# SHRI BHAGWAN AND ANR v. RAM CHAND AND ANR

- **Citation:** [1965] 3 S.C.R. 218
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963-05-09
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, Raghubar Daiyal, V. Ramaswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shri-bhagwan-and-anr-v-ram-chand-and-anr-3399
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

B
U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, ss. 3(4)
and 7-F-Power of District Magistrate to grant permission to sue a
tenant for eviction-Whether revisional power of State Governmeni
quasi-judicial and be exercised by observing ru.les of natural justice.
The appellants applied to the Rent Controller and Eviction Ofllcer
under s. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act,
1947, for permission to file a suit in ejectment against the predeces.-
sors-in-interest of the respondents who were the present tenants of
certain premises in Agra. After a series of proceedings before the
Officer and the appellate authority, the latter eventually ordered thatl
the permission applied for should be granted. The respondent
then moved the Commissioner of Agra in revision and the orden
granting permission was set aside by him; but upon an application
made to it under s. 7-F of the Act, the State Government directed!
the Commissioner to revise his order. Accordingly the latter cancelled
his previous order and confirmed the order granting permission passed ty the appeilate authority.
The appellants' ejectment suit, in which one of the issues was
whether the permission granted to sue the respcndents was valid,
was decreed in favour of the appellants and an appeal against this
decree to the First Additional Civil Judge was dismissed.
However, on appeal to the High Cour:t, the single Judge,
differing from the view expressed in earlier decisions of the High
Court that the revisional order which the· State Government was
authorised to pass under s. 7-F is a purely administrative order, came
to the conclusion that the permission g,ranted ·.vas invalid l:ecause
the State Government, when exercising its authority under s. 7-F
of the .Act was required to decide the matter in a quasi-judiciaV
manner and by following principles of natural justice and should
lt.ave given the'respondents an opportunity of being heard. On appeal
to this Court:
HELD: The revisional proceedings which go before tbe State
Government under s. 7-F are. like the proceedings before tbe District
Magistrate under s. 3(2) as \Vell as before the Commi33ioner under
s. 3(3), quasi-judicial in character and all these tbree authorities must
act according io the principles of natural justice. [226 B, CJ.
The right conferred on the tenant not to be evicted. except on
the specified grounds enumerated in els. (a) to (g) of s. 3(1) is "
statutory right of great significance and it is this statutory right
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of which the tenant would be deprived when the landlord obtains·
H
the permission of ihe District Magistrate. Therefore the Act must be
taken. to require that in exercising their respective powers to grant
the permission, the appropriate authorities have to consider the
matter in a quasi-judicial manner and to follow the principles of
natural justice before reaching their conclusion. [226H-227B].
The Associated Cement Compani'es Ltd. v. Bhupendra Cement Works,
Surajpur v. P. N. Sharma, (1965] 2 S.C.R. 366 and. Ridge v. Baldwin
& Ors. L.R. [1964] A.C. 40, referred to.
•
--~-----------
\ ---- .... ''
SRRI RRAGWA>iv. RMl° CHAND (Gaje>"uir .. :garlk~~.'o;J.) ..
219'
.
' : '
-
'
'
.
·; __ ,~ ·.~: .. ,::::;:,;·,·: -~: :~:·:..
.
,
A
Narottam Saran v. State of U.P. A.LR.; 1954, All. 232 and l\Iurlidhar v. Strtte of U.P. A.LR. 1964 All. 148, disapproved.- -~· -· ·
B
c
D
· Lannan Purslwttam
Paimputkar
v, ·state of Bombay [1964]
1 S.C.R. 200, considered.
·
Obiter : Ccnsiderations of judicial propr'.ety and decorum
require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined
to take the view that the earlier decisions of \he High Ccurt, whether
of a Division Bench or of a s'.nglc Judge, need to be reconsidered, ·
he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge,
_ but should refer the ·matter to a Division- Bench or, in a proper case.
place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable ·him
- to constitute a larger Bench to examine the 'q

## Text

218
SHRI BHAGWAN AND ANR.
A
v.
RAM CHAND AND ANR.
March I, 1965
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., RAGHUBAR DAIYAL AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.J
B
U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, ss. 3(4)
and 7-F-Power of District Magistrate to grant permission to sue a
tenant for eviction-Whether revisional power of State Governmeni
quasi-judicial and be exercised by observing ru.les of natural justice.
The appellants applied to the Rent Controller and Eviction Ofllcer
under s. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act,
1947, for permission to file a suit in ejectment against the predeces.-
sors-in-interest of the respondents who were the present tenants of
certain premises in Agra. After a series of proceedings before the
Officer and the appellate authority, the latter eventually ordered thatl
the permission applied for should be granted. The respondent
then moved the Commissioner of Agra in revision and the orden
granting permission was set aside by him; but upon an application
made to it under s. 7-F of the Act, the State Government directed!
the Commissioner to revise his order. Accordingly the latter cancelled
his previous order and confirmed the order granting permission passed ty the appeilate authority.
The appellants' ejectment suit, in which one of the issues was
whether the permission granted to sue the respcndents was valid,
was decreed in favour of the appellants and an appeal against this
decree to the First Additional Civil Judge was dismissed.
However, on appeal to the High Cour:t, the single Judge,
differing from the view expressed in earlier decisions of the High
Court that the revisional order which the· State Government was
authorised to pass under s. 7-F is a purely administrative order, came
to the conclusion that the permission g,ranted ·.vas invalid l:ecause
the State Government, when exercising its authority under s. 7-F
of the .Act was required to decide the matter in a quasi-judiciaV
manner and by following principles of natural justice and should
lt.ave given the'respondents an opportunity of being heard. On appeal
to this Court:
HELD: The revisional proceedings which go before tbe State
Government under s. 7-F are. like the proceedings before tbe District
Magistrate under s. 3(2) as \Vell as before the Commi33ioner under
s. 3(3), quasi-judicial in character and all these tbree authorities must
act according io the principles of natural justice. [226 B, CJ.
The right conferred on the tenant not to be evicted. except on
the specified grounds enumerated in els. (a) to (g) of s. 3(1) is "
statutory right of great significance and it is this statutory right
c
D
E
F
G
of which the tenant would be deprived when the landlord obtains·
H
the permission of ihe District Magistrate. Therefore the Act must be
taken. to require that in exercising their respective powers to grant
the permission, the appropriate authorities have to consider the
matter in a quasi-judicial manner and to follow the principles of
natural justice before reaching their conclusion. [226H-227B].
The Associated Cement Compani'es Ltd. v. Bhupendra Cement Works,
Surajpur v. P. N. Sharma, (1965] 2 S.C.R. 366 and. Ridge v. Baldwin
& Ors. L.R. [1964] A.C. 40, referred to.
•
--~-----------
\ ---- .... ''
SRRI RRAGWA>iv. RMl° CHAND (Gaje>"uir .. :garlk~~.'o;J.) ..
219'
.
' : '
-
'
'
.
·; __ ,~ ·.~: .. ,::::;:,;·,·: -~: :~:·:..
.
,
A
Narottam Saran v. State of U.P. A.LR.; 1954, All. 232 and l\Iurlidhar v. Strtte of U.P. A.LR. 1964 All. 148, disapproved.- -~· -· ·
B
c
D
· Lannan Purslwttam
Paimputkar
v, ·state of Bombay [1964]
1 S.C.R. 200, considered.
·
Obiter : Ccnsiderations of judicial propr'.ety and decorum
require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined
to take the view that the earlier decisions of \he High Ccurt, whether
of a Division Bench or of a s'.nglc Judge, need to be reconsidered, ·
he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge,
_ but should refer the ·matter to a Division- Bench or, in a proper case.
place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable ·him
- to constitute a larger Bench to examine the 'question. That is the
proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is
. founded on healthy principles of j'1dicial decorum and propriety.
[228B-D]
.
C1Vll APPELLATE JuRISDlCTION : . Civil Appeal No. 764 of ..
1964.
•
Appeal by special leave from the· judgment and decree dated
May 9, 1963, of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal
No. 2272 of 1959.
·
A. v, Viswanatha Sastri, B. R. L. lyrngar, S. K. Mehta, and
K. L. Mehta, for the appellants.
·
C. B. Agarwala, S. S. Khanuja and Gcnpat Rai. for the res-
. E
· pendents.
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H
The Judgment of the Court was deliver~d by
G:ijendragadkar, C •. J. The short question of law which
arises in this appeal by special leave is whether the reviSional orde1
passer.I by the State Goyernment of Uttar Pradesh under s. 7-F
of the Uttar Prad~sh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction
Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act), is rendered invalid by reason
of the fact that before passing th.- said crc.'er; the State Gov,,rnment
did not hear the two respondents; Ram Chand and Kai!ash Chr.nd,
. who were affected by it. This question arises in. this. way: The respondents are the present tenants of the premises bearing municipal
No. 863., situated at Jumna Kinara Ro~d. Agra, com1r.only known
-as Putaria ·Mahal. -Their predecessors were let into possession as
·tenants by the appell3nts, Lala Shri Bhagwan and Shrimati Go pal
Devi, on an agreement that they would pay a monthly rent of
Rs. 58-4-0 and that the tenancy would commence from the Sudi 1
of each Hindi month and end on Badi · 15 of the next month ..
The two appellants applied to the Rent Controller and Eviction
Ut!icer (hereafter called the Officer), under s. 3 of the Act for
permission to file a suit in ejectment. against the predecessors-in-·
interest of the respondents. The Officer granted permission· by his
order passed on September I, 1951. The respondents then moved
the Additional District Magistrate, who had been authorised by the ' .
District Magistrate to hear appeals against the decision of. the .
Officer. The appellate authority declined to confirm the pennis·
220
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1965] 3 s.c.R.
sion ,granted to the appellants and remanded the case to the
Officer for a fresh hearing. On re-hearing the matter, the Officer
changed his view and rejected the appellants' application for permission on August 9, 1952. The appellants then moved the appellate authority again and prayed that the original order granting
permission to them to sue the respondents should be restored. On
December 9, 1952, the appellate authority ordered that permission
•hould be granted to the appellants for suing the respondents in
ejectment. The respondents then moved the Commissioner of Agra
in revision. On February 4, 1953, the revisional authority allowed
the revisional application and set aside the appellate order granting
permission to the appellants. That took the appellants to the State
Government under s. 7-F of the Act. On May, 7, 1953, the State
Government directed the Commissioner to revise his order on the
ground that it thought that the need of the appellants was genuine.
Acting in purs,uance of this direction, the Commissioner passed an
order on July 28, J 953, by which he cancelled his previous order and
confirmed the order passed by the appellate authority, granting
oermission to the appellants to sue the respondents in ejectment.
This order was clearlv the result of the direction issued by the State
Government under s. 7-F of the Act. After this order was passed, the
appellants sued the respondents in ejectment in the court of the
Civil Judge, Agra.
The claim made by the appellants for ejectment of the respondents· was resisted by them on several grounds, and on the contentions raised by the respondents. the trial court framed six issues.
One of the issues was whether the permission granted to the appeL
!ants to sue the respondents was valid. It is with this issue that we
are concerned in the present appeal. The trial Judge found in favour
of the· appellants on this issue and recorded· his conclusion in their
favour even on the other issues which had been framed by him.
ln the result, the trial court passed a decree in favour of the appel·
!ants on August 31, 1957. The respondents challenged this decree
by preferring an appeal in the court of the First Additional Civil
Judge, Agra. In their appeal, they disputed the correctness of the
h1ndings recorded by the trial court on all the issues, including the
issue about the validity of the sanction obtained by the appellants
before filing the present suit. The appeal court confirmed all the
findings recorded by the. trial Judge, with the result that the respondents' appeal was dismissed, on the 30th May, 1959.
The respondents then went to the Allahabad High Court by
way of second appeal. The learned single Judge of the said High
Court, who heard the said appeal, was called upon to consider the
question as to whether the permission granted to the appellants
was valid. That, in fact, was the only issue which was raised before
him. The other issues which had been found in favour of
the
appellants were not raised before the learned Judge. On the issue as
to the validity of the sanction obtained by the appellants, the learned
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SHRI llliAGWAN v. RAM CHAND (Gajendragadkar,, C.J.)
221
Judge came to the conclusion that the said sanction was invalid
inasmuch as the State Government in exercising its authority under
s. 7-F of the Act. had not given an opportunity to the respondents to
be heard. He took the view that in exercising its authority under
s. 7-F, the State Government was required to decide the matter in
revision in a quasi-judicial manner and it was absolutely essential
that the principles of natural justice should have been followed by
the State Government before reaching its decision and an opportunity should have been given by it to the respondent to place their
case before it.
It appears that this question had been considered by Division
Benches of the Allahabad High Court in the past and the consensus of judicial opinion appears to have been in favour of the
view that the revisional order which the State Government is
authorised to pass under s. 7-F, is not a quasi-judicial order but
is a purely administrative order, and so, it is not necessary that
the State Government should hear the parties before exercising its
jurisdiction under the said section. The learned single Judge was
persuaded by the respondents to consider whether the said decisions
were right and he came to the conclusion that the view
taken in the said decisions was not right. The judgment delivered
by the learned single Judge shows that he had reached this conclusion on re-examining the question in the light of some decisions
of this Court to which his attention was invited. After he had
reached this conclusion and had dictated a substantial part of his
judgment, his attention was drawn to a decision of this Court in
Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar v. State of Bombay and others('),
which was then not reported. The learned Judge considered the
blue print of the judgment to which his attention was invited and
thought that the said judgment confirmed the view he had already
taken. about the nature of the proceedings and the character of·
the jurisdiction contemplated by s. 7-F. Having held that the State
Government was bound to give an opportunity to the respondents
to place their version before it, before it exercised its !luthority
under s. 7-F, the learned Judge naturally came to the conclusion
that the impugneq order passed by the State Government under
s. 7-F was invalid, and that inevitably meant that under s. 3 of the
Act, the suit was incompetent. In the result, the second appeal
preferred by the respondents was allowed and the appellants' suit
ordered to be dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the
learned Judge directed that the parties should bear their own costs
throughout. It is against this decision that the appellants have come
to this Court by special leave; and so, the only point which falls
for our decision is whether the revisional order passed by the
State Government under s. 7-F, without giving an opportunity to
the respondents to place their case before it, is rendered invalid.
When a legislative enactment confers jurisdiction and power
on any authority or body to deal with the rights of citizens, it
(') [1964] l.S.C.R. 200.
222
. SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
(1965) 3 B.C.R.
often becomes necessary to enquire whether the said authority or
body is required to act judicially or quasi.judicially in deciding
questions entrusted to it by the statute. It sometimes also becomes
necessary to consider whether such an authority or body is a
tribunal or not. [t is well-known that even administrative bodies or
authorities which are authorised to deal with matters within their
jurisdiction in an administrative manner, are required to reach their
decisions fairly and objectively; but in reaching thelr decisions,
they would be justified in taking into account considerations of
policy. Even so, administrative bodies may, in acting fairly and
objectively, follow che principles of natural justice; but that does
not make the administrative bodies tribunals and does not impose
on them an obligation to follow the principles of natural justice.
On the other hand, authorities or bodies which are given jurisdiction by statutory provisions to deal with tbe rights of citizens, may
be required by the relevant statute to act judicially in dealing with
matters entrusted to them. An obligation to act judicially may, in
some cases, be inferred from the scheme of the relevant statute and
its material provisions. In such, a case, it is easy to hold that the
authority or body must act in accordance with the principles of
natural justice before exercising its jurisdiction and its powers; but
it ls not necessary that the obligation to follow the principles of
natural justice must be expressly imposed on such an authority or
body. If it appears that the authority or body has been given power
to determine questions
affecting the rights of citizens, the very
nature of the power would inevitably impose the limitation that
the power should be exercised in conformity with the principles of
natural justice. Whether or not such an authority or body is a
tribunal, would depend upon the nature of the power conferred
on the authority or body, the nature of the rights of citizens, the
decision of which falls within the jurisdiction of the said authority
or body, and other relevant circumstances. This question has been
considered by this Court on several occasions. In the Associated
Cement Companies Ltd., Bhupendra Cement Works, Surajpur v.
P. N. Sharma and another('), both aspects of this matter have been
elaborately examined, arid it has been held, adopting the vieW
expre.>s~d by the House of Lords-in Ridge v. Baldwin and others(')
that the extent of the area where the principles of natural justice
have to be followed and judicial approach has to be adopted, must
depend primarily on the nature of the jurisdiction and the power
conferred on any authority or body by statutory provisions to deal
with the questions affecting the rights of citizens. In other words,
in that decision this Court has held that the test prescribed by
Lord Reid in his judgment in the case of Ridge(') affords· valuable
assistance in dealing with the vexed question with which we are
concerned in the present appeal.
Let us, therefore, examine the scheme of the Act and the
(') [1965] 2 S.C.R. 366.
(') L.R. [1964] A.C. 40.
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SBRI BHAGWAN v. RAM CHAND (Gajendragadkar, C.J.)
223
nature of the power and jurisdiction conferred on the State Gov·
emment bys. 7-F. The Act was passed in 1947 and it_s main ~bject
obviously was, in the words of the pream~le, to contmue durmg '.!-
limited period powers to control the lettmg and the rent of residential and non-residential accommodation and to prevent the
eviction of tenants therefrom .. The preamble further provides that
whereas due to shortage of accommodation in Uttar Pradesh it is
expedient to provide for the continuance during a limited perio<l
c>f powers to control the letting and the rent of such accommodation and to· prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom, the Act was
enacted. Indeed, it is a matter of common knowledge that similar
Acts have been passed in all the States in India.
Section 3 of the Act provides that "subject to any order passed
under sub-s. (3), no suit shall, without the permission of the District
Magistrate, be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his
eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the
following grounds". Then .follow seven clauses (a) to (g) which set
out the grounds on which a landlord can seek to evict his tenant
even without the permission of the District Magistrate The scheme
of s. 3, therefore, is that in order to protect the tenants from evic.
tion, the legislature has provided that the landlords could evict their
tenants only if there was proof of the existenpe of one or the other
of the seven grounds specified by clauses (a) to (g) in s. 3(1).
Having made this general provision, s. 3(1) makes an exception
and enables the landlord to seek to evict his tenant even though
his case may not fall under any of the seven clauses of s. 3(1),
provided he has obtained the permission of the District Magistrate,
In other words, if the District Magistrate grants permission to the
landlord, he can sue to evict the tenant under the general provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, as for instance, s. I 06. ThiS(
clearly means that the District Magistrate is empowered to grant
exception to the landlord from complying with the requirements
of clauses (a) to (g) of s. 3(1) and take the case of the tenancy in
question outside the provisions of the said clauses. That is the
nature and eff~c~ of the power conferred on the District Magistrate
to grant perm1ss1on to the landlord to sue his tenant in eviction.
Section ·3, as it was originally enacted, provided that no suiC
shall, . without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed
in any.civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accom.
modat10n except on one or more of the grounds specified by
clauses (a) to (f). Gause (g) has been subsequently added.
In 1952, clauses (2), (3) and (4) were added to s. 3 by the
Amending. Act 24 of 1952. It is as a result of th::ce amendments
that s. 3(1) now provides that subject to any order passed under
sub-s. (3), the permission granted by the District Me:>:;strate would
enable the landlord to sue his te11ant in ejectment It is now necessary to read sub-ss. (2), (3) and (4), which are as follows:
"12) Where any application has been made to the District
224
SUPREME
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REPORTS
(1965] 3 S.C.R.
Magistrate for pe<mission to sue a tenant for eviction
from any accommodation and the District Magistrate
grants or refuses to grant th~ Jlermission, the party
aggneved by his order may, w1th1n 20 days from the
date on which the order is communicated to him, apply
to the Commissioner to revise the order."
"(3) The Commission~r ~hall hear the application made
under sub-section (2\ as far as m3 y be, within six
weeks from the date of making it, and he may,
if he .is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or
propnety cf the order passed by the District Magistrate
or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him,
alter or reverse his o~der, or make such other order as
may be just and proper."
"(4) The order of the Commissioner under sub-section (3)
shall, subject to any order passed by the State Gov·
ernmerit under s. 7-F, be final."
The scheme of these three sub-sections is that the District
Magistrate should first consider whether the landlord should be
allowed to sue without complying with clauses (al to (g) of s. 3(1).
When he decides the question one way or the other, the party
aggrieved by the decision has been given a right to apply to the
Commissioner to revise the said order within the limitation pres-
. cribed by sub-s. (2). That takes the proceedings before the Commis·
sioner, and he exercises his revisional jurisdiction and reaches his
own decision in the matter. Sub-section (4) provides that the revi·
sional order passed by the Commissioner shall, subject to the
order passed by the State Government under s. 7-F, be final. That
takes us to s. 7-F. Section 7-F reads thus:
"The State Government may call for the record of any
case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing
of a suit for eviction referred to in s. 3 or requiring any
accommodation to be let or not to be let to any person
under s. 7 or directing a person to vacate any accommodation under s. 7-A and may make such order as appears
to it necessary for the ends of justice."
As we have already indicated, the question we have to decide in
the present appeal is: what is the nature of the proceedings taken
before the State Government under s. 7-F and what is the character
of ,the jurisdiction and power conferred on the State Government
by it; are the proceedings purely administrative, and can· the State
Government decide the question and exercise its jurisdiction without complying with the principles of natural justice?
In dealing with this question, we have first to examine the
nature of the power conferred on the Disttict Magistrate himself.
There is no doubt that what the District Magistrate is authorised to
do is to permit the landlord to claim eviction of his tenant, though
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SHR! BHAGWAN v. RAM CHAND (Gajendrag:dk:ir, C.J.)
225;
he may not comply with s. 3(1), clauses (a) to (g) and that clearly
means that the order which the District Magistrate may pass while
granting sanction to the Jtmdlord has the effect of taking away
from the tenants the statutory protection given to them by the
scheme of s. 3(1 ). A landlord can normally evict his tenant by
complying with the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property
Act. Section 3(1) inposes a statutory limitation on the said power
by requiring the proof of one or the other of the seven grounds
stated in clauses (a) to (g) of s. 3(1), before he can seek to evict
his tenant. That limitation is removed by the sanction which the·
District Magistrate may grant; and so, it is plain that the order
which the District Magistrate passes under s. 3(2) affects the
statutory rights of the tenants. That is one aspect of the matter
which cannot be ignored.
The second aspect of the matter is that the party who may feel
aggrieved by the order·passed by the District Magistrate, is given
the right to move the Commissioner in revision within the prescribed pericd of limitation. and this provision necessarily implies,
that the District Magistrate should indicate his reasons why he
makes a particular order under s. 3(2). Unless the District Magistrate indicates, though briefly, the reasons in support of his final
order. the Commissioner would not be able to exercise his jurisdiction under s. 3(3). How could the Commissioner consider the
question as to whether the order passed by the District Magistrate
is correct or is legal or is proper. unless he knows the reasons on
which the said order is based 1 Thus. the provision for a revisional
application to the Commissioner atso indicates that the District
Magistrate has to weigh the pros and cons of the matter and come
to a certain conclusion before he makes the order. The rule
naturally imports the requirement ithat
the
parties s·hould bfl'
allowed to put their versions before him. The District Magistrate
cannot reasonably weigh the pros and cons unless both the landlord and the tenant are given an opportunity to place their versions
before him. Therefore, we are satisfied that the jurisdiction conferred on the District Magistrate to deal with the rights of theparties is of such a character that principles of natural justice cannot be excluded from the proceedings before him.
This conclusion is very much strengthened when we consider
the provisions of s. 3(3). This clause specifically requires the Commissioner to hear the application made under sub-s. (2) within the
specified period. This requirement positiyely enacts that the proceedings before the Commissioner are quasi-judicial. This clause
further provides that the Commissioner has to be satisfied as to
the correctness. legality, or propriety of the order under revision.
He can also examine the question as to the regularity of the proceedings held before the District Magistrate. In our opinion, it is
impossible to escape the conclusion that these provisions unambiguously suggest that the proceedings before the District Magistrate
as well as before the Commissioner are quasi-judicial in character
SUPREME
COUl\T
l•EPORTS
[1965] 3 s.c.n.
Further, the revisional power has to be exercised and a revisional
order has to be passed by the Commissioner to serve the purpose of·
justice, because the clause provides that the Commissioner may
make such other order as may be just and proper. Thus, we are
satisfied that when the District Magistrate exercises his authority
under s, 312) and the Commissioner exercises his revisional power
under s. 3(31, they must act according to the principles of natural'
justice. They are dealing with the question of the rights of the land·
lord and the tenant and they are required to adopt a judicial
approach.
If that be the true position in regard to the proceedings
contemplated by sub-s. 3(2) and sub-s. 3(3), it is not difficult to hold
that the revisional proceedings which go before the State Gov·
ernment under s. 7-F, must partake of the same character. It is
true that the State Government is authorised to call for the record
suo motu, but that cannot alter the fact that the State Government would not be in a position to decide the matter entrusted to
its jurisdiction under s. 7-F, unless it gives an opportunity to both
the parties to place their respective points of view before it. It is
the ends of justice which determine the nature of the order which
the State Government would pass under s. 7-F, and it seems to us
plain that in securing the ends of justice, the 'State Government
cannot but apply principles of natural justice and offer a reason·
able opportunity to both the parties while it exercises its jurisdic·
tion under s. 7-F.
We have already referred to the general policy of the Act. In
that connection, we may mention two other sections of the Act.
Section 14 provides that no decree for the eviction of a tenant
from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement
of this Act, shall. in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant,
be executed· against him so long as this Act remains in force,
except on any of the grounds mentioned in s. 3. This section
emphatically brings out the main object of the Act which is to
save the tenants from eviction. That is why it prescribes a bar
against the execution of the decrees which may have been passed
for the eviction of tenants before the Act came into force, unless
the landlords are able to show one or the other ground inentioned
in s 3.
A similar provision is made bys. 15 in regard to pending suits ..
It lays down that in all suits for eviction of tenants from any
accommodation pending on the date of commencement of this Act,
no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of
the grounds mentioned in s. 3.
The provision also emphasises the
importance attached by the Act to the protection of the ten a n11s
from eviction. The right conferred on the tenant no to be evicted,
except on the specified grounds enumerated by chmes (a) t~ (gl
of s. 3(1), is a statutory right of great significance, and it is this
statlltory right of which the tenants would be deprived when the
landlord obtains the sanction of the District M 1'.'is•rate. That is
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F
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SlllU BHAGWAN v. RAK CHAND (Gajendragadbr, C.J.)
227
A
why we think the Act must be taken to require that in exercising
their respective powers under s. 3(2) and s. 3(3), the appropriato
authorities have to consider the matter in a quasi-judicial manner,
and are expected to follow the principles of natural justice before
reaching their conclusions.
We have already indicated that the Allahabad High Court
B · had consistently taken the contrary view and held that the functions discharged by the appropriate authorities under s. 3(2) and
s. 3(3) are administrative and an obligation to follow the principles
of natural justice cannot be imposed on the said authorities vide
Narettam Saran v. State of U.P.('). Indeed, after the learned single
c
Judge had held in the present proceedings that the view taken by
the earlier decisions of the Allahabad High Court was erroneous, a
Division Bench of the said High Court considered the same question once again and re-affirmed its earlier view vide: Mur/idhar v.
State qf U.P.('). We have carefully considered the reasons given
by the learned Judges when they re-affirmed the earlier view taken
D
by the High Court of Allahabad on this point. With respect, we
are unable to agree with the decision in Murlidhar's(') case.
E
In this connection, we may refer to the decisions of this Court
in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar's(') case on which the learned
single Judge partly relied in support of his conclusion. In
that case, this Court was called upon to consider the question
whether the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the State Government under s. 79 of the Watan Act was purely administrative, and
it came to the conclusion that in exercising the said revisional juris·
diction, the State Government is not acting purely as an administrative authority; its decision is judicial or quasi-judicial, and so, it
is essential th<., the State Government should follow the principles
of natural justice before reaching its conclusion under that section.
The scheme of the relevant provisions of the Watan Act cannot,
however, be said to be exactly similar to the scheme of the Act
with which we are concerned; whereas section 3 of the Act with
which we. are concerned in the present appeal deals with the statu·
G tory rights conferred on the tenants, the relevant sections of the
Watan Act dealt with the right of possession of the Watan property
itself. That being so, it cannot be said that the decision in Laxman
Purshottam Pimputkar's(') case can be deemed to have overruled
by nec~ssary implication the view taken by the Allahabad High
Court in regard to the nature of the power conferred on the approH
priate authorities by ss. 3 and 7-F of the Act.
Before we part with this appeal, however, we ought •o point
out that it would have been appropriate if the learned sin~le Judge
had not taken upon himself to consider the question as to whether
the earlier decisions of the Division Benches of the High Court
(') A.'.!'.. 1954 All. 232.
(2) '..T.T'. I9fi4 All.. 148.
('I fl 964] I S.C.R. mo.
L/B(N)3SCI-2
228
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] 3 8.C.R.
needed to be re-considered and revised. It is plain that the said
decisions had not been directly or even by necessary implication
overruled by any decision of this Court; indeed, the judgment
delivered by the learned single Judge shows that he was persuaded
to re-examine the matter himself and in fact he had substantial!y
recorded his conclusion that the earlier decisions were erroneous
even before his attention was drawn to the decision of this Court
in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar'sC) case. It is hardly necessary
to emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum
require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined
to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court,
whether of a Division Bench or of a single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a
single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or,
in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice
to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question.
That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters
and it is founded on healthy principles of Judicial decorum and
propriety. It is to be regretted that the learned single Judge
departed from this traditional way in the present case and chose to
examine the question himself.
The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be
no order as to costs.
Appeal dismisse,.
(') [1964] I S.C.R. 200
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