# SHEIKH GULFAN AND OTHERS v. SANAT KUMAR GANGULI

- **Citation:** [1965] 3 S.C.R. 364
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-03-15
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, M. HIDAYATULLAiH, V. Ramab Swami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sheikh-gulfan-and-others-v-sanat-kumar-ganguli-3496
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act (2 of 1949), s. 30(c)-If applies to land
in respecr of which betterment fee is levied.
The appellants were thika tenants under the respondent in respect
of the suit land. Under the Calcutta Improvement Trust Act, 1911, a
Rcheme had been framed for improvement of an area within which
the suit land was situate and the suit land was shown among the
pro!Jerties in regard to which betterment fees were proposed to be
levied. The respondent accepted the betterment fee assessed and
levied under s. 78A of the Act. Thereafter, he filed suits for the ejectment of the appellants. The suits were d'smissed as not maintainable,
because of s. 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, under which
an application for the ejectment of a thika tenant could be filed only
before the Controller under that Act, On appeal, it was held, that the
suits were governed by the provisions of s. 30(c) of the Thika Tenancy
Act, under·which, nothing in the Act applied to any land which was
required for carrying out any of the provis'ons of the Improvement
Trust Act, and therefore,· the appeals were allowed.
c
D
In the a n0eal to this Court by the tenants on the question "" to
E
whether s. 30(c) applied to the suits;
HELD: Bt'cause the land was liable to pay betterment fee and
tbe fee thus realised served the purPQSe of s. 122 of the Improvement
•rrust Act by swelling the funds of the Imorovement Trust Board and
"uch fm,d could be utilised by the Board for the purposes of carryjng
out the scheme, it cannot be said that the land itself was reauired for
F
carryini; out the provisions of the Improvement Trust Act. The requireJ'lent of s. 3G(cl of the Thika Tenancy Act could not be said to be
satisfied by such an indirect connection between the land and the
general purpose of the Improvement Trust Act. [378 A-BJ
•
In construing the words of a statute the context in whiCh the
words occur. the object of the statute in which the prov•ision is included and the policv underlying the statute assume relevance and
G
become material, [373 F]
In the instant case, the object of the Thika Tenancy Act to help
thika
is writ large in all the material provisions of the Act.
In construing s. 30, which provides for an exception to the applicability of beneficent legislation, if two constructions are reasonably
possible, the Court would be justified in preferring that construction
B
which helps to carry out the beneficent purpose of the Act and does
not undu ?y expand the area or the scope of the exception, that is, the
exception must be strictly construed. Under the section, it is the
land which must be reauired and not any fee or charges that may
be levied against it. Further. there must be a direct connection
between the land as such and the requirements of the provisions
of the Improvement Trust Act, and not with the policy of the provisions or the object which they are intended to achieve. In order
that s. 30(c) should be applicable, the respondent must point
A
B
c
I
D
E
F
G
H
SHEIKH GULF AN Q. SANAT KUMAR GA N'.JULI
0.J.)
365
.ou\ a specific provision of the Improvement Trust Act for the carrying out of which the land as such was required. S€ction 122 of that·
Act would not help the respondent, because, it would not be possible
to hold that for carrying out its provisions the land was directly
required. [376 f, 376 H-377 C, G: 378 HJ
Moreover, when s. 78A of the Improvement Trust Act, expressly
says that the land in respect of which betterment fee can be levied,
is not required for the scheme, the argument that such a land is,
nevertheless, required for carrying out the provision of s. 71:A, eannot
be accepted. (377 HJ
Betterment fee is levied against a land, because its value is increased as a result of the improvement scheme and the Board is
justified in recouping itself by such levy in respect of the unearned
increment in the value of the land, and, if the landholder pays the
fee, he may:apply under s. 25 of the Improvement Trust Act for an
enhance

## Text

_Characters 0–39,768 of 49,266. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39768 for what follows._

364
SHEIKH GULFAN AND OTHERS
v.
SANAT KUMAR GANGULI
March 15, 1965
A
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAiH AND V. RAMAB
SWAMI, JJ.J
Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act (2 of 1949), s. 30(c)-If applies to land
in respecr of which betterment fee is levied.
The appellants were thika tenants under the respondent in respect
of the suit land. Under the Calcutta Improvement Trust Act, 1911, a
Rcheme had been framed for improvement of an area within which
the suit land was situate and the suit land was shown among the
pro!Jerties in regard to which betterment fees were proposed to be
levied. The respondent accepted the betterment fee assessed and
levied under s. 78A of the Act. Thereafter, he filed suits for the ejectment of the appellants. The suits were d'smissed as not maintainable,
because of s. 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, under which
an application for the ejectment of a thika tenant could be filed only
before the Controller under that Act, On appeal, it was held, that the
suits were governed by the provisions of s. 30(c) of the Thika Tenancy
Act, under·which, nothing in the Act applied to any land which was
required for carrying out any of the provis'ons of the Improvement
Trust Act, and therefore,· the appeals were allowed.
c
D
In the a n0eal to this Court by the tenants on the question "" to
E
whether s. 30(c) applied to the suits;
HELD: Bt'cause the land was liable to pay betterment fee and
tbe fee thus realised served the purPQSe of s. 122 of the Improvement
•rrust Act by swelling the funds of the Imorovement Trust Board and
"uch fm,d could be utilised by the Board for the purposes of carryjng
out the scheme, it cannot be said that the land itself was reauired for
F
carryini; out the provisions of the Improvement Trust Act. The requireJ'lent of s. 3G(cl of the Thika Tenancy Act could not be said to be
satisfied by such an indirect connection between the land and the
general purpose of the Improvement Trust Act. [378 A-BJ
•
In construing the words of a statute the context in whiCh the
words occur. the object of the statute in which the prov•ision is included and the policv underlying the statute assume relevance and
G
become material, [373 F]
In the instant case, the object of the Thika Tenancy Act to help
thika
is writ large in all the material provisions of the Act.
In construing s. 30, which provides for an exception to the applicability of beneficent legislation, if two constructions are reasonably
possible, the Court would be justified in preferring that construction
B
which helps to carry out the beneficent purpose of the Act and does
not undu ?y expand the area or the scope of the exception, that is, the
exception must be strictly construed. Under the section, it is the
land which must be reauired and not any fee or charges that may
be levied against it. Further. there must be a direct connection
between the land as such and the requirements of the provisions
of the Improvement Trust Act, and not with the policy of the provisions or the object which they are intended to achieve. In order
that s. 30(c) should be applicable, the respondent must point
A
B
c
I
D
E
F
G
H
SHEIKH GULF AN Q. SANAT KUMAR GA N'.JULI
0.J.)
365
.ou\ a specific provision of the Improvement Trust Act for the carrying out of which the land as such was required. S€ction 122 of that·
Act would not help the respondent, because, it would not be possible
to hold that for carrying out its provisions the land was directly
required. [376 f, 376 H-377 C, G: 378 HJ
Moreover, when s. 78A of the Improvement Trust Act, expressly
says that the land in respect of which betterment fee can be levied,
is not required for the scheme, the argument that such a land is,
nevertheless, required for carrying out the provision of s. 71:A, eannot
be accepted. (377 HJ
Betterment fee is levied against a land, because its value is increased as a result of the improvement scheme and the Board is
justified in recouping itself by such levy in respect of the unearned
increment in the value of the land, and, if the landholder pays the
fee, he may:apply under s. 25 of the Improvement Trust Act for an
enhancement of the rent payable by .the tenants; but there is no
reason why such a landlord should get the additional benefit of
exemption from the aopl'cation of the provisions of the Thika Tenancy
Act. Clauses (a) and -(b) of s. 30 -Of that Act indicate that it is only
lands vested in Government or other special bodies or authorities that
are excepted from the application of the Act. The words used in cl.
(c) do not justify the conclusion that a orivate landholder is intended
to be equated with Government or with such other special bodies or
authorities. [378 C, D, FJ
Though lands acquired by the Board may be covered by s. 30(b)
(•iv), on the assumption that the Bo2'rd is a local authority, s. 30(c)
would not become redundant if it was held not to apply to the suit
land, because. there may still be some other lands which are net
acquired by the Board but which may. nevertheless. be required for
carrying out some provisions of the Improvement Trust Act, as for
example under ss. 35C and 42 of that Act. Or, the legislature might
have made, by way of abundant caution, a S!"'Cific provision in respect
of lands which are acquired by the Board as well as those which
would be required for the pmoose of carrying out the provisions of
the Improvement Trust Act. (379 D-H]
'
CIVIL AFPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 48 to 53
of 1963.
Appeals from the judgment and decrees dated May 3, 1960, of
the Calcutta High Court in Appeals Nos. 215, 67, 82 & 216 of 1958.
W. S. Bar/ingay, S. S. Khanduja and Ganpat .Rai, for the appellants (in all the appeals).
.. -
••
G. S. Pathak and D. N. Mukherjee; for the respondent (in all
the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Gajendragadkar, C.J. The s.hort question which these six ap.
peals raise relates to the construction of section 30(c) of the Calcutta
Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 (W.B. Act No. II of 1949) (hereinafter
.called 'the Acf). This question arises in tliis way. The respondent
Sanat Kumar Ganguli is the owner of a plot of land being premises
No. 12, Haldar Lane, in Central Calcutta This plot had been let
out in several lots to the predecessors-in-title of the six appellants.
366
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 3 s.c.B.
On July 24, 1954, the respondent filed six suits-Nos. 2240 to 2245
of 1954 against the six appellants respectively on the original side
of the Calcutta High Court, claiming decrees for
against
them and asking for arrears of ground rent and Municipal taxes.
The appellants contested the respondent's claim on the ground
that the lands in suits had been taken by their predecessors-in-title
from the owner 11s Thika tenants in or about the year 1900, and
they alleged that they were in occupation of the said plots after
having built substantial structures on them. The appellants further
claimed that they had themselves let out po_rtions of such structures
to their own tenants. On these allegations, a preliminary objection
to the competence of the suits was raised by the appellants on the
grounp that under s. 5 of the Act, claim for ejectment of Thika
tenants can be entertained only by the Controller, and so, the
learned Judge on the original side of the Calcutta High Court had
no jurisdiction to entertain it.
The respondent admitted that the appellants were Thika
tenants and did not dispute that normally, a claim for ejecting such
Thika tenants could be tried only by "the Controller; but he urged
that the present suits fell within the scope of s. 30(c) of the Act and
in consequence, the provisions of s. 5 and indeed, all other relevant
provisions of the Act did not apply to them. That is how the respondent sought to meet the preliminary objection raised by the
appellants.
In appreciating the nature of the controversy thus raised by
the pleadings, it is necessary to mention some more facts. On
February 9, 1940 a notice was issued by the Chairman of the Calcutta Improvement Trust under s. 43 of the Calcutta Improvement
Act, 1911 (Bengal Act V of 1911) as amended up to 1931. This Act
will hereafter be called 'the Improvement Act'. This notice shows
that a scheme bearing No. 53 had been framed for the purpose of
improvement of Calcutta by a street scheme in Ward No. JO of the
Calcutta Municipality for an area the boundaries whereof were
described in the said notice. This notice gave the particulars of the
scheme and was accompanied by a map of the area comprised in
the scheme. It also contained the statement of the land which it
was proposed to acquire as well as land on which betterment fee
was proposed to be levied. These plans were open for inspection
at the office of the Trust at No. 5, Clive Street, Calcutta. Along with
this notice, another notice was published which gave a list of properties proposed to be acquired under the scheme and contained a
statement of the land in regard to which betterment fees were proposed to be levied. Premises No. 12, Haldar Lane, were included
in the latter category of lands.
In July 1952, proceedings were started for settling .the betterment fee to be levied in respect of premises No. 12, Haldar Lane,
and a lett;r was addressed by the Chief Valuer of the Calcutta
A
B
0
D
E
G
B
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SHEIKH GULFAN v. SANAT KUMAR GANGULI (Gajendragadkar, O.J.)
367
Improvement Trust to the respondent on November 19, 1952. This
letter shows that the Chief Valuer had not received a reply from
the respondent, though his advocate had accepted the assessment of
betterment fee of Rs. 15,000 in the Land Committee meeting which
had been held on August 7, 1952 and confirmed by the Board on
August 30, 1952. On November 19, 1952, however, the respondent
recorded in writing that he accepted the said assessment.
The respondent's case before the learned trial Judge was that
since betterment fee had been levied by the Board in respect of the
suit premises and had been accepted by him, s. 30(c) of the Act
applied to the present suits. Section 30{c) provides that "nothing in
the Act shall apply to any land which is required for carrying out
any of the provisions of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911." That
is how the respondent sought to repel the application of s. 5 of the
Act and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Controller to deal with
ejectment proceedings -in respect of thika tenants' holdings. The
learned trial Judge held that the plots constituting the land in the
six respective suits did not attract the provisions of s. 30(c) of the
Act, and so, he upheld the preliminary objection raised by the
appellants and came to the conclusion that the suits filed by the
respondent on the original side of the Calcutta High Court -.vere
incompetent and could not be entertained. In the result, the said
suits were ordered to be dismissed with costs.
The respondent challenged these decrees by preferring six
appeals before a Division Bench of the High Court. The learned
Judges who heard these appeals have delivered separate, but concurring, judgments and have upheld the respondent's argument that
the land in suits attracted the provisions of s. 30(c) of the Act, with
the result that the preliminary objection raised by the _appellants
has been rejected. Once the preliminary objection was rejected, it
was plain that no other point survived, because the appellants had
no defence to make on the merits of the respondent's claim. That is
why the appeals were allowed and decrees, for possession were passed in favour of the respondent. The claim made by the respondent in
respect of arrears of ground rent and municipal taxes was t1lso
allowed. It is against these decrees that the appellants have come to
this Court with certificates granted by the High Court; and so, the
only question which arises for our decision is whether the Division
Bench was right in holding that s. 30{c) of the Act applied to the
present suits. The answer to this question depends on a fair construction of the provision prescribed by s. 30{c).
Before dealing with this question, it is necessary to refer to the
material provisions of the Act. The Act was passed in 1949 with
the object of making better provision relating to the Jaw of landlord
and tenant in respect of thika tenancies in Calcutta. Section 2(5) in
Chapter I defines a "thika tenant" as meaning any person who
holds, whether under a written lease or otherwise, land under
another person, and is or but for a special contract would be liable
368
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 3 s.0.11.
to pay rent, at a monthly or at any other periodical rate, for that
land to that another person and has erected or acquired by purchase
or gift any structure on such land for a residential, manufacturing
or business purpose and includes the successors in interest of such
person. Sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of this definition exclude from
its purview certain other categories of persons, but we are not concerned with these categories Gf persons in the present appeals. It is
common ground that the appellants are thika tenants in respect of
the plots in their possession.
Chapter II of the Act deals with incidents of thika tenancies.
Broadly stated, the object of the Act is to afford special protectian
to the thika tenants and several provisions have been enacted by
the Act to carry out this object. Section 3 specifies the grounds on
which alone a thika tenant may be evicted. Section 4 prescribes a
notice before ejectment proceedings can be taken against a thika
tenant; and s. 5 provides for proceedings for ejectment. The important feature of the provisions contained in s. 5(1) is that the
application for ejectment of a thika tenant has to be made to the
Controller in the prescribed manner. The "controller" is defined
bys. 2(2) as meaning an officer appointed as such by the State
Go!ernment for an area to which the Act extends and includes
officers of another category therein described. The remaining provisions of Ch. II deal with the procedure which has to be followed
by the Controller in dealing with applications for ejectment of
thika tenants and make other incidental provisions in that behalf.
· The policy of the Act to afford protection to the thika tenants is
writ large in all these provisions.
Chapter III contains provisions as to rent of thika tenancies.
Chapter IV deals with appeals and certain special procedures. Section 27(1), for instance, provides for appeals to the Chief Judge of
the Court of Small Causes of Calcutta and District Judge respectively under clauses (a) and (b). Section 27(6) provides that an order
made under sub-s. (4) by the Chief Judge or the District Judge or a
person appointed under sub-s. (2), as the case may be, or, subject to
such order, if any, an order made by the Controller under this Act
shall, subject to the provisions of sub-s. (5) be final and may be
executed by the Controller in the manner provided in the Code of
Civil Procedure for the execution of decrees. It is thus clear that
the Act has made special provisions for the enforcement of the
rights and liabilities of the thika tenants, has constituted hierarchy
of special authorities to deal with claims made by landlords against
their thika tenants, either in the first instance or at the appellate
stage. The decisions of these special authorities which become final
are assimilated to decrees passed under the Code of Civil Procedure
and can be executed in the manner prescribed by 0.21 of the Code.
Section 31 provides that restriction or exclusion of the Act by
agreement between a landlord and a thika tenant will be invalid,
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SHEIKH GULFANV. SANAT KUMAI\ GANGuLI {Gajendragadkar, 0.J.)
369
and will not affect the rights conferred on the thika tenants by the
provisions of the Act. It is in the light of these provisions that we
have to construe s. 30 of the Act.
Section 30 reads thus: -
"Nothing in this Act shall apply to-
(a) Government lands,
(bl any land vested in or in the possession of-
(i) the State Government,
(ii) a port authority of a major port, or
(iii) a railway administration, or
(iv) a local authority, or
(c) any land which is required for carrying out any of the
provisions of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 191 l.''
The perusal of s. 30 clearly shows that the provisions of the
Act are excluded in regard to lands specified in clauses (a), (b) and
(c), 50 that claims made for ejectment of thika tenants from these
lands will not be governed by the provisions of the Act and can be
made and entertained in ordinary civil courts of competent jurisdiction. The question which we have to consider in the present appeals
is whether the land which is the subject-matter of the sh suits is
land which is required for carrying out any of the provisions of the
Improvement Act.
That takes JS to the relevant provisions of the Improvement
Act itself. The Improvement Act was passed in 1911 and has been
amended from time to time. Let us consider broadly the material
provisions of this Act, as they stood prior to the amendment of
1955, which would assist us in construing s. 30(c) of the Act. This
Act was passed, because it was thought expedient to make provision for the improvement and expansion of Calcutta by opening up
congested areas, laying out or altering streets, providing open
spaces for purposes of ventilation or recreation, demolishing or
constructing buildings, acquiring land for the said purposes i.nd for
the re,housing of persons of the poorer and working classes displaced by the execution of improvement schemes, and otherwise as
hereinafter appearing. It was further thought expedient to constitute
a Board of Trustees and invest it with special powers for carrying
out the objects of this Act. Section 2(1a) of this Act defines a
"betterment fee" as the fee prescribed by s. 78A in respect of an
increase in value of land resulting· from the execution of an im·
provement scheme. Chapter III of this Act deals with
schemes and re-housing schemes. Section 36 provides when general
improvement schemes may be framed. It is only where the conditions specified by clauses (a) & (b) of s. 36 are satisfied that general
schemes can be framed. Under this section, the Board has to pass
37()
COURT REPORTS
[1965] 3 s.o.B.
a resolution to the effect that the general improvement scheme
should be framed on the ground that the area comprised in the
scheme is an unhealthy area and that it was necessary to frame a
general improvement scheme in respect of.Jmch area. Section 40
with matters which· have to be considered while framing improvement schemes. It provides that when framing an· improvement
scheme in respect of any area, regard shall be had to-
(a) the nature and the conditions of neighbouring areas
and of Calcutta as a whole;
(b) the several directions in which the expansion of Calcutta appears likely to take place; and
(c) the likelihood of improvement schemes being required for other parts of Calcutta. ·
Section 41 deals with matters which must be provided for in improvement schemes; it reads thus: ._c_
"Every improvement scheme shall provide for-
(a) the acquisition by the Board of any land, in the area
comprised in the scheme, which will, in their opinion
be required for the execution of the scheme;
(bl the laying out or re-laying out of the land in the said
area;
(c) such demolition, alteration or reconstruction of buildings, situated on land which it is proposed to acquire
in the said area, as the Board may think necessary;
(d) the construction of any buildings which . the Board
may consider it necessary to erect for any purpose
other than sale or hire;
·
(e) the laying out or alteration of streets (including
bridges, causeways and culverts), if required; nnd
(f) the levelling, paving, metalling, flagging, channelling,
sewering and draining of the said streets, and the
provision therein of water, lighting and other sanitary
conveniences ordinarily provided in a Municipality."
Section 42 deals with matters which may be provided for in dealing
with improvement schemes. It is necessary to read this section as
well:-
"Any improvement scheme may provide
(a) the acquisition by the Board of any land, in the area
comprised in the scheme, which will, in their opinion,
be affected by the execution of the scheme;
(b) raising, lowering or levelling any land in the area
comprised in the scheme;
A
B
c
D
B
J
G
H
A
B
0
D
E
F
G
H
SHEIKH GULFANV. SANAT KUMAR GANGULI (Gajendragadkar, G.J.)
371
(c) the formation or retention of open spaces; and
(d) any other matters, consistent with this Act, which the
Board may think lit"
Under s. 47, the Board is required to consider objections, representations and statements of dissent received under the relevant provisions of sections 43, 44 and 45; and it provides that as a consequence of considering' the said objections, representations and
statements of dissent, the Board may either abandon the scheme
or apply to the State Government for sanction to the scheme, with
such modifications, if any, as the Board may consider necessary.
Section 47(2)(e) lays down that every application submitted under
sub-s. (1) shall be accompanied by a list of the names of all persons,
if any, who have dissented, under s. 45, clause (bl, from the proposed
acquisition of their land or from the proposed recovery of a betterment fee, and a statement of the reasons given for such dissent. The
rest of the Chapter deals with the subsequent stages of the framing
of the improvement schemes to which it is unnecessary to refer.
Chapter IV deals with acquisition and disposal of land. Three
sections out of this Chapter are relevant for our purpose. Section
78 deals with the abanuonment of acquisition in consideration of
special payment. Section 78(1) is relevant; it reads thus:-
"In any case in which the State Government has sanctioned the acquisition of land, in any area comprised in an
improvement scheme, which is not required for the execution of the scheme, the owner of the land, or any person
having an interest therein, may make an application to
the Board, requesting that the acquisition of the land
should be abandoned in consideration of the payment by
him of a sum to be fixed by the Board in that behalf."
The other sub-sections of s. 78 lay down a procedure for dealing with applications made under sub-s. (1). With the details of
these provisions we are not concerned. The only point which is
relevant for our purpose is that an application for abandonment
can be made in respect of land which is not required for the execution of the scheme. In other words, if it appears that the piece of
land which is comprised in the scheme already sanctioned by the
Government is in fact not required for the execution of the scheme,
an application may be made for abandonment of acquisition in respect of such a land. The basis for making such an application is that
though the land was comprised in the scheme, it is found that it is
not required for the execution of the scheme
That takes us to s. 78A which has a bearing on the construction
of s. 30(c) of the Act. Section 78A(l) is material for our purpose; it
reads thus: -
"When by the making of any improvement scheme,
any land in the area comprised in the scheme which is not
L/B(N)3SCl-U
372
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 3 s.c.11.
required for the execution thereof will, in the opinion of
the Board, be increased in value, the Board, in framing
the scheme, may in lieu of providing for the acquisition
of such land, declare that a betterment fee shall be payable by the owner of the land or any person having an
interest therein in respect of the increase in value of the
land resulting from the execution of the scheme."
Section 78A(2) provides for the determination and calculation of
the betterment fee.
The last section in this Chapter ,is s. 81. It confers power on
the Board to dispose of land vested in or acquired by them under
this Act. Section 81 (1) lays down that the Board may retain, or
may let on hire, lease, sell, exchange or otherwise dispose of any
land vested in or acquired by them under this Act. How this power
can be exercised is specified by sub-sections (2) and (3) of s. 81.
Before we part with the Improvement Act, it would be useful
to mention that sections 120 to 126 which occur in Ch. VI of this
Act deal with the accounts of the Board. Section 122 provides for .
credits to capital account and lays down, inter a/ia, that all sums,
except interest, received by way of special payments for betterment
fees in-'pursuance of sections 78, 78A or 79, shall be credited to the
capital account. Section 123 deals with the question of the application of the capital account, and it proceeds on the basis that the
moneys credited to the capital account .shall be held by the Board
in trust, and by clauses (a) to (h), it specifies the objects or purposes
for which the said amount can be applied. Section 124 refers to
items which have to be included in the revenue account; and s. 125
requires that like the moneys credited to the capital account, those
credited to the revenue account must also be held by the Board in
trust, and the same shall be applied for the purposes specified in
clauses (a) to (g) of s. 125(1).
Let us now revert to the question about the construction of
s. 30(c) of the Act. Before answering this question, we would like
to recall the material facts which are not in dispute: The land in
question has been included in the boundaries of the area comprised
in the scheme. After the Board framed scheme No. 53, it has issued
a notice under s. 43(1) of the Improvement Act, and. as required
by s. 43(7)(b), while mentioning the boundaries of the area comprised in the scheme, it has clearly been shown that the land in
question is comprised in the said scheme. In respect of this land,
proceedings have been taken under s. 78A of the Improvement Act
and betterment fee has been levied and accepted.
Mr. Pathak for the respondent contends that as soon as it is
shown that the land in question was comprised in the scheme and
in respect of it betterment fee has been levied and accepted, s. 30(cl
of the Act is attracted. His argument is that such a land is required
for carrying out the provisions of the Improvement Act. On the
'
A
ll
c
D
F
G
JI
A
B
a
D
E
F
G
H
SHEIKH GULF AN v. SANAT IWMAR GANGULI (Gajendragadkar, O.J.)
373
other hand, Dr. Barlinge contends that the land in respect of which
betterment fee has been levied cannot be said to be required for
carrying out any provisions of the Improvement Act, though it may
be that the betterment fee would assist the Board in discharging its
functions under the Improvement Act. In deciding the merits of
these competing claims, it is necessary to remember that the dispute
in the present proceedings is not between the Board on the one
hand and the landlord or the thika tenant on the other; the dispute
is between the landlord and the thika tenants, and in the decision
of this dispute, the Board is not interested. Whatever be the decision of the Court in the present dispute will not affect the Board in
the discharge of its duties and functions and will have no impact
on the scheme as such.
The words used in s. 30(c) of the Act are, in a sense, simple
enough; but it must be conceded that the problem of their construction is not very easy, and so, we might attempt to resolve this problem by considering what our approach should be in construing the
relevant provision. Normally, the words used in a statute have to
be construed in their ordinary meaning; but in many cases, judicial
approach finds that the simple device of adopting the ordinary
meaning of words does not meet the ends 6r a fair and a reasonable
construction. Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of
words may not necessarily assist a proper construction of the statutory provision in which the words occur. Often enough, in inter·
preting a statutory provision, it becomes necessary to haw regard
to the subject-matter of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve. That is why in deciding the true scope and effect of
the relevant words in any statutory provision, the context in which
the words occur, the object of the statute in which the provision is
included, and the policy underlying the statute assume relevance
and become material. As Halsbury has observed, the words "should
be construed in the light of their context rather than what may be
either strict etymological sense or their popular meaning apart from
that context(')". This position is not disputed before us by either
party.
There has, however, been a sharp controversy before us on
the question as to what is the context to which recourse should be
had in interpreting section 30(c). Mr. Pathak contends that in
construing s. 30(c) of the Act, the key words are "required for
carrying out any of the provisions of the Improvement Act", and
he has urged that the task of interpretation of this key clause should
ne attempted by having regard to the context, the object and the
policy of the Improvement Act. In interpreting this clause, the court
should ask itself: what is the purpose of the provisions of the Improvement Act which the land is required to serve, before s. 30(cl
of the Act can be invoked? And in finding an answer to this question, the court must bear in mind the historical evolution of the legal
(1) Haiabury's Lows of England Vol. 36, p. 394, para 593.
374
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
trn6UJ a s.c.B.
pnnciples relating to the powers
functions of Improvement
Boards. In this connection Mr. Pathak has rehed on the oecis10n of
the House of Lords in R. H. Galloway v. 1 he Mayor and Commonalty of London('). ln that case a contrast was drawn between
the special powers conferred on persons by Parliament for etiecting
a particular purp0se, and those comened on the Mayor and Colllmonalty of tne City of London to maKe certain public iinprovcments tn the City. 1t was held that where a company was authorised
to take compulsorily the lands of any person for a detinite object,
it wouJd be restrained by in1uncllon trom ahy attempt to take them
for any other object. On the other hand, where the Mayor and
Commonalty of the City of London had been entrusted with powers
to make certain public unprovements in the City, and for that purpose had been authori>ed compuisorily to take land, to raise money
on the credit of it, and to sell superfiucus land to pay off the debt,
the Act which gave them those powers did· not expressly con1er on
the authonties to acquire more Jand than was absolutely necessary
to effect the des!Ied lIIlprovements; nevertheiess the mateiial provisions of the said Act ought to be construed tavourably to them, and
ought to be interpreted to confer on them the power to take lands
'·for the purposes of the Act'', even though they may not be absolutely necessary for the improvement scneme as such. ln other
words, this decision shows that where the Board .is entrusted with
the work of improving the City and is constituted for that purpose
by a statute, its power to acquire lands for the purpose of the inlprovement scheme would include the power to acquire a land which
is comprised in the scheme, though it may not be absolutely necessary for the scheme as such; and in such a case, it would be competent to the Board first to acquire the land and then· to dispose of it,
thereby putting itself in possession of the necessary funds io discharge its functions and obligations.
The same principle has been emphasised by the Privy Councii
in the Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta v. Chandra Kanta
Ghosh('). We have already referred toss. 41 and 42 of lhe Improvement Act. Section 41 enumerates matters which must be provided
for in the improvement schemes, whereas s. 42 deals with matters
which may be provided for in the improvement schemes. Section
42(a) lays down that any improvement scheme may provide for the
acquisition by the Board of any land, in the area comprised in the
scheme, which will, in their opinion, be affected by the execution of
the scheme. The question whic)l arose before the Privy Council in
the case of the Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta(') was
whether under s. 42(a), it was competent to the Board to acquire,
for the purpose of recoupment, land which is not required for the
execution of the scheme, but the trustees are of opinion that the said
land would, by virtue of the scheme, be increased in value. The
(') [1866] 1 Eng & Ir A.C. 34.
(1) [1919] L.R. 47 I.A. 45.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
II
A
B
0
n
E
F
G
n
Sl!EIKH GULFANV. SANATKUMA!t GAXGl'LI (Gajendragadkar, C.J.)
375
decision of this question depended, inter alia, on the meaning of the
word "affected" used in s. 42(a). The argument which was urged
before the Privy Council was that in order that land can be acquired
by the Beard under s. 42(a), it must appear that the land falls in
the area comprise::! in the scheme and would be affected by the
execution of the scheme. If the land does not become a part of the
scheme itself but remains outside the scheme, it cannot be said to
be affected by the scheme; and so, the Board may have no power
to acquire it avowedly for the purpose of securing reccupment
money. The Privy Council rejected this contention and held that
the Board was empowered to acquire land which is comprised in
the scheme and would be competent to sell it and thereby raise
funds if It is satisfied that the value of the land will be enhanced by
virtue of the scheme. "There would appear to be nothing". said Lord
Parmoor speaking for the Board, "either in the general scheme of
the Act or in the special context which is inconsistent with giving
the word "affected" its ordinary and normal sense; but it was suggested in the argument on behalf of the respondent that the Act
did not authorise the Board to acquire land unless it was either
physically ·affected· by the execution of the scheme, or injuriously
affected, whether by severance or in some other manner" (p. 54).
In rejecting this argument, Lord Parmoor observed that "in the
opinion of their Lordships, none of the suggested limitations to the
usual and normal meaning of the word "affected" in s. 42 are admissible, and that there is no reason, either in the general purpose
of the Act or the special context, that the word should not be
construed in its ordinary sense, and that, as so construed, s. 42
.. uthorises the acquisition of the land of the respondent, which was
inserted in the scheme, because in the opinion of the Board, it
would be enhanced in value by its execution". Section 78 and s. 78A
which has been inserted in the Improvement Act in 1931, in a sense
give statutory recognition to the principle evolved by the l'rivy
Council while interpreting s. 42 of the Improvement Act.
Basing himself on this aspect of the matter, Mr. Pathak contends that where a land is comprised in the improvement scheme
originally notified and betterment fee is levied later in respect of it
under s. 78A, the Board can be deemed to have taken two steps; it
may be said that the Board acquired the land and later, sold it to the
owner on the terms and conditions authorised bys. 78A. In other
words, the argument is that the levy of batterment fee is another
way of bringing the land within the purview of the improvement
scheme and it is, in fact. an alternative way of acquiring it. If that
is so, s. 30(c) which obviously includes lands acquired for the purposes of the scheme, cannot be said to exclude land which iS not
directly acquired, but is indirectly placed in the same category of
lands, because recovery of the recoupment fee is one way of acquiring the land. It is on these grounds that Mr. Pathak has strenuously
contended that the key clause in s. 30(c) should receive a liberal
/376
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 3 s.c.R.
construction and the land in question in the present proceedings
A
should be held to be required for carrying out the relevant provisions of the Improvement Act.
On the other hand, Dr. Balinge has emphasised the fact that
the section which we are construing occurs in the Thika Tenancy
Act and it is the context of this Act as well as the object which it
B
seeks to achieve that are relevant and material. 'There is no doubt
that the provisions of the Act are intended to serve the purpose of
social justice. The Legislature realised that the relations between
the landlord and the tenants in respect of holdings let out to thika
tenants under the Act needed to be regulated by statute and it
thought that thika tenants deserved some special protection. The
C
Act is thus aJ measure which can be described as soaial welfare
measure, and
the argument is that s. 30 which provides
for an exception to the material provisions of the Act, shoud
be strictly construed, so that the beneficent purpose of the Act
should not be unduly narrowed down or restricted. In construing
s. 30(e), it would, therefore, be relevant to remember whether it
D
could not have been the intention of the Legislature to permit a
private land-holder whose land has not been acquired and does not
form part of the improvement scheme, to claim immunity from the
application of the relevant provisions of the Act which give protection to the thika tenants; and sa, Dr. Barlinge's contention
is that it would be unreasonable to introduce a liberal approach
E
in construing the clause "required for carrying out any of the provisions of the Improvement Act" as suggested by Mr. Pathak.
In our opinion, while construing s. 30(c) it would be necessary
to bear in mind the context of the Act in which the section occurs.
We have already noticed the broad features of the Act. and .the
F
object of the Act to help the thika tenants is writ large in all the
. material provisions. In the case of such a statute, if an exception is
provided, the provision prescribing the exception and creating
a bar to the application of the Aat to certain cases must,
we think, be strictly comtrued. Take the other clauses of s. 30; they
clearly indicate that it is only lands vested in· Government or other
G:
special bodies or authorities that are excepted from the application
of the Act. Prima facie, it is not easy to assume that a privHte landholder like the respondent would be within the protection of s. 30,
because there is no consideration in his case, as in the case of other
authorities or bodies covered by clauses (a) and (b) of s. 30, which
would justify the exclusion of the Act to his case. That is one aspect'
H
of the matter which we cannot ignore.
That takes us to the crux of the problem : can the land in
question be said to be required for carrying out any of the provisions of the Improvement Act? It is significant that it is the land
which must be required, and not any fee or charges that may be
levied against it. What s. 30(c) of the Act seems to require is direct
A
B
c
D
:r:
F
G
H
SHEIKH GULF AN v. SAN AT KUMAR GANGULI (Gajendragadkar, O.J.)
377
connection between the Ja"nd as such and the requirements of the
provisions of the Improvement Act. The other ingredient of s. 30(c)
is that the land must be required for carrying out the provisions of
the Improvement Act. In the context, this second ingredient of the
section seems to suggest that the land must be necessary for carrying out the provisions as such of the Improvement Act; in other
words, we should be able to say about the land in question that it
was necessary for carrying out a particular provision of the Improvement
Act.
The
third and
the last
ingredient of s.
30(c) is that the necessity must be established for carrying out
the provisions of the Improvement Act and not the policy of the
said provisions or the object which they are intended to achieve.
Having regard to these ingredients of s.