# SHEODHYAN SINGH AND OTHERS v. MUSAMMAT SANICH,ARA KUER AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1962] 2 S.C.R. 753
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** P.B. Ga.Jendragadkar, K.N. WoNcHoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sheodhyan-singh-and-others-v-musammat-sanich-ara-kuer-and-others-2292
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Pinal decru-Sale certifica.te-Properly 80/d fully descrilied
but wrong n·umbor given-If mere mi8description.
In the final decree for sale in a mortgage suit and in the
sale certificate the number of the property in dispute was given
as No. 160 instead of No. 1060 which wa• the real number
although it was otherwise fully described w that its identity
could be clearly established. The appellants contended that
a decree could not be granted with m;pect to this plot. The
High Court found that No. 160 in the final decree and the
sale certificate was a mistake for No. I 060 and that there was
no plot No. 160, in the particular khata. Jhe High Court
further held that this was a case of misdcscription and not a
case of disputed identity.
With regard to an_oiher p!ot in dis~
pute subrogation was claimed on behalf of the second mortgagees alleging that the first mortgoge was redeemed by the
second mortgagees although their mortgage deed did not
n1ention anything about the earlier mortgage nor was any
money left to redeem it.
Held, (i) that tho High Court was right in holding that
this was a case of misdescription and that as the identity of the
property was well established the contention of the appellants
must fail.
Thakur Barhma v.Jibon Manva.re, ( 1913) L.R. 41 I.A. 38,
Gossain Das Kundu v. MrithunjlJ// Agran Sardar, (1913) 18
C,L. J. 541, followed.
Rambhadra Naidu v. Kadiruja Sami Na.icker, (1921) L.R.
48 I. A. 155, distinguished.
(ii) In the absence of any agreement regarding subrogation in the second mortgage the question of subrogation could
not be raised.

## Text

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
753
SHEODHYAN SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
MUSAMMAT SANICH,ARA KUER AND OTHERS
(P.B. GA.JENDRAGADKAR AND
K.N. WoNcHoo, J.J.)
Pinal decru-Sale certifica.te-Properly 80/d fully descrilied
but wrong n·umbor given-If mere mi8description.
In the final decree for sale in a mortgage suit and in the
sale certificate the number of the property in dispute was given
as No. 160 instead of No. 1060 which wa• the real number
although it was otherwise fully described w that its identity
could be clearly established. The appellants contended that
a decree could not be granted with m;pect to this plot. The
High Court found that No. 160 in the final decree and the
sale certificate was a mistake for No. I 060 and that there was
no plot No. 160, in the particular khata. Jhe High Court
further held that this was a case of misdcscription and not a
case of disputed identity.
With regard to an_oiher p!ot in dis~
pute subrogation was claimed on behalf of the second mortgagees alleging that the first mortgoge was redeemed by the
second mortgagees although their mortgage deed did not
n1ention anything about the earlier mortgage nor was any
money left to redeem it.
Held, (i) that tho High Court was right in holding that
this was a case of misdescription and that as the identity of the
property was well established the contention of the appellants
must fail.
Thakur Barhma v.Jibon Manva.re, ( 1913) L.R. 41 I.A. 38,
Gossain Das Kundu v. MrithunjlJ// Agran Sardar, (1913) 18
C,L. J. 541, followed.
Rambhadra Naidu v. Kadiruja Sami Na.icker, (1921) L.R.
48 I. A. 155, distinguished.
(ii) In the absence of any agreement regarding subrogation in the second mortgage the question of subrogation could
not be raised.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 497 of 57.
Appeal from the Judgment and decree dated
October IO,
1955, of the Patna High Court, in
Appeal from Original Decree No. 483 of Hl47.
L.K. Jha, and P.J(. Chntteijee, fort.he Appellants.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and R. C. Pm8ad, for
resp0ndents Nos. l to 7.
1961
Ma11, 4.
1961
She~dhya1T1 Singh
v.
Afu1Gnwuit.
8•.nWkGrlt Jfotr
1r anrhoo .! .
754
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1961. May, 4.
was delivered by
The Judgment of the Court
WANCHOO, .T.-This iH an appeal on a certificate gm11ted by the Patna High Court. The respondents brought a suit with respect to fon plots
of land a1ul nl;i,imerl a d0claration tha~ the property
belongcrl to Owm and prayorl for posKession of the
plots by njeetmPnt of the defendants-appellants
and for mesne profits.
Beside3 the appellants,
there was another set of d!'fendants to the suit
from whom the respondents purchased the property.
The respondents' case was that the appellants had
taken a loan from the other defondants on a mortgage bond on the basis .of which those defendant~
instituted a suit in l!l3:!.
Thi~ suit was decreed
against the appellants and thert'aHnr the other
defendants got the mortgaged property sold by
auction in execution and purchased it themselves
in 1936. Thereafter the other defendants entered
into possession of the property, delivery of which
was made to them by court. The other defendants
remained in possession of the property till they
sold it to the respondents in 1943. Thereafter the
respondents came into poBBeseion of the property.
The appellants however began to create trouble
from 1942. After the sale to the respondents, the
appellants created further trouble which led to
proceedings in a criminal court under s. 144 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and the appellants
were forbidden from going to the property in dispute. Later on, the appellants were bound down
under s. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to
keep the peace. In 1945 there was a murder in
connection with this property on account of which
some of the appellants were tried by the court of
session but were acquitted. There were further
troubles over the crop of theee plots in 1945.
Eventually after their acquittal by the court of
session, the appellants took poBSession of the prol!erty by forcibly dispossessing the res:ponden~.
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT RHPORTS
755
Consequently the respondents filed the suit out of
which this appeal has arisen in July 1946.
The suit was resisted by the defendants on a large
number of grounds with which we are however not
concerned now.
The only points urged before us
by learned counsel for the appellants is with respect to three plots out of the ten which were the
subject matter of the suit. The trial court accepted
the case put forward on behalf of the respondents
and decreed the suit for possession and ordered
that mesne profits would be determined subsequently. There was then un appeal by the present
appellants to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal except as to one plot with respect to which the suit of respondents was dismissed.
As the decree was of vuriancc the High Court
granted a certificate ; and thtit is how the present
appeal has come up before us.
We have already pointed out that the learned
counsel for the appellants has confined his &rguments before us with respect only to three plots,
namely, 1060, 427 and 1128, out of the ten plots
which were in dispute in the courts below. His
c;iontention is that in any case the courts below were
wrong in granting possession to the respondents
with res:pect to these three plots. We propose
therefore to deal with the contentions raised in
respect of these three plots only.
Re. Plot. No. 1060.
The contention on behalf of the appellants with
respect to this plot is that it was neither included
in the final decree for sale in favour of the respondents' predecessors-in-interest nor in the sale
certificate.
Therefore, it was not open to the
court8 below to grant a decree in favour of the
respondents with respect to this plot. The final
decree contains ten plots. It gives the Tauzi
Number the Khasra Number, the Thana Number,
the Survey Number, the area aμd the bolinda,ries
1961
8he<Xlhyan Si,.,h
v.
MU811mmat
Sanichara Kuer
Wllnchoo J.
I
1961
Sheodhyan Singh
v.
lviusammat
E1anicharrt K net
TI' anclioo .I.
I
756
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19o2J
of each plot. Among the ten plots mentioned in
the final decree, there is a plot No. 160, but no plot
bearing No. 1060. In the sale certificate also tJH,
same ten plots arc mPntioned.
The sale certificatl·
contains the khata number, the plot number, th<'
area and tho boundaries of each plot.
Thare abo
we find No. 160 but no No. 1060.
The High Comt
has held that No. 160 in the final decree and in
the sale certificate is a mistake for 1060. It has
further held that this is a case of misdescription
and not a case of disputed identity, for in this case
the identity of the plot included in the final decree
imd sold through th() sale certificate is not un-
~ertain. It has pointed out that the khata numbPr,
the area and the boundaries that are given in the
final decree and in the srJe certificate corresponcl
with the khata number, the area and the boundaries
of plot No. 1060. It has also pointed out that in
the writ of delivery of possession to the responrlents' predecessors as well as in the sale deed in
favour of the respondents the correct plot (namely,
1060) has been mentioned. Fnrther the High Court
has also pointed out that there is no plot bearing
No. 160 in khata No. 97.
Therefore, as the khata
number, the area and the boundaries given in the
final decree and in the s<tle certificate tally with
No. 1060, the identity is clearly establishe<l and
there has only been a misdescription of the plot in
the final decree as well as in the sale certificate by
the omission of one zero from the plot number.
In this connection, learned counsel for the
appellants relies on Rr~mbhadra Naidu v. Kad-iriya8ami N aicker (I).
In that case it was held that
·'certificates of sale are documents of title which
ought not to be lightly regarded or loosely construed." It was further hdd that "where upon a
sale under a mortgage de<·ree the purchaser haR
been given a sale certificate which plainly includes
certain property and has been put into possession,
it is not open to the Court in a subsequent suit by
(I) (1921) L. R. 48 I.A. 155.
~ S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
757
the mortgagor's represcnt'ltive to hold by reference
back to the mortgage eked tlw,t the property in
q ucstion was not sold under the decree." The
facts however in that case were very different
from tho facts in the present case.
There what
had happened was that the mortgage included the
pannai larnls which IH'lirngcd to the mortg>tgor and
which were in his onjoym2nt. But at the date of
the mortgage certain paunai lancls were not in the
enjoyment of the mortgagor. When however the
Hale proceedings were taken in execution the person
who was in possession at the date of the mortgage
of some of the pannai lands was dead and in the
final decree as well as in the execution proceedings
all pannai lands belonging to the mortgagor and
in his enjoyment were ordered to be sold. The
mortgagor objected that some of the pannai lands
were outside the mortgage and were not liable to
sale.
This objection was disallowed and all the
pannai lands were sold and were included in the
sale certificate and possession thereof was delivered
to the purchasers. In these cirnumstances the Privy
Council held that it was not possible to go back to
the mortgage deed to find out what had been sold.
It was also held that no suit could lie in the circumstances in view of s. 4 7 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
In the present appeal, the learned counsel for
the respondents does not ask us to go beyond the
sale certificate and the final decree for sale; his contention is that there is a mere misdescription of the
plot number in the two documents and that the
identity of the plot sold is clear from the circumstances which we have already set out above. He
relies on Thakur Bar;nha v. Jiban Ram Marwari (2).
In that case what had happened was that the
judgment·debtor
owned a
mahal in which ten
annas share was mortgaged while the remainder
was
free from encumbrances.
A creditor of
his attached
and put up for sale six annas
(2)
( 1913) L.R. 41 I.A. 38.
1961
--
Sheodhyan Singh
v.
Musammat
Sanichara K uer
Wanchoo J.
••
1961
S!teodhyan Si nyh
v.
Mu•am.mat
Sanichara K uer
Wanchoo J.
758
8UPREME COUBT REPORTS
[1962]
share· out of the mortgaged share. The property
attaclH'd was sold.
When the ,·met.ion purchasers
applied for the sale
certificate they
alleged
that a mistake had been made in the schedule of
the property to be sold in that the word "not" had
been omitted from t.he description of tho six aumts
share and that the property should have been described as being six annas not mortgaged. This prnycl'
of theirs was allowed by the executing court and the
appeal to the High Court failed.. On appeal to the
Privy Council, it was held that in a judicial sale
only the property attached can be sold and that
property is conclusively described in and by the
schedule to which the attachment refers, namely,
the six annas share subject to an existing-mortgage.
The Privy Council therefore allowed the appeal and
observed that a case of misdeseription could be
treated as a niere irregularity, but the case before
them was a case of identity and not of misdescription. It was pointed out that a property
fully identified in the schedule may be in some
respects misdescribed, which would be a different
case.
Thus the effect of this decision is that
where there is no doubt as to the identity and there
is only misdescription that could be treated as a
mere irregularity. Another case on which reliance has
been placed on behalf of the respondents is Gossain
Das K'undu v. Mrittunjoy Agnan Sardar(3). In that
case the land sold was descriued by boundaries and
area; but the area seems to have been incorrect.
It was held to be a case of misdescription of the
area and the boundaries were held to prevail.
We are of opinion that the present case is
analogous to a case of misdescription. As already
pointed out the area, the khata number and the
bounda.ries all refer to plot No. 1060 and what has
happened is that in writing the plot number, one
zero hes been missed and 1060 has become 160. It
is
also
important to remember that
there
is no plot bearing No. 160, in khata No. 97.
(3) (1913) 18 C. L. J. 541.
2 .s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
759
In these circumstances we are of opinion that
the High Court was right in holding that this
is a case of misdescription only and that the
identity of the property sold is well established
namely, that it is plot No. 1060.
The matter may
have been different if no boundaries h<td been given
in the final decree for sale as well as in the sale
certificate and only the plot number was mentioned.
But where we have both the boundaries and the
plot number and the circumstances are as in this
case, the mistake in the plot number must be treated as a mere misdescription which does not affect
the identity of the property sold. The contention
of the appellants therefore with respect to this plot
must fail.
Re. Plot No. 427
This plot was originally mortgaged with two
other plots in 1920 with the other defendants for
Rs. 400/. Later, the mortgagor usufructuarily
mortgaged this plot with a number of others with
Ramzan Mian and another in 1927 for Rs. 2,500/-.
This mortgage deed does not show that any
money was left with the mortgagees to redeem
the plots mortgaged with the other defendants.
But it appears that soon after the mortgage in
favour of Ramzan Mian, the mortgage in favour of
the other defendants was redeemed by payment of
the mortgage amount due to them through Nizamud-diil and Shams-ud-din. It is said that this payment was made on behalf of Ramzan Mian and
therefore Ramzan Mian and another were subrogated in place of the other defendants so far as this plot
was concerned. Further it is urged that Ramzan
Mian and another were not made parties to the suit
of ljl32 and that there is nothing to s1?-ow that when
the suit was brought for sale of the ten plots in 1932
the mortgage made in favour of Ramzan Mian and
another in 1927 had been redeemed and therefore the
purchasers in the execution proceedings in that suit
could only get the property subject to the mortgage
<tf aamzan Mian ·and another and could not;
19/J.1
8lm1d1'yan Si'll(fh
v.
Muaammat
8anichara K uu
Wanchoo J.
i '
I
-
1961
Sl1eodhyan· Si11gh
v.
Mwammat
Sanichara Kuer
Wanchoo .T.
760
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
[1962]
dispossess the appellants, if th<"y were in possession
throu-gh mortgagees Ramzan Mian and another. In
reply, tho lcar1wrl counsd for the respondents contends that so far as the appellants are concerned,
their right and title in this plot have completely
gone and it is not for the appellants to claim any
right of subrogation in respect of the mortgage
which was redeemed by Ramzan Mian and another.
Further it is urged that there is nothing to show on
this record that in 1932 when the suit was brought
the mortgage of Ramzan Mian and another was subsisting and that the appellants were in possession on
behalf of Ramzan Mian and another. Ther11fore the
appellants could not put forward any claim for
possession of plot No. 427 and if Ramznn Mian and
another had any claim they can look after their
own interest, even if they were not made parties
to the suit of 1932. The result would be that their
rights in their mor.tgage would br- subsisting and
they can enforce them, if they can under the law,
against the respondents; but the appellants cannot
put forward their claim to defeat the respondents'
case.
We are of opinion that there is no force in
these contentions raised on behalf of the appellants. In the first place, it is difficult to understand how the appellants can raise the question of
subrogation on behalf of Ramzan Mian and another.
In the second place, Ramzan Mian and another could
only be subrogate<l to the rights of the mortgagees
of 1920 whose mortgage they had redeemed if
there was an agreement in their mortgage that
they would ho so suhrogated. We might have
inferred such agreement if any money had been left
with Ramzan Mian and another to redeem the
earlier mortgage; but the mortgage deed of 1927 in
their favour says nothing about the earlier mortgage at all. In these circumstances there can he
no question of subrogation even if it was open to
the appellants to raise that point b«<fore us on
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOP.TS
761
behalf of Rarnzan Mian and another.
As to the contention that Ramzan Mian and
another were not made parties to the mortgage suit
and therefore their rights arc not affected am! if
the appellants held the land from Ramzan Mian
and another they would still be entitled to possession and could not be dispossessed, it is enough to
say that this argument could be raised if it were
established that the mortgage of 1927 was still
subsisting when the suit was brought in 1932. On
that point however there is no evidence and we do
not know whether the mortgage of Ramzan Mian
and another was subsisting in 1932. Further the
finding of the High Court is that whatever evidence
is on the record shows that at any rate in 1935 the
appellants were in possession of plot No. 427. In
these circumstances we cannot hold positively that
the mortgage of Rarnzan Mian and another was
subsisting in 1932 when the suit was brought and
that the appellants were in possession of tliis plot
on behalf of Ramzan Mian and another.
The
appellants therefore cannot resist the claim of the
respondents for possession on the ground that they
are holding this plot on behalf of Rarnzan Mian and
another without any proof of this on the record.
The appellants contention therefore with respect to
plot No. 427 must also fail.
Re. Plot. No. 1128
The case of the appellants with respect to
this plot is similar to the case with reference to
plot 427.
In the circumstances the appellants'
contention with respect to this plot must also fail.
As no other point was urged before us, the whole
appeal fails.
We therefore dismiss the appeal with ousts.
Appeal disinisserl.
1961
Sheodhyan Sin~h
Musammat
/-:J'anichara KuPr
--
ll'anchoo I.
.