# SHARDA v. DHARMPAL

- **Citation:** [2003] 3 S.C.R. 106
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2003-03-28
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 5933 of2000
- **Bench:** V.N. Khare. Cj, S.B. Sinha, Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sharda-v-dharmpal-19084
- **Pages:** 37

## Headnote

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955/Cod? of Civil Procedure, 1908-Sections
12(/)(bj and 13(/)(iii)!Section 151-Matrimonial proceedings-Divorce sought
C on the gro11nd of ill mental health of spouse--Application for medical
examination-Jurisdiction of Co11rt to pass direction for the examinationHeld: Though the Act or any other law governing the field do not expressly
empower the Court to issue a direction for such examination, matrimonial
Court has power to pass such order under its discretionary power uls 151
CPC-However Court to exercise such power only in case of strong prima
D facie case with s11fjicient material-In case of refi1sal for submission for the
examination, Court entitled to draw adverse inference-Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908-Section 75(e}, Order 32 Rule 15, Order 26 Rule !OALunacy Act, 1912-Section 41-Mental Health Act, 1987-Section 2(1)-
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities Protection of Rights and Full
E Participation) Act, 1995-National Trust for Welfare with Autism, Cerebral
Palsy, Mental Retardation and Muhiple Disabilities Act, 1999-Universal
Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, 197 5.
Constitution of India, 1950--Article 21-Right to privac)~Order for
medical examination by matrimonial Court-Whether violative of the rightF Held: No-Right to privacy is not an absolute right-In case of conflict between
fimdamental rights of two parties, the right which advances public morality
would prevail.
Respondent-husband filed application for divorce under Section
12(l)(b) and 13(l)(iii) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. He also filed an
G application seeking direction for medical examination of the appellant-wife
as to whether she was of unsound mind. The application was allowed by
District Judge directing her to submit herself for medical examination.
Revision Petition against the order was dismissed by High Court.
H
In appeal to this Court appellant contended that in the absence of a
106
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SHARDA 11. DHARMPAL
107
specific empowering provision, the Court dealing with matrimonial cases A
cannot subject a party to the lis to undergo medical examination against
her volition; that in case of refusal to undergo medical examination, the
Court may merely draw an adverse inference; and that compelling a
person to undergo a medical examination by an order of the Court would
be violative of right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of B
the Constitution.
Respondent-husband contended that matrimonial Court is required
to arrive at a finding as to whether the appellant had been suffering from
unsoundness of mind, by virtue of Section 5, 12(1) and 13(1) of the Act;
that as the state of mind of a party to the marriage may render the C
marriage voidable, court is entitled to take expert's opinion in this behalf;
and that exposure to medical examination aided by scientific data would
not infringe the right to personal liberty under Article 21.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. A matrimonial court has the power to order a person
to undergo medical test. However, the Court should exercise such a power
if the applicant has a strong prima facie case and there is sufficient
material before the Court. If despite the order of the court, the respondent
refuses to submit himself to medical examination, the court will be entitled
to draw an adverse inference against him. [142-C-E[
1.2. For the purpose of grant of a decree of divorce what is necessary
D
E
is that the petitioner must establish that unsoundness of mind of the
respondent is incurable or his/mental disorder is of such a kind and to
such an extent that he cannot reasonably be expected to live with her
spouce. Medical testimony for arriving at such finding although may not F
be imperative but undoubtedly would be of considerable assistance to the
court. Such medical testimony being the evidence of experts would not
leave the court from the obligation of satisfying itself on the point in issue
beyond reasonable doubt. Relevance of a medical evidence, ther

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A
B
SHARDA
V.
DHARMPAL
MARCH 28, 2003
[V.N. KHARE. CJ, S.B. SINHA AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN. JJ.]
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955/Cod? of Civil Procedure, 1908-Sections
12(/)(bj and 13(/)(iii)!Section 151-Matrimonial proceedings-Divorce sought
C on the gro11nd of ill mental health of spouse--Application for medical
examination-Jurisdiction of Co11rt to pass direction for the examinationHeld: Though the Act or any other law governing the field do not expressly
empower the Court to issue a direction for such examination, matrimonial
Court has power to pass such order under its discretionary power uls 151
CPC-However Court to exercise such power only in case of strong prima
D facie case with s11fjicient material-In case of refi1sal for submission for the
examination, Court entitled to draw adverse inference-Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908-Section 75(e}, Order 32 Rule 15, Order 26 Rule !OALunacy Act, 1912-Section 41-Mental Health Act, 1987-Section 2(1)-
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities Protection of Rights and Full
E Participation) Act, 1995-National Trust for Welfare with Autism, Cerebral
Palsy, Mental Retardation and Muhiple Disabilities Act, 1999-Universal
Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, 197 5.
Constitution of India, 1950--Article 21-Right to privac)~Order for
medical examination by matrimonial Court-Whether violative of the rightF Held: No-Right to privacy is not an absolute right-In case of conflict between
fimdamental rights of two parties, the right which advances public morality
would prevail.
Respondent-husband filed application for divorce under Section
12(l)(b) and 13(l)(iii) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. He also filed an
G application seeking direction for medical examination of the appellant-wife
as to whether she was of unsound mind. The application was allowed by
District Judge directing her to submit herself for medical examination.
Revision Petition against the order was dismissed by High Court.
H
In appeal to this Court appellant contended that in the absence of a
106
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SHARDA 11. DHARMPAL
107
specific empowering provision, the Court dealing with matrimonial cases A
cannot subject a party to the lis to undergo medical examination against
her volition; that in case of refusal to undergo medical examination, the
Court may merely draw an adverse inference; and that compelling a
person to undergo a medical examination by an order of the Court would
be violative of right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of B
the Constitution.
Respondent-husband contended that matrimonial Court is required
to arrive at a finding as to whether the appellant had been suffering from
unsoundness of mind, by virtue of Section 5, 12(1) and 13(1) of the Act;
that as the state of mind of a party to the marriage may render the C
marriage voidable, court is entitled to take expert's opinion in this behalf;
and that exposure to medical examination aided by scientific data would
not infringe the right to personal liberty under Article 21.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. A matrimonial court has the power to order a person
to undergo medical test. However, the Court should exercise such a power
if the applicant has a strong prima facie case and there is sufficient
material before the Court. If despite the order of the court, the respondent
refuses to submit himself to medical examination, the court will be entitled
to draw an adverse inference against him. [142-C-E[
1.2. For the purpose of grant of a decree of divorce what is necessary
D
E
is that the petitioner must establish that unsoundness of mind of the
respondent is incurable or his/mental disorder is of such a kind and to
such an extent that he cannot reasonably be expected to live with her
spouce. Medical testimony for arriving at such finding although may not F
be imperative but undoubtedly would be of considerable assistance to the
court. Such medical testimony being the evidence of experts would not
leave the court from the obligation of satisfying itself on the point in issue
beyond reasonable doubt. Relevance of a medical evidence, therefore,
cannot be disputed. [ 116-B-D[
G
I .J. A decree for divorce in terms of Section 13(1 )(iii) of the Act can
be granted in the event the unsoundness of mind is held to be not curable.
The burden of proof of the existence of requisite degree of mental disorder
is on the spouse making the claim on that state of fact. Having regard to
the complexity of the situation, the doctor's opinion may be of utmost H
108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2003] 3 S.C.R.
A importance for granting or rejecting a prayer for a decree of divorce. The
question is as to whether a mental disorder is curable can be subject matter
of determination of by a Court of Law having regard to the expert medical
opinion and particularly the ongoing development in the scientific and
medical research in this direction. I 116-E, F; 118-CI
B
c
l.4. Hindu Marriage Act, 195!i or any other law governing the field
do not contain any express provision empowering the Court to issue a
direction upon a party to a matrimonial proceedings to compel him to
submit himself to a medical examination. However, this does not preclude
a court from passing such an order. 1118-D, El
In re: MB. (An Adult: Medical Treatment) (1997) 2 F.C.R. 541; St.
George's Healthcare N.H.S. Trust v. S. Regina v. Collins and Others Ex parte
S. (1998) 3 Weekly Law Reports 9:16, referred to.
S v. S, W. v. Official Solicitor (1972) AC 24: (1970) 3 All ER 107, W.
C v. W. (1963) 2 All ER 841 and B.R.B. v. J.B. (1968) 2 All E.R. - 1023,
referred to.
1.5. Although individuals have the right not to be subjected to
compulsory physical interventions and treatments but every measure
adversely affecting a person's physkal and moral integrity necessarily does
E not involve an interference with r1~spect to his private life. 1120-D, El
Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, (1995) 19 EHRR 112, referred
to.
Human Rights Law and Practice-Chapter 4; Evidence by Wigmore,
F Volume VIII, third edition; .Evidence by Phipson, 14th Edition, referred to.
1.6. In the event a court of law may find a person as disabled either
physically or mentally, an appropriate direction for his rehabilitation
having regard to Universal Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons,
1975, provisions of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal opportunities,
G Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, the National Trust
for Welfare with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple
Disabilities Act, 1999 and other statutes, may be issued. (122-D, El
H
1.7. The Court has power to issue appropriate direction for
protection of human rights of mentally ill persons and to see to it that a
SHARDAv.DHARMPAL
109
person suffering from mental illness gets adequate protection In terms of A
the Mental Health Act, 1987. 1123-DI
Halsbury's laws of England, Volume 11, 4th Edition; Halsbury 'slaws
of England, Volume 17, 4th Edition, referred to.
1.8. Primary duty of a Court is to see that truth i~ 11rrived at. A party B
to a civil litigation, it is axiomatic, is not e11titled to constitutional
protection under Article 20 of the Constitutio11 of India. Thus, the Civil
Court although may not have any specific provisions in the Code of Civil
Procedure and the Evidence Act, has inherent power in terms of Section
151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to p11ss all orders for doing complete
justice to the parties to the suit. Discretionary power under Section •SI C
of Code of Civil Procedure, it b trite, can be exercised also on an
application filed by the party. 1123-H; 124-A·CI
Smt. Revamma v. Shri Shanthappa, AIR (1972) Mysore 157 and P.
Sreeramamurthy v. lakshmikantham, AIR (1955) Andhra 207, disapproved. D
1.9. In matrimonial disputes, the Court has also a conciliatory role
to play - even for the said purpose it may require expert advice. In certain
cases medical examination by the experts in the field may not only found
to be leading to truth of the matter but may also lead to removal of
misunderstanding between the parties. It may bring the parties to terms. E
Having regard to development in medicinal technology, it is possible to
find out that what was presumed to be a mental disorder of a spouse is
not really so. 1124-B, CJ
I.IO. Under Section 75(e) of Code of Civil Procedure and Order 26
Rule JOA the Civil Court has the requisite power to issue a direction to F
hold a scientific, technical or expert investigation. [124-DI
1.11. The question as to whether a person is mentally ill or not
although may be a subject matter of litigation, the Court having regard
to the provisions contained in Order 32Rule15 of Code of Civil Procedure, G
Section 41 of the Indian Lunacy Act as also for the purpose of judging
his competence to examine as a witness may issue requisite directions. If
the Court for the purpose envisaged under Order 32 Rule 15 of Code of
Civil Procedure or Section 41 of the Indian Lunacy Act can do it suo motu,
there is no reason why it cannot do so on an application filed by a party
to the marriage. (128-F; 129-BI
H
110
SUPREtvlE COURT REPORTS
[2003] 3 S.C.R.
A
1.12. Even otherwise the Court may issue an appropriate direction
so as to satisfy himself as to whether apart from treatment he requires
adequate protection inter a/ia by way of legal aid so that he may not be
subject to an unjust order because of his incapacity. I 129-CI
1.13. Keeping in view the fact that in a case of mental illness the
B Court has adequate power to examine the party or get him examined by
a qualified doctor in an appropriate case the Court may take recourse to
such a procedure even at the instance of the party to the lis. It is, however,
axiomatic that a Court shall not order a roving inquiry. It must have
sufficient materials before it to enable it to exercise its discretion. Exercise
C of such discretion would be subjected to the supervisory jurisdiction of
the High Court in terms of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and/or Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Abuse of the discretionary
power at the hands of a Court is not expected. The Court must arrive at
a finding that the applicant has established a strong prima facie case before
passing such an order. If despite an order passed by the Court, a person
D refuses to submit himself to such medical examination, a strong case for
drawing an adverse inference would be made out. Section 114 of the Indian
Evidence Act also enables a Court to draw an adverse inference if the party
does not produce the relevant evidences in his power and possession.
E
F
(129-C, D; 141-G, H; 142-A, Bl
Gautam Kundu v. State of West Ben~a/ and Anr .. 119931 3 SCC 418,
distinguished.
Birendra Kumar Biswas v. Hemlata Biswas, AIR (1921) Cal. 459approved.
Bipinchandra Shanti/al Bhau v. Madhurihen. AIR (1963) Gujarat 250;
Shanti Devi 'V. Ram Nath, AIR (11972) P & H 270; P. A. Anbu Anandan v.
Sivakumari, AIR (1999) Madras 232; P. Sreeramamurthy v. lakshmikantham,
AIR 1955 Andhra 207; Snu. Nigamma and Anr. v. Chikkaiah and Anr .. AIR
2000 Kar. 50; G. Venkatarayan v. Kurupati laxmi Devi. AIR (1985) A.P. I;
G George Swamidoss Joseph v. Miss Sundari Edward. (1954) 67 Mad. LW 676,
referred to.
2.1. The implicit power of a court to direct medical examination of
a party to a matrimonial litigation in a case of this nature cannot be held
to be violative of one's right of privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution
H of India. (142-B, q
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SHARDAv.DHARMPAL
111
2.2. With the expansive interpretation of the phrase "personal A
liberty", right to privacy has been read into Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution. But the right to privacy in terms of Article 21 of the
Constitution is not absolute right. If there were a conflict between
fundamental rights of two parties, that right which advances public
morality would prevail. 1130-A-DI
MP. Sharma. v Salish Chandra, AIR (1954) SC 297; Kharak Singh v.
State of U.P., AIR (1963) SC 1295; R. Rajagopal v. State a/Tamil Nadu and
Ors., AIR (1995) SC 264; People's Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India,
1199711SCC301; Govindv. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., AIR (1975)
B
SC 1378; Mr. 'X' v. Hospital 'Z', 119981 8 SCC 296; Mr. 'X' v. Hospital C
'Z', 12003] 1 SCC 500; R. Raj Gopal v, Str;ite of Tr;imi/ Nadu and Ors., AIR
(1995) SC 264 and M Vijaya v. The Chairman, Singareni Collieries r;111d Ors.,
referred to.
R (on the application of S) v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, (2003)
I All ER 148; Armando Schmerber v. State of California, (384 US 757); Paul D
H. Brejthaupt v. Morris Abram, (352 US 432); Charles Joseph Kastigar and
Michael Gorean Stewart v. United Stmes, (US 32 L.Ed. 2d 212); Ma/thew
R., 113 Mc. App 701, 715. 688 A2d 955, 961; Zuniga v. Pierce, 714 F.2d
632 (1983) and Laznovsky v. Laznovsky 74.5 A,2d 1054 (Md. Ct. App. 2000),
referred to.
Halsbury 's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Reissue, Volume 8(2);
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, Volume 6 al page 2677, referred
to.
E
2.3. In matrimonial cases where divorce is sought, say on the ground p
of impotency, schizophrenia ... etc. normally without there being medical
examination, it would be difficult to arrive at a conclusion as to whether
the allegation made by his spouse against the other spouse seeking divorce
on such a ground, is correct or not. In order to substantiate such allegation,
the petitioner would always insist on medical examination. If respondent
avoids such medical examination on the ground that it violates his/her right G
to privacy or for a matter right to personal liberty as enshrined under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, then it may in most of such cases
become impossible to arrive at a conclusion. It may render the very
grounds on which divorce is permissible nugatory. Therefore, when there
is no right to privacy specifically conferred by Article 21 of the H
112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[20031 3 S.C.R.
A Constitution of India and with the extensive interpretation of the phrase
"personal liberty" this right has been read into Article 21, it cannot be
treated as absolute right. What is emphasized is that some limitations on
this right have to be imposed and particularly where two competing
interests clash. In matters of aforesaid nature where the legislature has
B conferred a right upon his spouse to seek divorce on such grounds, it would
be the rights of that spouse which come in conflict with the so-called right
to privacy of the respondent. Thus the Court has to reconcile these
competing interests by balancing the interests involved. 1141-B-El
2.4. If for arriving at the satisfaction of the Court and to protect the
C right of a party to the lis who may otherwise be found to be incapable of
protecting his own interest, the Court passes an appropriate order, the
question of such action being violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India would not arise. The Court having regard to Article 21 of the
Constitution of India must also see to it that the right of a person to defend
himself must be adequately protect•~d. 1141-Fl
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5933 of2000.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.11.1999 of the Rajasthan High
Court in S.B.C.R.P. No. 1414 of 1999.
E
Naresh Kaushik, O.P. Arya. Ms. Shilpa Chohan, B.W. Dayal and Ms.
F
Lalita Kaushik, for the Appellant.
Ms. Nanita Sharma and Vivek Sharma, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. Whether a party to a divorce proceeding can be
compelled to a medical examination is the core question involved in this
appeal. This question arises out of a judgment dated 17.11.1999 passed by
the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in S.B. Civil Revision
G Petition No. 1414/99 dismissing an application filed by the appellant herein
questioning an order of the Addi. District & Session Judge No. 1,
Hanumangarh Camp Sangaria dated 8.10.1999 directing to submit herself to
medical examination on the question as to whether she is of unsound mind.
The paities herein were married on 26.6.1991 according to the Hindu
H rites. On or about 3.6.1995, the respondent filed an application for divorce
SHARDA v. DHARMPAL (S.B. SINHA, J.]
113
against the appellant under Section 12(1)(b) and 13(I)(iii) of the Hindu A
Marriage Act, 1955. He filed an application seeking directions for medical
examination of the appellant on 5th May, 1999. The appellant objected thereto
inter alia on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to pass such
directions. By an order dated 8. I 0.1999 the said application was allowed
directing the appellant to submit herself to the medical examination, Aggrieved B
by the said order, she filed a Revision Petition before the High Court which
was dismissed by the impugned judgment.
Mr. Kaushik, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
herein has principally raised two contentions in support of this appeal. Firstly.
compelling a person to undergo a medical examination by an order of the C
Court would be violative of right to 'personal liberty' guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution of India. Secondly, in absence of a specific empowering
provision, a court dealing with matrimonial cases cannot subject a party to
the Iis to undergo medical examination against his/ her volition. Jn the event,
ifa party does not undergo such medical examination, the Court may merely
draw an adverse inference..
D
The learned counsel in support of his aforementioned contentions relied
upon Bipinchandra Shantifaf Bhatt v. Madhuriben, AlR (1963) Gujarat 250,
Smt. Revamma v. Shri Shanthappa. AlR 1972 Mysore 157, Shanti Devi v.
Ram Nath, AlR (I 972) P&H 270, M. Venkatachallapati v. Aroja, AIR (I 981) E
Madras 349, Gautam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, AIR (1993) SC 2295,
P.A. Anbu Anandan v. Sivakumari, AIR (1999) Madras 232, Smt. Ningamma
and Anr. v. Chikkaiah and Anr., AlR (2000) Kar. 50.
Ms. Nanita Sharma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, submitted that a Matrimonial Court is required to arrive at a F
finding as to whether the appellant herein had been suffering from unsoundness
of mind, mental disorder or insanity by virtue of the provisions contained in
Section 5, Section 12(1) and Section 13( I) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
As such a state of mind of a party to the marriage may render the marriage
voidable, the Court is entitled to take the expert's opinion in this behalf so
as to enable it to satisfy itself as regard the existence of the conditions for G
grant of a decree for divorce.
The learned counsel further contended that the exposure to medical
examination aided by scientific data would not infringe the right to personal
liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of lndia.
H
114
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2003] 3 S.C.R.
A
In support of the said contentions the learned counsel relied upon G.
Venkatanarayan v. Kurupati Lai:mi Devi, AIR (1985) A.P. 1, Birendra Kumar
Biswas v. Hemlata Biswas, AIR ( 1921) Cal. 459, George Swamidoss Joseph
v. Miss Sundari Edward., {(1954) 67 Mad LW 676} and A.S. Mohammad
Ibrahim Umma/ v. Shaik J\·fohwnmad Marakayar and Anr., AIR ( 1949) Mad.
B 292.
c
D
E
F
G
H
The relevant .statutory provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
(Section 5, 12(l)(b) and !3(l)(iii)) for adjudication of this case are outlined
as follows :
··s. CONDITIONS FOR A HINDU MARRIAGE -A marriage may be
solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are
fulfilled, namely, -
(i)
neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage;
(ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party -
(a)
is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of
unsoundness of mind; or
(b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering
from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to
be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or
(c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity;
(iii) .. ..
(iv) .. ..
(v) .. ..
12.VOIDABLE MARRIAGES.
(I) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by
a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds, namely, -
(a) ...
(b) that the marriage is in contravention of the condition specified
in clause (ii) of section 5;
13. DIVORCE.
'-·
SHARDA v. DHARMPAL [S.B. SINHA, J.]
115
(I) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the A
commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the
husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the
ground that the other party -
(i) ...
(ii)
(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering
continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a
kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably
be expected to live with the respondent.
Explanation : In this clause -
(a) the expression "mental disorder" means mental illness, arrested or
incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other
disorder or disability of mind and includes schizophrenia;
(b) the expression "psychopathic disorder" means a persistent disorder
or disability of mind (whether or not including sub-normality of
intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously
irresponsible conduct on the part of the other party, and whether or
not it requires or is susceptible to medical treatment or;"
Clause 2(b) of Section 5 provides for one of the conditions for a valid
Hindu marriage that neither party must be suffering from unsoundness of
mind, mental disorder or insanity. In terms of Section 12(1)(b) of the Act a
man-iage may be held to be voidable if the other party was suffering from
mental disorder or insanity. Section 13( I )(iii) of the Act provides that a party
B
c
D
E
to the marriage may present a petition for dissolution ofman-iage by a decree F
of divorce inter alia on the ground that the other party has been incurably of
unsound mind and has been suffering continuously or intermittently from
mental disorder of such a kind that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected
to live with the respondent. It is beyond any cavil that a marriage in
contravention of the aforementioned provisions of the Hindu Man-iage Act is G
per se not void but is merely voidable.
Issues for consideration
The following issues arise for consideration in the present case:
A. Whether a Matrimonial Court has the power to direct a party to H
116
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2003 I 3 S.C.R.
A
undergo medical examination?
B
A.
B.
Whether passing of such an order would be in violation of Article
21 of the Constitution of India?
Power of the Court to direct a party to undergo medical
examination
It is trite law that for the purpose of grant of a decree of divorce what
is necessary is that the petitioner must establish that unsoundness of mind of
the respondent is incurable or his/her mental disorder is of such a kind and
to such an extent that he cannot reasonably be expected to live with his/ her
C spouse. Medical testimony for arriving at such finding although may not be
imperative but undoubtedly would be of considerable assistance to the court.
We may, however, hasten to add that such medical testimony being the
evidence of experts would not leave the court from the obligation of satisfying
itself on the point in issue beyond reasonable doubt. Relevance of a medical
evidence, therefore, cannot be disputed.
D
A sound mind indisputably is a key to a happy married life. A party to
the marriage must, thus, have normal and sound mind so as to live a happy
marital life. A disorder of thought, behaviour and mind leading to unsoundness
of mind may give rise to a cause of action for filing an application under
E Section 13( I )(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The burden of proof of the
existence of requisite degree of mental disorder is on the spouse making the
claim on that state of fact.
The decisions rendered by various courts of this country including this
Court lead to a conclusion that a decree for divorce in terms of Section
p
13(1 )(iii) of the Act can be granted in the _event the unsoundness of mind is
held to be not curable. A party may behave strangely or oddly inappropriate
and progressive in deterioration in the level of work may lead to a conclusion
that he or she suffers from an illness of slow growing developing over years.
The disease, however, must be of such a kind that the other spouse cannot
reasonably be expected to live with him or her. A few strong instances
G indicating a short temper and somewhat erratic behaviour on the part of the
spouse may not amount to his/ her suffering continuously or intermittently
from mental disorder.
It may be noticed that Section 2(1) of the Mental Health Act, 1987
H defines 'mentally ill person" to mean a person who is in need of treatment
SHARDA v. DHARMPAL [S.B. SINHA, J.]
117
by reason of any mental disorder other than mental retardation. Mental disorder A
may further be of varying degree.
This Court in Ram Narain Gupta v. Rameshwari, AIR (1988) SC 2260
while considering a question as to whether a party to the marriage was
suffering from schizophrenia observed:
"14. Indeed the caution of a learned author against too readily giving
a name to a thing is worth recalling :
B
"Giving something a name seems to have a deadening influence
upon all our relations to it. It brings matters to a finality. Nothing
further seems to need to be done. The disease has been identified.
C
The necessity for further understanding of it has ceased to exist."
It is precisely for this reason that a learned authority on mental health
saw wisdom in eschewing the mere choice of words and the hollowness
they would bring with them. He said :
"I do not use the word 'schizophrenia' because I do not think
any such disease exists .... I know it means widely different things
to different people. With a number of other psychiatrists, 1 hold
that the words 'neurosis', 'psychoneurosis', 'psychopathic
personality', and the like, are similarly valueless. I do not use
them, and I try to prevent my students from using them, although
the latter effort is almost futile once the psychiatrist discovers
how conveniently ambiguous these terms really are .... "
D
E
"In general, we hold that mental illness should be thought and
spoken of less in terms of disease entities than in terms of
personality disorganization. We can precisely define organization
p
and disorganization; we cannot precisely define disease .... "
"Of course, one can describe a 'manic' or a 'depressed' or a
'schizophrenic' constellation of symptoms, but what is most
important about this constellation in each case ? Not, we think,
its curious external form, but rather what it indicates in regard G
to the process of disorganization and reorganization of a
personality which is in fluctuant state of attempted adjustment
to environmental reality. Is the imbalance increasing or
decreasing? To what is the stress related? What psychological
factors are accessible to external modification? What latent
capacities for satisfaction in work, play, love, creativity, are H
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discoverable for therapeutic: planning? And this is language thatcan be understood. It is practical language and not language of
incantation and exorcism."
15. This medical concern against too readily reducing a human being
into a functional n'Jn-entity and as a negative unit in family or society
B
is law's concern also is reflected, at least partially, in the requirements
of Section 13 ( 1) (iii). In the last analysis, the mere branding of a
person as schizophrenic will not suffice. For purposes of Section 13
(I) (iii) 'schizophrenia' is what schizophrenia does."
Having regard to the complexity of the situation, the doctor's opinion
C may be of utmost importance for granting or rejecting a prayer for a ciecree
of divorce. The question is as to whether a mental disorder is curable can be
subject matter of determination of by a Court of Law having regard to the
expert medical opinion and particularly the ongoing development in the
scientific and medical research in this direction.
D
The Hindu Marriage Act or any other law governing the field do not
contain any express provision empowering the Court to issue a direction
upon a party to a matrimonial proceedings to compel him to submit himself
to a medical examination. However, in our opinion, this does not preclude a
court from passing Stich an order. w,, may, however, notice that such
E provisions have expressly been inserted in England by way of Sections 22
and 23 of the Family Law Reform Act, 1987 on the recommendations of the
F
G
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Law Commission. Sections 23 is to the following terms:
"23. Provisions as to scientific t<osts
(I) For subsections (I) and (2) of section 20 of the Family Law
Reform Act 1969 (power of court to require use of blood tests)
there shall be substituted the following subsections -
(I) In any civil proceedings in which the parentage of any
person falls to be determined, the court may, either of its
own motion or on an application by any party to the
proceedings, give a direction-
(a) for the use of scientific tests to ascertain whether such
te~ts show that a par1:y to the proceedings is or is not the
father or mother of that person; and
(b) for the taking, within a period specified in the direction,
-
"
SHARDA v. DHARMPAL [S.B. SINHA, J.]
119
of bodily samples from all or any of the following, A
namely, that person, any party who is alleged to be the
father or mother of that person and any other party to
the proceedings;
and the court may at any time revoke or vary a direction
previously given by it under this subsection."
The English courts at one point of time held that the Court had no
power to order a blood test on the ground that it would be a battery which
no court may authorize. (See S v. S, W. v. Official Solicitor, [1972] AC 24:
[1970] 3 All ER 107, W v. W., [1963] 2 All ER 841.
However, the Court has been empowered to issue such a direction in
a civil litigation ..
In B.R.B. v. JB., (1968) 2 All.E.R. 1023, it was held:
B
c
"A judge of the High Court has power to order a blood test whenever D
it is in the best interest of the child. The judges can be trusted to
exercise this discretion wisely. No limit-condition or bound is set up
to the way in which judges exercise their discretion. The object of the
court always is to find out the truth. When scientific advances give
fresh means of ascertaining it, there should not be any hesitations to
use those means whenever the occasion requires."
As regard cases involving capacity as given In re M.B. [(An Adult :
E
Medical Treatment) 1997 (2) F.C.R. 541] when surgical or invasive treatment
may be needed by a patient, certain guidelines had been enumerated in St.
George's Healthcare N.HS. Trust v. S. Regina v. Collins and Ors., Ex parte F
S. reported in 1998 (3) Weekly Law Reports 936. These guidelines are:
"(i) They have no application where the patient is competent to accept
or refuse treatment. In principle a patient may remain competent
notwithstanding detention under the Mental Health Act 1983.
(ii) If the patient is competent and refuses consent to the treatment, G
an application to the High Court for a declaration would be pointless.
In this situation the advice given to the patient should be recorded.
For.their own protection hospital authorities should seek unequivocal
assurances from the patient (to be recorded in writing) that the refusal
represents an informed decision, that is, that she understands the H
A
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nature of and reasons for the proposed treatment, and the risks and
likely prognosis involved in the decision to refuse or accept it. If the
patient is unwilling to sign a written indication of this refusal, this too
should be noted in writing. Such a written indication is merely a
record for evidential purposes. It should not be confused with or
regarded as a disclaimer.
(iii) If the patient is incapable of giving or refusing consent, either in
the long term or temporarily (e.g. due to unconsciousness), the patient
must be cared for according to th1! authority's judgment of the patient's
best interests. Where the patient has given an advance directive, before
becoming incapable, treatment and care should normally be subject
to the advance directive. However, if there is reason to doubt the
reliability of the advance directive (for example it may sensibly be
thought not to apply to the circumstances which have arisen), then an
application for a declaration may be made."
Although individuals have the right not to be subjected to compulsory
physical interventions and treatments but every measure adversely affecting
a person's physical and moral integrity necessarily does not involve an
interference with respect to his private life. (Costello-Roberts v. United
Kingdom reported in (1995) 19 EHRR 112.
(See Human Rights Law and Practice - Chapter 4 - The European
Convention on Human Rights - Article 8 : Right to respect for private and
family life - Page 165 at 169)
In Wigmore on Evidence, Volume VIll, third edition, it has been
observed:
"The Courts can as well command a witness to let the jury, or qualified
experts, inspect his premises, his chattels, or his person, as to produce
his documents. It is not to be supposed that our Courts will finally
commit themselves to the denial of such a plain dictate of principle
and of common sense."
It has been further observed:
"(c) As to a witness' living body, whether by self-exhibition to the
jury at the trial, or by inspection of experts out of court, there is
ample authority denying any privilege of non-disclosure; the trial
H
Court's discretion determining the necessity and the suitable
SHARDA v. DHARMPAL [S.B. SINHA, J.)
121
conditions. But some Courts still decline to tak'e this liberal view, A
even in cases where this form of evidence is most necessary, as on
a charge of rape or of slander of chastity. It is astonishing that Courts
are so tardy in ignoring th.e propriety of getting at the truth by direct
and simple methods, especially when modern science can here be of
such peculiar assistance. Notable examples of the vital necessity of B
here resorting to modern scientific methods are seen in the inquiry
into paternity by blood-group examination and into the credibility of
a woman-complainant in sex-crimes by psychiatric examination.
Whether a person under arrest (not a witness) may be measured,
photographed, or physically examined, is considered post, under the C
privilege against self-crimination."
In Phipson on Evidence, 14th Edition, it is stated:
"9-01 Competence is to be distinguished from compellability. A person
may be admitted to give evidence, though in certain cases he will not
be compelled by the court to do so. In general, all persons are both D
competent and ·compellable. A person, howeve"r, though competent
and compellable as a witness may not be competent or may not be
compellable to give evidence as to particular matters."
It has been further stated:
"1·13. Detention, preservation, inspection, samples, photographs,
experiments· A report by a court expert may be ordered under Order
40, r. I, and this may involve experiments and tests. In patent actions
this power is given by Order I 03, r. 27, but there is a discretion, and
E
the court will not make an order for an inspection for what may be F
nothing more than a 'fishing' inspection; in arbitrations by the
Arbitration Act 1950, s. 12(6); in references by Order 36, and in
country court cases by C.C. Rules 1981, Ord. 19 and Ord. 21, r. 6 (an
inspection of a lady's mouth by a dentist was, however, refused under
these rules as not being "any property or thing the subject-matter of
the action"). Nonetheless, medical inspection of a party may be ordered G
in various cases, e.g. in Chancery to determine pregnancy; in nullity
suits on the ground of impotence, and refusal to submit is evidence
against the party; though bankrupts cannot be compulsorily examined
with a view to their life insurance. A plaintiff in a personal injury
action is liable to have his action stayed unless he submits to a medical H
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,examination on behalf of the defendant. Moreover, the court will not
lightly order an examination which is unpleasant, painful or potentially
dangerous. Since 1974, the court has had power to order that the
parties exchange accounts of the substance of any oral or documentary
expert medical evidence as a condition precedent to allowing the
expert's rei;ort to be given at an. These two rules substantially nullify
the common law privilege, which prevented the court from ordering
the exchange of medical reports. The privilege still exists and will be
of importance in relation to evidence obtained but, because
unfavourable, not intended to be used or where the court exercises its
discretion against disclosure. So, scientific experiments may be
C
ordered, artistic tests undertaken, or specimens of handwriting brought
into being, in or out of court, during the trial. Regulations may be
made under the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act I 965, s.
50, providing for examination and report on any questfons arising for
decision under the Act."
0
In the event a Court of Law may find a person as disabled either
physically or mentally, an .appropriate direction for his rehabilitation having
regard to Universal Declaration on th<, Rights of Disabled Persons, 1975,
provisions of the Persons with Disabilitiies (Equal opportunities, Protectiqn of
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, the National Trust for Welfare with
E Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disabilities Act,
1999 and other statutes, may be issued.
The Court, however, indisputably is empowered to satisfy itself as to
whether a party before it suffers from mental illness or not either for the
purpose of appointment of a guardian in terms of Order 32, Rule 15 of Code
F of Civil Procedure or Section 41 of the Indian Lunacy Act as also for the
determination of his competence as a witness.
G
Order 32, Rule 15 of Code of Civil Procedure and Section 41 of the
Indian Lunacy Act read thus:
Order 32 Rule 15: RULES I TO 14 (EXCEPT RULE 2-A) TO APPLY
TO PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND.
Rules I to I 4 (except rule 2-A) shall so, far as may be, apply to
persons adjudged, before or during the pendency of the suit, to be of
unsound mind and shall also apply to persons who, though not so
H
adjudged, are found by the court on enquiry to b~ incapable, by
11
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SHARDA v. DHARMPAL [S.B. SINHA, J.)
123
reason of any mental infirmity, of protecting their interest when suing A
or being sued.
41.