
Mr. N. C. Chatterjee also cited certain observations
of Kania C.J. in State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar
Vaidya(') as supporting his contention that the
grounds which are furnished to the detenu must have
been before the State Government before it approves
of the order. Said the learned Chief Justice:
"It is obviouR that the grounds for making the
order as mentioned above, are the grounds on which
the detaining authority was satisfied that it was
necessary to make the order. These grounds therefore must be in existence when the order is made''.
But the grounds referred to in the above passages
are the reasons for making the order, not the
formal expressions in which they are embodied,
and that will be clear from the following observation
further on:
"By their very nature the grounds are conclusions of facts and not a complete detailed recital of
all the facts".
Our conclusion is that th11 failure on the part of
the District Magistrate of Thana to send along with
his report under section 3(3), the very grounds which
he subsequently communicated to the detenu under
section 7 is not a breach of the requirements of that
sub-section, and that it was sufficiently complied with
when he reported the materials on which he made the
order.
The second contention of the petitioners also fails,
and these applications must therefore be dismissed.
(l l [1951] s c It. lr.7, 178.
-