# SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. ~ v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS

- **Citation:** [2009] 13 S.C.R. 710
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2009-08-25
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 8500-8501 of 2001
- **Bench:** B.N. Agrawal, G.S. Singhvi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shanti-sports-club-anr-v-union-of-india-ors-25149
- **Pages:** 64

## Headnote

/Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
,.+ '
c
s. 48(1) - Withdrawal from acquisition of land - HELD:
Can be done only by issuing a notification in the official
Gazette - Note recorded by Minister in the file cannot be
relied upon to plead before Court that the Government had
taken decision to withdraw from acquisition - Even if the
D competent authority records its opinion in the file on merits
of the matter under consideration, the same cannot be termed
/T
as a decision of the Government unless it is sanctified and
acted upon by issuing an order under Articles 77(1) and (2)
or Articles 166(1) and (2) of the Constitution - Government's
E subsequent decision not to withdraw from a,cquisition of the
land in question as communicated to the parties concerned
does not suffer from vice of discrimination/arbitrary exercise
of power/non-application of mind- Constitution of India, 1950
-
Articles 14, 77(1) and (2) and 166(1) and (2) -
-->--
F
Administrative Law - Opinion of competent authority in the file,
requirements to term if as decision of Government.
Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972:
s. 3 - Prohibition against transfer of acquired lands -
Land acquired in terms of Land Acquisition Act transferred by
_.,.
G land owners after completion of acquisition proceedings -
Constructions raised thereon - HELD: Even if any sale
Jrtransactions did take place, the same will have to be treated
as void in view of express prohibition contained in s. 3 - Equity
.
H
710
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 711
& ORS.
cannot be pleaded on ground of huge expenditure incurred
A
~
on construction, to seek court's intervention for protection of
unauthorized construction raised on acquired lands - Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 - Equity.
Urban Development:
B
~
Town planning -
Transfer of acquired land and
constructions raised thereon in violation of statutory provisions
-+.-
- HELD: Object of planned development can be achieved by
rigorous enforcement of master plans - It is high time that
executive and political apparatus of State take serious view c
of the menace of illegal and unauthorized constructions by
affluent class of builders and others .
.
~·
•.,.:'"4
Large tracts of lands were acquired in terms of
Notifications u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 D
\(
issued between 13.11.1959 and 23.1.1965 for planned
development of Delhi. The acquisition was upheld by the
Supreme Court1. In respect of the land in question,
notification u/s 4 of the Act was issued on 23.1.1965, the
declaration u/s 6 was published on 23.12.1968, and the E
award was made on 22.12.1982. Meanwhile, the lands
were transferred by sale-deed dated 31.1.1969 and
constructions raised thereon. In the writ petitions
~
challenging other notifications as also the notification
with regard to the lands in question, the Full Bench of the
F
High Court2 declined to interfere, but observed that the
petitioners would be at liberty to make representation to
the authorities concerned for release of the land. On
appeal, the Supreme Court3 held the constructions raised
by the writ petitioners as unauthorized. The Court also
G
recorded the statement of the counsel for the State that
the Government would consider each of the structures
"""
. 1.
Roshnara Begum vs. Union of India AIR 1996 Delhi 206.
2.
Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi 1975 (1) SCR 802.
3.
Murari v. Union of India 1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 313.
H
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A . and take a decision thereon.
Appellant No. 2 who came to be in possession of the
lands in question through some arrangements with the
transferees of sale deed dated 31.1.1969, between 1990
8 and 1993, got appellant no. 1 Club registered under the
Societies Registration Act and constructed a complex
over the acquired lands in the name of appellant no. 1
Club, contrary to the provisions of s. 3 of the Delhi Land
(Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972 and without making
C any application for sanction of the building plans. After
the d

## Text

_Characters 0–39,885 of 128,206. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39885 for what follows._

[2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 710
A
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR.
~
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 8500-8501 of 2001)
B
AUGUST 25, 2009
[B.N. AGRAWAL AND G.S. SINGHVI, JJ.]
/Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
,.+ '
c
s. 48(1) - Withdrawal from acquisition of land - HELD:
Can be done only by issuing a notification in the official
Gazette - Note recorded by Minister in the file cannot be
relied upon to plead before Court that the Government had
taken decision to withdraw from acquisition - Even if the
D competent authority records its opinion in the file on merits
of the matter under consideration, the same cannot be termed
/T
as a decision of the Government unless it is sanctified and
acted upon by issuing an order under Articles 77(1) and (2)
or Articles 166(1) and (2) of the Constitution - Government's
E subsequent decision not to withdraw from a,cquisition of the
land in question as communicated to the parties concerned
does not suffer from vice of discrimination/arbitrary exercise
of power/non-application of mind- Constitution of India, 1950
-
Articles 14, 77(1) and (2) and 166(1) and (2) -
-->--
F
Administrative Law - Opinion of competent authority in the file,
requirements to term if as decision of Government.
Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972:
s. 3 - Prohibition against transfer of acquired lands -
Land acquired in terms of Land Acquisition Act transferred by
_.,.
G land owners after completion of acquisition proceedings -
Constructions raised thereon - HELD: Even if any sale
Jrtransactions did take place, the same will have to be treated
as void in view of express prohibition contained in s. 3 - Equity
.
H
710
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 711
& ORS.
cannot be pleaded on ground of huge expenditure incurred
A
~
on construction, to seek court's intervention for protection of
unauthorized construction raised on acquired lands - Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 - Equity.
Urban Development:
B
~
Town planning -
Transfer of acquired land and
constructions raised thereon in violation of statutory provisions
-+.-
- HELD: Object of planned development can be achieved by
rigorous enforcement of master plans - It is high time that
executive and political apparatus of State take serious view c
of the menace of illegal and unauthorized constructions by
affluent class of builders and others .
.
~·
•.,.:'"4
Large tracts of lands were acquired in terms of
Notifications u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 D
\(
issued between 13.11.1959 and 23.1.1965 for planned
development of Delhi. The acquisition was upheld by the
Supreme Court1. In respect of the land in question,
notification u/s 4 of the Act was issued on 23.1.1965, the
declaration u/s 6 was published on 23.12.1968, and the E
award was made on 22.12.1982. Meanwhile, the lands
were transferred by sale-deed dated 31.1.1969 and
constructions raised thereon. In the writ petitions
~
challenging other notifications as also the notification
with regard to the lands in question, the Full Bench of the
F
High Court2 declined to interfere, but observed that the
petitioners would be at liberty to make representation to
the authorities concerned for release of the land. On
appeal, the Supreme Court3 held the constructions raised
by the writ petitioners as unauthorized. The Court also
G
recorded the statement of the counsel for the State that
the Government would consider each of the structures
"""
. 1.
Roshnara Begum vs. Union of India AIR 1996 Delhi 206.
2.
Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi 1975 (1) SCR 802.
3.
Murari v. Union of India 1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 313.
H
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A . and take a decision thereon.
Appellant No. 2 who came to be in possession of the
lands in question through some arrangements with the
transferees of sale deed dated 31.1.1969, between 1990
8 and 1993, got appellant no. 1 Club registered under the
Societies Registration Act and constructed a complex
over the acquired lands in the name of appellant no. 1
Club, contrary to the provisions of s. 3 of the Delhi Land
(Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972 and without making
C any application for sanction of the building plans. After
the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court and the
Supreme Court, appellant no. 2 filed representations for
release of the land u/s 48 (1) of the Act on the ground that
several parcels of acquired lands had already been
released. The representations ultimately were placed
D before the then Minister for Urban Development, who on
8.6.1999 noted, "in accordance with the settled policy, no
demolition can or will be ordered ... " and left the matter
to be considered by the successor, who finally by his
order dated 14.7.1999 decided that the land covered by
E sports complex could not be released. The decision was
communicated to the appellants by letter dated 9.6.2000.
This was unsuccessfully challenged by the appellants.
.~·
--
.(.
In the instant appeals, the questions for
+
F consideration before the Court were: (i) whether the note
dated 8.6.1999 recorded by the then Minister for Urban
Development could be treated as a decision of the
Government to withdraw from acquisition of the land in
question in terms of s.48(1) of the Act; and (ii) whether
G the decision contained in letter dated 9.6.2000 is liable to
be nullified on the ground of arbitrariness and violation
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
'>-
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
H
"""" '
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 713
& ORS.
~-
HELD: 1.1. Although, the plain language of s.48(1) of A
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 does not give ~ny
indication of the manner or mode in which the power/
discretion to withdraw from the acquisition of any land
is required to be exercised, having regard to the scheme
of Parts II and VII of the Act, which postulates publication
B
of notification u/s 4(1), declaration u/s 6 and agreement
u/s 42 in the official gazette as a condition for valid
--+-.-
acquisition of the land for any public purpose or for a
company, it is reasonable to take the view that withdrawal
from the acquisition, which may adversely affect the c
public purpose for which or the company on whose
behalf the acquisition is proposed, can be done only by
issuing a notification in the official gazette. As a
necessary concomitant, it must be held that the exercise
of power by the government u/s 48(1) of the Act must be· D
~t
made known to the public at large so that those
interested in accomplishment of the public purpose for
which the land is acquired or the company concerned
may question such withdrawal by making representation
to the higher authorities or by seeking court's E
intervention. The requirement of issuing a notification for
exercise of power u/s 48(1) of the Act to withdraw from
the acquisition of the lar:wd can also be inferred from the
+.
judgments of this Court.* [Para 27 and 28) [741-G-H; 742A-8, F-G; 7 43-8-C]
F
* Municipal Committee, Bhatinda v. Land Acquisition
Collector and others (1993) 3 SCC 24; U.P. State Sugar
Corporation Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Others (1995) Supp 3
SCC 538; State of Maharashtra and another v. Umashankar
Rajabhau and others (1996) 1 sec 299; and State of T.N.
G
and others v.L. Krishnan and others (1996) 7 sec 450;
--..s
Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and others (1998) 4
sec 387, relied on.
1.2. A noting recorded in the file by an officer of the
H
\\
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
714
4·
'
·A Government or even the Minister is merely a noting
simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents
expression of opinion by the particular individual. By no
' ..
stretch of imagination, such noting can be treated as a
decision of the Government. Even if the competent
....
B authority records its opinion in the file on merits of the
tmatter under consideration, the same cannot be termed
as a decision of the Go~ernment unless it is sanctified
~~
and acted upon by issuing an order in accordance with
Article 77(1) and (2) or 166(1) and (2) of the Constitution
c of India. The noting in the file or even a decision gets
culminated into an order affecting right of the parties only
when it is expressed in the name of the President or the
Governor, as the case may be, and authenticated in the
manner provided in Article 77(2) or Article 166(2). [Para
I ,
D 29] [7 46-D-G]
J'r
1.3. A noting or even a decision recorded in the file
can always be reviewed/reversed~overruled or overturned
and the court cannot take cognizance of th.e/earlier noting
or decision for exercise of the power of judicial review.
E The· notings and/or decisions recorded in the file do not
confer any right or adversely affect the right of any
person and the same can neither be challenged in a court
nor made basis for seeking relief. [Para 29] [7 46-G-H]
.+-
F
State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh AIR 1961 SC
4~~ Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab (1962) Supp.
3 SCR 713; State of Bihar and others v. Kripalu Shankar and
others (1987) 3 SCC 34; Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri
Kishan (1993) 2 SCC 84; Sethi Auto Service Station and
. -'
G another v. Delhi Development Authority and others (2009) 1
sec 180, relied on.
>-
1.4. In the instant case, representation made on
• behalf of appellant No.1 was examined by different
functionaries of the Government and ODA. The note
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 715
& ORS.
dated 8.6.1999, recorded by the then Minister for Urban
A
Development in the file was· never translated into an order
nor the same was published in the official gazette in the
form of a notification. It was not even communicated to
the appellants or ODA. The Minister had himself left the
matter for consideration and detision by his successor,
B
who finally decided on 14.7.1999 that the appellants'
request for de-notification of the land could not be
+ ..
accepted because the development was carried out after
its acquisition and also because the land is req~ired for
a public purpose, i.e, Vasant Kunj Residential Project, c
which was held up due to prolonged litigation. Thus, the
appellants cannot rely upon the note recorded by the
then Minister on 8.6.1999 for pleading before the Court
that the Government had taken decision to withdraw from
acquisition of the land in question in terms of s.48(1) of D
\"t
the Act. [Para 38] [754-G-H; 755-A-D]
Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar (1984) 4 SCC
316, referred to.
2.1. As regards appellants' plea of discrimination and
E
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the
Government's decision not to withdraw from the
acquisition of land in question or de-notify the acquired
.J.:.
land, as contained in the letter dated 9.6.2000, does not
suffer from the vice of discrimination/arbitrary exercise of F
power/non-application of mind. No evidence was
produced before the High Court and none has been
produced before this Court to show that the land in
question is identically placed qua the lands released from
acquisition. The burden to prove the charge of G
discrimination and violation of Article 14 was on the
·appellants. It was for them to produce concrete evidence
before the court to show that their case was identical to
other persons whose land had been released from
acquisition and the reasons given by the Government for
H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 {ADDL.) S.C.R.
A refusing to release their land are irrelevant or extraneous.
Vague and bald assertions made in the writ petition
cannot be made basis for recording a finding that the
appellants have been subjected to invidious or hostile
discrimination. That apart, the concept of equality
B enshrined in that Article is a positive concept. Thus,
Article 14 cannot be invoked for perpetuating
irregularities or illegalities. [Para 42 and 50] [758-E; 766-
· c-E; 767-B]
.,+
2.2. The observations contained in the last part of
C paragraph 182 of the judgment of the Full Bench of the
High Court suggesting that the petitioner/applicant can
make representation for release of the land and the
concerned authorities can examine whether the sports
complex could serve the purpose of acquiring the land
D for the particular scheme or the scheme can be modified
or amended in respect of the 1aod in question were
nothing more than pious hope and right!y not responded
to by the Government becaus.e in the same paragraph the
Full Bench unequivocally ruled that the land was required
E for residential scheme of Vasant Kunj and the sports
complex built by the applica'nt was not in consonance
with the public· purpose for which the land was
earmarked in the scheme. [Para 42] [758-F-H; 759-A]
~
F
Roshanara Begum v. Union of India, AIR 1996 Delhi 206,
referred to.
2.3. The statement made by the counsel representing
the State before this Court which finds mention in
paragraph 21 of the judgment in Murari's case** not
G amount to a commitment on behalf of the Government
that representations made for release of land will receive
favourable consideration. In any case, once this Court
had made it clear in Murari's case that in a matter involving
acquisition of thousands of acres of land, it would not be
H proper to leave out some small portions here and there
·•
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 717
& ORS.
over which some construction may have been made, the
A
decision of the Government not to withdraw from the
acquisition of the land in question cannot be faulted.
[Para 42] [759-A-C]
**Murai v. Union of India (1999) 1 SCC 15, referred to.
B
3.1. As regards the appellants' plea for de-notification
of the land covered by the sports complex constructed
~ • by spending crores, admittedly, the appellants came in
possession of the land between more than 10 years ~fter
finalization of the acquisition proceedings. Thus, the C
appellants cannot plead equity and seek court's
intervention for protection of the unauthorised
constructions raised by them. Once the land is acquired
by following due process of law, the same cannot be
transferred by the land owner to another person and any
D
such transfer is void and is not binding on the State. A
transferee of the -acquired land can, at best, step into the
shoes of the land-owner and lodge claim for
compensation. [Para 43] [759-G-H; 760-A-B]
Gian Chand v. Gopala and others (1995) 2 SCC 528;
Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Dau/at
Mal Jain and others (1997) 1 SCC 37, Yadu Nandan Garg v.
State of Rajasthan and others JT (1995) 8 S.C. 179 and .l;aipur
Development Authority v. Mahavir Housing Coop. Society,
Jaipur and others (1996) 11 sec 229, referred· to
3.2. Further, s.3 of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on
Transfer) Act, 1972 contains prohibition against transfer
E
F
of the acquired land. The land owners and the purchaser
must have been aware of the prohibition on transfer of G
the acquired land, but by taking advantage of the stay
order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No.1753/
1980, they appear to have entered into some clandestine
transaction pursuant to which, the purchaser acquired
H
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A possession of the land and proceeded to build the sports
complex and commercial facilities thereon. The
-r
appellants are conspicuously silent as to how the
purchaser came in possession of land in question after
35 years of initiation of the acquisition proceedings and
B 10 years of finalization thereof. In any case, even if any
sale transaction did take place, the same will have to be
treated as void in view of the express prohibition
contained in s.3 of the 1972 Act. [Para 44 and 46) [760-D;
761-E-H; 762-A-B]
,.+
c
3.3. It is pertinent to note that after having secured
some sort of transfer of the acquired land in stark
violation of the prohibition contained in s. · 3 of the 1972
Act, the appellants could raise massive structure
comprising cricket ground, tennis stadium, badminton
D courts, swimming pool, table tennis room, squash court,
etc. and cottages with modern facilities without even
submitting building plans for sanction by any competent
authority and without being noticed by any of the
authorities entrusted with the duty of checking illegal/
E unauthorised construction. Such illegal constructions
cannot be protected by the court by nullifying the
decision taken by the Government not to withdraw from
the acquisition of the land in question. The records
clearly reveal that the cottages at the club and its lawns
F are being used for commercial and rental purposes. [Para
47) [762-C-H]
Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh (1995) 1 SCC
745; Narain Das v. Improvement Trust, Amritsar (1973) 2
G SCC 265; Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal
Committee (1996) 2SCC 459; State of Haryana v. Ram
Kumar Mann (1997) 3 SCC 321, Faridabad CT. Scan Centre
v. D. G. Health Services (1997) 7 SCC 752; Style (Dress land)
v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (1999) 7 SCC 89; State of
H Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh (2000) 9 SCC 94; Union
)'t··
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 719
& ORS.
....
of India v. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437, Ekta
A
Sakthi Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2006) 10 SCC ·
337, Sanjay Kumar Munjal v. Chairman, UPSC (2006) 8
SCC 42, K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. and others (2006) 3 SCC
581, Nationallnstitute of Technology v. Chandra Sekhar
Chaudhary (2007) 1 SCC 93; Vice Chancellor, M.D.
B
University, Rohtak v. Jahan Singh (2007) 5 SCC 77; State
of Kera/a and others v. K. Prasad and another (2007) 7 SCC
*~
140; Punjab State Electricity Board and others v .. Gurmail
Singh (2008) 7 SCC 245 and Panchi Devi v. State of
Rajasthan and others (2009) 2 sec 589, relied on
c
3.4. The object of planned development can be
achieved by rigorous enforcement of master plans
prepared after careful study of complex issues, scientific
~
research and rationalisation of laws. This Court has, from D
-'t.
time to time, taken cognizance of buildings constructed
in violation of municipal and other laws and emphasized
that no compromise should be made with the town
planning scheme and no relief should be given to the
violator of the town planning scheme etc. on the ground
E
that he has spent substantial amount on construction of
the buildings etc. [Para 52] [770-E; 771-H; 772-A-B]
.J..
K. Ramdas Shenoy v. Chief Officers, Town Municipal
Council, Udipi 1974 (2) SCC 506; Dr. G.N. Khajuria v. Delhi
Development Authority 1995 (5) SCC 762; M./. Builders Pvt.
F
Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu 1999 (6) SCC 464; Friends
Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa 2004 (8)
SCC 733; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India 2006 (3) SCC 399;
and S.N. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kamataka 2006 (3) SCC
208, relied on.
G
-'(.
3.5. Despite repeated judgments by the this Court
and High Courts, the builders and other affluent people
are engaged in unauthorized construction activities and
H
•
1'C
~.,.--
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A over the years shown scant respect for regulatory
mechanism envisaged in the municipal and other similar
laws either by issuing administrative orders or enacting
laws for regularization of such illegal and unauthorized
constructions in the name of compassion and hardship.
B Such actions have done irreparable harm to the concept
'
of planned development of the cities and urban areas. It
is high time that the executive and political apparatus of
the State take serious view of the menace of illegal and
.. ~
unauthorized constructions and stop their support to the
c lobbies of affluent class of builders and others, else even
the rural areas of the country will soon witness similar
chaotic conditions. [Para 53] [772-D-H]
Case Law Reference:
D
AIR 1996 Delhi 206
referred to
para 5
..
J'-
(1999) 1 sec 1s
referred to
para 5
(1993) 3 sec 24
relied on
para 28
~ ....
(1995) Supp 3 sec 538 relied on
para 28
E
(1996) 1 sec 299
relied on
para 28
(1996) 7 sec 450
relied on
para 28
(1998) 4 sec 387
relied on
para 28
~·
F
AIR 1961 SC 493
relied on
para 30
}
....,.
(1962) Supp. 3 SCR 713 relied on
para 31
(1987) 3 sec 34
relied on
para 32
'
~' ·,-
G
(1993) 2 sec 84
relied on
para 33
(2009) 1 sec 180
relied on
para 34
' ')---
(1984) 4 sec 316
referred to
para 39
H
..
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 721
& ORS.
(1995) 2 sec 528
relied on
para 43
A
(1997) 1 sec 37
relied on
para 43
JT (1995) 8 S.C. 179
relied on
para 43
(1996) 11 sec 229
referred to
para 43
B
(1995) 1 sec 745
relied on
para 50
~~
:(1973) 2 sec 265
relied on
para 51
(1996) 2SCC 459 ·
relied on
para 51
c
(1997) 3 sec 321
relied on
para 51
(1997) 1 sec 752
relied on
para 51
(1999) 1 sec 89
relied on
para 51
.,
D
(2000) 9 sec 94
relied on
para 51
~
(2003) 5 sec 437
relied on
para 51
(2006) 1 o sec 337
relied on
para 51
(2006) 8 sec 42
relied on
para 51
E
(2006) 3 sec 581
relied on
para 51
(2007) 1 sec 93
relied on
para 51
1"
(2007) 5 sec 11
relied on
para 51
F
(2001) 1 sec 140
relied on
para 51
(2008) 1 sec 245
relied on
para 51
(2009) 2 sec 589
relied on
para 52
1914 (2) sec 506
relied on
para 52
G
-(
1995 (5) sec 762
relied on
para 52
1999 (6) sec 464
relied on
para 52
2004 (8) sec 733
relied on
para 52
H
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
2006 (3) sec 399
relied on
para 52
2006 (3) sec 20s
relied on
para 52
CIVIL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
8500-8501 of 2001.
B
~
From the Judgment & Order dated 21.8.2201 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Civil Writ Petition No. 4777/93
and 3277 of 2000.
,j.
c
WITH
Conte.Pet. (C) 252-253 of 2001 in C.A.Nos. 8500-8501
of 2001.
Indra Jai Singh, A. Sharan, ASG, Mukul Rohtagi, .Shyam
Divan, Geeta Luthra, Jayashree Wad, Ashish Wad, Yashraj
rD Deora, Chirag Dave (for J.S. Wad and Co.) Indra Sawhney,
)4
Binu Tamta, Sushma Suri, S.W.A. Qadri, Rahul Kaushik, Anil
Katiyar, D.S. Mahra, V.B. Sahary (for Saharya & Co.), Prabal
Bagchi, D.N. Goburdhan, Sanjeev Sahay, Shreekant N. Terdal,
-
E M.P. Jha Ram Ekbal Roy, Harsh~ardhan Jha for appearing
parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. These appeals filed against order dated
~
F 21.8.2001 of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court whereby
-
it refused to interfere with the Central Government's decision
:
not to exercise discretion under Section 48(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') to withdraw from the
acquisition of land comprised in khasra Nos.35, 369/36, 37,
G 38, 367/21 and 365/33 of Village Masudpur, Tehsil Mehrauli,
Delhi are illustrative of how the litigants use the courts process
for frustrating the acquisition of land for a public purpose for
years together and seek equity after. raising illegal construction
over the acquired land under the cloak of interim order(s)
H passed by one or the other court.
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 723
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
......
Background Facts:
A
2. In the aftermath of partition of the country, lakhs of
people were forced to leave their habitat, properties, trade,
business, etc. in the territory which became Pakistan. Most of
them came and settled in northern parts of the country,
B
particularly Punjab and Delhi. Out of sheer compulsion, they
~~
constructed houses, etc. without proper layouts and planning.
Initially, the Government did not pay much attention to the
haphazard construction of houses and the growth of unplanned
colonies, but with rapid increase in population of the city on c
account of influx of thousands of people from other parts of the
country, it was realized that planned development of the capital
city is sine qua non for its healthy growth. Keeping this in mind,
....
the Central Government created Delhi Development Authority
(ODA) and also set up Town Planning Organization, which was
D
~ entrusted with the task of giving advice on all matters pertaining
to planning in the territory of Delhi.
....
3. The master plan of Delhi was notified in 1962. It
envisaged development of Delhi in different segments, i.e.,
residential, commercial, institutional, industrial etc. in a scientific
E
and modern way. For implementing the concept of planned
development in accordance with the notified master plan, large
~
tracts of land were acquired vide notifications dated
13.11.1959, 24.10.1961, 4.4.1964, 16.4.1964 and 23.1.1965
issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. Writ petitions filed by
F
those affected by the first notification were dismissed by the
High Court and their appeals were dismissed by this Court in
the case titled Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC
285, with a categorical finding that the planned development
of Delhi is a public purpose for which large tracts of land could
G
·1'
be acquired.
4. The acquisitions made in furtherance of other
notifications were also challenged by the land holders and other
affected persons. C.W.P. No.963/1980 filed by one Ved
Prakash was dismissed by the High Court. However, the H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADOL.) S.C.R.
A special leave petition was entertained by this Court and leav~
~
was granted.
5. During the pendency of the civil appeal arising out of
the special leave petition filed by Ved Prakash and some writ
B petitions which were directly entertained by this Court, a
Division Bench of the High Court made a reference to the Full
Bench for considering the questions whether the acquisition
proceeding should be treated as having been abandoned on
account of delay in making the awards and whether more than
,, -j..
c
one award can be passed in respect of the land covered by
the same notification. The Full Bench dismissed all the writ
petitions and related miscellaneous applications vide judgment
titled Roshanara Begum v. Union of India, AIR 1996 Delhi 206.
Appeals filed against the judgment of Full Bench were
D
dismissed by this Court - Murar{ v. Union of India (1997) 1 -
sec 15.
."-16. The land which is subject matter of these appeals was
acquired vide notification dated 23~ 1.1965. Declaration under
Section 6 was published on 23.12.1968, notices under Sections
E 9 and 10 were issued in 1976 and the award was made on
22.12.1980.
7. Shri Amrit Lal Khanna, who is said to have purchased
26 big has of land comprised in khasra Nos.35, 369/36 and 37
. }-.
in Village Masudpur, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi along with three
F others, namely, S/Shri Srivastava, Naresh Kumar and Gopal
Kishan from Shri Parmeshwar Lal vide sale deed dated
31.1.1969 challenged notification dated 23.1.1965 in W.P.
No.1753/1980. He also filed an application for interim relief. By
G
an order dated 9.12.1980, the High Court restrained the
respondents in the writ petition from dispossessing the
petitioner. The writ petition was finally dismissed by the Full
)--·
Bench along with other cases.
8. While the writ petition filed by Shri Amrit Lal Khanna
H was pending, Shri Satish Khosla (appellant No.2 in one of the
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 725
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
appeals) got registered a company in the name and style of
A
-..
Shanti India Private Limited under the Companies Act, 1956
and a society in the name of Shanti Sports Club under the
Societies Registration Act, 1860. Between 1990-1993, Shri
Satish Khosla appears to have entered into some
arrangemenUagreement with Shri Amrit Lal Khanna and other
B
land owners and got possession of land bearing khasra Nos.35,
369/36, 37, 38, 367/21 and 365/33 of Village Masudpur, Tehsil
~-.
Mehrauli, Delhi which had already been acquired by the Central
Government. Thereafter, he got constructed complex over the
acquired land in the name of appellant No.1 without even making c
an application to the competent authority for sanction of the
building plan. He did so because he knew that if an application
for sanction of the building plan was to be made, the same
would be rejected in view of the prohibition contained in Section
3 of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 (for
D
~
short 'the 1972 Act') against transfer of the acquired land and
the concerned authorities may stall the clandestine construction
activities.
9. With a view to protect his possession of the acquired
land and illegal construction raised over it, Shri Satish Khosla
E
filed W.P. No.4777/1993 in the name of Shanti Sports Club of
which he himself was described as President and Shri Sunil
Nagar, Member Secretary of the Club for issue of a mandamus
-J
to the Central Government to release the land under Section
48(1) of the Act. In that petition, it was claimed that with the
F
construction of a sports complex, the purpose of acquisition,
i.e., planned development of the area has already been served.
10. At this stage, it is appropriate to note that before filing
W.P. No.4777/1993, Shri Satish Khosla got filed two suits for
G
injunction. The first suit bearing No.3318/1991 was filed on
29.10.1991 in the name of Shanti India Private Limited with the
prayer that DOA be restrained from digging the land or
constructing gates on the road leading to Shanti Garden. In that
suit, it was pleaded that the plaintiff is a company registered
H
'-.
726
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) $.C.R.
A under the Companies Act, 1956; that it purchased 38 bighas
r13 biswas of land comprising in khasra Nos.35, 369/36, 37,
38, 367/21 and 365/33 situated in Village Masudpur, Tehsil
Mehrauli, Delhi and floated Shanti Sports Club of India which
formed a cricket academy with a view to provide cricketing
;
B facility for its members. It was then averred that on 28.10, 1991,
DOA started digging a road, which runs from Andheria Modh
to Airport with a view to raise a wall for blocking the entire road
~ -J._
and rendering the suit property inaccessible. Along with the suit,
the plaintiff filed an application for temporary injunction. By order
c dated 4.1.1992, the Court permitted ODA to raise the wall
without obstructing the plaintiffs access to the suit property. In
the second suit bearing No.1544/1993 which was filed on
13.7.1993, appellant No.2 herein joined S/Shri Atma Ram and
Amrit Lal Khanna as plaintiffs and prayed that ODA be
D restrained from dispossessing them or interfering with their
.'f.
possession or demolishing or sealing any part of existing
structure. The subject matter of second suit was identical to the
one for which earlier suit had been instituted. In the plaint, all
the plaintiffs were described as owners of the property
E measuring 38 bighas 13 biswas and it was pleaded that a
sports club in the name of Shanti Sports Club of India was built
by plaintiff No.3, Shri Satish Khosla. It was alleged that officers
of the DOA have demolished certain structures in Village
}-
Kishangarh on 29.6.1993 and threatened to demolish the suit
F
property. In the second suit also an order of Injunction was
passed on 15.7.1993.
11. After filing Writ Petition No.4777/1993, Shri Satish
Khosla instituted third suit bearing No.2865/1995 in his own
name and thart>f Shri Amrit Lal Khanna claiming that they were
G Bhumidars of khasra Nos.35, 369/36 and 37 of Village
Masudpur, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi, total measuring 26 bighas 6
)"
biswas; that the suit property was surrounded by a boundary
wall with an iron gate; that plaintiff No.1-Satish Khosla floated
the Shanti Sports Club which runs a cricket academy for its
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 727
& ORS. [G:S. SINGHVI, J.]
.,
members and that the officers of the DOA have threatened to
A
demolish the boundary wall and take forcible possession of an
, -
area of about 250 sq. yds. on the pretext that it formed part of
.I
khasra Nos.460, 368 and 36, which was earmarked for
construction o( a dispensary. In the third suit, the court passed
l
an order of temporary injunction on 12.12.1995 restraining DOA
B
from disppssessing the plaintiffs or demolishing the boundary
wall.
_.}-, _
12. By filing Writ Petition No.4777/1993, Shri Satish Khosla
had hoped that he will be able to convince the High Court to c
ignore the gro.ss irregularities and illegalities committed by him
in securing possession of the acquired land and raising
construction o.ver it and pass an order for protection of the
existing structure and also direct the Central Government to
release the land from acquisition on which sports complex ha~
D
already been constructed, but his hopes were belied because
.){
the High Court did not entertain the prayer for interim relief.
Undeterred by this unexpected adverse result, Shri Satish
Khosla got filed C.~. No.8269/1993 in Writ Petition No.1753/
1980 with the prayer that the government be directed to release
the land from acquisition because the same has already been
E
developed. The Full B.ench of the High Court considered similar
prayer made on behalf of other land owners, referred to the
.,( -
judgment of this Court 'In Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti
Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (1993) 2 SCC 662 and held:
F
" . . . . . . So, even if some land has been developed by the
land owner according to his own notions and may be the
construction raised by him on the said land is also serving
/--
some public purpose, still that cannot be a substitute for
,,,. ...
planned development of Delhi which object is visualiwd- G
by the authorities. If the public object for wh,i,ch t'fie -land is
/
sought to be acquired by the authorit~es is justified, it
cannot be frustrated because the; land owner has
developed the land and is utilising lhe land for some other
public purpose. So, this contention also does not survive H
/
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
in view of the law held down by the Supreme Court."
""'" .
13. The Full Bench separately dealt with Writ Petition
.
No.1753/1980 and C.M. No.8269/1993 and dismissed the
same by recording the following observations:
B
"181. Most of the points raised in this writ petition are
common with the main points already discussed by us.
However, Mr. G. L. Sanghi, Senior Advocate, who
,...._
appeared for the applicant in C.M. 8269/93 has urged that
the land in question has been developed into a sports
c
complex and modern amenities have been provided and
it would be national waste. in allowing such constructions
to be demolished.
182. It is urged that the applicant has acquired this land
D
in 1969 before coming into· force of the Delhi Land
(Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 and thus, there was
'fno bar in the transferee raising constructions. However,
it is the admitted fact that all these constructions have
been raised after issuance of the notification under
E
Section 4 of the Act. These constructions have been
raised obviously with complete knowledge of the fact that
this land is liable to be acquired for public purpose. It is
true that transferee of the land such as the applicant is
entitled to same benefits and rights as the transferor (See
. )...
·F
Smt. Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda,
'.
AIR 1970 SC 802). However, unless and until it is shown
that public purpose for which the land was sought to be
-~
acquired by issuing a notification under Section 4 and
declaration under Section 6 has elapsed, it would not be
-...... Qossible for this Court to hold that mere fact that land has
G
·~.been .. de,veloped by the petitioner/applicant should lead
to the co;Jc~~on that pu?lic purpose for whi9h the lan_d
r
was sought to·-1,J__e acqwred has been achte_ved. It ts
pointed out to us th;Jt this particular land is required for
'
.
'\.
H
'
/
/
/
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 729
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
the residential scheme of Vasant Kunj. So, it cannot be
A
said that the sports complex built up by the applicant in
the land in question is in consonance with the public
purpose for which the land has been earmarked in the
scheme of the Government. Thus, we do not think that
'f',.
the petitioner/applicant can legally get the notification
B
quashed on any valid grounds in the present matter.
However, the petitioner/ applicant is at liberty to make any
-+.
representation to the authorities for getting the land
released and it is for the authorities to examine whether
in view of the modern sports complex having been brought c
into existence in the land in question could it serve the
public purpose of acquiring this land for that particular
scheme or the scheme is liable to be modified or amended
in respect of the land in question. However, the acquisition
proceedings are not liable to be quashed on any such
D
.I(
plea."
[Emphasis added]
14. In the appeals preferred against the judgment of the
Full Bench, the land owners reiterated the prayer for issue of
E
direction to the Government to release their land by asserting
that the same has already been developed by constructing
factories, workshops, godowns, schools, residential houses/
quarters, farm houses with modern facilities and sports
complex. This Court opined that the constructions raised by the
F
appellants would be regarded as unauthorized because no
sanction or permission is shown to have been obtained from
the competent authority. The Court then referred to an earlier
judgment in State of U.P. v. Pista Devi (1986) 4 SCC 251 and
rejected the prayer for release of land by making the following
G
observations:-
"Some of the learned counsel for the appellants also
submitted that even the land shown in green colour in the
master plan which has been sought to be acquired but it
is not understood as to for what purpose the said land is
H
730
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.} S.C.R.
A
being acquired. It was also submitted that there are a large
---
number of structures and complexes raised on the land
~
sought to be acquired in which schools, sports and other
recreational activities are going on. Shri G.L. Sanghi,
learned counsel appearing for the appellants in Ctvil
B
Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 5771 of 1996 and Civil
Appeal arising out of SLP (C) 'No. 7 40 of 1996 as well as
other advocates appearing for some other appellants
submitted that there exist factories, workshops, godowns
~+-
and MCD school besides residential houses and quarters
c
over the land belonging to the appellant Partap Singh
situated at Roshanara Road, Sabzi Mandi, Delhi which has
been acquired and that there exists modern and welldeveloped farmhouse with modern facilities in the land
belonging to the appellant Roshanara Begum, where there
D
are a good number of other structures and fruit-bearing
trees. Consequently these areas do not require further
. "'
development as they are already developed and, therefore,
the said land should be released from acquisition. Mr
Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for some of the
E
appellants urged that the appellant concerned had
developed a sports complex providing modern amenities
therein and if the same is demolished it would be a great
national waste. It was, therefore, urged that such complexes
and built-up areas should be deleted from the acquisition.
}.
F
It may be pointed out that in the master plan the land
indicated in green colour is reserved for recreational
facilities. The recreational facilities are also part of the
planned development of Delhi and it cannot be disputed
that recreational amenities are also part of the life of the
people and an important feature of a developed society.
-;
G
Therefore, no legitimate objection can be made in the
acquisition of such land which is shown in green colour.
·~
So far as the structures and constructions made on the
land are concerned there is no material to show that they
were made before the issuance of notification under
H
SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 731
& ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Section 4 of the Act. It is also not clear whether such A
consttubtions were raised with or without necessary
sanction/approval of the competent authority. No
grievance therefore can legitimately be raised in that
behalf as the same would be regarded as unauthorised
and made at the risk of the landowners. Here a reference
B
of a decision of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v.
Pista Devi may be made with advantage, para 7 of which
reads as under: (SCC p.