# SHATRUGHNA BABAN MESHRAM v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

- **Citation:** [2020] 13 S.C.R. 1
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2020-11-02
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal Nos. 763-764 of 2016
- **Bench:** Uday Umesh Lalit, Indu Malhotra, Krishna Murari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shatrughna-baban-meshram-v-state-of-maharashtra-34557
- **Pages:** 128

## Headnote

Penal Code, 1860 - s.376(1), (2)(f), (i), (m), s.376-A and s.302
- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - s.6 -
Rape and murder of a minor girl - A two-and-a-half-year-old girl
was subjected to sexual assault by her maternal uncle - The assault
was accompanied by bites on the body of the victim - The rape was
of such intensity that there was merging of vaginal and anal orifices
of the victim - The victim was taken to PW-6-doctor for medical
attention but she was already dead - The Trial Court found
circumstances establishing the guilt of the appellant-accused - The
Trial Court held that the case was rarest of rare, one warranting
imposition of death sentence - Thus, the Trial Court by its order
awarded death sentence to the appellants on two counts, i.e. u/
s.302 of IPC and u/s.376-A of the IPC; rigorous imprisonment for
life under two counts, i.e. s.376(1)(2)(f), (i) and (m) of IPC and u/
s.6 of POCSO Act - The High Court affirmed the conviction and
the sentence passed by the Trial Court - On appeal, held: According
to the prosecution, on the day in question at about 7:30 p.m. when
the victim was with her grandfather, on the pretext that the father of
the victim had asked the appellant to bring the victim, the appellant,
who was maternal uncle of the victim, took her away, this part is
conclusively established through the testimony of PW-2, the
grandfather - As deposed by PWs 1 and 2, the appellant was found
by the side of the victim at the spot - The victim was having various
injuries whereafter she was taken for medical attention - Soon after
incident appellant was also medically examined and injuries were
found on his private parts - The proximity in terms of time and the
promptitude in reporting are crucial factors and the evidence in
that behalf is completely trustworthy - The approximate time of the
injury of the appellant as given in report is consistent with the case
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of prosecution - The pant of the victim was found at the spot of
incident is well established - In terms of chemical analyser's report,
the blood found on the trousers of the appellant was that of victim
- This fact is also completely established - And it is a matter of
record that as per post-mortem report and medical opinion, there
was forceful sexual assault on the victim and her death was caused
due to injury which was in nature of multiple lacerations over vaginal
and anal region; and merging of vaginal and anal orifices - All
these circumstances stand proved beyond any doubt and by
themselves constitute a conclusive and consistent chain excluding
every other hypothesis except the guilt of the appellant - The
appellant is thus guilty of having committed offences punishable
under clauses (f), (i) and (m) of sub-section (2) of s.376 of IPC;
and also, under clauses (j) and (m) of s.5 r/w s.6 of the POCSO Act,
(as it stood before it was amended by Act 25 of 2019) - Since
according to medical opinion, the death was because of sexual
assault, the appellant is also guilty of having committed offence
punishable u/s. 376A of IPC.
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.299, 300 and s.302 - Rape and
murder of a minor child - A two-and-a-half-year-old girl was
subjected to sexual assault - Her death was caused due to injuries
received during that assault - Whether such an act on part of the
appellant comes within the parameters of ss.299 and 300 of IPC
and whether he is guilty of having committed culpable homicide
amounting to murder - Held: Considering the age of the victim in
the present case, the accused must have known the consequence
that his sexual assault on a child of two-and-a-half-year-old would
cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause her death
- The instant matter thus comes within the parameters of clause
fourthly to s.300 IPC and the question posed on this issue must be
answered against the appellant - The appellant is therefore guilty
of having committed t

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 [2020] 13 S.C.R. 1
1
SHATRUGHNA BABAN MESHRAM
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 763-764 of 2016)
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, INDU MALHOTRA AND
KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - s.376(1), (2)(f), (i), (m), s.376-A and s.302
- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - s.6 -
Rape and murder of a minor girl - A two-and-a-half-year-old girl
was subjected to sexual assault by her maternal uncle - The assault
was accompanied by bites on the body of the victim - The rape was
of such intensity that there was merging of vaginal and anal orifices
of the victim - The victim was taken to PW-6-doctor for medical
attention but she was already dead - The Trial Court found
circumstances establishing the guilt of the appellant-accused - The
Trial Court held that the case was rarest of rare, one warranting
imposition of death sentence - Thus, the Trial Court by its order
awarded death sentence to the appellants on two counts, i.e. u/
s.302 of IPC and u/s.376-A of the IPC; rigorous imprisonment for
life under two counts, i.e. s.376(1)(2)(f), (i) and (m) of IPC and u/
s.6 of POCSO Act - The High Court affirmed the conviction and
the sentence passed by the Trial Court - On appeal, held: According
to the prosecution, on the day in question at about 7:30 p.m. when
the victim was with her grandfather, on the pretext that the father of
the victim had asked the appellant to bring the victim, the appellant,
who was maternal uncle of the victim, took her away, this part is
conclusively established through the testimony of PW-2, the
grandfather - As deposed by PWs 1 and 2, the appellant was found
by the side of the victim at the spot - The victim was having various
injuries whereafter she was taken for medical attention - Soon after
incident appellant was also medically examined and injuries were
found on his private parts - The proximity in terms of time and the
promptitude in reporting are crucial factors and the evidence in
that behalf is completely trustworthy - The approximate time of the
injury of the appellant as given in report is consistent with the case
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of prosecution - The pant of the victim was found at the spot of
incident is well established - In terms of chemical analyser's report,
the blood found on the trousers of the appellant was that of victim
- This fact is also completely established - And it is a matter of
record that as per post-mortem report and medical opinion, there
was forceful sexual assault on the victim and her death was caused
due to injury which was in nature of multiple lacerations over vaginal
and anal region; and merging of vaginal and anal orifices - All
these circumstances stand proved beyond any doubt and by
themselves constitute a conclusive and consistent chain excluding
every other hypothesis except the guilt of the appellant - The
appellant is thus guilty of having committed offences punishable
under clauses (f), (i) and (m) of sub-section (2) of s.376 of IPC;
and also, under clauses (j) and (m) of s.5 r/w s.6 of the POCSO Act,
(as it stood before it was amended by Act 25 of 2019) - Since
according to medical opinion, the death was because of sexual
assault, the appellant is also guilty of having committed offence
punishable u/s. 376A of IPC.
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.299, 300 and s.302 - Rape and
murder of a minor child - A two-and-a-half-year-old girl was
subjected to sexual assault - Her death was caused due to injuries
received during that assault - Whether such an act on part of the
appellant comes within the parameters of ss.299 and 300 of IPC
and whether he is guilty of having committed culpable homicide
amounting to murder - Held: Considering the age of the victim in
the present case, the accused must have known the consequence
that his sexual assault on a child of two-and-a-half-year-old would
cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause her death
- The instant matter thus comes within the parameters of clause
fourthly to s.300 IPC and the question posed on this issue must be
answered against the appellant - The appellant is therefore guilty
of having committed the offence of culpable homicide amounting to
murder.
Sentence/Sentencing - Rape and murder of a minor girl - A
two-and-a-half-year-old girl was subjected to sexual assault by her
maternal uncle - Her death was caused due to multiple injuries she
received during such assault - The Trial Court found that
circumstantial evidence established the guilt of the accused - The
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SHATRUGHNA BABAN MESHRAM v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Trial Court by its order awarded death sentence to the appellant on
two counts, i.e. u/s.302 of IPC and u/s.376-A of the IPC; rigorous
imprisonment for life under two counts, i.e. s.376(1)(2)(f), (i) and
(m) of IPC and u/s. 6 of POCSO Act - The death sentence was
confirmed by the High Court - On appeal, held: Merely because
the instant case is based on circumstantial evidence there is no reason
to commute the death sentence - The matter must be considered to
see whether the circumstantial evidence is of unimpeachable
character in establishing guilt of the accused or leads to an
exceptional case and also whether the evidence on record is so
strong and convincing that option of a sentence lesser than a death
penalty is foreclosed - In the instant case, the circumstances proved
on record are clear, consistent and conclusive in nature and are of
unimpeachable character in establishing the guilt of the appellant
- The evidence on record also depicts an exceptional case where
two and half year old girl was subjected to sexual assault - However,
it cannot be said that the option of a sentence lesser than death
penalty is completely foreclosed - A definite pointer in favour of
the appellant is the fact that he did not consciously cause any injury
with the intent to extinguish the life of the victim - In matters where
the conviction is recorded with the aid of clause fourthly u/s. 300 of
IPC, it is very rare that the death sentence is awarded - In various
Supreme Court decisions, where the victims were below 16 years of
age and had died during the course of sexual assault on them, the
maximum sentence awarded was life sentence - This aspect is very
important - Therefore, the appellant is guilty of the offence
punishable u/s. 302 IPC, since there was no requisite intent as would
bring the case under any of the first three clauses of s.300 IPC, the
offence in the present case does not deserve death penalty -
Appellant is sentenced to life imprisonment for offence punishable
u/s.302 IPC - The second count on which death sentence has been
imposed is u/s. 376A of IPC - In view of the fact that s.376A IPC
was brought on the statute book just a few days before the
commission of the offence, the appellant does not deserve death
penalty for said offence - However, the appropriate punishment
for the offence u/s. 376A IPC must be rigorous imprisonment for a
term of 25 years - The conviction and sentence recorded by the
Courts below for the offences punishable u/s. 376(1), (2)(f), (i) and
(m) of IPC, and u/s.6 of the POCSO Act are affirmed.
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Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.235(2) - Penal Code, 1860
- s.376(1), (2)(f), (i), (m), s.376-A and s.302 - Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - s.6 - Rape and murder of a minor
girl - Trial Court found appellant-accused guilty - The Trial Court,
by its order passed on the same day awarded death sentence to the
appellant on two counts, i.e. u/s.302 of IPC and u/s.376-A of the
IPC; rigorous imprisonment for life under two counts, i.e.
s.376(1)(2)(f), (i) and (m) of IPC and u/s. 6 of POCSO Act - The
death sentence was confirmed by the High Court - Before the
Supreme Court, the appellant contended that the sentence of death
was passed on the same day when the conviction order was
pronounced, there was non-compliance of s.235(2) of the Code,
the infraction on that count was sufficient to consider commutation
of the sentence of death to that of life imprisonment - Held: Merely
on account of infraction of s.235(2) of the Code, the death sentence
ought not to be commuted to life imprisonment - Adequate and
sufficient opportunity afforded to the appellant to place all the
relevant materials on record in the light of principle laid down in
Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra.
Penal Code, 1860 - s.376(1)(2) and s.376A - Criminal Law
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2013 - Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,
2013 - Rape and murder of a minor girl - The Trial Court, by its
order awarded death sentence to the appellant on two counts, i.e.
u/s.302 of IPC and u/s.376-A of the IPC; rigorous imprisonment
for life under two counts, i.e. u/s.376(1)(2)(f), (i) and (m) of IPC
and u/s. 6 of POCSO Act - The Criminal Law (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2013 (promulgated by the President of India on
03.02.2013), u/s.376(2) prescribed punishment as "shall be punished
with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life" - The
sentence prescribed by s.376(2) as amended by the Amendment Act,
has for the first time provided that the imprisonment for life "shall
mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life"
- Whether imposition of life sentence in the instant case for the
offence under u/s.376(2) could "mean imprisonment for the
remainder of that person's natural life" - Whether such ex-post
facto prescription would be consistent with the provisions of subArticle (1) of Article 20 of the Constitution - Held: In the instant
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case, the offence was committed on 11.02.2013 when the provisions
of the Ordinance were in force - However, the Amendment Act having
been given retrospective effect from 03.02.2013 - Since it was the
Ordinance which was holding the field, going by the provisions of
the Ordinance, Clauses (f), (h) and (l) of s.376(2) would get
attracted - As far as consistency of ex-post facto prescription with
Art.20(1) is concerned - An imposition of life sentence simpliciter
does not put any restraints on the power of the executive to grant
remission and commutation in exercise of its statutory power, subject
of course to s.433A of the Code - But, a statutory prescription that
it "shall mean the remainder of that person's life" will certainly
restrain the executive from exercising any such statutory power and
to that extent the concerned provision definitely prescribes a higher
punishment ex-post facto - In the process, the protection afforded
by Art.20(1) of the Constitution would stand negated - Therefore, it
is must to declare that the punishment u/s.376(2) of the IPC in the
present case cannot come with stipulation that the life imprisonment
"shall mean the remainder of that person's life".
Penal Code, 1860 - s.299 and s.300 - Interplay between -
discussed.
Words and Phrases - Theory of "Residual Doubt" -
discussed.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The Trial Court found eight circumstances
establishing guilt of the appellant-accused. According to the
prosecution, on the day in question at about 7:30 p.m. when the
victim was with her grandfather, on the pretext that the father of
the victim had asked the Appellant to bring the victim, the
appellant, who was maternal uncle of the victim, took her away.
This part of the evidence is conclusively established through the
testimony of PW2, the grandfather. This version finds mention in
the FIR which was recorded within few hours of the incident and
in the statement of PW2 recorded under Section 164 of the Code.
There is nothing on record to doubt the veracity of said version.
It is true that some other witnesses were not examined by the
prosecution but the strength of the testimony of PW2 does not
get diminished on any count nor can it be said that his testimony
loses its weight because the witness was the grandfather of the
SHATRUGHNA BABAN MESHRAM v.
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victim. The version coming through this witness is cogent,
consistent and also figured in prompt reporting of the FIR. This
Court has, therefore, no hesitation in accepting that the first
circumstance as noted by the Trial Court stands conclusively
established. [Para 18.1][48-F-H; 49-A-B]
2. As deposed by PWs 1 and 2, the Appellant was found by
the side of the victim at the spot i.e. in the premises of Anganwadi.
The victim was having various injuries whereafter she was taken
for medical attention. Soon after the incident, the Appellant was
also medically examined and Report Exbt. 46 showed injury on
his body. Even if PW9 had turned hostile and some other
witnesses were not examined, the fact that the victim was always
in the custody of Appellant till she was found at the spot alongside
the Appellant is quite clear. The proximity in terms of time and
the promptitude in reporting are crucial factors and the evidence
in that behalf is completely trustworthy. Thus, in view of this
Court, the second and third circumstances are also fully
established. [Para 18.2][49-C-D]
3. Soon after his arrest, the Appellant was produced for
medical examination before PW 7-Dr., who found injury on private
parts of the Appellant. The approximate time of said injury as
given in the opinion Exh. 46 is consistent with the case of
prosecution. No explanation, not even a suggestion came from
the Appellant how there could be an injury on his body as noticed
in Report Exh.46. Thus, the 4th circumstance also stands fully
established. [Para 18.3][49-E-F]
4. While considering the 5th circumstance, it must be stated
that as per record, the chappals were not proved to be that of the
Appellant and the pieces of flesh found at the spot of incident
were also not proved to be that of a human being. To that extent,
5th circumstance was not proved at all. However, the fact that
the pant of the victim was found at the spot of incident is well
established on record, and the 5th circumstance must be taken
to be proved only with respect to the recovery of the pant of the
victim. [Para 18.4][49-G-H; 50-A]
5. There is nothing on record to show that the stains of
semen found on clothing referred to in 6th circumstance, were
medically proved to be that of, or could be associated with the
Appellant. The 6th circumstance cannot therefore be taken to
be pointing against the Appellant. [Para 18.5][50-B]
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6. In terms of Chemical Analyser's Report Ext. 54, the blood
found on the trousers of the Appellant was that of the victim.
This fact is completely established. Given the quick succession
of steps in investigation, including the medical examination and
seizure of the clothes of the Appellant, this Court does not find
any infirmity. This Court, therefore, accept that the 7th
circumstance stands fully established.[Para 18.6][50-B-C;50G]
7. It is a matter of record that as per post-mortem report
and medical opinion, there was forceful sexual assault on the
victim and her death was caused due to injury No.17 which was in
the nature of multiple lacerations over vaginal and anal region;
and merging of vaginal and anal orifices. The 8th circumstance
must therefore be taken to be proved fully except to the extent
that said circumstance makes reference to pieces of flesh found
at the spot of incident. [Para 18.7][50-H; 51-A-B]
8. Do the circumstances established on record satisfy the
requirements spelt out in the decision of this Court in Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda is the question for consideration.
The established circumstances show:-
(a)
The victim was in the custody of the Appellant, from
the time she was taken from her grandfather till she
was found lying in the premises of Anganwadi; where
the Appellant was also found lying next to her.
(b)
The victim, who was hale and hearty when she was
taken by the Appellant, had number of injuries on her
body when she was found next to the Appellant.
(c)
The injuries on the body of the victim show that she
was abused and sexually exploited.
(d)
The sexual assault was so forceful that the victim, a
two-and-a-half-year-old girl suffered, among other
injuries, Injury No.17 i.e. Multiple lacerations over
vaginal and anal region merging vaginal and anal
orifice, margins irregular, blood infiltrated, reddish.
(e)
Injury No.17, as described above, was so severe that
there was merging of vaginal and anal orifices.
(f)
The victim died because of Injury No. 17.
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(g)
The Appellant had an injury on his private parts
corresponding to the period when the victim was in
his custody.
(h)
The Appellant was found to be capable of having
sexual intercourse.
(I)
The trousers of the Appellant had blood stains, the
DNA profiles of which, matched with that of the blood
of the victim.
These circumstances at serial numbers (a) to (i) stand
proved beyond any doubt and by themselves constitute a
conclusive and consistent chain excluding every other hypothesis
except the guilt of the appellant. [Para 19][51-B-H; 52-A]
9. The appellant is thus guilty of having committed offences
punishable under clauses (f), (i) and (m) of sub-section (2) of
Section 376 of IPC; and also, under clauses (j) and (m) of Section
5 read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, (as it stood before it was
amended by Act 25 of 2019). Since according to medical opinion,
the death was because of injury No. 17, the Appellant is also guilty
of having committed offence punishable under Section 376A of
IPC. [Para 22][52-F-G]
10. The injuries suffered by the victim were directly as a
result of sexual assault inflicted upon her. But the medical
evidence does not disclose that either before or after the
commission of sexual assault, any other injury was consciously
caused with the intention to extinguish the life of the victim. Injury
No. 17 which was the cause of death was suffered by the victim
during the course of commission of sexual assault upon her. The
questions that arise, therefore, are whether such an act on part
of the Appellant comes within the parameters of Sections 299
and 300 of IPC and whether he is guilty of having committed
culpable homicide amounting to murder. [Para 23][52-G-H; 53A-B]
11. Considering the age of the victim in the present case,
the accused must have known the consequence that his sexual
assault on a child of 2 1⁄2 years would cause death or such bodily
injury as was likely to cause her death. The instant matter thus
comes within the parameters of clause fourthly to Section 300
IPC and the question posed at the beginning of the discussion on
this issue must be answered against the Appellant. The Appellant
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is therefore guilty of having committed the offence of culpable
homicide amounting to murder. [Para 28][66-D-F]
12. As far as the sentence is concerned, after considering
various decisions of this Court, the Court summed up: (a) it is
not as if imposition of death penalty is impermissible to be awarded
in circumstantial evidence cases; and (b) if the circumstantial
evidence is of an unimpeachable character in establishing the
guilt of the accused and leads to an exceptional case or the
evidence sufficiently convinces the judicial mind that the option
of a sentence lesser than death penalty is foreclosed, the death
penalty can be imposed. [Para 41][97-E-G]
13. If the present case is so considered, the discussion must
broadly be classified under following two heads:-(A) Whether the
circumstantial evidence in the present case is of unimpeachable
character in establishing the guilt of the Appellant or leads to an
exceptional case; (B) Whether the evidence on record is so strong
and convincing that the option of a sentence lesser than a death
penalty is foreclosed. [Para 53][126-G-H; 127-A-B]
14. Going by the circumstances proved on record and, more
particularly the facets detailed earlier as well as the law laid down
by this Court in series of decisions, the circumstances on record
rule out any hypothesis of innocence of the Appellant. The
circumstances are clear, consistent and conclusive in nature and
are of unimpeachable character in establishing the guilt of the
Appellant. The evidence on record also depicts an exceptional
case where two and half years old girl was subjected to sexual
assault. The assault was accompanied by bites on the body of the
victim. The rape was of such intensity that there was merging of
vaginal and anal orifices of the victim. The age of the victim, the
fact that the Appellant was a maternal uncle of the victim and the
intensity of the assault make the present case an exceptional
one. [Para 53][127-B-D]
15. However, if the case is considered against the second
head, we do not find that the option of a sentence lesser than
death penalty is completely foreclosed. It is true that the sexual
assault was very severe and the conduct of the Appellant could
be termed as perverse and barbaric. However, a definite pointer
in favour of the Appellant is the fact that he did not consciously
cause any injury with the intent to extinguish the life of the victim.
SHATRUGHNA BABAN MESHRAM v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
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Though all the injuries are attributable to him and it was injury
No.17 which was the cause of death, his conviction under Section
302 IPC is not under any of the first three clauses of Section 300
IPC. In matters where the conviction is recorded with the aid of
clause fourthly under Section 300 of IPC, it is very rare that the
death sentence is awarded. In cases at Serial Nos. 10, 11, 16, 24,
40, 45 and 64 of the Chart tabulated in paragraph 30 hereinabove,
where the victims were below 16 years of age and had died during
the course of sexual assault on them, the maximum sentence
awarded was life sentence. This aspect is of crucial importance
while considering whether the option of a sentence lesser than
death penalty is foreclosed or not. [Para 53][127-D-G]
16. This Court, therefore, finds that though the Appellant
is guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, since
there was no requisite intent as would bring the case under any
of the first three clauses of Section 300 IPC, the offence in the
present case does not deserve death penalty. [Para 54][127-GH; 128A]
17. The second count on which death sentence has been
imposed is under Section 376A of IPC. As noted earlier, the
offence was committed on 11.02.2013 and just few days before
such commission, Section 376A was inserted in IPC by the
Ordinance. As concluded by this Court, the ex-post facto effect
given to Section 376A inserted by the Amendment Act would not
in any way be inconsistent with sub-Article (1) of Article 20 of the
Constitution. The Appellant is thus definitely guilty of the offence
punishable under Section 376A IPC. But the question remains
whether punishment lesser than death sentence gets ruled out
or not. As against Section 302 IPC while dealing with cases under
Section 376A IPC, a wider spectrum is available for consideration
by the Courts as to the punishment to be awarded. On the basis
of the same aspects that weighed with this Court while
considering the appropriate punishment for the offence under
Section 302 IPC, in view of the fact that Section 376A IPC was
brought on the statute book just few days before the commission
of the offence, the Appellant does not deserve death penalty for
said offence. At the same time, considering the nature and
enormity of the offence, it must be observed that the appropriate
punishment for the offence under Section 376A IPC must be
rigorous imprisonment for a term of 25 years. [Para 55][128-AE]
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Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
(1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88; State of Andhra
Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Another (1976)
4 SCC 382 : [1977] 1 SCR 601; State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Ram Prasad [1968] 2 SCR 522; Santosh
S/o Shankar Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2015) 7
SCC 641 : [2015] 4 SCR 962; Suraj Jagannath Jadhav
v. State of Maharashtra (2020) 2 SCC 693 : [2019]
15 SCR 84; State of Orissa v. Dibakar Naik and Others
(2002) 5 SCC 323 : [ 2002] 3 SCR 307; State, Govt of
NCT of Delhi v. Sunil and Another (2001) 1 SCC 652
: [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 144; Amrit Singh v. State of
Punjab (2006) 12 SCC 79: [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 889;
Dattatraya Ambo Rokade v. The State of Maharashtra
(2019) 13 SCALE 187; Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra
(1977) 3 SCC 68 : [1977] 3 SCR 636; B. A. Umesh vs.
Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka (2017) 4
SCC 124 : [2016] 5 SCR 438;Vasanta Sampat Dupare
v. State of Maharashtra (2017) 6 SCC 631 : [2017]
3 SCR 850 ;
Manoj Suryavanshi v. State of
Chhattisgarh (2020) 4 SCC 451 ; Hanumant v. State of
Madhya Pradesh [1952] SCR 1091; Vadivelu Thevar
v. State of Madras [1957] SCR 981; Jumman Khan v.
State of U.P. and Another (1991) 1 SCC 752 :[1990]
3 Suppl. SCR 398; Amrutlal Someshwar Joshi v. State
of Maharashtra (1994) 6 SCC 186: [1994] 2 Suppl.
 SCR 510; Shivaji alias Dadya Shankar Alhat v. State
of Maharashtra; (2008) 15 SCC 269:[2008]
13 SCR 81; Vasanta Sampat Dupare v.State of
Maharashtra (2015) 1 SCC 253; Manoharan v. State
(2019) 7 SCC 716; Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of West
Bengal (2007) 12 SCC 230 :[2006] 10 Suppl.
 SCR 662; Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of
Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767:[ 2008] 11 SCR 93;
Mohan and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1998) 5 SCC
336:[1998] 3 SCR 317; Nand Kishore v. State of
Madhya Pradesh (2019) 16 SCC 278; State of Haryana
v. Krishan and Another (2017) 8 SCC 204 : [2017]
7 SCR 251; Md. Mannan v. State of Bihar (2019) 16
SHATRUGHNA BABAN MESHRAM v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
12
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 13 S.C.R.
SCC 584 : [2019] 8 SCR 266; Dileep Bankar v.
State of M.P. MANU/SC/1125/2019 ; Rameshbhai
Chandubhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat (2009) 5 SCC
740; Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B. (1994) 2
SCC 220 : [1994] 1 SCR 37; Ashok Debabarma @
Achak Debbarma v. State of Tripura (2014) 4 SCC
747 : [2014] 4 SCR 287; Sudam v. State of Maharashtra
(2019) 9 SCC 388 : [2019] 14 SCR 943; Santosh
Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra
(2009) 6 SCC 498 : [2009] 9 SCR 90; Kalu Khan v.
State of Rajasthan (2015) 16 SCC 492; Ravishankar
alias Baba Vishwakarma vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2019) 9 SCC 689 : [2019] 14 SCR 285 - relied on.
Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5 :
[1989] 2 SCR 498 ; Malkiat Singh and others v. State
of Punjab (1991) 4 SCC 341 : [1991] 2 SCR 256;
Ajay Pandit v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 8 SCC 43
: [2012] 10 SCR 70; Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of
Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467 :[ 2007] 1 SCR 916;
Sebastian @ Chevithiyan v. State of Kerala (2010) 1
SCC 58; Purna Chandra Kusal v. State of Orissa (2011)
15 SCC 352; State of AP v. T. Prasanna Kumar (2003)
1 ACR 627 (SC); Mohd. Chaman v. State (NCT of Delhi)
(2001) 2 SCC 28; Ramesh Harijan v. State of Uttar
Pradesh (2012) 5 SCC 777 : [2012] 6 SCR 688; Ram
Deo Prasad v. State of Bihar (2013) 7 SCC 725 : [2013]
6 SCR 108; Ramesh v. State through Inspector of Police
(2014) 9 SCC 392 : [2014] 7 SCR 956; Mohd. Arif
alias Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India (2014)
9 SCC 737:[2014] 11 SCR 1009; Santa Singh v. State
of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190 : [1977] 1 SCR 229;
Kamta Tiwari v. State of M.P. (1996) 6 SCC 250 : [1996]
5 Suppl. SCR 507; Molai and Another v. State of M.P.
(1999) 9 SCC 581 : [1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 104; Neel
Kumar v. The State of Haryana (2012) 5 SCC 766 :
[2012] 5 SCR 696; Sushil Sharma v. State (NCT of
Delhi) (2014) 4 SCC 317 : [2013] 16 SCR 616;
Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde v. State of Maharashtra (2014)
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
13
4 SCC 292 : [2014] 3 SCR 406; Rajesh Kumar v. State
through Government of NCT of Delhi (2011) 13 SCC
706; Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab,(2013) 3 SCC
294 : [2013] 3 SCR 90 ; Rameshbhai Chandubhai
Rathod (2) v. State of Gujarat (2011) 2 SCC 764 : [2011]
1 SCR 829; Amit v. State of U.P. (2012) 4 SCC 107 :
[2012] 1 SCR 1009 Sunil v. State of M.P. (2017) 4 SCC
393; Sunil Damodar Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra
(2014) 1 SCC 129 : [2013] 9 SCR 295; Surendra Pal
Shivbalak Pal v. State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 127
: [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 464 ; Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde
v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 4 SCC 292:[2014] 3
SCR 406, Santosh Kumar Singh v. State of M.P. (2014)
12 SCC 650 : [2014] 7 SCR 928; Shyam Singh @
Bhima v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2017) 11 SCC 265;
Mukesh and Another v. State ( NCT of Delhi) and Others
(2017) 6 SCC 1 : [2017] 6 SCR 1 - referred to.
California v. Brown 93 L Ed 2d 934 : 479 US 538
(1987); Franklin v. Lynaugh 101 L Ed 2d155 : 487 US
164 (1988); Herrera v. Collins (1993) SCC Online US
SC 10; Oregon v. Guzek 546 US 517 (2006); Abdul
Kabir v. Quarterman 550 US 233 (2007); State v.
McKinney 74 SW 3d 291 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1989] 2 SCR 498
referred to
Para 17.2
[1991] 2 SCR 256
referred to
Para 17.2
[2012] 10 SCR 70
referred to
Para 17.2
[2007] 1 SCR 916
referred to
Para 17.2
(2010) 1 SCC 58
referred to
Para 17.2
(2011) 15 SCC 352
referred to
Para 17.2
(2015) 16 SCC 492
relied on
Para 17.2
[2014] 4 SCR 287
relied on
Para 17.2
[2019] 14 SCR 943
relied on
Para 17.2
[2019] 14 SCR 285
relied on
Para 17.2
SHATRUGHNA BABAN MESHRAM v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 13 S.C.R.
(2011) 13 SCC 706
referred to
Para 17.2
[2013] 3 SCR 90
referred to
Para 17.2
[2011] 1 SCR 829
referred to
Para 17.2
[2012] 1 SCR 1009
referred to
Para 17.2
(2017) 4 SCC 393
referred to
Para 17.2
[2013] 9 SCR 295
referred to
Para 17.2
[2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 464
referred to
Para 17.2
[2014] 3 SCR 406
referred to
Para 17.2
[2014] 7 SCR 928
referred to
Para 17.2
(2017) 11 SCC 265
referred to
Para 17.2
[2016] 5 SCR 438
relied on
Para 17.3
(2015) 1 SCC 253
relied on
Para 17.3
[2017] 3 SCR 850
relied on
Para 17.3
[2017] 6 SCR 1
referred to
Para 17.3
[1985] 1 SCR 88
relied on
Para 18
[1977] 1 SCR 601
relied on
Para 24
[1968] 2 SCR 522
relied on
Para 25
[2015] 4 SCR 962
relied on
Para 25 (B)
[2019] 15 SCR 84
relied on
Para 25 (C)
[2017] 7 SCR 251
relied on
Para 25 (D)
[2002] 3 SCR 307
relied on
Para 26.1
[2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 144
relied on
Para 26.2
[2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 889
relied on
Para 26.3
(2003) 1 ACR 627 (SC)
referred to
Para 26.4
(2001) 2 SCC 28
referred to
Para 26.5
[2012] 6 SCR 688
referred to
Para 26.5
[2013] 6 SCR 108
referred to
Para26.5
[2014] 7 SCR 956
referred to
Para 26.5
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
15
(2019) 13 SCALE 187
relied on
Para 26.6
[2014] 11 SCR 1009
referred to
Para 30
[1977] 1 SCR 229
referred to
Para 31
[1977] 3 SCR 636
relied on
Para 31
(2020) 4 SCC 451
relied on
Para 34
[1952] SCR 1091
relied on
Para 35
[1957] SCR 981
relied on
Para 35
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 398
relied on
Para 36(i)
[1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 510
relied on
Para 36(ii)
[1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 507
referred to
Para 36(iii)
[1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 104
referred to
Para36(iv)
[2008] 13 SCR 81
relied on
Para 36(v)
(2019) 7 SCC 716
relied on
Para 36(vii)
[2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 662
relied on
Para 37(i)
[2008] 11 SCR 93
relied on
Para 37(iii)
[2009] 9 SCR 90
relied on
Para 37(iv)
[1998] 3 SCR 317
relied on
Para 37(iv)
[2012] 5 SCR 696
referred to
Para 37(vi)
[2013] 16 SCR 616
referred to
Para 37(vii)
[2014] 3 SCR 406
referred to
Para 37(viii)
(2019) 16 SCC 278
relied on
Para 37(x)
[2019] 8 SCR 266
relied on
Para 37(xi)
(2009) 5 SCC 740
relied on
Para 38
[1994] 1 SCR 37
relied on
Para 37
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos. 763-764 of 2016.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.10.2015 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench in Criminal Appeal No.321 of
2015 and Criminal Confirmation Case No. 1 of 2015.
SHATRUGHNA BABAN MESHRAM v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
A
B
C
D
E
F
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 13 S.C.R.
Ms. Sonia Mathur, Sr. Adv., Sushil Kumar Dubey, Anuj Aggarwal,
Puneet Pathak, Himanshu Agarwal, Anshu Raj Singh, Balaji Srinivasan,
Sushil Karanjkar, Rahul S. Chitnis, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar,
Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.
1. These appeals by Special Leave challenge the common judgment
and order dated 12.10.2015 passed by the High Court1 in Criminal Appeal
No. 321 of 2015 and Criminal Confirmation Case No. 1 of 2015 affirming
the judgment and order dated 14.08.2015 passed by the Trial Court2 in
Special Case (POCSO Act3) No.11 of 2013 and confirming the Death
Sentence awarded to the Appellant on two counts i.e. under Section 302
of the Indian Penal Code (IPC, for short) and under Section 376A of
IPC.
2. The victim in the present case was a girl of two and half years
of age and the First Information Report was lodged at 09.25 p.m. on
11.02.2013 by her father with Parwa Police Station, Yavatmal as under:-
"By coming to the Police Station, I lodge an oral report that since
one year I am residing with my family at Zatala. I have two
daughters and one son. The victim, aged 2 years is my daughter
No.-2. I reside in the neighbourhood of my father- in-law.
This day 11.02.13, as there was a programme of Mahaprasad in
Duttatraya Temple in the village I had gone there for taking meals
at about 7.00 p.m. After taking meals I returned home at about
7.30 p.m. At that time I did not see my daughter Miss XXX4 at
home. Therefore, I asked my father-in-law as to where was my
daughter. On it, he told me, "Shatrughna Baban Meshram, aged
21 years, resident of Zatala has taken away your daughter XXX4
from me saying that he would reach her to you". But Shatrughna
did not bring my daughter to me. So I searched my daughter in
the village. I saw my daughter XXX4 and Shatrughna Meshram
lying in the new, under construction, building of Anganwadi. There
was no pant on the person of my daughter. It was lying beside.
1 The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur.
2 The Additional Sessions Judge, Yavatmal
3 The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
4 The identity of the victim is not being disclosed
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17
Her face was bitten and private parts were swollen. I came out
with my daughter. In the meantime, Baban Sambhaji Meshram,
aged 50 years also came there. He took Shatrughna to his house.
I along with father-in-law and Vitthal Ghodam took my daughter
in an auto from the village to Dr. Jaffar Siddiqui from Kurli. The
doctor examined her and declared her dead. So we returned home.
Shatrughna Meshram took my daughter XXX4 in the building of
Anganwadi, committed rape on her inhumanly in solitude, bit her
on face and lips and committed her murder."
3. As stated in the FIR, the victim was taken to PW6 Dr. Md.
Jaffar Siddiqui for medical attention but she was already dead and there
were marks of bites on her body. After registration of crime, the inquest
(Exh.15) was conducted which recorded, "- Black and bluish coloured
(contusion) marks are visible on both the cheeks and an injury is
visible on the left cheek. Similarly, both the lips are bitten. An injury
measuring 2 Cms. X 3 Cms. X 1 Cms. is visible on the chin". It also
recorded that there were bite marks on the chest and stomach of the
victim apart from signs of forcible sexual assault.
4. Soon after the registration of crime, PW13 A.P.I. Pankaj Vanjari
(Police Station In-charge) caused arrest of the Appellant vide Exh.23
and conducted spot panchnama. At the spot, full pant of the victim, pieces
of flesh and chappals of an adult male were found.
5.The Appellant was taken to PW7 Dr. Ulhas Digambar Lingawar
for medical examination who found that:
"There was injury of abrasion on tip of the glans penis. The injury
size was 5mm X 3mm. That injury was caused within 24 hours.
The accused was found capable for sexual intercourse."
In response to queries by the Investigating Officer said witness
had stated in his opinion Exh 46:-
"(1)
Yes, sign of sexual intercourse within 24 Hrs., was
present.
(2)
Yes, injury mentioned in certificate can be possible, due to
sexual intercourse."
6. The Post Mortem on the body of the victim was conducted on
12.02.2013 by a Board of five medical professionals and the Report
(Exh. 53) noted:-
SHATRUGHNA BABAN MESHRAM v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 13 S.C.R.
"Evidence of perineal tear with merging of vaginal and anal orifice,
details mentioned under column No.17 & 21. Dried blood and faecal
stains over genital and perineal region."
Following injuries were found on the person of the victim: -
"1.
Multiple abrasions over right zygomatic region of sizes
ranging from 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm. to 0.3 cm x 0.2 cm, reddish.
2.
Abrasion over left upper eye-lid of size 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm,
reddish.
3.
Abrasion over right cheek of size 4 cm x 4 cm, reddish.
4.
Abrasion over left cheek of size 8.5 cm x 7 cm, reddish.
5.
Evidence of missing both upper and lower lips exposing
labial fat with clean cut margins seen periorally without
blood infiltration (post mortem in nature).
6.
Lacerated wound over chin, midline of size 3 cm x 3 cm
muscle deep with tissue missing, margins irregular and blood
infiltrated, reddish.
7.
Bite mark over and around right nipple over a region of size
5 cm x 5 cm, margins contused, reddish.
8.
Bite mark over and around left nipple over a region of size
3 cm x 3 cm, margins contused, reddish.
9.
Bite mark over abdomen, 1 cm right at the level of umbilicus
over a region of size 4 cm x 3.5 cm, margins contused,
reddish.
10.
Bite mark over abdomen in the midline, 5 cm below the
umbilicus, over a region of size 3 cm x 3 cm, margins
contused, reddish.
11.
Bite mark over public region in the midline, 9cm below
umbilicus, over a region of size 4 cm x 3.5 cm, margins
contused, reddish.
12.
Bite mark over lateral aspect of right shoulder, over a region
of size 5 cm x 3 cm, margins contused, reddish.
13.
Bite mark over right buttock, over a region of size 3 cm x 3
cm, margins contused, reddish.
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19
14.
Bite mark over right buttock, over a region of size 3 cm x 3
cm, margins contused, reddish, separated from injury No.13
by 1.5 cm.
15.
Bite mark over right buttock, over a region of size 3 cm x
2.5 cm, margins contused, reddish separated from injury
No.14 by 1 cm.
16.
Bite mark over left buttock, over a region of size 3.7 cm x
3 cm, margins contused, reddish.
17.
Multiple lacerations over vaginal and anal region merging
vaginal and anal orifice (perineal tear at 3, 6 and 9 O'clock
positions), margins irregular, blood infiltrated, reddish.
18.
Abrasion over left knee joint region, on anterior aspect, of
size 1 cm x 0.5 cm, reddish.
Note: 1. Injuries No.1, 2, 3, 4 & 18 are caused by hard and rough
surface.
2. Injury No.5 is caused by sharp edged object.
3. Injury No.6 is caused by nibbling by teeth (nibbling by
bite).
4. Injury No.7 to 16 are caused by human bite.
5. Injury No.17 is caused by forceful sexual assault."
Under the heading "Internal Injuries" the corresponding
observations in Column No.21 were:-
"Evidence of tear in the posterior vaginal wall with merging of
vaginal and anal canal (perineal tear).