# SHEODHAN SINGH v. MOHAN LAL GAUTAM

- **Citation:** [1969] 3 S.C.R. 417
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-01-24
- **Bench:** Suoo, R. S. Bachawat, K. S. Hegde
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sheodhan-singh-v-mohan-lal-gautam-4879
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Election petition-Whether abates on di.vsolution of legislature-Pre ..
sentation by Advocate's clerk in petitioner's pr~sence ·-If proper presenta.
tion.
The responoent's election to the
U.P.
Legislative
Assembly
in
February, 1967, was challenged by the appdlant in an election petitioli
on various grounds including allegations of corrupt practices.
The respondent raised two preliminary objections before the High Court namely,
(i) the petition was not maintainable as it was not properly presented; and
(ii) the petition ceased to be maintainable as a result of dissolution of the
U.P. Legislative Assembly by virtue of the
President's proclamation of
April 15, 1968, under article 356 (I) of the Constitution issued during
the pendency of the election petition before the High Court. These preliminary objections were rejected by the High Court, which also dismissed
the petition on the merits.
On an appeal to this Court,
HELD : (i) The High Court was right in holding that the requirements of law as to the presentation of a petition were fully satisfied as
the electrnn petition was presented to the Registry by an Advocate's Clerk
in the presence of the petitioner. The petitioner in substance, though not
in form, himself presented the petition. (ii) There was no force in the
contention that the petition had become infructuous in view of the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly. [418H]
The question for consideration was not only the validity of the election
but aloo the allegation of corrupt practices which, if established, would
involve the respondent incurring certain electoral disqualifications.
It is clear from the provisions of Chapters III and IV. of Part VI of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951, that the contest in an elccilion
petition ts realty between the constituency and the person or persons complained of.
Onoe the machinery of the Act is moved by a candidate or
an elector, the carriage of the case does not entirely rest with the petitioner.
~fhe reason for these provisions is to ensure to the extent possible
that the persons who offend the election law, are not allowed to avoid
the con.sequences of their misdeeds.
[421G]
The law relating lo withdrawal and abatement of election petitions is
exhaustively dealt with in Chapter IV of Part VI of the Act. In deciding
whether a petition has abated or not it was not possible to travel outside
the provisions contained in that Chapter. The Act does not provide for
the abatement of an election petition either when the returned candidate
whose election is challenged resigns or when the assembly is dissolved.
[4210]
Carter and Anr. v. Mills 9, Common Pleas p. 117; distinguished; Ghasi
Ram v. Dal Singh and Others (1%8) 3 S.C.R. 102: followed,
(iii) On the facts, the High Court had rightly dismissed the petition.
417
418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 $.C.R.
Civ1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1564 of
A
1968.
Appeal under s. 116-Ai of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated May 23, 1968 of
the Allahabad High Court in Election Petition No. 40 of 1967.
Danial Latifi, S. J. Hyder, Rajindra Singh and M. I. Khowaja,
for the appellant.
Veda Vyasa, K. K. Jain, H.K. Puri, G. N. Dikshit, R. N. Dik·
shit, S. N. Sinha, K. C. Sharma and M. K. Garg, for the respon·
dent.

## Text

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SHEODHAN SINGH
v.
MOHAN LAL GAUTAM
January 24, 1969
(S. M, Suoo, R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]
Election petition-Whether abates on di.vsolution of legislature-Pre ..
sentation by Advocate's clerk in petitioner's pr~sence ·-If proper presenta.
tion.
The responoent's election to the
U.P.
Legislative
Assembly
in
February, 1967, was challenged by the appdlant in an election petitioli
on various grounds including allegations of corrupt practices.
The respondent raised two preliminary objections before the High Court namely,
(i) the petition was not maintainable as it was not properly presented; and
(ii) the petition ceased to be maintainable as a result of dissolution of the
U.P. Legislative Assembly by virtue of the
President's proclamation of
April 15, 1968, under article 356 (I) of the Constitution issued during
the pendency of the election petition before the High Court. These preliminary objections were rejected by the High Court, which also dismissed
the petition on the merits.
On an appeal to this Court,
HELD : (i) The High Court was right in holding that the requirements of law as to the presentation of a petition were fully satisfied as
the electrnn petition was presented to the Registry by an Advocate's Clerk
in the presence of the petitioner. The petitioner in substance, though not
in form, himself presented the petition. (ii) There was no force in the
contention that the petition had become infructuous in view of the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly. [418H]
The question for consideration was not only the validity of the election
but aloo the allegation of corrupt practices which, if established, would
involve the respondent incurring certain electoral disqualifications.
It is clear from the provisions of Chapters III and IV. of Part VI of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951, that the contest in an elccilion
petition ts realty between the constituency and the person or persons complained of.
Onoe the machinery of the Act is moved by a candidate or
an elector, the carriage of the case does not entirely rest with the petitioner.
~fhe reason for these provisions is to ensure to the extent possible
that the persons who offend the election law, are not allowed to avoid
the con.sequences of their misdeeds.
[421G]
The law relating lo withdrawal and abatement of election petitions is
exhaustively dealt with in Chapter IV of Part VI of the Act. In deciding
whether a petition has abated or not it was not possible to travel outside
the provisions contained in that Chapter. The Act does not provide for
the abatement of an election petition either when the returned candidate
whose election is challenged resigns or when the assembly is dissolved.
[4210]
Carter and Anr. v. Mills 9, Common Pleas p. 117; distinguished; Ghasi
Ram v. Dal Singh and Others (1%8) 3 S.C.R. 102: followed,
(iii) On the facts, the High Court had rightly dismissed the petition.
417
418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 $.C.R.
Civ1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1564 of
A
1968.
Appeal under s. 116-Ai of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated May 23, 1968 of
the Allahabad High Court in Election Petition No. 40 of 1967.
Danial Latifi, S. J. Hyder, Rajindra Singh and M. I. Khowaja,
for the appellant.
Veda Vyasa, K. K. Jain, H.K. Puri, G. N. Dikshit, R. N. Dik·
shit, S. N. Sinha, K. C. Sharma and M. K. Garg, for the respon·
dent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hegdc, J.
This appeal under s. ll 6A of the Representation
of the People A~t, 1951 arises from the decision in Election Petition No. 40 of 1967 on the file of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad. In that petition the appellant challenged the election
of the respondent to the U.P. Legislative Assembly from lglas
Constituency in the general election held in February 1967. In
that election the appe!lant, the respondent and four others contested. The respondent secured 10,705 votes more than the
appellant.
Other candidates secured Jess votes than the appellant. The appellant challenged the election of the respondent on
various grounds, most of which were given up either in the trial
court or in this Court. The High Court dismissed the election
petition. Against that order the appellant has come up in appeal.
Before going into the merits of the appeal, it is necessary to
deal with the preliminary objections to the appeal, taken by the
respondent.
The first objection taken was that the petition was
not maintainable as it was not properly presented. The second
objection was that the petition ceased to be maintainable as a result of the dissolution of the U.P. Legislative Assembly as per the
President's Proclamation of April 15, 1968 under Art. 356(1)
of the Constitution. That Proclamation was issued during the
pendency of this election petition before the High Court.
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The High Court rejected both those contentions but those contentions were again pressed for acceptance at the hearing of this
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appeal.
The High Court has found as a fact that the election petition
was presented to the registry by an advocate's clerk in the immediate presence of the petitioner. Therefore, in substance though
not in form, it was presented by the petitioner himself. Hence the
requirement of the law was fully satisfied.
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We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Veda Vyasa,
learned Counsel for the respondent that the petition must be held
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SHEODHAN SINGH V. MOHAN LAL (Hegde, I.)
419
to have become infructuous in view of the dissolution of the
assembly.
In this proceeding we are considering the validity of
the election of the respondent and not whether he is continuing as
a member. If the contention of the appellant that the respondent
was guilty of corrupt practices during the election is found to be
true then not only his election will be declared void, he is also
liable to incur certain electoral disqualifications.
The purity of
elections is of utmost importance in a democratic set-up. No one
can be allowed to corrupt the course of an election and get away
with it either by resigning his membership or because of the fortuitous circumstance of the assembly having beeu dissolved.
The
public are interested in seeing that those who had corrupted the
course of an election are dealt with in accordance with law. That
purpose will stand defeated if we accept the contention of Mr.
Veda Vyasa.
The election petitions in this country are solely regulated by
statutory provisions. Hence unless it is shown that some statutory
provision directly or by necessary implication prescribes that the
pending election petitions stand abated because of the dissolutton
of the Assembly, the contention of the respondent cannot be
accepted.
Section 80 provides that no election shall be called in question
except by an election petition presented in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. Section 8H1) says that an election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or
more of the grounds specified in sub-s. (I) of s. 100 and s. 101
to the High Court, by any candidate at such election or any elector.
Section 84 prescribes that a petitioner may, in addition to
claiming a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidate is void, claim a further declaration that he himself or
any other candidate has been duly elected. Chapter III of Part VI
deals with the trial of election petitions. Section 86 (I) prescribes
that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does
not comply with the provisions of s. 81 or s. 82 or s. 117. Section 87 (I) says that subject to the provisions of the Act and of
any rules made thereunder. every election petition shall be tried
by the High Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the
procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to
the trial of suits. Section 97 ( 1) provides for filing recrimination.
Section 98 reads :
"At the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the High Court shall make an order :
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(a) dismissing the election petition; or
(b) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void; or
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[!969] 3. S.C.R.
( c) declaring the election of all or any of the returnA
ed candidates to be void and the petitioner or any
other candidate to have been duly elected."
Section 99 (I ) is important for our present purpose. It says :
"At the time of making an order under s. 98 the High Court
shall also make an order :
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(a) where any charge is made in the petition of any
corrupt practice having been committed at the
election, recording-
( i) a finding whether any corrupt practice has or has
not been proved to have been committed at the
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election and the nature of that corrupt practice;
and
(ii) the names of all persons, if any, who have been
proved at the trial to have been, guilty of any
corrupt practice and the nature of that practice
.......... " (emphasis supplied).
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Chapter lV of Part VI deals with withdrawal and abatement of
election petitions.
Section I 09 stipulates that an election petition may be withdrawn only by the leave of the High Court and
where an application for withdrawal is made notice thereof fixing a date for the hearing of the application shall be given to all
other parties to the petition and shall be published in the official
gazette. Section 112 says :
" ( 1) An election petition shall abate only on the
death of a sole petitioner or of the survivor of
several petitioners.
(2) Where an election petition abates under sub-s.
(1 ) the High Court shall ca use the fact to be
published in such manner as it may deem fit.
( 3) Any person who might himself have been a petitioner may, within fourteen days of such publication, apply to be substituted as petitioner and
upon compliance with the conditions, if any, as
to security, shall be entitled to be so substituted
and to continue the proceedings upon such terms
as the High Court may deem fit."
Section 116 reads:
"If before the conclusion of the trial of an election
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petition, the sole respondent dies or gives n<itice that he
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does not intend to oppose the petition or any of the res-
. pendents dies or gives such notice and there is no other
respondent who is opposing the petition, the High Court
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SHEODHAN SINGH V. MOHAN LAL (Hegde, J.)
421
shall cause notice of such event to be published in the
Official Gazette, and thereupon any person who might
have been a petition.er may, within fourteen days of
such publication, apply to be substituted in place of
such respondent to oppose the petition, and shall be entitled to continue the proceedings upon such terms as
the High Court may think fit."
From the above provisions 1t is seen that in an election petition, the contest is really between the constituency on the one side
and the person or persons complained of on the other.
Once the
machinery of the Act is moved by a candidate or an elector, the
carriage of the case does not entirely rest with the petitioner. The
reason for the elaborate provisions noticed by us earlier is to ensure to the extent possible that the persons who offend the election
law are net allowed to avoid the consequences of their misdeeds.
The law relating to withdrawal and abatement of election petitions is exhaustively dealt with in Chapter IV of Part VI of the
Act. In deciding whether a petition has abated or not we cannot
travel outside the provisions contained in that Chapter.
There
is no provision providing for the dropping of an election petition
for any reason other than those mentioned therein. The act does
not provide for the abatement of an election petition either when
the returned candidate whose election is challenged resigns or
when the assembly is dissolved. As the Jaw relating to abatements
and withdrawal is exhaustively dealt with in the Act itself no reliance can be placed on the provisions of the Civil Procedure
Code nor did the learned Counsel for the respondent bring to our
notice any provision in the Civil Procedure Code under which the
election petition can be held to have abated.
In support of his contention that the petition has abated great
deal of reliance was placed by Mr. Veda Vyasa on the decision in
Carter and Anr. v. Mills('). Therein a pending election petition
was allowed to be withdrawn on the dissolution of the Parliamen.t.
In doing so Coleridge, C.J. observed thus :
"I am of opinion that this application should be
granted. The Queen having been pleased to dissolve
Parliament, of which fact the Court must take judicial
cognizance, a case has arisen not expressly provided for
in the Act; and under these circumstances we must guide
our proceedings by the old parliamentary practice on the
subject.
It is common knowledge, that according to
the old practice the petition abated or dropped in such
a case. We think the result is the same now, and that
we therefore have authority, and ought to make an order
for the return of the deposit."
(I) 9, Common Pleas p. 117.
422
SlJPREME COURT REPORTS
[!969] 3 s.c.R.
Keating, J.,
the other judge agreed with the learned Chief Justice.
We do not know the facts of that case. It is not known
whether the election of the returned candidate was challenged on
the ground of any corrupt practice.
The decision in that case
rested solely on 'the old parliamentary practice on the subject'.
We have no such practice in this country. That being so that
decision is of no assistance for our present purpose. In Ghasi
Ram v. Dal Singh and Others(') this Court proceeded on
the
basis that the dissolution of the assembly does not put an end to
the election petition. For the reasons already mentioned we think
that the High Court was right in its conclusion that the election
petition had not abated.
This takes us to the merits of the case. As mentioned earlier
the election of the
respondent was challenged on numerous
grounds. On the pleadings as many as 10 issues were raised. At
present we are concerned only with issues Nos. 7, 8 and 10.
The only question arising under issue No. 7 is whether Exh. 7,
was got printed and published by the. respondent. So far as the
question of getting it prepared and printed is concerned, the evidence principally relied on is that of P.W. 16 Mohan Singh. We
are in agreement with the High Court that Mohan Singh is a wholly
unreliable witness. According to him.he was a signatory to that
pamphlet and he took active part in getting it printed which means
that he was a party to the publication of false statement. He
appears to have been on the side of the responderrt at one stage
and· walked over to the side of the appellant at a later stage, not
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uncommon during election time. His evidence does not carry conviction. On his own showing he can be a stooge.
In support of the evidence of P.W. 16 reliance was placed on
Exh. D-23, one of the vouchers submitted by the respondent along
with his return of election expenses. That voucher relates to the
printino of two pamphlets on behalf of the respondent. It shows
that m~e of the pamphlet mentioned therein was printed on both
sides cf the paper. Exh. 7 is also printed on both sides of a
paper. From that we are asked to conclude that the voucher. in
question refers to printing of pa,mphlets like Exh. 7. Such an mference would be a far fetched one. According to the respondent
D-23 relates to pamphlets similar to Exh. A-154 and A-155. The
High Court has not accepted that contention. The basis on which
the High Court rejected that contention does not appear to us to
be correct. It is not necessary to go into that question as we are
of opinion that there is no satisfactory evidence to show that any
entry in Exh. D-23 relates to pamphlets similar to Exh. 7. We
are also unable to attach any weight to Exh. 3, the complaint
given by the appellant to the Returning Officer. The appellant
(1) [196i] J S.C.R 102.
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SHEODHAN SINGH v. MOHAN. LAL (Hegde, I.)
423
has considerable experience of filing election petitions. This was
the third election petition filed by him. Even as the election was
going on he appears to have been preparing for the election petition.
The evidence of P .W. 7, Narayan Singh Bodh throws a
great deal of light on this aspect.
Large number of witnesses were examined to show that either
respondent himself distributed pamphlets like Exh. 7 or he got
them distributed through others.
Their evidence ha• '-~en considered by the High Court in detail and reject• ·.
we nave been
taken through that evidence and we were not impressed by the
same. We are satisfied that the High Court has correctly assessed
that evidence.
Generally, this Court accepts the findings of fact arrived at by
the High Court.
Election petitions are tried by experienced
judges of the High Court. They had the benefit of observing the
witnesses when they gave ~vid.ence. Hence their appreciation
of evidence is entitled to great weight. We have not been shown
any good reason for departing from that rule.
Now coming to issue No. 8 which relates to the complaint of
the appellant that the respondent, his agents and workers had hired
several vehicles for conveyance of the voters to and from the polling stations.
In the petition, particulars of as many as twelve
vehicles which were said -to have been used for conveying voters
were given.
But the appellant's learned Counsel confined his
arguments to three vehicles only i.e. Truck No. USK 503, :Sus
No. RJL 9729 and a Tractor.
So far as Truck No. USK 503 is concerned, the witnesses
who were examined are P.Ws. 37, 40, 41, 45 and 48. Among
them the most important witness is P .W. 45 Sukhbir Singh. He
claims to have worked for the respondent and transported voters
to the polling station in the truck in question. Further he deposed
that he hired that truck from "Achaltar truck operators' Union"
Hathras.
It is now definitely established and that evidence was
not challenged before us· that in Hathras there was no concern
bearing that name. Hence it is obvious that the evidence of this
witness is wholly false. We are unable to accept the contention of
Mr. Latifi, learned Counsel for the appellant that the name of concern in question was wrongly mentioned by the witness due to
some confusion. The fact that P.W. 45 at one stage worked for
the respondent is not of much significance. Changing sides during election is nothing unusual. Once the evidence of P.W. 45
is proved to be false very little basis remains for the evidence of
other witnesses who spoke to the user of a. truck in question. It
is common knowledge that in the trial of election petitions there
would be no dearth of witnesses.
The faction spirit generated
during election projects itself during the trial of election petition
424
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[!969] 3 S.C.R.
that follows.
Much value cannot be attached to the complaint
given by the appellant's agent to the polling officer (Exh. 18).
That document has several suspicious features which were noticed
by the High Court.
Now coming to the tractor, its registration No. was not spoken
to by any witness. There is no evidence about its hiring. The
witnesses who speak to its user are P.Ws. 33 and 34. The evi·
dence of P.W. 33 is extremely vague. He deposed that a worker
of the respondent Sita Ram carried the voters from the villages to
the election booth. lle is unable to give the details of the tractor.
P. W. 34 is an omnibus witness. The evidence relating to owner
of that tractor is conflicting. The evidence of P.Ws. 33 and 34
does not carry conviction. It was rightly not
relied on by the
High Court.
Now coming to the hiring of Bus RJL 9729, according to the
petition that bus was owned by one Babu Lal of Jaipur. That Babu
Lal has not been examined. The evidence of P.Ws. 30, 31 and
32 who speak to the conveyance of the voters in that bus to the
polling stations is far from satisfactory. Their evidence did not
commend itself to the trial court. We agree with the High Court
that it is unsafe to rely on their evidence.
This takes us to issue No. 10 which relates to the complaint of
the appellant that the election expenses incurred by the respondent had exceeded the prescribed limit. In this connection various
items of expenses said to have been omitted in the return were
particularised in the petition but most of them were not pressed at
the hearing.
The evidence relating to the expenses said to have been incurA
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red in procuring and hiring vehicles for conveying voters to the
polling; booths has to be rejected in view of our earlier findings.
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Large number of witnesses were examined to show that considerable quantity of wheat, atta, sugar and ghee had been purchased
by the rnspondent for feeding his workers and the expenses incurred for that purpose had not been included in the return of expenses. Their evidence has not been believed by the trial court.
We have been taken through the evidence and we do not think it
is creditworthy nor are we able to place any reliance on the docuG
ments produced in that connection.
In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with
·costs.
R.K.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.