# SHEIIW MOHAMM&.D llAFIQ v. KHALlLtJL REitMAN & ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1973] 1 S.C.R. 500
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973
- **Bench:** K. S. Hi!GD~ ~ND A. N. G:toVEil
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sheiiw-mohamm-d-llafiq-v-khallltjl-reitman-another-5685
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Mohammedan Law-Demand in a_pre..emption tuit has to be mode
after tale-deed having heeh copied out in Sub Re,;strar.r Books-Date
entered In the book is date of sale ..
Law Rt/orm--Mohamedan
Law-Pre-emption, suit
for-Requirement of 4e1fi!Jnd.
A musiim left behind him as his heirs, his widow, twu sons, and
4 daug~ters A1 B, C and D.
In 1941, the heirs partitioned his property.
A portion was aU()tted to the widow and the sons and the remaining
portion to the daughters.
Respondent No. 1 purchased the portion allotted to the widow and the
sQn~. On August 19, 1952, he also enter~ into an agreement with the
4 daughters for the
purchase of their portion of the property within
3 months.
The sale was,
howeve!', not completed. On
August 11,
1953, all the 4 daughters executed an agr~ment of sale in favour of the
appellant.
Of the 4 daughters, D, h5>Wever, dtanged her mind and on
August 14, 1953, executed a <>ale--deed in fav~r of respondent No. 1.
'Th.e other 3 daughrers, however, sold their shares to the appellant
on
August 17, 1953.
The sale, however, was actuaUy registered in the books
of the Sub-Registrar on October 6, 1953.
Thereafter, the ap~Uant filed a suit against D, (respond:!nt No. 2)
for specific performance of her part of the a~ement. Respondent No. 1
also filed a !.Uit for possession by pre-elnption on the ground that he had
become a co-sharer with the other 3 daughters by virtue of the
sale
affected in Ius favour by D of her share. 1'he trial Court dismissed the
suit for specific pzrformance, but the suit relating to pre-emption was
decreed in favour of Respondent No, 1. The appellant failed before
the first appellate Court, and his appe<.;·, to the High Court were also not
succes~ful. The High Court upheld the decree of dismissal of the suit
for specific performance filed by the appellant;. and as regards the suit
for pre-emption, the High Court concluded that re5pondent No. 1 was
entit!ed to pre-emption.
....
In the appeal arising out of the suit for pre-emption, the sole contention raised by the appellant was that under Mohammedan Law, no
right of pre-emption accrues unless a demand for pre-emption is mare
and such a demand could only be made after the completion of the sale
of property sought to be pre-empted. It was contended by the appellant
that since the only demand was made on August 17, 1953, the demand
was premature because the actual registration of the ~ale deed in favour
of the ap(iellant. by the three daughters was not completed in _the books
of the Sub"'-Registrar tiU October 6, 1953 and therefore, the smt fo£ pre·
emption
was bound .to fail.
Dismissing the appeals,
HELD : (i) After the pronouncement of this Court in Ram Saran
Lall's case, th~: necessary. demands in a pre-emption suit had to be made
after the sa:·~ had been completed not by execution or registration of
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MOHD. RJ\J'IQ v. JC. lt.EHMAN
50J
tM ,sale-Geod b"& ~y tbe aaJe..deed bavirJ.t bt1!o 1109\ed out tn me Suf>-lle ·s-.
tttts bOOks ~d at would be tbe date entered in tbat boolc wtmf1
gJ
be considered as the date of sale. (SOSB]
was to
(ii) The •wellabt .et up in this Court a wboUy new
b'cb
was not agitated before any of the Courts below. Tbc po~
~tber
the demands made were
lkeana~ or compli:d with the
rules
f
Mohammad an. Law could only be detennined by reference to the entf:e
evl~ence and ~ not a RUrc question of law.
Even il\ the apcial lea\"C"
petitldn the J)Ot!1t Will tlot nllsed.
AccordinJly the appclla01 ca.aoot ~
allowed to raUe the q~
of lovall~lty of the demanda at tho r.t.e
stage and tbertfore the awt for pre-emptiOn must fall. [$060-E]
Ram Saran lAI and Ors. v. Mst. Domini lut, &: Ors, (19621 2 S.C.R.
474. referred to.
. (iii) The M~~medan Law .relating to demand before filiog a.
SUit for pre-erophoo IS
Of 8
higbly technical
nature. Tbc tafabi·imowsaibat is apoken of I!S the tint demand and tulab-Usllad
is
the
second demand. 1be third demand consists of the imtitutioo

## Text

500
SHEIIW MOHAMM&.D llAFIQ
v.
KHALlLtJL REitMAN & ANOTHER
May 3t 1972
[K. S. Hi!GD~ ~ND A. N. G:toVEil, JJ.]
Mohammedan Law-Demand in a_pre..emption tuit has to be mode
after tale-deed having heeh copied out in Sub Re,;strar.r Books-Date
entered In the book is date of sale ..
Law Rt/orm--Mohamedan
Law-Pre-emption, suit
for-Requirement of 4e1fi!Jnd.
A musiim left behind him as his heirs, his widow, twu sons, and
4 daug~ters A1 B, C and D.
In 1941, the heirs partitioned his property.
A portion was aU()tted to the widow and the sons and the remaining
portion to the daughters.
Respondent No. 1 purchased the portion allotted to the widow and the
sQn~. On August 19, 1952, he also enter~ into an agreement with the
4 daughters for the
purchase of their portion of the property within
3 months.
The sale was,
howeve!', not completed. On
August 11,
1953, all the 4 daughters executed an agr~ment of sale in favour of the
appellant.
Of the 4 daughters, D, h5>Wever, dtanged her mind and on
August 14, 1953, executed a <>ale--deed in fav~r of respondent No. 1.
'Th.e other 3 daughrers, however, sold their shares to the appellant
on
August 17, 1953.
The sale, however, was actuaUy registered in the books
of the Sub-Registrar on October 6, 1953.
Thereafter, the ap~Uant filed a suit against D, (respond:!nt No. 2)
for specific performance of her part of the a~ement. Respondent No. 1
also filed a !.Uit for possession by pre-elnption on the ground that he had
become a co-sharer with the other 3 daughters by virtue of the
sale
affected in Ius favour by D of her share. 1'he trial Court dismissed the
suit for specific pzrformance, but the suit relating to pre-emption was
decreed in favour of Respondent No, 1. The appellant failed before
the first appellate Court, and his appe<.;·, to the High Court were also not
succes~ful. The High Court upheld the decree of dismissal of the suit
for specific performance filed by the appellant;. and as regards the suit
for pre-emption, the High Court concluded that re5pondent No. 1 was
entit!ed to pre-emption.
....
In the appeal arising out of the suit for pre-emption, the sole contention raised by the appellant was that under Mohammedan Law, no
right of pre-emption accrues unless a demand for pre-emption is mare
and such a demand could only be made after the completion of the sale
of property sought to be pre-empted. It was contended by the appellant
that since the only demand was made on August 17, 1953, the demand
was premature because the actual registration of the ~ale deed in favour
of the ap(iellant. by the three daughters was not completed in _the books
of the Sub"'-Registrar tiU October 6, 1953 and therefore, the smt fo£ pre·
emption
was bound .to fail.
Dismissing the appeals,
HELD : (i) After the pronouncement of this Court in Ram Saran
Lall's case, th~: necessary. demands in a pre-emption suit had to be made
after the sa:·~ had been completed not by execution or registration of
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MOHD. RJ\J'IQ v. JC. lt.EHMAN
50J
tM ,sale-Geod b"& ~y tbe aaJe..deed bavirJ.t bt1!o 1109\ed out tn me Suf>-lle ·s-.
tttts bOOks ~d at would be tbe date entered in tbat boolc wtmf1
gJ
be considered as the date of sale. (SOSB]
was to
(ii) The •wellabt .et up in this Court a wboUy new
b'cb
was not agitated before any of the Courts below. Tbc po~
~tber
the demands made were
lkeana~ or compli:d with the
rules
f
Mohammad an. Law could only be detennined by reference to the entf:e
evl~ence and ~ not a RUrc question of law.
Even il\ the apcial lea\"C"
petitldn the J)Ot!1t Will tlot nllsed.
AccordinJly the appclla01 ca.aoot ~
allowed to raUe the q~
of lovall~lty of the demanda at tho r.t.e
stage and tbertfore the awt for pre-emptiOn must fall. [$060-E]
Ram Saran lAI and Ors. v. Mst. Domini lut, &: Ors, (19621 2 S.C.R.
474. referred to.
. (iii) The M~~medan Law .relating to demand before filiog a.
SUit for pre-erophoo IS
Of 8
higbly technical
nature. Tbc tafabi·imowsaibat is apoken of I!S the tint demand and tulab-Usllad
is
the
second demand. 1be third demand consists of the imtitutioo of the
suit for p~mptiot1. Both the talabs are conditions ~eot to tho
excn:ise of tbe rigbt of pre-emption.
The tlrst talab should be made as
soon as the fact of the saJe is known to the claimant. Ally unreasooable
or unoeceasory delay will be construed as an election not to pre-empt.
'Ibece are other highly technical rules which a pre-emptor has to follow
before he con succeed in a suit forr pre-emption. A strict compliance
with all the requimnents of the demands which are neoess:uv before a
pre-emptor can auccud in a suit for pre-emption under the Mohammedan Law may become
very diffiCult, pattit:ularly, ott tbe question of
promplne&s and avoidance of delay with regard to the lint demand. A
nle shall be deemed to be completed only after the sale-~ has bee~
l
copied in the books of the Sub-Registrar. If the demand has to be made
afl.er such completion it would
be
virtually
im~sible or at
any rute extremely difficult for any pre-emptor to make the first
demand as
proml'tly u
required
under
the
principles of
Mohammedan Law.
A prG-emptor cal)not be expected to keep a per·
petual watch with regu.rd to the point o( time when the office of the·
Sub-Registrar would copy out the s.ale-dlled in the PfCscTibed . ~k. It
is, however, a rotatter for the Parliament to make sutlt!.ble legulataon tor
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overcome lbis d.ifficulty. [$0SFI
/'rlnr:iples o/ Molwmtdun Luw, by Mulla, 16th Edn. referred to.
(iv) TI•e other appeal arising out of the suit. for specific perf~ance
also fa.ils, bec.auK. f~nt, the respondent had a n~tht of pre~ptJon, .aoct
ICCOndly the earlier agre-ement dated August 19, 1952
entered
mto
between 'Rnpom.lent 1 and 4 dau~hten at ill subsisted and t~
,appell~nt hnd
no ri~ht to brint a auit for spec1fic pcriornunce against D by VIrtUe of
the aubiequent al[ncmcnt dated August II, 1953.
CIVU. APPELLATE JualSDJCTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 691 an<f
692 ot 1967.
Appeals 1;.y sr>ecfal leave trom the judg~~ and order dated·_
luly 12, 1966 ot the .Allahabad Hl&b Court tn ~nd Appeals
Nos. 1031 and 1032 ot 1959..
· ·
M. c. Ch.aglt~ and s. s. Sltukta. for the appellants (in both the:
8PPeals).
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502
SUPREM"E COURT REPORTS
[1973] 1 S,C.R.
C. B. Agarwala and K. P. Gupta, for respondent No.1 (in both
the appeals).
A.N. Goyal, for respondent No.2 (in C.A. No. 691 of 1967).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered byGrover, J. T~ese appeals have been brought by special leave
from. a ~ommon Judgr;nent of the Allahabad High Court whereby
the dtsmtssa~ of ~he smt for specific perfonnance filed by the appel-
~ant was mamtamed and the decree for possession· by pre-emption
111 favour of respondent No. 1 was confinned.
.
On~ Gauhar Ali was the owner of a pucca two storeyed house
m the city of MQradabad. On his cleath he left behind as his heirs
his widow Musammat Begum, two sons Liaqat Ali and Ishtiaq
Ali and four daug~ters Sughara Begum, Kubra Begum, Mehmooda •
Begum and Chhotl Begum. In 1941 tht .. eirs of Gauhar Ali partitioned the property. According to the partition the house in dispute was divided longitudinally east and west. The western portion
was allotted to the widow and the sons and the eastern portion
came to the share of the four daughters. Respondent No. 1 purchased the western nortio11 of the house from the widow and the
'-.nns.
On August i9, 1952 he also entered into an agreement
with the four daughters for the purchase of their part of the home,
namely, the eastern portion. The period in which the sale-deed
was to be executed was three months but it appears that the sale
was not completed. On August 11, 1953 all the four daughters
executed
an agreement of sale in
favour of the appellant.
Musammat Chhoti Begum,
howeve:-, changed her
mind and
executed a sale-deed in favour of respondent No. 1 on August 14,
1953. The other three daughters, however, did not go back on
the agreem.ent entered into with the appellant and they got a saledeed transferring their share registered in favour of the appellant
on August 17, 1953. This sale was, however, actually registered
in the books of the Sub-Registrar ·on October 6, 1953.
On September 9, 1953 the appellant filed a suit against res.
pondent No. 2 (Chhoti Begum) for specific perfonnance of her
.part of the agreement.
~espondent No. _1 also filed on Feb~uary 6,
1954 a suit for possession by pre-em phon on the allegatiOn. that
he had become a co-sharer with the other t~ree da~ghters by vn1l_le
of the sale effected in his' favour by Chhoti Begum of her share m
~he eastern portion of the house. Both the suits were tried and .
disposed of by the trial court which held tha~ respondent N?· 1
was not a bona fide purchaser for ·value but smce ~e ha<l: a ~1ght
of pre-emption the suit for specific perforn1ance. was dismissed
and the suit relating to pre-emption was decreed m favour of resA
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MOHO. RAFIQ V. K. REHMAN (Grover, /.)
5-'0:3
pondent No. 1. The appellant filed appeals before the first appel-·
late court which failed.
He preferred two appeals to the High
Court which upheld the decree of dismissal in the suit for specific
performance filed by the appellant. As regards the suit for preemption it was held that tr.e ground of vicinity was no longer available in view of the judgru.ent of this Court in Bhau Ram v. B. Baijnath Singh(!).
The High Court, however, came to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 was a sharer in the appendagescommon gate and common .passage-and therefore he was entitled to pre-empti ~n.
In the appeal arising out of the suit for pre-emption the sole·
contention raised by Mr. Chagla is that under the Mahomedan
Law no right of pre-emption accrues unless a demand for preemption is made and such a demand can only be made after the·
completion of the sale of the property sought to be pre-empted.
For the purpose of finding out whether the sale had been completed the court had to consider the provisions of the Transfer
of Property Act 1882 and the Registration Act 1908 and not
the Principles of Mahomadan Law. Our attention has been invited to a decision of this Court in Ram Saran Lall & Others
v. Mst. Domini Kuer & Otherse). There a sale deed had been
executed on Jan11ary 31, 1946 and presented for registration on
the same date. On coming to know -:>f the execution of the sale- ,
deed the pre--empter made a talab-i-mowasibat on February .2, ~
1946. But the deed was actually copied out in the registration
books on February 9, 1946. The suit for pre-emption had been
resisted on the ground that the. talab (demand) had b~n made·
prematurely.
By a majority this Court held· that the sale was
completed only on February 9, 1946 when the registration was
complete and that the talab· was made prematurely and, therefore,
the suit must fail.
Now prima facie it would appear that in accordance with the
above decision the sale sought to be pre-empted . by respondent
No. 1 could not be regarded as having been completed until
October 8, 1953 when the sale deed was copied qut in the books
of the Sub-Registrar. The talab had been made according to the·
evidence which was accepted by the courts below on August 17,
1953, namely, the day on which the sale deed in favour of the
appellant by the three daughters was got registered by the Su~
Registrar, but the registration of which was not completed m
the books of the Sub-Registrar till October 6, 1953. Mr. Chagla
has contended strenuously that the only dernan~ alleged to h~ve·
been made was on August 17, 1953 and the smt for pre-emption_
was bound to fail as being premature according to the ratio of
the decision of this Court in Ra~ Saran Lall'$(2) case ..
(1) [1962] 3 Suppl. ·S.C.R. 724.
( 2) [1962)2 S.C.R. 474.
~04
~UPKE.ME-COUaT ~EPOR'l's
[197 3 j 1 S.C.R.
T~ difticul~y in tbe way of the appellant i~ that a wholly n~w
.ca5~ lS. now boJng s~t up on his beftalf by Mr. Chagla. ·In the
plaJDt It was stated m para 14 that as SoOn as. the plaintiff came
to loww about the purchase of the property by defendant No. 1
.he fulfilled the condition of the pre-emption according to Mahomadan Law and sent message to defendant No. 1 and also served
a notice that. ~ must· take from the plaintiff the sum of Rs.
3750/ ~ paid by him and transfer to the plaintiff the portion purchased by him from defendant Nos. 2 to 4 but he did not pay any
.heed. In the written statement in para 4 it was asserted by defendant No. 1 the present appellant tlj.at the plaintiff did not fulfil
any· co~dition of pre-emption nor did he ever place any demand
orally or in writting before the contesting defendant regarding the
purchase and reconveyance of the property in respect of which
pre-emption was sought.
The allegation of the plaintiff that he
had fulfilled any demand according to the Mahomedan Law was
totally incorrect and against the facts.
On the above pleadings
on the point the issue was framed in the following terms :
"Whether necessary demands of pre-emption as required by Hanafi Law were performed by the plaintiff ?''
The trial court discussed the evidence led on the above issue
·and held that demands had been properly performed in accordance
with law.
The evidence related mainly to what happened on
August 17, 1953 when the plaintiff was· informed of the sale
deed which had been executed in favour of defendant No.
1.
That wa·s the first demand and a second demand was also perf<¥ffied later. The date on which the second demaf!.d .was made
is, however, not mentioned in the judgment of the·trial court. In
·the appeal against the decree of pre-emption reference was made
to the evidence led on the question of demand and this is what
.the learned Additional District Judge said :
"Again addressing Haji Nisar and Mehruddin witnesses he said that he performed the first demand in
their presence and the second demand was again performed before them and that if it was necessary they would be
summoned as witnesses."
Now this judgment was delivered on February 13, 1959 by which
time the law laid down by this Court in Ram Saran Lall's case(!),
could naturally not have come to the notice of the counsel for the
parties and the same could not have been referred to before the
Additional District Judge.
But by tile time the appeal carne to
be decided by the High Court--the judgment was delivered in
July 1966-the law had been settled by this Court and if the appellant wanted to rely on the argument which has .been raised before
us there is no reason or justification for not havmg done so at that
(I) [l962J 2 s.c.R. 474.
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MOHD. RAFIQ v. JC. JtEHM'AN (Grov~r, I.)
505
stage. It must be remembered that fhe entire litigation had l'fO"
cceded on the basis that the rules of Mohamodan Law relating-not
only to pre-emption but also to the point of time when the $ale is
completed were being applied by the courts. After the pl'Onoun~
ment in Ram Saran Lall's(l) case it became settled that the neees~
sary demands in a pre.emption suit had to be made after the sale
had been compl~ted not by execution or registration of the sale deed
but by the sale deed having been copied out in the sub--Registrar's
Books and it would be the date entered in that bOOk which was to
be considered as the date of· sale.
According to Mr. Chagla the
demands on the evidence of the resp<>ndent himself, were made
before the 6th of October ,1953 and not afterwards.
This was a
question of fact which wei& never investigated by any of the courts.
Even if the argument canvassed before us had been raised before
the High Court that could have gone into the matter and considered thle evidence on the record to find out when the demands were
made.
Our attention has been called to a registered notice having
been se:rved on the appellant by the respondent. -There is men·
tion of 1mch a notice in para 14 of the plaint. This notice, Ext.
10, was sent after October 6, 1953, its date being November 30.
1953. After giving the details necessary for showing the right of
pre-emption of the plaintiff it was stated that the demand had
already been made and that for the purpose of avoiding any dis~
pute before filing the suit for pre-emption the vendee was being
infonned that he should accept the amount of consideration and ·
give the property to the plaintiff. Mr. Chagla says that this notice
could hardly be regarded as a proper demand according to the
requirements of Mahomedan Law.·
The Mahomedan Law relating to demand before filing a suit
t'or pre~emption is of a highly technical nature. It is stated in the
Prindples of Mahomedan Law by Mulla, 16th Edn. that the talabi-mowasibat is spoken of as ·the first demand and the talab-i~ishad
as the second demand. The third demand consists of the institution
of the suit for pre-emption. Both the talabs are conditions precedent
to the exercise of the right of pre-emption. The first talab should
be made as soon as the fact of the sale is known to the claimant.
Any .unreasonable or unnecessary delay will be construed as an
election not to pre-empt. In some of the cases referred to a delay
of 24 hours or even 12 hours wa~ considered too long and it was
held that where there has been so much delay the pre-emptor was
not entitled to sustain his elaim for pre-emption. There are other
highly technical rules about the presence of witnesses and the
nature of evidence which they should give with regard to the second
dfimand, the view of the High Courts being conflicting in the
matter; (See pages 242, 243).
· _
It seems to us that a strict compliance with all the requirements
of the two demands which ~
necessary before a pre-emptor can
(1) .(1962] 2 s.c.R. 474.
. S:LJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 1 S.C.R .
.succeed in a suit for pre-emption under ·the Mahomedan Law 1;1Uly
become very difficult, particularlyj· on the .question of.the promptness and .avoidance of delay with regard to the first demand.
As
.stated before a sale shall . be ~~ed to .~ completed only after
_the sale deed has been copied in the books of the
Sub~Registrar.
If the demand has to be made after such completion it would be
virtually impossible. or at any rate extremely difficult for any preemptor to make the first demand as promptly as required under
the principles of Mahomedan Law. It cannot be expected that a
pre-emptor should keep a perpetual watch and go on making constant inquiries with regard to the point of time when the office of
the Sub-Registrar would copy out the sale deed in the prescribed
book.
However, that is a matter on which legislation tnay become
necessary and that is for the Parliament to consider and not for
us.
It would be abundantly clear from what has been stated above
that the question of demand has not been examined by any of the
courts keeping in view the law laid down by this Court and the
principles to which reference has been made.
Obviously it was the
appellant who was to blame for not agitating these matters at least
before the High Court.
The point whether the demands made
were premature or complied with the rules of Mahomedan Law
could only be determined by reference to the entire evidence and·
is not a pure question of law.
It is surprising that even in the
petition for special leave to this Court the points which Mr. Chagla
has raised were not canva~sed. In the Statement of the Case
only the matter was put in these ~ords:
"Further, the respondent could not claim pre-emption
as a co-sharer ( Shafi:.e-Sharik) he had not become owner
of the one fourth share in the eastern portion before
the sale deed in favour of the appellant.
The sale deed
in his favour was regist~red on the 17th August 1953,
some time after the, three sisters registered the deed in
favour of the appellant.
As held by this Hon'ble Court
in the case reported in 1962~2)SCR 474 the demand
made by the respondent at 4 or 5 p.m. on 17-8-1953 was
not valid".
Mr. Chagla, while fairly and properly admhting that all these
infirmities are present, has maintained that we should give a decision on the question of demand in the light of his argument · and
that the pre-emptor whose right is weak and is of a piratical nature
should not be allowed to succeed unless he satisfies the court that
he has strictly complied with the requirements of law relatin11 to
pre-emption. In our judgment adjudication of this matter whlch
is a mix·ed question of law and fact should have been invited from
the court~ below and in the absence of any such decision it will not
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MOHO. RAFIQ v. K. REHMAN (Grover, J.)
507
be just and proper for us, at this Stage, to allow the matter to be
re-opened and to entertain the contention of Mr. Chagla on the
Qu.-...stion of the invalidity of the demand or demands··made by the
~espondent before. filing the suit for pre-emption.
. Acco~~d~ ~
appeal arisip~ o~~. of ~e suit for .J>~·emption
fails and It 1S chsmissed. But tlie Parties wtll bear their own costS
thrOughout.
In the other appeal arising .out of the suit for specific perf~
mance it had been decided by the first appellate court that the·
preliminary condition specified in the agreement Ext. A-3 which·
had.~en ·executed by Mussama:t Chhoti Begum and her 3 11isters
in favour of the respondent about getting the premises-vacated from
the tenant had not been satisfied and therefore the agreement had
not lapsed.
Respondent No. 1 could have enforced that. agreement and the appellant had no right to bring ~ suit for specific per ..
formance against Chhoti Begum by virtue of the subsequent agree.;
ment dated August 11, 1953.
The suit for specific performance
was liable to be dismissed both on the ground that the respondent
had a right of,pre·emption and that the appellant could not enforce
the agreement dated August 11, 1953 in the presence of the earlier
agreement dated August 19, 1952. The High Court had affirmed
that view. On behalf of the appellant an attempt was made by
Shri M. C. Chagla to assail the above decision but we are unable
to find any error in the judgment of the first appellate court or die
High Court of a nature which wQuld justify interference by w.
therefore the appeal arising out of the suit for specific performance
also fails and it is dismissed.
In that appeal the parties will bear
their own costs in this Court.
S.C.
Appeals dismis~ed.