# SHIVAJI DAYANU PATIL & ANR v. SMT. VATSCHALA UTTAM MORE

- **Citation:** [1991] 3 S.C.R. 26
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1991-07-17
- **Bench:** B.C. Ray, S.C. Agrawal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shivaji-dayanu-patil-anr-v-smt-vatschala-uttam-more-11082
- **Pages:** 28

## Headnote

Motor Vehichles Act, 1939: Sections 2( 18) and 92A-'Motor
Vehicle' --Petrol tanker used for transporting petrol-Overturned due
to collision with another motor vehicle-Damaged to the extent that it
.became immobile-Whether ceases to be a 'Motor Vehicle'-Death due
C to explosion and fire taking place few hours after the collision-Both
.connected and related events-Causal relationship between user of the
vehicle and accident-Need not be direct and proximate-Death as a
result of accident arising out of 'use of Motor Vehicle'-No fault
liability-Nature and scope of .
.D
Bombay Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989: Rules 291-A, 291-B, 297(2),
306cA to 306-D. Adjudication of claims under Section 92A of the Ac/-
Special Procedure to be followed by Claims Tribunal for expeditious
disposal-Normal procedure prescribed in respect of claims under
Section JIOA-Need not be followed.
E
Words & Phrases: 'use'-'Arisingouto{-Meaningof.
Due to a collision on the highway between a Petrol tanker and a
truck, the Petrol tanker went off the road and fell on its side at some
.. distance from the highway. As a result of it, petrol leaked out and
collected nearby. Nearly four hours after the collision an explosioll
F ,tool< place in the petrol tanker resulting in fire. A large number of
;persous who had assembled near the petrol tanker sustained burn
·inj!!rles; few of them succumbed to the injuries. Respondent's son was
.ime of the persons w!Jo died as such.
Respondent tiled a claim before ttie Motor Accident Claims Tri-
\G
'1!1111111 under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act for Rs.75,000 as
. .;i!Djpeni;ation. She also claimed Rs.15,000 as compensation under
Si:.ction 92A of the Act. The Tribunal.dismissed tl1e claim under Section
l):Z.:\. on the ground that the explosion coul!l not be said to be an acci<!en.t
,!!rising out of tbe use .l!f tile petrol tanker and so t'1e provisions of
Section 92A were noi attracted. It held that the explosion and the tire
:H
which took.place after abo11t four hours of the accident had no con11ec26
'
...
S.D. PATIL v. V.U. MORE
2'
tion with the accident and it was altogether a different and indep.endent
accident, It also observed that the villagers took benefit of the ~arller
.·
.
'
;
. ' '
accident and while they were trying to pilfer petrol from the tanker
there was fricl"; ·, which caused the ignition and explosion and since an
outside agenq was responsible therefore the subsequent accident of
explosion and fire could not be said to be an accident arising out of th~
use of the tanker.
On appeal, a Single Judge of the High Court disagreed with the
finding of the Tribunal that the explosion was a direct consequence ,of
the attempt to pilfer petrol from it a.nd further held that in view of
Sub-Section (4) of Section 92A if there was a wrongful act, neglect or
default on the part of the deceased or injured, the ~lalin under Section
92A for compensation for no liability cannot be rejected. He observed
that the fact that at the material time, the tanker was not driven on the
highway but was lying turtle on the side of the highway, would not make
any difference and that the tanker was a vehicle lying on the side of the
highway and would be covered by the expression 'use' in Section 92A of
the Act and so compensation would be payable under 'no fault liability'.
The petitioners filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the said decision and a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the same affirm·
A
,...
B
c
•
D
ing the findings of the Single Judge. The Bench held that the.collision
between the tanker and the other vehicle which occurred earlier and the
escape of petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in explosion .E
and fire were not unconnected but related events. It rejected the claiiii
of the petitioners that the first .information report recorded by .the
police and the panchnama indicated that .the explosion and fire near
the petrol tanker had been caused by careless act of throwing away of a
match stick used for light

## Text

_Characters 0–39,946 of 69,617. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39946 for what follows._

A
B
SHIVAJI DAYANU PATIL & ANR.
v.
SMT. VATSCHALA UTTAM MORE
JULY 17, 1991
[B.C. RAY AND S.C. AGRAWAL, JJ)
Motor Vehichles Act, 1939: Sections 2( 18) and 92A-'Motor
Vehicle' --Petrol tanker used for transporting petrol-Overturned due
to collision with another motor vehicle-Damaged to the extent that it
.became immobile-Whether ceases to be a 'Motor Vehicle'-Death due
C to explosion and fire taking place few hours after the collision-Both
.connected and related events-Causal relationship between user of the
vehicle and accident-Need not be direct and proximate-Death as a
result of accident arising out of 'use of Motor Vehicle'-No fault
liability-Nature and scope of .
.D
Bombay Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989: Rules 291-A, 291-B, 297(2),
306cA to 306-D. Adjudication of claims under Section 92A of the Ac/-
Special Procedure to be followed by Claims Tribunal for expeditious
disposal-Normal procedure prescribed in respect of claims under
Section JIOA-Need not be followed.
E
Words & Phrases: 'use'-'Arisingouto{-Meaningof.
Due to a collision on the highway between a Petrol tanker and a
truck, the Petrol tanker went off the road and fell on its side at some
.. distance from the highway. As a result of it, petrol leaked out and
collected nearby. Nearly four hours after the collision an explosioll
F ,tool< place in the petrol tanker resulting in fire. A large number of
;persous who had assembled near the petrol tanker sustained burn
·inj!!rles; few of them succumbed to the injuries. Respondent's son was
.ime of the persons w!Jo died as such.
Respondent tiled a claim before ttie Motor Accident Claims Tri-
\G
'1!1111111 under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act for Rs.75,000 as
. .;i!Djpeni;ation. She also claimed Rs.15,000 as compensation under
Si:.ction 92A of the Act. The Tribunal.dismissed tl1e claim under Section
l):Z.:\. on the ground that the explosion coul!l not be said to be an acci<!en.t
,!!rising out of tbe use .l!f tile petrol tanker and so t'1e provisions of
Section 92A were noi attracted. It held that the explosion and the tire
:H
which took.place after abo11t four hours of the accident had no con11ec26
'
...
S.D. PATIL v. V.U. MORE
2'
tion with the accident and it was altogether a different and indep.endent
accident, It also observed that the villagers took benefit of the ~arller
.·
.
'
;
. ' '
accident and while they were trying to pilfer petrol from the tanker
there was fricl"; ·, which caused the ignition and explosion and since an
outside agenq was responsible therefore the subsequent accident of
explosion and fire could not be said to be an accident arising out of th~
use of the tanker.
On appeal, a Single Judge of the High Court disagreed with the
finding of the Tribunal that the explosion was a direct consequence ,of
the attempt to pilfer petrol from it a.nd further held that in view of
Sub-Section (4) of Section 92A if there was a wrongful act, neglect or
default on the part of the deceased or injured, the ~lalin under Section
92A for compensation for no liability cannot be rejected. He observed
that the fact that at the material time, the tanker was not driven on the
highway but was lying turtle on the side of the highway, would not make
any difference and that the tanker was a vehicle lying on the side of the
highway and would be covered by the expression 'use' in Section 92A of
the Act and so compensation would be payable under 'no fault liability'.
The petitioners filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the said decision and a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the same affirm·
A
,...
B
c
•
D
ing the findings of the Single Judge. The Bench held that the.collision
between the tanker and the other vehicle which occurred earlier and the
escape of petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in explosion .E
and fire were not unconnected but related events. It rejected the claiiii
of the petitioners that the first .information report recorded by .the
police and the panchnama indicated that .the explosion and fire near
the petrol tanker had been caused by careless act of throwing away of a
match stick used for lighting a beedi or cigarette.
· ·
Aggrieved by the said decision, the petitioners preferred the pre·
sent petition for special leave to appeal.
On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that the petrol
tanker was not a motor vehicle, as defined in Section 2(18) of the Act, at
F
the time the explosion and fire took place because at that time the
G
petrol tanker was lying turtle and was not capable of movement on the
road; that since before the explosion and fire the petrol tanker was lying
immobile it could not he said that the petrol tanker was in use as a
motor· vehicle at the timtrof .the explosion and fire; that even if it ·is
.found that the petrol tanker was in use as a motor vehicle at the time of
. the explosion and fire, there was no caus31 relationship between the
H
.... ~
~·
.
•.
j'.
A
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991] 3 S.C.R.
collision which took place between the petrol tanker and the truck and
the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker which took place about
four-and-half hours later and it cannot, therefore, be said that the
explosion and fire in the petrol tanker was an accident arising out of the
use of a motor vehicle.
B
Dismissing the petition, this Court,
c
D
HELD: 1. Section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was in the
nature of beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit
of expeditious payment of limited amount by way of compensation to
the victims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the
basis of no fault liability. In the matter of interpretation of a beneficial
legislation the approach of the courts is to adopt a construction which
advances the beneficient purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose. [39E-G]
Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jadavji Keshavji Modi &
Ors., [1982] 1 SCR 860; Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben
Chandravadan & Ors., [1987] 2 SCR 752, relied on.
Manjusri Raha & Ors. v. B.L. Gupta & Ors. etc., [1977] 2 SCR
944; State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi & Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 184;
Bishan Devi & Ors. v. Sirbaksh Singh & Anr., [ 1980] I SCR 300;
E
N.K. V. Bros. Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors. etc., [1980] 3 SCR
IOI and Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai
Prabhatbhai & Anr., [1987] 3 SCR 404, referred to.
2. The petrol tanker was a vehicle manufactured for the purpose
of transporting petrol. It was a vehicle which had been adapted for such
F
use and was suitable for use on the road for transporting petrol. At the
time when the petrol tanker collided with the truck on the national
highway, it was being used for the purpose of transporting petrol. It
cannot, therefore, be disputed that when the said collision took place it
was a motor vehicle as the said expression was defined in section 2(18)
of the Act. Merely because the petrol tanker had turned turtle as a
G
result of the collision and was lying at a short distance away from the
road, uoes not mean that it had ceased to be suitable or fit for use on the
road and it had ceased to be a motor vehicle. It could be said that as a
result of the collision with the truck the petrol tanker was damaged to
such an extent that there was no reasonable prospect of the vehicle ever
being made mobile again. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that
H
the petrol tanker which was a motor vehicle when it collided with the
'
S.D. PATIL v. V.U. MORE
29
truck had ceased to be a motor vehicle after the said collision and It
A
could not be regarded a motor 'vehicle under Section 2(18) of the Act at
the time when the explosion and fire took place. [40H; 41A-C, 42D-E]
-1,
Boiani Ores Ltd. etc. v. State of Orissa etc., [ 1975] 2 SCR 138;
Newberry v. Simmonds, [1961] 2 Q.B. 345 and Smart v. Allan & Anr.,
[1963] 1 Q.B. 291, referred to.
.B
·3, The word 'use' has a. wider connotation ·as to rover the period
when ~vehicle is not moving and is stationary and the use of a
~
vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered
Immobile on account of a break-down or mechanical defect or accident.
In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the petrol tanker was not in c
the use at the time when it was lying on its side after the collision with
the truck; ~44F•G]
Pushpa Rani .Chopra v. Anokha Singh & Ors., [1975] ACJ 396;
General Managar, K.S.R. T.C. v. S. Satalingappa & Ors., [1979] ACJ
452 and Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Suman Navnath
D
t
Rajguru & Ors., [1985] ACJ 243, approved.
Elliott v. Grey, [1960] 1 Q.B. 367 and Government Insurance
Office of New South Wales v. R.J. Green & Lloyd Pty. Ltd., [1965] 114
CLR 437, referred to.
'
E
4.1. There is no ground for interfering with the findings recorded
by the High Court that those persons who sustained Injuries as a result
of the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker did not indulge in any
y
unlawful activity whiclt might have caused the explosion and fire.
The matter has, therefore, to be examined in. the light of the meaning to be assigned to the words "arising out or' In the expression
F
"accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in Section 92A
of the Act. [46D·E]
4.2. The words "arising out or' have been used in varjous sta·
totes in different contexts and have been construed by Courts widely as
well as narrowly, keeping in view the context in which they have been
G
\,
used in a particular legislation. [ 46F]
4.3. In the context of motor accidents the expressillns "caused
by" and "arising out or' are often used in statutes. Although both these
expressions imply a causal relationship between the accident resulting
in injury and the. use of the motor vehicle but they differ in the degree of
H
A
30
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991] 3 S.C.R.
proximity of such relationship. As compared to the expression "caused
by'' the expression ''arising out of'' has a wider connotation and the
causal relationship is not required to be direct and proximate and it
can be less immediate. [47G; 48E]
4.4. The expression "caused by" was used in Sections 95(1)(b)(i)
i3
and (ii) and 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In Section 92A of the Act, Parliament,
however, chose to use the expression "arising out of" y.·hich indicates
that.for the purpose of awarding compensation under Section 92A, the
causal relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accidenf resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be
direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. This would imply
c that accident should be connected with the use of the motor vehicle but
the said connection need not be direct and immediate. This construction
of the expression "arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in section
92A enlarges the field of protection made available
0
to the victims of
accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the
enactment. [480-E]
Mackinnon Machkenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommed
/ssak, [1970] I SCR 869; Government Insurance Office of New South
Wales v. R.J. Green & Ltyoyd Pl. Ltd., [1965] 114 CLR 437; Heyman v.
Darwins Ltd., [1942] A.C. 356; Union of India v. E.B. Aaby's Rederi
A;S, [1975] A.C. 797 and Samick Lines Co. Ltd. v. Owners of the
E
Antonis P. Lemos, [1985] 2 WLR 468, referred to.
5. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the accident
involving explosion and fire in the petrol tanker was connected with the
use of tanker as a motor vehicle. The High Court was right in holding
that the collision between the tanker and the other vehicle which had
F
occurred earlier and the escape of petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in the explosion and fire were not unconnected but
related events and merely because there was interval of about four to
four-and-half hours between the said collision and the explosion and
fire in the tanker, it cannot he necessarily inferred that there was no
causal relation between explosion and fire. In the circumstances, it
G
must be held that the explosion and fire resulting in the injuries which
led to the death of the Respondent's son was due to an accident arising
.,,
out of the use of the motor vehicle viz., the petrol tanker. [48G-H; 49A-B]
6. The object underlying the enactment of Section 92A is to make
arnilable to the claimant compensation amount to the extent of
H
ks.15,000 in case of dea1:1 ·•nd Rs.7,500 in case of permanent disable'
-,
•
S.D. PATIL v. V.U. MORE
31
men! as expeditiously as possible and the said award has to be made
before adjudication of the claim under Section 11 OA of the Act. This
would be apparent from the provision of Section 928 of the Act which
provides that a daim for compensation under Section 92A in respect of'
death or perm:ment disablement of any person shall be disposed of as
expeditiously .. s possible and where compensation is claimed in respect
of such death or permanent disablement under Section 92A and also in
pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under Section 92A shall be disposed of in the first place. With a
view to give effect to the said directive contained in Section 928 of the
Act, the Maharashtra Government has amended the Rules and has
inserted special provisions in respect of claims under Section 92A in
Rules 291A, 291B, 297(2), 306A, 3068, 306C and 3060 of the Rules.
The object underlying the said provisions is to enable expeditious disposal of a claim petition under Section 92A of the Act. The said object
would be defeated if the Claims Tribunal is required to hold a regular
trial in the same manner as for adjudicating a claim petition under
Section llOA of the Act. [528-E]
7. Rules 291A, 306A and 3068 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1989 contain adequate provisiocs which would en&ble the Claims
Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect of the matters necessary for awarding compensation under Section 92A of the Act and in view of these
special provisions the Claims Tribunal is not required to follow the
normal procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules with regard
to adjudication of a claim under Section HOA of the Act for the
purpose of making an order on a claim petition under Section 92A
of the Act. [53B-D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition•
(Civil) No. 14822 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.8.1990 of the B0rnbay
High Court in LP.A. No. 65 of 1990.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G.L. Sanghi, K.S.V. Murthy. S.M. Puri and Prarnod Dayal for
G
the Petitioners.
Ashok H. Desai, George Kurian, A.P. Vaze and G.B. Sathe for
the Respondent.
The J udgrnent of ihe Court was delivered by
H
A
c
•
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991] 3 S.C.R.
S.C. AGRAWAL, J. The questions raised for consideration in
this petition for special leave to appeal involve the interpretation of
the expression "arising out of the use of a motor vehicle"' contained in
section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to
as 'the Act').
On October 29, 1987, at about 3 A.M., there was a collision
between a petrol tanker bearing Registration No. MKL-7461 and a
truck bearing Registration No. MEH-4197 on the National Highway
No. 4 near village Kavatha, in District Satara, Maharashtra. The
petrol tanker was proceeding from Pune side to Bangalore whereas the
truck was coming from the opposite direction. As a result of the said collision, the petrol tanker went off the road and fell on its left side at a
distance of.about 20 feet from the highway. As a result of the overturning of the petrol tanker, the petrol contained in it leaked out and
collected nearby. At about 7.15 A.M., an explosion took !)lace in the
said petrol tanker resulting in fire. A number of persons who had
assembled near the petrol tanker sustained burn injuries and a few of
D
them succumbed to the said injuries. One of those who died as a result
of such injuries was Deepak Uttam More. The respondent is the
mother of Deepak Uttam More. Petitioner No. 1 is the owner of the
said petrol tanker and Petitioner No. 2, the insurer of the same.
The respondent, as the legal representative of her deceased son,
E
filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,
Satara ('Claims Tribunal') under section 110 of the Act claiming
Rs. 75 ,000 as compensation from the petitioners. She also made a claim
for payment of Rs.15,000 as compensation under section 92A of the
Act. It appears that claim petitions were also filed by the legal representatives of other persons who had died as a result of the burn
F
injuries sustained by them in the explosion and fire in the petrol
tanker. The petitioners contested the claim petitions filed by the
respondent and other claimants under section 92A of the Act and
raised objection with regard to the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal
to entertain such petitions on the ground that explosion and fire resulting in in juries to the deceased could not be said to be an accident
G
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. The Claims Tribunal decided
/
all the claim petitions filed under Section 92A of the Act by a common
order dated December 2, 1989 whereby the said petitions were dismissed on the ground that the explosion could not be said to be an accident arising out of the use of the petrol tanke'r and that the provisions
of section 92A of the Act were not attracted. The Claims 1ribunal was
H
of the view that the explosion and the fire which took place after about four
'><·
S.D. PATIL v. V.U. MORE [AGRAWAL, J.J
33
hours had no connection whatsoever with the accident which took
place at 3 A.M. and that the explosion and the fire was altogether an
independent accident. The Claims Tribunal also observed that the
villagers tried to take the l:>enefit of the earlier accident and tried to
pilfer petrol from the petrol tanker and while thus pilfering the petrol
there was friction which caused ignition and explosion and since an
outside agency was responsible for the explosion and fire which situation was created by the villagers themselves the explosion could not be
said to be an accident arising out of the use of the tanker. The respondent filed an appeal against the said order of the Claims Tribunal
before the High Court. The said appeal was allowed by a learned
Single Judge of the High Court by judgment dated February 5, 1990.
The learned Single Judge disagreed with the finding of the Claims
Tribunal that the explosion was a direct conseql\ence of the attempt to
pilfer petrol from the tanker and observed that the Tribunal was not
justified in proceeding on the assumption that all the injured persons
and deceased were engaged in pilfering· the petrol and the explosio.n
was a direct consequence of the same. The learned Single Judge also
held that in view of sub-section ( 4) of section 92A of the Act if there is
a wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the deceased or the
injured, the claim under section 92A of the Act for compensation fo~ no
fault liability cannot be rejected. With regard to the applicability of
section 92A of the Act, the learned Single Judge observed that the fact
that at the material time the tanker was not being driven on the Highway but was lying turtle on its side would make no difference apd that
it was a vehicle lying on the side of the Highway and would be covered
by the expression 'use' in section 92A of the Act and compensation
would be payable under no fault liability of section 92A of the Act.
He, therefore, directed payment of Rs.15,000 as compensation under
section 92A of the Act to the respondent. The Petitioners filed a
Letters Patent Appeal against the said decision of the learned Single
Judge which was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court by
judgment dated August 16, 1990. The Appellate Bench of the High
Court has affirmed the finding of the learned Single Judge that there
was no evidence whatsoever that the person or persons in respect of
whose deaths compensation had been claimed under section 92A were
themselves committing theft or pilferage of petrol at the time of their
deaths and that these victims could have only been curious by-standers
at the site of the accident. The learned Judges have observed that the
expression 'use of a motor vehicle' covers a very wide field, a field
more extensive than which might be called traffic use of the motor
vehicle and that the use of a vehicle is not confined to the periods when
it was in motion or was moving and that a vehicle would still be is use
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19911 3 S.C.R.
even when it was stationary The learned Judges were of the yiew that
mere I)" because there w·as interval of about four and half ·hours between the collision of the petrol tanker and the explosion and fire in the
tanker, it cannot be necessarily inferred that there was no causal rel.ation b.etween earlier event and the later incident of explosion and fire
and that the earlier collision if not the cause was <it least the main
contributory factor for the subsequent explosion and fire in the tanker
in question inasmuch as the tanker was carrying petrol which was a
highly combustible and volatile material and after the collision the
petrol tanker had fallen on one of its sides on sloping ground resulting
in escape of highly inflammable petrol and there was grave risk of
explosion and fire from the petrol coming out of the tanker and the
tanker was allowed to remain in such a dangerous condition for hours
without any effort being made to prevent such great hazard of fire and
explosion from petrol escaping from the tanker. According to the
learned Judges, the collision between the tanker and the other vehicle
which occurred earlier and the escape of petrol from the tanker which
ultimately resulted in explosion and fire were not unconnected but
related events. The learned Judges rejected the submission made on
behalf of the petitioners that in the instant case the first information
report recorded by the police and the panchanama indicated that the
explosion and fire near the petrol tanker had been caused by careless
act of throwing away of a match stick used for lighting a beedi or
cigarette. The learned Judges held chat the papers and documents filed
before the Claims Tribunal under rule 306B of the Bombay Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1959 did not establish that the fire was ignited by
someone carelessly throwing a match stick. Feeling aggrieved by the
said decision of the Appellate Bench of the Bombay High Court, the
petitioner have filed this petition for special leave to appeal. A notice
for final disposal was issued on the petition and the learned counsel for
the parties have been heard at length.
Shri G.L. Sanghi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. has urged that in the instant case, it cannot be said that the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker which occurred at about 7.15 A.M.,
i.e., nearly folir and half hours after the collision involving the petrol
tanker and the other truck, was an accident arising out of the use of a
motor vehicle and therefore. the claim petition filed by the respondent
could not be entertained under section 92-A of the Act. Shri Sanghi
has made a three-fold submission in this regard. In the first place, he
has submitted that the petrol. tanker was not a motor vehicle as defined
in section 2( 18) of the Act at the time when the explosion and fire took
place because at that time the petrol tanker was lying turtle and was
,,
,.
S.D. PATIL v. V.U. MORE [AGRAWAL, J.]
35
not capable of movement on the road. The second submission of Shri
Sanghi is that since before the explosion and fire the petrol tanker was
lying immobile it could not be said that the petrol tanker, even if it be
~ssumed that it was a motor vehicle, was in use as a motor vehicle at
the time of the explosion and fire. Thirdly, it has been submitted by
Shri Sanghi that even if it is found that the petrol tanker was in use as a
motor vehicle at the time of the explosion and fire, there was no causal
relationship between the c0llision which took place between the petrol
tanker and the truck at about 3 A.M. and the explosion and fire in the
petrol tanker which took place about four and half hours later and it
cannot, therefore, be said that explosion and fire in the petrol tanker
was an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.
Before we proceed to deal with the aforesaid submissions of Shri
Sanghi, it would be relevant to mention that section 92A of the Act
forms part of Chapter VJI-A which was introduced in the Aq by
Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Act 47 of 1982). The said
Chapter bears the heading "LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT IN
CERTAIN CASES" and contains sections 92A to 92E. The purpose
underlying the enactment of these provisions, as indicated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill. was as follows:
"There has been a rapid development of road transport
during the past few years and large increase in the number
A
of motor vehicles on the road. The incidence of road acciE
dents by motor vehii;les has reached serious proportions.
During the last three years, the number of road accidents
per year on the average has been around 1.45 lakhs and of
these the number of fatal accidents has been around 20,000
per year. The victims of these accidents are generally
pedestrians belonging to the less affluent sections of
F
society. The provisions of the Act as to compensation in
.respect of accidents can be availed of only in cases of accidents which can be proved to have taken place as a resμlt of
a wrongful act or negligence on the part of the owners or
drivers of the vehicles concerned. Having regard to the
nature of circumstances in which road accidents take place,
c;J
in a number of cases, it is difficult to secure adequate evidence to prove negligence. Further, in what are known as
"hit-and-run" accidents. by reason of the identity of th"
vehicle involved in t!ie accident not being known, th<e
persons affected cannot prefer aμy claims for compensa ~
tion. It is, th~refore, considered riec;essary to ~menc;I th~-
H
A
B
c
36
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1991) 3 S.C.R.
Act suitably to secure strict enforcement of road safety
measures and also to make, as a measure of social justice,
suitable provisions first for compensation without proof of
fault or negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the
vehicle and, secondly, for compensation by way of solatium
in cases in which the identity of the vehicle causing ,an
accident is unknown , , , , , "
In this context, it may be pointed out that before the said amendment this Court had highlighted the need for legislation providing for
no fault liability in motor accidents claims in a number of decisions.
(See: Manjusri Raha & Ors. v. B.L. Gupta & Ors. etc., [1977) 2 SCR
944; State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi & Ors., [1979) 3 SCR 184;
Bishan Devi & Ors. v. Sirbaksh Singh & Anr., [19801 1 SCR 300 and
N, K. V. Bros. Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors. etc., [ 1980) 3 SCR
101.
D
Section 92A which made provision for liability to pay compensaE
F
G
H
tion in certain cases on the principle of no fault read as under:
"92-A. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the
principle of no fault-( 1) Where the death or permanent
disablement of any person has resulted from an accident
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles,
the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the
owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable
to pay compensation in respect of such death cir disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable
under sub-section ( 1) in respect of the death of any person
shall be a fixed sum of fifteen thousand rupees and the
amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in
respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall
be a fixed sum of seven thousand five hundred rupees.
(3) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1),
the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish
that the death or permanent disablement in respect of
which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful
act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle
or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
S.D. PATIL v. V.U. MORE [AGRAWAL, J.]
37
( 4) A claim for compensation under sub-section (I) shall
A
not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or
default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the
quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of sucJ:t
death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of
the share of such person in the responsibility for such death B
or permanent disablement.,,
Section 92-B preserved the right to pay compensation for death
or permanent disablement under other provisions of the Act and it
provided as follows:
c
"92-B. Provisions as to other right to claim compensation
for death or permanent disablement (1) The right to claim
compensation under Section 92A in respect of death or
permanent disablement of any person shall be in addition
to any other right (hereafter in this section referred to as
the right on the principle of fault) to claim compensation in D
respect thereof under any other provision of this Act or of
any other law for the time being in force.
(2) A claim for compensation under Section 92A in
respect of death or permanent disablement of any person
shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where E
compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under Section 92A and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for
_compensation under Section 92A shall be disposed of as
aforesaid in the first place.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
. section (1), where in respect of the death or permanent
disablement of any person, the person liable to pay compensation under section 92A is also liable to pay compensation in accordance with the right on the principle of fault,
F
the person so liable shall pay the first-mentioned compenG
sation and-
(a) if the amount of the first-mentioned compensation is less than the amount of the second-mentioned, he
shall be liable to pay (in addition the first-mentioned compensation) only so much of the second-mentioned compenH
A
B
38
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1991) 3 S.C.R.
sation as is equal ta the amount by which it exceeds the
first-mentioned comp'ensation;
(b) if the amount of the first-mentioned compensa'
tion is equal to or l'eSs than the amount of the secondmentioned compensation, he shall not be liable to pay the
second-mentioned compensation."
In section 92-C of the Act. the expression 'permanent disable-,
ment' for the purpose of Chapter VII-A was explained. Section 92-D
made the provisions of Chapter VII-A applicable in relation to any
claim in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person
C
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) resulting
from an accident of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of section
92-A. Section 92-E of the Act gave overriding effect to the provisions
of Chapter VII-A over any other provisions of the Act or of any law
for th~ time being in force.
D,
In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai
Prabhatbhai & Anr., [ 1987] 3 SCR 404 a reference has been made to
the background in which Chapter VII A was introduced in the Act and
it has been observed:
"When the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was enacted there
E
were no motor vehicles on the roads in India. Today,
thanks to the modern civilisation, thousands of motor vehicles are put on the road and the largest number of injuries
and deaths are taking place on the roads on account of the
motor vehicles accidents. In view of the fast and constantly
increasing volume of traffic, the motor vehicles upon the
F
roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the
principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher, [1968]
LR. 3 HL 330, 340. From the point of view of the pedestrian the roads of this country have been rendered by the
use of.the .motor vehicles high1y dangerous. 'Hit and run'
cases where the drivers of the motor vehicles who have
G
caused the accidents are not known are increasing in
number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part
is injured or killed by a motorist whether negligently or
not, he or his legal representatives as the case may be
should be entitled to recover damages if the principle of
social justice should have any meaning at all. In order to
H
meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the
S.D. PATIL v. V.U. MORE {AGRAWAL, J.J
39
dea.!)is and injuries caused in road accidents there )las been
A
a continuous agitation through out the world to make the
liability for damages arising out of motor vehicles accidents
as a liability without fault. In order to meet the above
social demand on the recommendation of the Indian Law
Commission Chapter VIIA was introduced in the Act.
(pp. 415-416)"
B
In that case, this Court after taking nbte of the provisions con,
tained in section 92A has further observed:
"It is thus seen that to a limited extent relief has been
granted under section 92-A of the Act to the legal repC
resentatives of the victims who have died on account of
motor vehicles accidents. Now they can claim Rs.15,000
without proof of any negligence on the part of the owner of
the vehicle or of any other person. This part of the Act is
clearly a departure from the usual common law principle
that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of D
the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming
any compensation for the death or permanent disablement
caused on account of a motor vehicle accident. To that
extent the substantive law of the country stands modified.··
(pp. 416-417)
It is thus evident that section 92-A was in the nature of a beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious
payment of a limited amount by way of compensation to the victims of
an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no
E
Y
fault liability. In the matter of interpretation of a beneficial legislation
the approach of the courts is to adopt a construction which advances F
the beneficient purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a
construction which tends to defeat that purpose. The same approach
has been adopted by this Court while construing the provisions of the
Act. See: Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jadavji Keshavji Modi
& Ors., [1982] i SCR 860 and Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan & Ors., [1987] 2 SCR 752.
G
The expression 'arising out of the use of motor vehicles" was also
used by Parliament in sub-section (!)of section 110 of the Act wherein
provision was made for constitution of Motor Accidents Clail)ls Trio
bunals f9r speedy and expeditious adjudication of ~!aims of compensation in respect of accidents involving death or bodily injuries to H
A
B
c
D
40
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19911 3 S.C.R.
persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles or damages' to any
property of a third party so arising or both. Furthermore, by subsection (1) of section 94 of the Act an obligation was impose'ct that no
person shall use except as a passenger or cause or allow any other
person to use a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force
in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person,
as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of Chapter VIII of the Act. Section 95 prescribed the requirements of such insurance policies as well as limits of liability. In clause
( b) of sub-section ( 1) of section 95, it was laid down that the policy of
insurance required must be a policy which insures the person or classes
of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section
(2) against (i) any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of
the death of or bodily in jury to any person or damage to any property
of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a
public place and (ii) the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a--
public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle
in a public place. While construing the expression "arising out of the
use of a motor vehicle" in sub-section (1) of section 92-A of the Act,
regard will have to be had to the fact that expressions to the same
effect were also contained in sections 95 and 110 of the Act.
The first submission of Shri Sanghi is based on the definition of
the expression "motor vehicle" contained in sub-section (18) of
E
section 2 of the Act which was as under:
"2( 18) "motor vehicle" means any mechanically propelled
vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of
propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not
_,
F
been attached and a trailer, but does not include a vehicle
running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type
adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed
pren1iseS"
Shri Sanghi has urged that the word "adapted" in the aforesaid
G
provision has been construed by this Court in Boiani Ores Ltd. etc. v.
State of Orissa etc., [ 19751 2 SCR 138 to mean suitable orfit for use on
the roads and that in the instant case, it cannot be said that at the time
"'
when the explosion and fire took place the petrol tanker which was
lying turtle was suitable or fit for use on the road. We find it difficult to
accept this contention. The petrol tanker was a vehicle manufactured
H
for the purpose of transporting petrol. It was a vehicle which had been
S.D. PATIL v. V.U. MORE [AGRAWAL, J.l
41
adapted for such use and was suitable for use on the road for transport·
ing petrol. At the time when the petrol tanker collided with the truck
on the national highway, it was being used for the purpose of transporting petrol. It cannot, therefore, be disputed that when the said
collision took place it was a motor vehicle as the said expression was
defined in section 2( 18) of the Act. Did it cease to be motor vehicle
after the collision with the truck on account of its lying turtle on its side
at some distance from the road as a result of the said collision? In our
view, this question must be answered in the negative. Merely because
the petrol tanker had turned turtle as a result of the collision and was
lying at a short distance away from the road, does not mean that it had
ceased to be suitable or fit for use on the road and it had ceased to be a
motor vehicle. No material has been placed on record to show that the
petrol tanker would not have been in a position to move after it was
put back on the wheels.
A
B
c
The question whether a vehicle has ceased to be a mechanically
propelled vehicle has been considered by the English Courts in cases
involving prosecution for offence under Section 15 of the Vehicles
D
(Excise) Act, 1949 which imposed a penalty on a person using on a
public road any mechanically propelled vehicle for which a licence
under the said Act was not in force. In Newberry v. Simmonds, [1%1]
2 Q. B. 345 the prosecution was in respect of a motor-car whose engine
had been stolen some time prior to the period in question. It was
contended by the owner that since the engine of the motor-car had
E.
been stolen it had ceased to be a mechanically propelled vehicle.
Negativing the said contention, it was held.
"We are, however, satisfied that a motor-car does not
cease to be a mechanically propelled vehicle upon the mere
removal of the engine if the evidence admits the possibility
F
that the engine may shortly be replaced and the motive
power restored." (p. 350)
In Smart v. Allan & Anr., [1963] 1 Q.B. 291 a similar question
arose. Here the defendant had bought a car for Pounds 2 and subsequently sold it as scrap for 30s.