# SHARADCHANDRA GANESH MULEY v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1995] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 693
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1995-08-14
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 7565-66 of 1995
- **Bench:** K. Ramaswamy, B.L. Hansaria
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sharadchandra-ganesh-muley-v-state-of-maharashtra-and-ors-13182
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

B
Land Acquisition Ac~ 1894:
Sections 4(1), 11(2), 11-A, 12(1)-Notification u/s. 4(1)-Cltallenge to
in writ petition before High Court-Dismissal of-Award by Land Acquisition C
Officer--Period of Limitation for-Computation of-Held, award is conclusively made on the date Land Acquisition Officer signed and sealed it, and
not when claimant received copy thereof
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 :
Section 11; Explanation IV-Constructive resjudicata-Doctrine of
'might and ougltt'-Landowner's Writ challenging notification u/s. 4(1) of
Land Acquisition Act pendin~Amendment Act 68 of 1984 coming into force
meanwhile-Held, defence of bar u/s. 11-A being available to land owner but
not availed of, doctrine of constructive res judicata applies in subsequent writ
petition.
E
The Land-owner-claimant, after unsuccessfully challenging before
the High Court initially the notification under section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 and later the award made by the Land Acquisition
Officer after the decision of the High Court in the earlier writ petition, F
tiled the appeals by special leave against both the judgments of the High
Court.
Tht! appellant contended that the award made by the Land Acquisition Officer, was without jurisdiction as the same was not made within two
years from the date of decision of the High Court in the earlier writ G
petition.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court
HELD: 1.1. The award was clearly made within two years from the
judgment of the High Court. The High Court gave its judgment on H
693
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A
31.3.1992 whereas the Land Acquisition Officer made the award on March
30, 1994 under his signature and seal. Under s.12(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it is conclusive evidence of making of the award. Because
of the mere fact that the appellant had received the copy of the award on
April 12. 1994, it cannot be said that the award was made on the date.
B
[696-B; 695-A-B; 695-G]
1.2. Under s.11(2) of the Act, it is mandatory that the authorities
shall obtain prior approval of the comp~tent authority or the State
Government in case where the value of the lands exceeds the value
prescribed under the rules made by the appropriate Government. The
award clearly indicates that on May 17, 1993 endorsement was made
C "subject to prior approval". Obviously, the award was made on May 17,
1993 and after obtaining the prior approval, it was signed by the Land
Acquisition Officer on March 30, 1994. [695-H; 696-A-B]
2. The bar under s.llA of the Act, was available to the appellant when
D
the first writ petition was filed, since the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 had
come into force on September 24, 1984 during the pendency of the writ
petition. He did not raise the point. Therefore, the doctrine of "might any
ought" engrafted in Explanation IV to s.11 of the CPC would come into
play and the appellant is precluded to raise the controversy once over.
E
F
Therefore, the doctrine of constructive res judicata puts an embargo on
his right to raise the plea of bar of limitation under s.llA. [695-E]

## Text

SHARADCHANDRA GANESH MULEY
A
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
AUGUST 14, 1995
[K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.]
B
Land Acquisition Ac~ 1894:
Sections 4(1), 11(2), 11-A, 12(1)-Notification u/s. 4(1)-Cltallenge to
in writ petition before High Court-Dismissal of-Award by Land Acquisition C
Officer--Period of Limitation for-Computation of-Held, award is conclusively made on the date Land Acquisition Officer signed and sealed it, and
not when claimant received copy thereof
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 :
Section 11; Explanation IV-Constructive resjudicata-Doctrine of
'might and ougltt'-Landowner's Writ challenging notification u/s. 4(1) of
Land Acquisition Act pendin~Amendment Act 68 of 1984 coming into force
meanwhile-Held, defence of bar u/s. 11-A being available to land owner but
not availed of, doctrine of constructive res judicata applies in subsequent writ
petition.
E
The Land-owner-claimant, after unsuccessfully challenging before
the High Court initially the notification under section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 and later the award made by the Land Acquisition
Officer after the decision of the High Court in the earlier writ petition, F
tiled the appeals by special leave against both the judgments of the High
Court.
Tht! appellant contended that the award made by the Land Acquisition Officer, was without jurisdiction as the same was not made within two
years from the date of decision of the High Court in the earlier writ G
petition.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court
HELD: 1.1. The award was clearly made within two years from the
judgment of the High Court. The High Court gave its judgment on H
693
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A
31.3.1992 whereas the Land Acquisition Officer made the award on March
30, 1994 under his signature and seal. Under s.12(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it is conclusive evidence of making of the award. Because
of the mere fact that the appellant had received the copy of the award on
April 12. 1994, it cannot be said that the award was made on the date.
B
[696-B; 695-A-B; 695-G]
1.2. Under s.11(2) of the Act, it is mandatory that the authorities
shall obtain prior approval of the comp~tent authority or the State
Government in case where the value of the lands exceeds the value
prescribed under the rules made by the appropriate Government. The
award clearly indicates that on May 17, 1993 endorsement was made
C "subject to prior approval". Obviously, the award was made on May 17,
1993 and after obtaining the prior approval, it was signed by the Land
Acquisition Officer on March 30, 1994. [695-H; 696-A-B]
2. The bar under s.llA of the Act, was available to the appellant when
D
the first writ petition was filed, since the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 had
come into force on September 24, 1984 during the pendency of the writ
petition. He did not raise the point. Therefore, the doctrine of "might any
ought" engrafted in Explanation IV to s.11 of the CPC would come into
play and the appellant is precluded to raise the controversy once over.
E
F
Therefore, the doctrine of constructive res judicata puts an embargo on
his right to raise the plea of bar of limitation under s.llA. [695-E]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7565-66
of 1995.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.3.92 and 30.6.94 of the
Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 649 of 1984 and W.P. No. 2249/94.
U.R. Lalit and A.M. Khanwilkar for the Appellant.
A.S. Bhasme, Rajiv Masodkar and D.M. Nargolakar for the ResponG' dents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
Delay of 840 days condoned.
H _,
Leave granted.
'j
1111
S.G. MULEY v. STATE
695
The appellant is challenging the notification under s.4(1) of the Land A
Acquisition Act published on February 3, 1970. Initially, he filed W.P.
649/84 and obtained stay of dispossession of February 16, 1984. That writ
petition was dismissed on merits on March 31, 1992. The Land Acquisition
officer made the award on March 30, 1994 which was challenged in W.P.
No. 2249 of 1994, but without success. Thus these appeals by special leave B
against the original writ petition as well as the second writ petition.
Shri Khanwilkar, learned counsel for the appellant, has stated in
fairness that in the first petition he could not canvas the bar of limitation
under s.llA of the Act for the reason that the appellant had obtained an
order through the court on February 16, 1984 injuncting dispossession of C
the land from him; and in view of the judgments rendered by this Court
that direction would be an impediment for the authorities to make the
award within two years. Therefore, he raised a further contention that since
the award has not been made within two years from the date of the decision
of the High Court, namely, March 31, 1992, the award passed under s. 11 D
is without jurisdiction. We find no force in the contention.
It is seen that the bar under s.llA was available to the appellant
when the first writ petition was filed, since the Amendment Act 68 of 1984
had come into force on September 24, 1984 during the pendency of the
writ petition. He did not raise the point. Therefore, the doctrine of "might E
and ought" engrafted in Explanation IV to s.11 of the CPC would come
into play and the appellant is precluded to raise the controversy once over.
Therefore, the doctrine of constructive res judicata puts an embargo on his
right to raise the plea of bar of limitation under s.llA.
Further, we have seen the xerox copy of the award, copy of which
had been supplied to the appellant. It clearly indicates that the Land
Acquisition Officer made the award on March 30, 1994 under his signature
and seal. Under s.12(1) of the Act it is conclusive evidence of making of
F
the award. Because of the mere fact that the appellant had received the G
copy of the award on April 12, 1994, it cannot be held that the award was
made on that date. There are no interpolations in the signature made by
the officer along with the date. It is seen that the over-writing is only in
respect of some other matters. Under s.11(2), it is mandatory that the
authorities shall obtain prior approval of the competent authority or the
State Gove!"nment in case where the value of the land exceeds the value H
696
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A prescribed under the rules made by the appropriate Government. In fact
the award clearly indicates that on May 17, 1993 endorsement was made
"subject to prior approval". Obviously, the award was made on May 17,
1993 and after obtaining the prior approval, it was signed by the Land
Acquisition Officer on March 30, 1994. Therefore, the award was clearly
B
made within two years from the date of the judgment of the High Court.
We do not, therefore, find any illegality warranting interference. The
appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
R.P.
Appeals dismissed.
;-