# SHREE SITA RAM SUGAR CO. LTD v. THE PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1974] 1 S.C.R. 67
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973-04-24
- **Case number:** Ciyil Appeal No. 1958 of 1968
- **Bench:** A. N. Grover, C. A. Vaidialingam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shree-sita-ram-sugar-co-ltd-v-the-presiding-officer-labour-court-and-others-6020
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

U.P. Industrial Dfaputcs Act.
1947-Section 6-G(l }-Power of State Gove11unent l'O witlitfraH• reference fronr Labour Court or Tribunal-Power is confined to withdrawal of reference. for the purpose of transferring adjudication of
the reference to another Labour Court or Tribunal.
The appellant company retired three of its workmen and the industrial dif'
pute thus arising was referred to the Labour Court, Gorakhpur, for adjudicatiot
The reference was registered by the Labour Court as Adjudication Case No. 93
of 1960. The parties filed their written statement and proceedings went on re•
sultiD.2 in the Labour Court passing an order dated February 26, 1961 holding
that the retirement of the three workmen was neither legal nor justified. There
were similar disputes regarding the retirement of several other workmen and the.
dispute relating to them was referred to the same Labour Court and this reference was registered as Adjudication Case No. 98 of 1960, The three workmen
whose cases were the subject matter of the first reference were also included in
the second reference.
They applied to the Labour Court to have their names
deleted from the second reference,
and they were
accordingly deleted.
The
Labour Court gave its award .in the second reference on February 27, !961. In
this award the Labour Court specifically stated that it was not recording any
'finding with regard to the three workmen covered by the first reference.
On a
representation made by the appellant the State Government issued a notification
on February 28. 1961 withdrawing the first reference relating to the three aforesaid workmen. This was purported to be done under sub-section ( 1) of section
6-G of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Even so the State Oovernn1ent
published the award in the first reference on May 6, 1961. The appellant filed
a writ petition in the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution -for the
issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the award dated February 26,
1961
and
also for a mandamus directing the State Government to withdraw its Notification
dated May 6. 1961. The single Judge as well as the Division Bench decided
a1ainst the appellant.
In appeal before this Court,
HEID : (i) The wording of sub-section (1) of section 6-G is capable of
being construed as conferring on the State Government a power to withdraw
any proceedings or to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal
to another. But having regard to the scheme of section 6-G read in the light
of the other provisions of the Act the section will have to be in~rpreted as
giving to the State Government only a p9wer to transfer a proceediug from one
Labour Court to another. When section 6 makes it obligatory that an award has
to be made by the Tribunal concerned and that it has to be published by the
State Government within 30 days of its receipt and declares that the award on
publication becomes fina1, it is idle to expect that the legislature intended to
nullify thC entire proceedings by conferring an absolute power of withdrawal on
the State- GOvernment under section 6-G. The/roper way of reading section
6-G is to limit the power of withdrawal referre to therein only for the purpose
of transferring proceedings from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another. [75D]
The provisions of -s. 33B and s. 6-D of the Act did not support a contrary
conclusion.
Sirsilk Ltd. and Others v.
Government of Andhra Pradesh &
Another
[19641 2 S.C.R. 448. distinguished.
H
<ii) The expression 'or' in s. 6~G (1) interposed between 'withdraw any pro·
ceedings' or 'transfer a proceeding' will have to be understood as 'and'. [75H]
Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. The Com.onissioner of Income-tax and Excess Pro/itl
Tax, (1959] S.C.R., 848 relied on.
6$
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[ 1974} 1 s.r..R.

## Text

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67
SHREE SITA RAM SUGAR CO. LTD.
v.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT AND OTHERS
April 24, 1973
[A. N. GROVER AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]
U.P. Industrial Dfaputcs Act.
1947-Section 6-G(l }-Power of State Gove11unent l'O witlitfraH• reference fronr Labour Court or Tribunal-Power is confined to withdrawal of reference. for the purpose of transferring adjudication of
the reference to another Labour Court or Tribunal.
The appellant company retired three of its workmen and the industrial dif'
pute thus arising was referred to the Labour Court, Gorakhpur, for adjudicatiot
The reference was registered by the Labour Court as Adjudication Case No. 93
of 1960. The parties filed their written statement and proceedings went on re•
sultiD.2 in the Labour Court passing an order dated February 26, 1961 holding
that the retirement of the three workmen was neither legal nor justified. There
were similar disputes regarding the retirement of several other workmen and the.
dispute relating to them was referred to the same Labour Court and this reference was registered as Adjudication Case No. 98 of 1960, The three workmen
whose cases were the subject matter of the first reference were also included in
the second reference.
They applied to the Labour Court to have their names
deleted from the second reference,
and they were
accordingly deleted.
The
Labour Court gave its award .in the second reference on February 27, !961. In
this award the Labour Court specifically stated that it was not recording any
'finding with regard to the three workmen covered by the first reference.
On a
representation made by the appellant the State Government issued a notification
on February 28. 1961 withdrawing the first reference relating to the three aforesaid workmen. This was purported to be done under sub-section ( 1) of section
6-G of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Even so the State Oovernn1ent
published the award in the first reference on May 6, 1961. The appellant filed
a writ petition in the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution -for the
issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the award dated February 26,
1961
and
also for a mandamus directing the State Government to withdraw its Notification
dated May 6. 1961. The single Judge as well as the Division Bench decided
a1ainst the appellant.
In appeal before this Court,
HEID : (i) The wording of sub-section (1) of section 6-G is capable of
being construed as conferring on the State Government a power to withdraw
any proceedings or to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal
to another. But having regard to the scheme of section 6-G read in the light
of the other provisions of the Act the section will have to be in~rpreted as
giving to the State Government only a p9wer to transfer a proceediug from one
Labour Court to another. When section 6 makes it obligatory that an award has
to be made by the Tribunal concerned and that it has to be published by the
State Government within 30 days of its receipt and declares that the award on
publication becomes fina1, it is idle to expect that the legislature intended to
nullify thC entire proceedings by conferring an absolute power of withdrawal on
the State- GOvernment under section 6-G. The/roper way of reading section
6-G is to limit the power of withdrawal referre to therein only for the purpose
of transferring proceedings from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another. [75D]
The provisions of -s. 33B and s. 6-D of the Act did not support a contrary
conclusion.
Sirsilk Ltd. and Others v.
Government of Andhra Pradesh &
Another
[19641 2 S.C.R. 448. distinguished.
H
<ii) The expression 'or' in s. 6~G (1) interposed between 'withdraw any pro·
ceedings' or 'transfer a proceeding' will have to be understood as 'and'. [75H]
Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. The Com.onissioner of Income-tax and Excess Pro/itl
Tax, (1959] S.C.R., 848 relied on.
6$
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[ 1974} 1 s.r..R.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Ciyil Appeal No. 1958 of 1968.
A
Appeal by &pecial leave from the judgment and order dated August
2, 1966 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 960 of
1964.
G. B. Pai, Bhuvnesh Kumari, O. C. Mathur,!. B. Dadachanji & Co.,
for the appeilant.
Danial Latifii and S. Ramachandran, for respondents Nos. 4 and 5.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VAIDIALINGAM, J.
The short question that raises for consideration
in this appeal, by special leave, is whether the State Government has
power under section 6G of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act,
1947
(hereinafter to be referred to as the Act)
to withdraw an order
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already passed referring a dispute for adjudioation. The facts leading
up to the filing of the Writ Petition by the appellant are as follows :-
The appellant, a public limited company, carrying on business of
manufacture and sale of sugar from sugarcane, employs about a
thousand workmen in its factory at Baitalpur. The· appellant retired
three workmen, namely, Chhatradheri Lal, Chandrika Prasad SrivasD
taya and Bal Karan.
This led' to an industrial dispute. The State
Government by Notification No.
785/LC/XV1II/LA-97(GR)/1959
dated October 25, 1960, referred the said dispute to the Labour Court,
Gorakhpur, for adjudication. This reference (hereinafter to be referred to as Reference No. I) was registered by the Labour Court as
Adjudication Case No. 93 of 1960. The parties filed their written
statements and proceedings went on resulting in the Labour Court
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passing an award dated February 26, 1961, holding, that the retirement of the three workmen was neither legal nor justified. This award
was published in the U.P. Gazette dated May 6, 1961, by the State
Government's Notification dated April 4, 1961, No. 1176(E10)36/
A/46(ST)-59. There were similar disputes regarding the~ retirement of
several other workmen and accordingly that dispute was referred by
the State Government to the same Labour Court for adjudication by
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Notification No. 322(LC)XVIII-LA-115(GS)/1959 dated October 31,
1960. This reference (hereinafter to be referred to as Reference
No. II) was registered by the Labour Court as
Adjudication Case
No. 98 of 1960. At this stage it must be mentioned that Reference
No. II related to several workmen numbering about thirty or forty
which included also the three workmen covered by Reference No. I.
The three workmen covered by Reference No. I made an application
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to the Labour Court for deleting their names from Reference -No. II
on the ground that their grievance is the subject 9f adjudication in
Case No. 93 of 1960. Though the appellant opposed this application, the Labour Court by its order dated February 21, 1961, accepted
the prayer of the three workm~n and as such. th~y ~.ased to have anything to do further in Reference No. II. AdJudica•ion Case No. 98 of
1960 arising out of Reference No. II, also resulted in aifaward being
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pass~d by the Labour Cou~t on Febi;iary 27, 1961.. In this .award,
the Labour" Court had decided the dispute on ments. But 1t has
specifically stated that it is not recording any finding with regard to the
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SITA RAM SUGAR co. v. LABOUR COURT (Vaidia/ingam, !.)
69
three workmen covered by Reference No. I, as iheir names have been
excluded from Adjudication Case No. 98 of 1960, arising out of
Reference No. II. This award dated February 27, 19~1, was pub·
lished in the State Gazette on April 4, 196f.
We have earlier mentioned that the award dated February 26,
1961, in Adjudication Case No. 93 of 1960, arising out of Reference
No. I, was published in the State Gazette on May 6, 1961. ·After
the award was made on February 26, 1961, the State Government
issued a Notification on February 28, 1961, withdrawing the Notification dated October 25, 1960, making Reference No. 1. The order of
withdrawal runs as follows :
"GOVERNMENT OF UTTAR PRADESH
LABOUR(A) DEPARTMENT
No. 167(LG)/XVIII·LA-97(GR)/f959
Dated Kanpur, February 28, 1961
ORDER
Whereas an industrial dispute 'between the employers and
the workmen of the concern known as Shree Sitaram Sugar
Co. Ltd., Baitalpur, Dist!. Deoria relating to retirement of
the workmen, was referred for adjudication to the Labour
Court at Gorakhpur in G.O. No. 785(LC)/XVIII.LA-97
(GR)/1959, dated October 25, 1960.
And whereas the same dispute is also covered by G.O.
No. 822 (LC)/XVIII·LA-115(GR) /1959, dated October
31, 1960, as amended by G.O. No. 912(LC) /XVIII-LA115(GR) /1959, dated November 21, 1960, referring tbe
same question of retirement of workmen to Labour Court
at Gorakhpur;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by
sub section (1) of section 6-G of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1947), the
Governor is pleased to order that G.O. No.
785(LC) /
XVIII-LA-97(GR)/1959, dated October 25, 1960, referring
the said dispute for adjudication,
shall be and· is hereby
withdrawn."
Sd/- J. Prasad
Under Secretary."
It will be noted from the above Notification that the State Government had withdrawn its previous order referring the dispute by virtue
of powers stated to be conferred under sub-section (1) of section'6~G
of the Act. We have also referred to the fact that the award in Reference No. I was published in the State Gazette on May 6, 1961. It
will be noted that th·2 material dates to be considered with regard to
Reference No. I are as follows :-
(a) The dispute was
referred for adjudication by Notification dated October 25, 1960.
(b) The award was made on February 26, 1961.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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•
The Notification dated October 25, l~, referring
the dispute was withdrawn by
Notific'ation dated
February 28, 1961.
'·{d) The award was published in the State Gazette dated
May 6, 1961.
It will btl\ noted from these dates that the ordi:t withdrawing the
original reference was made two days after the Tribunal had passed
the award. The publication of the award was after the State Government had withdrawn its original order mal>ing the reference.
The appellant filed the Writ Petition in the High Court under
Article 226_ for the issue of writ of certiorari quashing the award dated
February 26, 1961 and also for a mandaus directing the State Government to withdraw its Notification dated May 6, 1961, publishing the
award. The proceedings before the High Court related to the matters
arising out of Reference No. I. According to the appellant, the award
dated February 28, 1961, had become ineffectual and useless in view
of the State Government having withdrawn the
Notification dated.
October 25, 1960, referring the dispute for adjudication.
Its further
contention was that having withdrawn on February 28, 1961, its previous order referring the dispute, the State Government had no power
to publish the award, as it had done on May 6, 1961 and that the
said order publishing the award had to be revoked. The union contested the Writ Petition on the ground that the State Government has
no power under section 6-G to withdraw an orcier already passed
referring a dispute for adjudication and that, in any event, it has DCJ
such power after an award has been m¥ie by a Labour Court or Tribunal. According to the union, the order of withdtawal dated Febru•
ary 28, 1961, is of no effect and that the pnblication of the award oni
May 6, 1961, was valid and that the State Government cannot be·
called upon to revoke the same.
The learned single Judge posed two questions for consideration :
(l) whether th~ power to withdraw under section 6-G of
the Act is confined to withdrawal for purposes of
transferring the proceedings to another Court Or Tribunal; and
( 2) . whether the power under section 6-G can be exercised
at any stage until the award of the Labour Court or
Tribunal has become enforceable under section 6-A
of the Act.
The learned single Judge did not consider the first question and proceeded on the assumption that nuder section 6-G the State Government has power to withdraw .a reference already made. But, after
considerin!ll the second question, he came to the conclusion that the
power of -withdrawal cannot be exercised after an award had been
made by the Tribunal concerned. In this view,~ the learned single
Judge held that the order of withdrawal dated February 28, 1961, was
of no effect and that the publication of the award on May 6, 1961.
was according to law. In this view, the Court declined to grant any
relief to the appellant.
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SITA RAM SUGAR co. v. LABOUR. COVRT (Vaidialingam, !.)
71
The appellant challenged the decision of the learn@ single Judge
in Special Appeal No. 960 of 1964. The Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court has held that the State Government has power
under section 6-G to withdraw ~ny proceedings pending before a
Labour Court or Tribunal. But it held that as the award had been
·made on February 26, 1961, there were no proceedings pending before
the Labour Court on February 28, 1961, when the ordei:.of withdrawal
was passed by the State Government. In this view the Division Bench
held that it was not open to the State Government to withdraw the
proceedings aiter the award had been made by the Tribunal and,
therefore, the Notification dated February 28, 1961, is of no effect. By
judgment and order dated August 2, 1966, the learned Judges confirmed the order of the single Judge and dismissed the Special Appeal.
The management has come to this Court in this appeal.
Mr. G. B. Pai, learned counsel for the appellant, placed considerable stress on the language of section 6-G of the Act and pointed out
that in addition to the power of transferring a proceeding from one
Labour Court or Tribunal to another, the said section, has conferred
an absolute right on the State Government to withdraw an order al·
ready passed referring a dispute for adjudication. There is only an
obligation on the State Government to make the order in writing and
also give reasons for the action taken by it. The counsel very·,heavily
relied on section 6-D of the Act and urged that this power of with·
drawing a reference can be exercised till the date when the award
becomes enforceable. Therefore, the mere fact that an award has
been made does not take away the powe~ of the State Government to
withdraw a reference. In the case before 1ls, the counsel pointed out
that the award had been made only on February 26, 1961 and the
reference had been withdrawn by the State Government on February
25, 1961, long before the award had become enforceable.• The counsel urged that, in view of the circumstances pointed out above, the
view of the High Court that the State Government h.:is no power to
withdraw the reference, as the award has been made, is erroneous.
Mr. Daniel Latifi, learned counsel for the workmen concerned, on
the other hand, urged that the view of the High Court that there is a
power under section 6-0 in the State Government to withdraw a refe·
rence is erroneous. The counsel pointed out that section 6-G confers•
on the State Government only a power to transfer ·a: proceeding from
one Labour Court or Tribunal to another. The counsel also pointed
out that section 6-D has no bearing in the construction of section 6-G
of the Act. When there is no power in the State Government to wi'th·
draw a reference, the counsel pointed out, the question ·at what stage
the proceedings can be withdrawn is purely academic. Even assuming
that there is a power under section 6-G in the State Government to
withdraw an order of reference already made, that section, the counsel
pointed out, does not give power to order such withdrawal after_ an
award has been passed.
According to him, once an award has been
made by a Lallour Court or Tribunal, proceedings bef()re !1: come to a
close and there is nothing for being withdrawn by ilie ~late Government. The counsel supported the reasoning of the High Court that
section 6-G does not confer any power on the State Government to
72
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974] 1 S.C.R.
withdraw an order. of reference after an award had been made by the
Labour Court or Tribunal concerned.
In our opinion, the first and fl)!emost question that should
ha~e
been considered by t.he High Court is whether section 6-0 confers a
power on the State Government to withdraw an order earlier passed
referring a dispute for adjudication. It is only when this point is
answered in the affirmative the further question is upto what stage can
the power of withdrawal be exercised by the State. The State of Uttar
Pradesh was a party before the learned single Judge as well as the
High Court and is 2nd respondent in the appeal before us. We have
already referred to the fact that the relief that was asked for by the
appellant was by way of writ of mandamus directing the State Government to withdraw the publication, made in the Gazette of May 6,
1961, of the award by its order dated. April 4, 1961. This relief was
asked for by the appellant on the ground that the order dated February 28, 1961, of the State Government withdrawing the reference was
well within its power. In the Writ Petition the powers and functions
of the State Government under the Act came squarely for consideration.
Under those circumstances one would have expected the State
Government to appear before this Court and place its point of view
regarding the points under consideration.
Unfortunately,
the
State
Government has chosen to reniain ex-parte in this apeeal. Hence we
have to decide the points in controversy only on the basis of the contentions advanced on behalf of the empfoyer and the workmen.
It is now necessary to refer to certain relevant provisions of the
Act.
According to the preamble, the Act has been enacted to provide for powers to prevent strikes and Jock-outs and for the settlement of industrial disputes and other incidental matters. Section 2 ( c)
states :
"'Award' means an interim or final determination of any
industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by
any Labour Court or Tribunal and includes an arbitration
award made under Section 5-B."
The above definition takes ii. both interim and final awards. Section
4-K gives power to the State Government to refer for adjudication an
industrial dispute to the Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal under
the circumstances mentioned therein.
Section ~5 gives power to
the
State Government to include other undertakings in any adjudication.
Section 6 dealing with the proceedings before a Tribunal, submission
of the award and its publication runs as follows :-
"6. Awards and action to be taken thereon-
( I ) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a
Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold its
proceedings expeditiou,ly and shall as soon as it is practicable on the conclusion thereof. submit its award to the State
Government.
(2) The award of a Labour Court or Tribunal shall be
in writing and shall be signed by its Presiding Officer.
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SITA RAM SUGAR co. v. LABOUR COURT (Vaidialingam, J.)
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.<3 )_ Subject to the provisions of sub-section { 4) every
arb1tra1Jon award and the award of a Labour Court or Tribunal, shall within a period of thirty days from the date of
its receipt by the State Government, be published in such.
manner as the State Government thinks fit.
( 4) The State Government may before publication of au.
award of a Labour Court or Tribunal under sub-section ( 3),
remit the award for
reconsideration of the adjudicaung
authority, and that authority
shall, after
reconsideration
submit its award to the State Government, and the State
Government shall publish the award in the manner provided
in sub-section ( 3).
( 5) Subject to the provisions of section 6-A, an awani
published under sub-section (3) shall be final and shall not
be called in question in any court in any manner whatso·
ever.
( 6) A Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may- either
of its own motion or on the application of any parry to the
dispute, correct any clerical or arithmetical
mistake in the
award, or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or
omission; whenever any correction is made as
aforesaid, a
copy of the order shall be sent to the State Government and
the provision of this Act, relating to the publication of an
award shall mutatis mutandis apply thereto."
The above section clearly indicates that when once an industrial dispute has been referred for adjudication, the Labour Court or Tribunal
has to conduct its proceedings expeditiously and it has to submit its
award to the State Government. The award has to be published within thirty days of its receipt by the State Government.
Power has no
doubt been given to the State Government, before publication of an
award, to remit the same for reconsideration. When the same is received
after reconsideration, the State Government is bound to publish the
same; as provided under sub-section ( 3). An award published under
sub-section (J) is final subje9t to the provisions of section 6-A. The
Labour Court or Tribunal has power to correct any clerical or arithmetical mistake in the award. But if any such correction is made, a copy
of the order making the correction will have to be sent to the State
Government. The provisions relating to publication of an award apply
to the order making a correction in the award.
Sectio'l 6-A deals with the commencement of the award. The
general rule, as provided under sub-section (I) is that an award be·
comes enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its
publication under section 6.
Sub .. section (3) provides for a slightly
different period depending upon the circumstances mentioned therein.
Sections 6-D and 6-G are as foltows :-
"6-D. Commencement and conclusion of proceedingsProceedings before a Labour Court or Tribunal shall be
deemed to have commenced on the date of reference of a
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1974 J 1 S.C.R.
dispute to adjudication, and such proceedings shall be deemed
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to have concluded on the date on which the award becomes
enforeable under [·~ction 6-A."
"6-G. Power to transfer certain proceedings--
(!) The State Government may, by order in writing and
for reasons to be stated therein, withdraw any proceeding
under this Act, pending before a Labour Court or Tribunal or
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transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal
to another Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be,
for the disposal of the proceeding and the Labour Court or
Tribunal to which the proceeding is so transferred may, subject to any special directions in the order of transfer, proceed
either de nova or from the stage at which it was so transferred;
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Provided that where a proceeding under sec!ion 6-E or
section 6-F is pending before a Tribunal, the proceeding may
also be transferred to a Labour Court.
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section
( 1) any Tribunal, if so authorized by the State Government,
may transfer any proceeding under section 6-E or section
D
6-F pending before it to any one of the Labour Courts specified for the disposal of such proceedings by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette and the Labour
Court to which the proceeding is so transferred shall dispose
of the· same."
Sections 6-D and 6-G substantially correspond to sub-section (3) of
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section 20 and section 33-B respectively of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (Central Act XIV of 1947).
It must _be stat-ed that a superficial reading of sub-section (1) of
section 6-G in iso!'ation will give the impression that the State Government has got two distinct and separate powers, namely-
( a) to withdraw any proceedings under the Act pending
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before a Labour Court or Tribunal; or
(b) to transfer the proceedings from one Labour Court
or Tribunal to another Labour Court or Tribunal for
disposal of the same.
It is on the basis of such a reading of the section that Mr. Pai, the
learned counsel, urged that there is an absolute power in the State
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Government to withdr~w an order already passed referring a dispute
for ad_iudication. This power, according to the learned counsel, is
distinct and separate fron1 the power given under the same section to
the State Government to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court
or Tribunal to another. If we do not accept the contention of Mr. Pai
that section 6-G confers two such distinct and separate powers, section
6-D will not assist the appellant. It is only if we hold that the GovernH
ment has a power to withdraw simpliciter, the further question regarding the stage upto which the power could be exercised will arise for
consideration.
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SITA RAM SUGAR co. v. LABOUR COURT (Vaidialingam, /.)
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We have already pointed out that section 6 casts a duty on the
Tribunal, when a dispute has been referred to it, to deal with it
expeditiously and to submit its award to the State Government.
The
State Government has also an obligation to publish the award within
thirty days of its receipt. No doubt sub-section ( 4) of section 6 gives
power to the State Government, before publishing the award. to remit
the same for reconsideration. But still a duty is cast upon the State
Government to publish the award as reconsidered by the Tribunal within thirty days of its receipt. Section 6-A also gives certain powers to
the State Government regarding the award, which normally becomes
enforceable under sub-section ( 1 l on the expiry of thirty days from
the date of its publication.
Section 6-G, in our opinion, deals only with the power of the
State .Government to transfer a proceeding frorri one Labour Court or
Tribunal to another and for purposes of such transfer to withdraw the
proceedings from the Labour Court or Tribunal from whom it is being
transferred. We are free to admit that the wording of sub-section (1 )•
is capable of being construed as conferring on the State Government a
power to withdraw any proceedings or to transfer a proceeding from
one Labour Court or Tribunal to another. But having regard to the
scheme of section 6-G, read in the light of the other provisions referred to earlier, the secfon will have to be interpreted as giving to the·
State Government only a power to transfer a proceeding from one·
Labour Court to another. 'Nben section 6 makes it obligatory that
an award has to be made by the Tribunal concerned and that it has to
be published by the State Government within thirty days of its receipt
and declare that the award on publication becomes final, it is idle to
expect that the legislature intended to nullify the entire proceedings.
by conferring an absolute power of withdrawal on the State Government under section 6-G. · The proper way of read\.ng section 6-G. is to·
limit the power of withdrawal, referred to therein, only for the purpose
of transferring the proceedings from one Labour Court or Tribunal to
another. That the expression 'or' in section 6-G(l) interposed between
'withdraw any proceedings' .... or 'transfer a proceeding' will have to
be understood as 'and'. So read, the power conferred under section
6-0 on the State Government is that of withdrawing any proceedings
from one Labour Court or Tribunal and transferring the same to
another.
Mr. Pai drew our attention to section 33-B of the Central Act and
emphasised that the said section is worded differently from
section·
6-G of the Act.
According to him, the wording of section 33-B clearly
shows that the withdrawal (If any proceedings is only for tran_sferring
the same to another Labour Court or Tribunal. On the other hand, ·the
counsef pointed out that a different phraseology has been used in
section 6-G indicating the conferment of two distinct powers. We have
alrea<ly referred to this aspect and expressed the view that a superficial reading of section 6-G will support the contention of Mr. Pai. If
the expression 'or', ~s mentioned earlier, is read as 'and', the section
does not present any difficulty. That having due regard to the scheme
of the statute and the purpose sought to be served the expression 'or'
can be read under certain circumstances as 'and' as hM been \aid down
76
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 1974 J 1 S.C.l\.
by this Court in Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. The Commissioner of IncomeA
Tax and Excess Profits Tax.(I) Adopting the same principle and
having due regard to the object of section 6-G, which essentially is
only to confer in the State Government a power to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another, the expression 'or'
has to be read in section 6-G as 'and', If so rer.d, sub-section ( 1) of
·sectiorr 6-G confers on the State Go";;ernment on!y a power to withdraw .
a proceeding fro'1l one Labour Court or Tribunal and transfer the
B
same to another. It is needless to state that transfer of a proceeding
.can only be when it is pending before ~ Labour Court or Tribunal.
Section 6-D, in our opinion, has no relevancy in. construing section
·6-G. Section 6-D is enacted for a totally different purpose. 'For instance
section 6-E provides for conditions of service etc. to remain unchanged
in certain circumstances during the pendency of proceeding~. Similarly
·under section 6-F a question may arise whether an employer has
contravened the provisions of section 6-E during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court or Tribunal. It may be quite essential
to consider whether anrr proceedings were pending before a Labour
Court or Tribunal. For the purpose of considering the question whether
any proceedings were pending, the Act has created a fiction under
section 6-D by indicating the starting point of a proceeging before a
Labour Court as well as its conclusion. The starting point of the
proceedings has been fixed from the date of the reference and its
termination has been fixed as the date on which the award becomes
enforceable under section 6-A. During this period broadly it has to be
considered that proceedings ai:e- pending before a Labour Court or
Tribunal.
We need not refer to the other provisions of the Act where
the duration of the pendency of proceedings may assume importance.
Section 6-D can be invoked only in those cases. But it does not come
into the picture, as mentioned earlier, in construing section 6-G.
Mr· Pai xeferred us to the decision of this Court in
The Sirsilk
Ltd., and Others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh &
Another('),
where the provisions of section 17 and 18 of the Central Act were
read in harmony ~nd the Srnte Government was directed not to publish
the award though its publication was mandatory. We are not faced with
such a situation in the case before us. We have already referred to the
fact that in Adjudication Case No. 98 of 1960, arising out of Reference
No. II, respondents 4 to 6 herein had requested the Labour Court to
exclude them from the said adjudication on the ground that they are
already covered by Adjui:licalion Case No. 93 of 1960, arising our of
Reference No. I. The Labour Court passed an order on February 21,
1961, excluding the said three workmen from
Adjudication
Case
No. 98 of 1960. That means the said three workmen had no further
interest in the said Adjudication Case. If that is so, the award passed
on February 26, 196 i: in the case arising out of Reference No- I was
perfectly correct and the publication of the said award on
Ma~ 6,
1961, was also in pursuance of the mandatory provisions of the Act.
There is no question of any conflict between the two awards. Hence
·the appellant cannot seek any assistance. from the decision
of this
ii I [1959] S.C.R. 84S.
(2) [1964] (2) S. C. R. 448.
c
D
E
F
G
H
SITA RAM SUGAR co. v. LABOUR COURT (Vaidialingam, J.)
17
A
Court in The Sirsilk Ltd., and Others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh
& Another(') and it cannot ask for a writ of mandamus directing the
State Government to cancel the publication of the award.
B
We are in agreement with the view of the High Court that the
appellant is not entitled to any relief, though for different reasons. The
appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
G.C.
Appeal dismissed.
•I) [1964] 2 S. C. R. 448.