# SHRI BALWAN SINGH v. SHRI LAKSHMI NARAIN & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 91
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1957-02-28
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shri-balwan-singh-v-shri-lakshmi-narain-others-1906
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

...
3 S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
91
of the Act of 1913 may be continued after the repeal
of that Act, it follows that the .;District Judge of
Poona continues to have jurisdiction to entertain
it. If it were not so, then s. 6 would become infructuous.
For these reasons we think that the appeal J'hust
fail and it is therefore dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
SHRI BALWAN SINGH
v.
SHRI LAKSHMI NARAIN & OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, O.J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO AND J. 0. SHAH, JJ).
Election Petition-Corrupt Practice-Hiring vehicle for conveyance of electors-Pleadings-Particulars of contract of hiring, if
necessary-Representation of the People Act, z95z, (43 of z95z),
ss. 83(z)(b), 90(3) and z23(5).
The first respondent filed an election petition for an order
that the election of the appellant be declared void on the ground
that the appellant had committed the corrupt practice under
s. 123(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, in that
he had hired a tractor for conveying women electors from their
houses to places of polling and back. By an amendment application the first respondent gave particulars about the conveying of
voters, but he did not give any particulars regarding the contract
of hiring nor did the appellant ask for such particulars. At the
trial the first respondent led evidence in respect of the contract
of hiring and the appellant raised no objection to the relevance
of that evidence. The Election Tribunal dismissed the petition
but on appeal the High Court held the charge proved and
declated the election of the appellant void.
The appellant contended that the election petition ought to have been dismissed
because particulars of the contract of hiring which was an essential ingredient of the corrupt practice had not been given.
Held, (per Sinha ;c. ]., Jafer Imam, K. N. Wanchoo and
J.C. Shah, JJ), that the corrupt practice under s. 123(5) was the
conveying of electors to and from the polling station and not the
contract of hiring. If the election petition gave particulars about
the use of a vehicle for conveying of electors to; and from the
polling station, the failure to give particulars of the contract of
hiring, as distinguished from the fact of hiring, did not render
the petition defective.
An election petition was not liable to be
B. M. Sugar
Syndicate Ltd.
v.
]. R. Kulkarni
Sarkar].
February, 23
92
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
rg6o
dismissed in limine merely because full particulars of a corrupt
practice alleged were not set out. If an objection was taken and
Shri Balwan Singh the Tribunal was of the view that full particulars had not been
v.
set out the petitioner had to be given an opportunity to amend
Shri
or amplify the particulars. It was only in the event of nonLakshmi Narain compliance with the order to supply the particulars that the
char~e which remained vague could be struck ont.
Resides, in
the present case no material prejudice was caused to the appellant
by the absence of the particulars of the contract of hiring.
Sarkar J.-Under s. r23(5) the hiring of the vehicle for
conveyance of electors was an essential element of the corrupt
practice and it was necessary to give particulars of the contract
of hiring.
But the failure to give such particulars did not render
the petition liable to be dismissed. Section 83 of the Act did not
provide for the dismissal of the petition for failure to furnish
particulars nor did s. 90(3) empower the Tribunal to dismiss a
petition for non-compliance with the provisions of s. 83. The
appellant was entitled to apply for particulars but he did not do
so; he could not at a later stage complain about the absence_ of
the particulars.
CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 4ll of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated 9th January 1959 of the Allahabad High
Court in :First Appeal No. 448/A of 1958.
L. K. Jha, P. Rama Reddy, R. K. Garg and R. Patnaik fm the appellant.
G. S. Pathak, G. N. Dikshit, Udai Pratap Singh,
J.

## Text

...
3 S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
91
of the Act of 1913 may be continued after the repeal
of that Act, it follows that the .;District Judge of
Poona continues to have jurisdiction to entertain
it. If it were not so, then s. 6 would become infructuous.
For these reasons we think that the appeal J'hust
fail and it is therefore dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
SHRI BALWAN SINGH
v.
SHRI LAKSHMI NARAIN & OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, O.J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO AND J. 0. SHAH, JJ).
Election Petition-Corrupt Practice-Hiring vehicle for conveyance of electors-Pleadings-Particulars of contract of hiring, if
necessary-Representation of the People Act, z95z, (43 of z95z),
ss. 83(z)(b), 90(3) and z23(5).
The first respondent filed an election petition for an order
that the election of the appellant be declared void on the ground
that the appellant had committed the corrupt practice under
s. 123(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, in that
he had hired a tractor for conveying women electors from their
houses to places of polling and back. By an amendment application the first respondent gave particulars about the conveying of
voters, but he did not give any particulars regarding the contract
of hiring nor did the appellant ask for such particulars. At the
trial the first respondent led evidence in respect of the contract
of hiring and the appellant raised no objection to the relevance
of that evidence. The Election Tribunal dismissed the petition
but on appeal the High Court held the charge proved and
declated the election of the appellant void.
The appellant contended that the election petition ought to have been dismissed
because particulars of the contract of hiring which was an essential ingredient of the corrupt practice had not been given.
Held, (per Sinha ;c. ]., Jafer Imam, K. N. Wanchoo and
J.C. Shah, JJ), that the corrupt practice under s. 123(5) was the
conveying of electors to and from the polling station and not the
contract of hiring. If the election petition gave particulars about
the use of a vehicle for conveying of electors to; and from the
polling station, the failure to give particulars of the contract of
hiring, as distinguished from the fact of hiring, did not render
the petition defective.
An election petition was not liable to be
B. M. Sugar
Syndicate Ltd.
v.
]. R. Kulkarni
Sarkar].
February, 23
92
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
rg6o
dismissed in limine merely because full particulars of a corrupt
practice alleged were not set out. If an objection was taken and
Shri Balwan Singh the Tribunal was of the view that full particulars had not been
v.
set out the petitioner had to be given an opportunity to amend
Shri
or amplify the particulars. It was only in the event of nonLakshmi Narain compliance with the order to supply the particulars that the
char~e which remained vague could be struck ont.
Resides, in
the present case no material prejudice was caused to the appellant
by the absence of the particulars of the contract of hiring.
Sarkar J.-Under s. r23(5) the hiring of the vehicle for
conveyance of electors was an essential element of the corrupt
practice and it was necessary to give particulars of the contract
of hiring.
But the failure to give such particulars did not render
the petition liable to be dismissed. Section 83 of the Act did not
provide for the dismissal of the petition for failure to furnish
particulars nor did s. 90(3) empower the Tribunal to dismiss a
petition for non-compliance with the provisions of s. 83. The
appellant was entitled to apply for particulars but he did not do
so; he could not at a later stage complain about the absence_ of
the particulars.
CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 4ll of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated 9th January 1959 of the Allahabad High
Court in :First Appeal No. 448/A of 1958.
L. K. Jha, P. Rama Reddy, R. K. Garg and R. Patnaik fm the appellant.
G. S. Pathak, G. N. Dikshit, Udai Pratap Singh,
J. P. Goval, M. S. Gupta and P. C. Aggarwala, fo:r
respondent No. 1.
1960. February, 23. The Judgment of Sinha, C. J.
Imam, Wanchoo and Shah, JJ. was delivered by
Shah, J. Sarkar, J. delivered a separate Judgment.
Shah J.
SHAH, J.-Three candidates, Balwan Singh (hereinafter referred to as the appellant), Ram Dulari and
Gaya Prasad, contested the election to the U. P.
Legislative Assembly from tho Akbarpur Rural Assem.
bly Constituency No. 6, at the last general elections held
in 1957. The polling of votes took place on February
28, 1957, and the result of the election was declared
on March 2, 1957. The appellant secured the highest
number of votes and was declared duly elected. A
voter named Lakshmi Narain-who will hereinafter
be referred to as the first respondent-submitted an
application to the Election Commission of India to
declare the election of the appellant Balwan Singh
•
-
.I .
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
93
void on the ground inter alia that the appellant" and/
r96o
or his election agent and/or other persons with his Sh . B -1 -
s·
h
.
.
ri a wan ing
consent, had committed corrupt practices and the
v.
result of the election was materially affected by such
Shri
corrupt practices committed in his interest. "
In Cl. Lakshmi Narain
(f) of para 9 of the petition, which is material for this
appeal, it was averred by the first respondent, that in
villages set out in annexure D, the appellant, his
agents and workers with the consent of the appellant,
hired and procured bullock carts and tractors for conveying women electors to and from the polling station.
In Sch. D, was set out a list of 30 villages. This elec·
tion petition was referred for trial to the District
Judge, Kanpur, who was constituted the Election Tribunal for trying the petition. The appellant by his
written statement contended that the averments made
in Cl. (f) of para. 9 were untrue ; that neither he nor
his agents or workers had ever hired or procured
bullock carts or trucks to convey women voters from
the vill~ges set out in Annexure Dor any other village
to the polling station. He also submitted that the
first respondent had not disclosed the names of the
voters nor the particulars of the conveyances, and
that the latter could not in view of the defective
pleading be permitted to challenge the election of the
appellant on that charge. On July 15, 1957, the first
respondent applied for leave to amplify the particulars
set out in the various clauses of para. 9, including the
particulars set out in Cl. (f) and prayed for leave to
amplify the recitals in that clause by incorporating
Ann. D-1 in the petition. In Ann. D-1, the first respondent set out the nature of the vehicles used, the
names of the owners of the vehicles, the names of the
villages from which women voters were conveyed at
the expense of the appellant to the polling station and
back, the hire paid, and the description of the families
to which the women voters who were conveyed belonged. The appellant submitted in rejoinder that by his
application, the first respondent in substance sought
not to amplify the particulars given by him, but to
make allegations about fresh corrupt practices, and
prayed that several clauses including Cl. (f) of para. 9
be deleted. On July 29, 1957, the Election Tribunal
Shah ].
•
94
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
r96o
rejected the application of the first respondent. He
Sh . B -1 -
5 .
h observed that:
ri a wan ing
M
]
·
h
1
t•
v.
"
ere y saymg t at t ie corrupt prac ice was
Shd
followed in the villages whose list was given in
Lakshmi Narain
annexure 'D' does not amount to giving particulars
Shah ].
as were required· to be furnished by the aforesaid
Section 83 (l)(b) of the Representation of the People
Act."
and directed that certain paragraphs including Cl. (f)
para. 9 and Annexure D be struck off.
Relying upon a judgment of the Allahabad High
Court delivered on September 9, 1957, Mubarak Mazdoor v. K. K. Banerji and another (1)
in which, the
practice to be followed in dealing with allegations of
corrupt practices, made in an election petition, on the
ground of vagueness, was enunciated the first respondent applied for review of that order. The EJection
Tribunal, by its order, dated September 13, 1957,
accepted the plea of the first respondent for review of
the order, and directed that the order dated July 29,
1957, be set aside.
The appellant applied under Art. 227 of the Constitution, to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
challenging the correctness and propriety of the order
of the Election Tribunal reviewing its order dated
July 29, 1957. By its order dated March 6, 1958, the
High Court substantially confirmed the order passed
by the Tribunal. The High Court observed that the
Tribunal had jurisdiction to review its earlier order,
and that in the circumstances of the case it was unnecessary to decide whether the order dated September
13, 1957, was properly passed, because the order dated
July 29, 1957, was" unjust and improper", and the
matter having been brought before it in a proceeding
under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the High Court
could rectify the error.by setting aside the earlier order.
Pursuant to the order passed by the High Court, the
averments made in Cl. (f) of para. 9 were restored, and
Ann. D-1 was incorporated in the petition.
By its order dated August 16, 1958, the Tribunal
dismissed the petition holding that the first respondent failed to establish the corrupt practices on which
(1) 13 E.L.R. 310.
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT l~EPORTS
95
the petition was founded.
Dealing with the corrupt
z960
practice set out in Cl. (f) of para. 9, the Tribunal
. -
5 .
h
observed that the corrupt practice described in s. 123 Shri Balwan ing
(5) of the Representation of the People Act, lies in the
.;hri
act of hiring or procuring vehicles by a candidate or Lakshmi Narain
his agent, and that this corrupt practice is not committed merely by conveying the voters, and as the partiShah j.
culars of hiring and procuring of the vehicles were not
furnished in the petition, and the evidence adduced by
the first respondent to support his case of hiring or
procuring vehicles was unsatisfactory the case of the
first respondent about the commission of a corrupt
practice by the appellant stood unsubstantiated.
In an appeal under s. 116A of the Respresentation
of the People Act, against the order of the Election
Tribunal the High Court Qf Judicature at Allahabad
set aside the order and declared the election of the
appellant void. The High Court held that the
petition was defective in that it omitted to set out the
date and place of the hiring of the tractor, which was
proved t<;> have been used for conveying voters to the
polling station, but no prejudice was caused to the
appellant as a result of that omission. In the view
of the High Court the testimony of A. P. Malik, the
Presiding Officer at Naholi polling station, corroborated by exh. 22, a petition submitted on the date
of the polling by one Raghuraj Singh, agent of Ram
Dulari, a contesting candidate, and further supported
by the evidence of witness Kalika Prasad and another
witness Raghuraj Singh, established that voters were
conveyed in a trailer attached to a tractor, at the
instance of the appellant to the Naholi polling station,
and that the evidence of one Hanuman Singh established the contract of hiring the tractQr used for
conveying voters to the polling station. The High
Court accordingly held that the appellant had committed the corrupt practice of hiring a vehicle for
conveying voters to the polling station. Against the
order passed by the High Court declaring the election
of the appellant void, this appeal has by special leave
been filed.
Section 83{l}(b) of the Representation of the People
Act, as amended provides that an election petition
96
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
I960
shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice
Shri Balwan Singh the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as
v.
possible of the names of parties alleged to have comShri
mitted such corrupt practice and the date and place
Lakshmi Narain of the commission of each such practice. Section 123
sets out what shall be deemed to be corrupt practices
Shah J.
for the purposes of the Act, and by Cl. (5) thereof, as
it stood at the material date, it was in so far as it is
relevant, provided :
"The hiring or procuring, whether on payment
or otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate
or his agent or by any other person for the conveyance of any elector (other than the candidate
himself, the members of his family or his agent) to
or from any polling station provided under section
25 or a place fixed under sub-section (1) of section 29
for the poll."
Neither in the petition as originally filed nor as
amended, the date and place of hiring the tractor
which was alleged to have been used for conveying the
voters, and the names of the persons between whom
the contract of hiring was settled, were set out. The
question which then falls to be determined is :
Whether the election petition was liable to be rejected
because it did not set forth particulars of the date and
place of hiring the vehicle alleged to have been used
in conveying voters? In the opinion of the High
Court the corrupt practice ·described in s. 123(5) being
the hiring or procuring of a vehicle for conveying
voters to the polling station, in the absence of a
detailed statement as to the time and place of the
hiring, the petition was defective. In so opining, the
High Court relied upon an earlier decision of that
Court, Madan Lal v. Syed Zargham Haider and
others('). In that case, Bhargava, J., delivering the
judgment of the Court, observed:
" ...... under s. 123(5) of the Representation of the
People Act, a corrupt practice consists in the act of
hiring or procuring certain types of vehicles by a
candidate or his agent or by any other person for
the conveyance of any elector to or from any polling station. A corrupt practice is, therefore,
. .
If) IJ E.L.R. 4~6.
-·
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
97
committed not by conveying the voter but by the
.r96o=
act of hiring or procuring the conveyance. In clause
.
.
(b) of section 83(1), an election petitioner is required Shri BaJwan Singh
to set forth full particulars of the corrupt practice
s: .
including as full a statement as possible of the Lakshmi ;arain
names of the parties alleged to have committed such
corrupt practice and the date and place of the comShah J.
mission of each such practice. The language used
in this provision of law requires the setting forth of
the full particulars of the corrupt practice and
specially mentions at least three particulars which
must be given. These are the names of the parties
alleged to have committed the corrupt practice, the
date when the corrupt practice was committed and
the place of the commission of the corrupt
practice."
Not the contract of hiring but the fact of hiring for
conveying voters to and from the polling station is
declared by s. 123(5) a corrupt practice. A petition
which sets forth the particulars about -the use of a
vehicle . for conveying voters to and from the polling
station, with details as to the time and place coupled
with as full a statement as possible in support of the
plea that the vehicle was hired or procured by the
candidate or his agent or another person substantially
complies with the requirement of s. 83(l)(b). In considering whether a corrupt praetice described in
s. 123(5) is committed, conveying of electors cannot be
dissociated from the hiring of a vehicle. The corrupt
practice being the hiring or procuring of a vehicle for
the conveyance of the electors, if full particulars of
conveying by a vehicle of electors to or from any
polling station are given, s. 83 is duly complied with,
even if the particulars of the contract of hiring, as
distinguished from the fact of hiring, are not given.
Normally, the arrangement for hiring or procuring a
vehicle, is within the special knowledge of the parties
to that agreement and it is difficult to assume that it
was intended to require the petitioner in an election
dispute to set out the particulars of facts within the
special knowledge of the other party, and expose the
petition to a penalty of dismissal if those particulars
could not be given. If particulars in support of the
13
98
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
'960
plea of the vehicle being hired or procured by the
Sh . B -1 -
5 . h candidate or his agent or by another person was used
ri
a wan ing
,
.
.
v. •
for conveymg voters to or from the pollmg stat10n
Sh1i
are set out, failure to set out particulars of the conLakshmi Na1ain tract of hiring or arrangement of procuring will not
Shah].
render the petition defective.
By The Representation of the People Act, 1951, as
amended by Act 27 of 1956, a• penalty of dismissal of
a petition or the striking out of the plea of a corrupt
practice merely because particulars in that behalf are
not set out is not imposed. By s. 90, cl. (5) of the
Act the Tribunal is authorised to allow particulars of
ariy corrupt practice alleged in the petition, to be
amended or amplified in such manner as 11!.ay, in its
opinion, be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective
trial of the petition. By s. 90( I) of the Act every
election petition is, subject to the provisions of the
Act and Rules made thereunder to be tried as nearly
as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil Procedure Code to the trial of
suits: and for failure to furnish particulars after
being so ordered but not before the Tribunal may
strike out a defective plea. The practice to be followed
in cases where insufficient particulars of a corrupt
practice are set forth in an election petition is this.
An election petition is not liable to be dismissed in
limine merely because full particulars of a corrupt
practice alleged in the petition, are not set out.
Where an objection is raised by the respondent that a
petition is defective because full particulars of an
alleged corrupt practice are not set out, the Tribunal
is bound to decide whether the objection is wellfounded. If the Tribunal upholds the objection, it
should give an opportunity to the petitioner to apply
for leave to amend or amplify the particulars of the
corrupt practice alleged; and in the event of noncompliance with that order the Tribunal may strike
out the charges which remain vague. Insistence upon
full particulars of corrupt practices is undoubtedly of
paramount importance in the trial of an election petition, but if the parties go to trial despite the absence
of full particulars of the corrupt practice alleged, and
evidence 9f the contesting parties is led on the plea
-
'
I
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
99
-f
raised by the petition, the petition cannot thereafter
r96o
be dismissed for want of particulars, because the defect,.,, . B -1 -
5 . k
·
f
d
d
f . . d. .
f h .., ri a wan ing
is one o proce ure an not one o Juris 1ct10n o t e
v.
Tribunal to adjudicate upon the plea in the absence of
Shri
particulars. The appellate court may be justified in Lakshmi Narain
setting aside the judgment of the Tribunal if it is
satisfied that by reason of the absence of full parti_.
culars, material prejudice has resulted; and in considering whether material prejudice has resulted failure
to raise and press the objection about the absence of
particulars before going to trial must be given due
weight.
Assuming that in the case before us, the petition
was defective because particulars as to the persons
x
between whom the contract of hiring was entered
into, and the date and place thereof, have not been
set out, the High Court was right in holding that no
material prejudice was occasioned thereby. In the
written statement to the petition as originally filed,
it was not expressly contended that because of the
absence of particulars as to the names of the persons
between whom the contract of hiring took place, and
_.,
the date and place of the contract; the appellant was
unable to meet the charges made against him. Even
after the petition was amended, no such objection was
raised by the appellant. Before the Tribunal, at the
hearing of the argument, a plea that the petition was
defective, because of lack of particulars relating to the
names of the persons who entered into the contract of
hiring, and the time and place thereof was apparently
raised. But all the evidence relating to the hiring.
and the time and place thereof, was without objection
admitted on the record. It is not even suggested that
because of the absence of the particulars, the appellant was embarrassed in making his defence, or that
he could not lead evidence relevant to the plea of
corrupt pni.ctice set up by the first respondent. We
are therefore unable to hold that any material pre-
-I·
judice was occasioned because of the absence of those
particulars in the petition.
The order of the Tribunal rejecting the application
of the first respondent for amplification of the particulars of the corrupt practice alleged in the election
Shah ].
•
100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
r960
petition was, for reasons already set out, erroneous ;
Sh .B -1 -
5 . hand in that view the question whether the High Court
"
a wan ing
· d"
t d "t ]f · h Id"
"t If b
d
t th h
v.
mis tree e
1 se m o mg 1 se
oun , a
e earShri
ing of the appeal, by its earlier judgment delivered
Lakshmi Narain on the writ petition, does not fall to be determined.
Shah].
•
Counsel for the appellant urged that in any event,
the High Court was not justified in disagreeing with
the considered judgment of the Tribunal on questions
purely of appreciation of evidence. But this appeal
has been filed with special leave granted under Art.136
of the Constitution. It is the settled practice of this
Court to grant leave to appeal under Art. 136 only if
exceptional and special circumstances exist, or that
substantial and grave injustice has been done and the
case presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant
a review of the decision appealed against. Merely
because the appeal has been admitted by special leave,
the entire case is not at large, and the appellant is not
free to contest the findings of fact of the subordinate
tribunals. Only those points on which special leave
may initially be granted, can be urged at the final
hearing; and normally, special leave will not be
granted by this Court under Art 136(1) of the Constitution on a plea of error committed by the Courts below
in the appreciation of evidence.
This would be sufficient to justify us in refusing to
entertain the argument advanced by the counsel for
the appellant. 'Ve may, however, observe that even
on a review of the evidence, we are satisfied that the
High Court was right in its conclusion. There was
before t.he Tribunal the evidence of Mr. A. P. Malik,
the Presiding Officer at the N aholi polling station,
who testified that he had seen on the day of polling
a tractor at a distance of 100 to 150 yards from the
polling booth. The witness stated that he did not
remember having seen any flag or poster on the
tractor. The witness, however, had made a note in
his diary about an application submitted to him by
Raghuraj Singh. P. W. 30. A copy of that application
has been produced, and it is recited in that application
that a tractor had come to the polling booth and was
parked near "the line of yoters"; that some persons,
a majority of whom were women, were sitting on the
\-
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·3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
101
tractor; that a red flag was hoisted and posters of the
r960
socialist party were pasted on the tractor; and that
-
some men and women, who came on the tractor, were Shri Balwan Singh
placed in the queue of voters. There was also the
s~;ri
evidence of Raghuraj Singh, P.W. 38, a voter in the Lakshmi Narain
constituency. He stated that he had seen the tractor
belonging to Chandra Bahadur Pandey of village
Shah ].
Chapargatha, near :the polling station; that a red flag
was hoisted and posters were pasted over the tractor
with the symbol of a banyan tree which was the
emblem of the party of the appellant. He further
stated that one Kalika Prasad and some female members of his family had come on the trailer and Radhey
Shyam, an agent of the appellant, had taken all these
voters and had given them slips of paper. Kalika
Prasad was also examined and he stated that he and
his wife and several other villagers had gone to the
N aholi polling station to exercise their franchise on
the trailer attached to the tractor; that a red flag was
hoisted and posters were pasted on the trailer; and
that there was on the posters the legend that votes
be cast in favour of the appellant. lt is established
by unimpeachable evidence that a tractor was brought
to N aholi Polling Station on the date of the polling. ·
The Tribunal accepted the evidence of Mr. Malik, but
rejected the testimony of other witnesses on somewhat
fanciful theories. The Tribunal observed that at the
material time no tractor was brought near the polling
booth, and if one was brought, the owner of the tractor
may possibly have given a free lift to the voters to the
polling station and back. The Tribunal also suggested
that the tractor may have been brought without the
consent of the appellant or his agents. But the fact
that a tractor was brought to the polling station, is
clearly established by the evidence of Mr. Malik. That
on the tractor was carried a red flag of the party of
the appellant, is established by the evidence of th,e
two witnesses, Raghuraj Singh, P.W. 30 and Raghuraj Singh P.W. 38, and also by the evidence of Kalika
Prasad. It is also established on the evidence that on
the tractor, were displayed posters bearing the symbol
of a banyan tree, which was the election emblem of the
party of the _appellant at the election. There was no
102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960J
z960
sufficient reason for disc11rding this testimony. Witness
. -
.
Hanuman Singh P. w·. 56 deposed that he was present
Shn Balwan Singh t h
·
f th
t j
f th b
·
f. h · ·
a t e t.1me o
e se t ement o
e
argam o
irmg
;~,;
the tractor belonging to Chandra Bahadur for conveyLakshmi Narain ing voters. The High Court accepted that evidence
and we do not think, judged in the context of the
other evidence that the High Court was in error in
so doing.
The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Sarkar J.
SARKAR, J.-I agree that this appeal fails.
The appellant had been declared elected at an election. The first respondent filed an election petition
under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to
to have the appellant's election declared void. Among
other things it was said that the appellant had
committed a corrupt practice which was described in
the petition substantially in these words : In villages
mentioned in annexure D the appellant hired a tractor
for conveying women electors from their houses to
places of polling and back.
The appellant applied to have this allegation struck
out as it did not contain sufficient particulars of the
corrupt practice alleged. The respondent in his turn
sought permission to give particulars of this corrupt
practice by amending his petition by the substitution
of a new annexure to his petition marked Dl in the
place of the existing annexure D. The Election
Tribunal first made an order refusing the amendment
and striking out the allegation as desired by the
appellant. Later it made another order reviewing its
earlier order and thereby cancelled that order. By
this order it directed the restoration of the allegation
struck out and the substitution of .annexure D by
annexure D 1.
The appellant moved the High Court at Allahabad
under arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution against
the latter order of the Tribunal. The High Court held
that the Tribunal had the power to review any order
made by it and that the order made on review allowing the amendment was correct. It also held that if
the Tribunal had no power of review, the High Court
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_,
3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
103
being itself seized of the matter, would be deemed to
r960
have set aside the first order of the Tribunal and
d
d
11
.
th
d
t
Th
l Shri Balwan Singh
ma e an or er a owmg
e amen men .
. e appe -
lant did not appeal from this order of the High Court.
s~~i
The parties then went to trial before the Tribunal. Lakshmi Narain
The appellant led his evidence without any objection
as to the petition being defective for want of any
Sarkar J.
particulars. The Tribunal took the view that the
corrupt practice alleged had not been proved and
dismissed the petition. On appeal the High Court
held that the corrupt. practice had been proved and
set aside the election of the appellant. Hence this
appeal.
·
It is said that the election petition should have
been dismissed because sufficient particulars of the
corrupt practice alleged had ·not been given in the
petition. The corrupt practice alleged is of the kind
mentioned in s. 123 (5) of the Act which is in these
words:
The hiring or procuripg, whether on payment or
otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate
.............. : ......... for the conveyance of any elector
............... to or from any polling station.
It is contended that the hiring of the vehicle is an
essential element of the corrupt practice mentioned in
this section. I am leaving out of.consideration the
procuring of a vehicle because that is not the case
here. It is said that the petition must, therefore,
state the particulars of the date and place of the
contract of hiring and the parties to it. Reference is
made to s. 83 of the Act where it is provided that,
"An election petition ............ shall set forth full
particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner
alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the
names of the parties alleged to have committed such
corrupt practice and the date and place of the
commission of each such corrupt practice." The
question thus arises whether the particulars of the
parties to the contract of hiring and the date when,
and the place where, it had been made should have
been given.
The respondent does not deny that the particulars
of the contract of hiring had not been stated in the
104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
z960
petition. According to him the corrupt practice
Sh .. 15 .
h mentioned in s. 123 (5) is not committed by the
" Ba wan ing
f h" .
b
b
h
contract o
irmg
ut
y t e conveyance of the
5v/,,;
electors in a hired vehicle.
Hence, he says that no
Lakshmi Narain question as to these particulars arises.
In my view the appellant's contention is wellSarkar J.
founded.
Under the section the hiring of the vehicle
for the conveyance of electors is the corrupt practice.
It is of the essence of this corrupt practice that the
vehicle must have been hired, that is to say, a contract for the hiring of the vehicle must have been
made. I am unable to imagine how a vehicle can be
hired without a contract. Therefore it seems to me
that particulars of that contract should be given.
I am also unable to appreciate the respondent's
contention. It seems to me that to say that the
corrupt practice is committed by the conveyance of
electors in a hired vehicle is the same thing as saying
that electors had been conveyed by a vehicle which
had been hired, that is, a vehicle in respect of which
a contract of hiring had been made. Simple conveyance of electors in a vehicle is not enough.
The
vehicle must be a hired vehicle. Hence there is no
corrupt practice unless the hiring of the vehicle, that
is, the contract of hire in respect of it is established.
Whether a simple contract of the hiring of a vehicle
for the conveyance of electors without actual
conveyance of them would amount to a corrupt
practice or not, is a question that does not arise in
this case. But it seems to me that whatever view is
taken of that question, that would not make the
contract of hiring any the less an essential clement of
the corrupt practice described in s. 123(5).
In my view therefore the appellant was entitled to
the particulars the want of which he now complains.
The question then is what is the effect of the failure
to supply these particulars ? I am unable to agree
that the petition was thereupon liable to be dismissed.
It has not been shown to us that the Act provides for
such dismissal. Section 83 does not say that on
failure to furnish the prescribed particulars the
petition shall be dismissed. On the other hand,
s .. 90(3) of the Act provides that, "The Tribunal bhall
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...
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
105
-f dismiss an election petition which does not comply
z960
with the provisions of section 81, section 82 or sec-
. -
.
tion 117." This section does not include s. 83. It Shri Balwan Singh
v.
• therefore seems to me that the appellant was not
Shri
entitled to a dismissal of the petition for want of the Lakshmi Narain
particulars.
The appellant was certainly entitled to apply for
the particulars. I conceive he would have such a
right 1lnder s. 83 and also s. 90(1) of the Act which
made the provision_s of the Code of Civil Procedure
applicable to a trial before an Election Tribunal, in
the view that I have taken, that the contract of
hiring is an essential element of the corrupt practice
mentioned in s. 123(5) of the Act. The appellant
'
however made no such application. Instead he went
to trial and led evidence without making any grievance that he was hampered in his defence for want
of the particulars. He cannot at a later stage
complain about the absence of the particulars. It is
unnecessary to consider what would have happened
if upon the appellant's application the respondent
had been directed to furnish the. particulars and had
.._
failed to do so, for no such order had been made.
It only remains for me to say that it is not open
for the appellant to contend now that the Tribunal
was wrong in reviewing its order. The High Court
rejected that contention in the order made on the
application under arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. For greater safety it also made an order
allowing the amendment sought by the respondent.
The High Court's decision not having been questioned
by the appellant by an appeal, is binding on him.
He must therefore accept the position that the
amendment of the petition was proper. I may also
state that if the amendment had not been properly
allowed that would not have made any difference.
The only result would have been that some more
particulars of the corrupt practice alleged would have
been wanting. For the reasons earlier stated this
would not have entailed a dismissal of the election
petition.
Sarkar].
106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960J
z960
The only other point that was argued at the bar
. -
.
was a question of fact, namely, whether the corrupt
Shri Bal wan Singh practice alleged had been proved. On that point
;;.,;
I am in perfect agreement with the view expressed
Lakshmi Narain by my learned brothers and have nothing to add.
Sarkar ].
z960
February, 24
Appeal dismissed.
THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH
(NOW MADHYA PRADESH)
v.
MORADHWAJ SINGH AND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
] agirs, Abolition of-Constitutional validity of enactmentV indhya Pradesh Abolition of J agirs and Land Reforms Act, I952
(XI of I952), ss. 22(r), 37,
Schedule cl. (4)(e)-Code of Civil
Procedure (Act V of I908), s. 9-Constitution of India, Art. JI A.
;.
These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity
of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms
Act, 1952 (XI of 1952). Applications were made before the
Judicial Commissioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the
ground that various provisions of the Act placed unreasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the Constitution. The Judicial Commissioner held that the
Act, excepting s. 22(1), s. 37 and cl. (4)(e) of the Schedule to the
Act, was constitutionally valid. The State appealed against
that part of the order which declared the three provisions
unconstitutional and one of the petitioners appealed against the
order declaring the rest of the Act constitutional.
Held, that the appeal OD the State must be allowed and that
of the petitioner dismissed.
It was not correct to say that s. 22 of the Act, which lays
down the scheme for giving effect to s. 7(a) of the Act which
permits the Jagirdars to remain in possession of certain lands
even after the abolition of their jagirs, is a piece of colourable
~
legislation and, therefore, ultra vires the Legislature. That
section cannot be said to discriminate as between jagirdars on
the one hand and other occupants of land, to whom s. 28(1)
applies, on the other, since they belong to distinct and different
classes.
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