# SHRI KRISHAN v. KURUKSHETRA UNIV. (Fazal Ali, !.)

- **Citation:** [1976] 2 S.C.R. 722
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-11-17
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 947 of 1975
- **Bench:** H. R. Khanna, P. N. Bhagwati, Murtaza Fazal ·Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shri-krishan-v-kurukshetra-univ-fazal-ali-6874
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Statutes of Kurukshetra University-Ordinance X. cl. 2(b )-Scoo,, ofApp/icarion for examination-Not scrutinised by the University in the beginninR
--If could raise objection after the examination-If University could alle~e fraud
!ater-Statunent made in igndrance of law-Effect of.
Under the statutes of the respondent-University persons in servke could
take the three-year degree course in law by attending the evening classes.
A
candidate who had failed in some of the paP'ers or one year could cl-ear those
papers before comple~ing the three-year course.
Under cl. 2 (b) of Ordinance
X contained in the University Calendar, Volume I, a candidate should sub.mil
lo the University an application seeking permission to appear for an examination which should be signed by the Principal of the College or the head of the
department concerned certifying that the candidate bad attended a regular course
of study for the prescribed number of academic years.
But, this certificate
is provisional and could be withdrawn at any time before the examination 1t
the applicant failed to attend the prescribed .course or lectures before the end
of bis term.
The appellant, a Government servant; joined the LLB. I year class o[ the
University.
He failed in three papers, but was promoted to the 'Second yc&r.
B1;fore appearing in the second examination. however, he wrote to the University stating that. if be was not able to get the requisite permission from his
employer to join the law classes he would abide by any order that the liniverE
sity might pass.
The appellant, however, wrote to the University later that this
condition was not at all necessary and requested that his result in Pa.it 11 might
be announced.
In reply the University wrote to the appellant that since bis
percentage of marks in Part I was short, bi's candidature for Part II examination stood cancelled.
Having failed in his appeal to the Vice-Chancellor, he
moved the High Court which dismissed his writ petition in liminc.
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A'!lowing the appeal to this Court,
HELD : The impugned order of the university suffers from errors of law
patent on the face of' the record.
This, was not a case which should have been
dismissed by the High Court in limine.
(730-A]
(!) The last part of cl. 2(b) clearly shows that the University could withdraw the certificate if the applicant had failed to attend the prescribed course
of lectures.
But, this could be done 011/y before the examination.
Once an
applicant was allowed to take the examination, the statute which empqwers the
University to withdraw the candidature of the applicant has worked itself out
and the applicant cannot be refused admission subsequently for any infirmity
which should have been looked into before giving permission to appear.
[727-E-F]
(2) It was the duty of the University to scrutinise the form for admission
to the examination in order to find out whether it was in order. It was also
the duty of the head of the department of law, before submitting the form to
the University, to see that the form complied with all the requirements of Jaw.
ff neither· took Ca$ to scrutinise the admission form, then the question of the
appellant committing a fraud did not arise.
Where a person on whom fraud
is commiMed is in a position to discover the• truth by due diligence, fraud
is
not proved.' It was neither a case of suggestio, falsi nor of suppressio 1·cd.
[728 A-CJ
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SHRI KRISHAN v. KURUKSHETRA UNIV. (Fazal Ali, !.)
723
Premii Bhai Ganesh Bhai Kshatriya v. Vice-Chancellor, Ravishankar Uni-
••ersity, Raipur and qthers, A.LR. 1967 M.P. 194, 197, approved.
(3 )(a) There is no provision of the University statutes which could have
afforded jurisdiction to it to cancel the candidature of ihe appellant on the
ground that he had not obtained the previous permission of his superior 1Jfficers.
The impugned order did not mention this ground at all.
[7280, 729-BC]
(b) 'The undertaking given by the app~Hant that he would get the ~equisite
permi

## Text

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SHRI KRISHAN
l'.
THE KURUKSHETRA UNIVERSITY, KURUKSHETRA
November 17, 1975
[H. R. KHANNA, P. N. BHAGWATI AND S, MURTAZA FAZAL ·ALI, JJ.j
Statutes of Kurukshetra University-Ordinance X. cl. 2(b )-Scoo,, ofApp/icarion for examination-Not scrutinised by the University in the beginninR
--If could raise objection after the examination-If University could alle~e fraud
!ater-Statunent made in igndrance of law-Effect of.
Under the statutes of the respondent-University persons in servke could
take the three-year degree course in law by attending the evening classes.
A
candidate who had failed in some of the paP'ers or one year could cl-ear those
papers before comple~ing the three-year course.
Under cl. 2 (b) of Ordinance
X contained in the University Calendar, Volume I, a candidate should sub.mil
lo the University an application seeking permission to appear for an examination which should be signed by the Principal of the College or the head of the
department concerned certifying that the candidate bad attended a regular course
of study for the prescribed number of academic years.
But, this certificate
is provisional and could be withdrawn at any time before the examination 1t
the applicant failed to attend the prescribed .course or lectures before the end
of bis term.
The appellant, a Government servant; joined the LLB. I year class o[ the
University.
He failed in three papers, but was promoted to the 'Second yc&r.
B1;fore appearing in the second examination. however, he wrote to the University stating that. if be was not able to get the requisite permission from his
employer to join the law classes he would abide by any order that the liniverE
sity might pass.
The appellant, however, wrote to the University later that this
condition was not at all necessary and requested that his result in Pa.it 11 might
be announced.
In reply the University wrote to the appellant that since bis
percentage of marks in Part I was short, bi's candidature for Part II examination stood cancelled.
Having failed in his appeal to the Vice-Chancellor, he
moved the High Court which dismissed his writ petition in liminc.
F
G
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A'!lowing the appeal to this Court,
HELD : The impugned order of the university suffers from errors of law
patent on the face of' the record.
This, was not a case which should have been
dismissed by the High Court in limine.
(730-A]
(!) The last part of cl. 2(b) clearly shows that the University could withdraw the certificate if the applicant had failed to attend the prescribed course
of lectures.
But, this could be done 011/y before the examination.
Once an
applicant was allowed to take the examination, the statute which empqwers the
University to withdraw the candidature of the applicant has worked itself out
and the applicant cannot be refused admission subsequently for any infirmity
which should have been looked into before giving permission to appear.
[727-E-F]
(2) It was the duty of the University to scrutinise the form for admission
to the examination in order to find out whether it was in order. It was also
the duty of the head of the department of law, before submitting the form to
the University, to see that the form complied with all the requirements of Jaw.
ff neither· took Ca$ to scrutinise the admission form, then the question of the
appellant committing a fraud did not arise.
Where a person on whom fraud
is commiMed is in a position to discover the• truth by due diligence, fraud
is
not proved.' It was neither a case of suggestio, falsi nor of suppressio 1·cd.
[728 A-CJ
j .....
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• -
.. \
{
I
SHRI KRISHAN v. KURUKSHETRA UNIV. (Fazal Ali, !.)
723
Premii Bhai Ganesh Bhai Kshatriya v. Vice-Chancellor, Ravishankar Uni-
••ersity, Raipur and qthers, A.LR. 1967 M.P. 194, 197, approved.
(3 )(a) There is no provision of the University statutes which could have
afforded jurisdiction to it to cancel the candidature of ihe appellant on the
ground that he had not obtained the previous permission of his superior 1Jfficers.
The impugned order did not mention this ground at all.
[7280, 729-BC]
(b) 'The undertaking given by the app~Hant that he would get the ~equisite
permission of the employer did not put him out ~f wurt. It was wr.1tten b~
cause he was anxious to appear in Part II exammat1on. and was written
111
terrorem and in complete ignorance of his legal rights.
Any admissions made
in ignorance of legal ri'ghts or under dures~ cannot bind the maker of the
admission.
[729-DE]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 947 of 1975.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
the 2nd April, 1971 of the Punjab a_nd Haryana High Court in Civil
Writ No. 1039 of 1974.
·
Kapil Sibal and S. K. Gambhir for the appellant.
S. K. Nandy for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL Au, J.-What appears to have l?een a clear case of refusal
of admission to the appellant or the cancellation of his candidature at
the proper time has been completely bungled and ifcstroycd by the
inherent inconsistency and seemingly contradictory stand taken by the
respondent and lack of proper vigilance on the part of the Head of the
Department of Law. The facts of the present case lie within a very
narrow compass and only two short points of law have been raised before us by Mr. Kapil Sibbal learned counsel for the appellant.
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The appellant was a teacher in the Government High School,
Dumarkha in the District of Jind (Haryana). The University of Kurukshetra was running law classes for three years Course and had extended the facility to persons who were in service to attend the evening
classes and complete the three-years course ta that manner. The appelIJs
lant decided to take the benefit of the facility given by. the Kurukshetra
University and joined the LL.B. Part I classes some time in the year
1971. According to the University statute a student of the Faculty of
Law was given the option to clear certain subjects ill which he may
have failed at one of the examinations before completing the threeyears course.
The students were to appear in six papers each year.
In April 1972 the petitioner appeared in the annual examination of
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Part I but failed in three subjects, namely,, Legal Theory, Comparative Law and Constitutional Law of India. Subsequently· he was promoted to Part II which he joined in the year 1972. Under the University Statute the appellant was to appear in Part' II Examination in
April 1973. On April 26, 1973 the appellant applied for his Roll
Number to the University in order to reappear in the subjects in ~vhich
• he had failed and to clear them but he was refused permission and
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according to the appellant without any reasons. The annual examination for Part II was to be held on May 19, 1973 and the appellant approached the University for granting him provisional permission to
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
appear subject io his getting the permission from his employer
to
attend the Law Faculty. In between it appears that the appellant had
been prosecuted for offence under ss. 376, 366 and 363 I.P.C. and
was suspended durr11g the period when the case was going on against
him.
The appellant was, however, acquitted and was reinstated by -
his employer on August 22, 1972. It would thus appear that on May
18, 1973 as also on April 25, 1973 when he had applied for his Roll
Number to clear the subjects, the stigma of criminal case had been
completely removed.
To start the thread the appellant as mentioned already approached
the University on May 18, 1973 and wrote a letter to the University
· authorities giving an undertaking that if he was not able to get the
requisite permission from his employer to join the Law Classes, he
would abide by any order that the University may pass.
It appears
that on the basis of this undertaking he was allowed to appear at the
Part II Examination on May 19, 1973. On June 20, 1973 the appel:
!ant wrote to the University authorities that the condition on which he
was to get the permission was not at all necessary and that his results
may now be announced. On June 26, 1973 the respondent informed
the appellant that since his percentage was short in Part I his candidature stood cancelled.
Thereafter there were series of correspondence
between th~ appellant and the University authorities but the appellant .
was refused admission to LL.B. Part III Class.
The appellant then
filed an appeal to the Vice Chancellor of the University on September 2@, 1973 which was also rejected on November 3, 1973. Thereafter the appellant approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the respondent cancelling
the candidature of the appellant but the High Court after issuing notice
to the other side and persuing the application form rejected the petition in limine.
Hence this appeal by the appellant by special leave to
this Court.
The sheet-anchor of the case of the respondcn t was that the appellant had been involved in a criminal case and therefore the Head of
Institution could not give the certificate in the prescribed form that
the appellant bore a good moral character. Subsequently it was said
that as the appellant was short of the requisite perceatage in LL.B.
Part I he could not insist on his being admitted to the Part II Examination; and lastly the stand taken by the respondent was that the
Evening Law Classes were held to benefit the members of the Services
and it was incumbent on the appellant to have obtained permission
of his superior officers and as he did not do so, the University was well
within its rights in refusing him permission to appear at the Part II
Examination or in admitting him to Part III Law course.
A long counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondent of which
some paragraphs are extracted below :
"4. Para 4 of the writ petition is rebutted.
The petitioner was involved in a case under sections 363 and 366 of
the Indian Penal Code. As a result, he was suspended. He
remained under suspension till August 23, 1972, when he
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SHJU KRISHAN v. KURUKSHETRA UNIV. (Fazal Ali, !.)
was reinstated.
Consequently, he attended the le_ctures in
Part I. So far as Part II is concerned, the petitioner didn't
attend the requisite number of lectures.
According to the
notice displayed on the notice board of the Department of
Laws on January 24, 1973, the petitioner was falling short of
attendance by 48 lectures upto
December, 1972. There-
'after, another notice-Was displayed on the notice board on
April 16, 1973, according to which the petitioner was falling
short of attendance by 46 lectures. As such, the averment
in the writ petition that he attended his lectures according
to the rules is absolutely false.
Vide letter dated November 17, 1972, the Headmaster,
Government High School, Dumarkha (District Jind) made
an inquiry from the University regarding the petitioner's
result in the LL.B. Part I Examination. The intimation was
sent by the University vide their letter· dated November 17,
1972. Thereafter, a letter dated January 1, 1973, was re-
. ceived in the University from the District Education Officer
725
stating inter alia that "it may also be pointed out that Shri
Siri Krishan, Teacher was reinstated on 23-3-1972 and thereafter he is attending his duties in School. I am amazed to
learn that he is declared by your Law Department to be
attendh1g classes in LL.B. Part II simultaneously".
"A copy of this letter is appended as Anncxure 'R.1' to
this affidavit.
A perusal of this letter would show that the
p(:titioner had not been granted permission by his employer
to attend the law classes at the University. Furthermore, the
approximate distance between his station of posting and the
University is more than fifty miles. Keeping in view the
fact that he was posted in the interior of District Jind, it is
impossible that the petitioner could have attended the requisite number of lectures.
Evidently, the petitioner
was
himself aware of the fact that he had not attended the requisite number of lectures. It is also incorrect to suggest that
the petitioner's name could be sent for the examination only
if he had completed and required minimum attendance of
lectures. The examination fornis are always sent In December. Rule 2(b) of Ordinance 10 of the Kurukshetra University Calendar, Volume I, provides as under iiver alia :-
"B.-that he has attended regular course of study for the
prescribed number of academic years.
Certificate
(b) will be provisional and can be withdrawn at any
time before the examinatiori if the applicant fails to
attend the prescribed course of lectures before the end
of his term."
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
The petitioner's examination form was, as such, sent provisionally and could be withdrawn at any time in case of his
failure to attend the requisite percentage of lectures."
·
23. (i) In reply to sub-para (i) of the writ petition, it is
submitted that the cancellation of the candidature of the
petiti0ner for LL.B. Part II was not based on any extraneous·
considerations.
Under the rules of the University every
student is required to attend the prescribed course of lectures delivered to the class in each of the subjects offered.
Mr. Sri Krishan was short of attendance which was duly notified on the notice board of the Department of Law twice;
once on January 24, 1973 and again on April 16,
1973.
The admission of the petitioner to the Law course in the University was under dispute as a result of a complaint from
the District Education Officer, Jind. The petitioner came to
the Magistrate on May 18, 1973, with an application that
pending final decision of his case, he may be allowed to sit
in the examination provisionally at his own risk and responsibility.
In this appliC'ation, the petitioner did not mention
that he was also falling short in !ectures as
notified by the
Head of the Department of Law. Since the office was closed
at that time and the examination was to start at 8.00 a.m. on
May 19, 1973, the candidate was allowed to appear in the
examination provisionally at his own risk and responsibility.
(viii) In reply to sub-para (viii) of the writ petition, it
is submitted that in the admission notice printed a.t page 75 ·
in the Hand Book of Information for the session 1971-72 to
which the application for admission to the Department forms
a part, mentions that LLB. Classes in the evening were for
employed persons only. It was, therefore, implied that the
applicant while seeking admission in this class would obtain
the approval of his employers. This approval became particularly necessary because of the constant complaints of
serious nature from the employers (the. Government) of the
petitioner who insisted that he must obtain such permission.
It may be recalled that the petitioner in his undertaking to
the Registrar on May 18, 1973 promised-to produce the required permission."
It will be seen from the above affidavit that the stand taken by the
respo'adent is by no means consistent. It may be mentioned that at one
stage the University takes the stand that it was a case of shortage of
percentage and therefore the appellant was refused admission
to
appear at Part II Examination.
Later on this stan,d is given up and
the respondent averred that as the appellant did not get the permission of his superior officers and since the University was moved by
the District Education Officer to cancel the candidature of the appellant the impugned order was passed by the University.
It was also
argued by Mr. S. K. Nandy counsel for the respondent ~hat !he appellant knew fully well that his percentage was short and m spite of that
he fraudulently suppressed this fact from the University authorities
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SHRI KRISHAN v. KURUKSHETRA UNIV. (Fazal Ali, I.)
727
when he was allowed to appear in the LL.B. Part I Exami'@tion in
April 1972.
Mr. Sibbal learned counsel for the appellant submitted two points
before us. In the first place it was argued that once the appellant was
allowed to 'appear at LLB. Part II Examination held on May 19, 1973
his candidature could not be withdrawn for any reason whatsoever, in
view of the mandatory provisions of clause 2(b) of the Kurukshetra
University Calendar Vol. I, Ordinance X under which the candidature
could be withdrawn before the candidate took
the
examination.
Secondly it was argued that the order of the University was mala fide
because the real reason for cancelling the candidature of the appellant
was the insistence of the District Education Officer that the appellant
should not have. been admitted to the Law Faculty unless he had obtained the permission of his superior officers. In order to appreciate
the first contention it may be necessary to extract the relevant portions
of the statute contained in Kurukshetra University Calendar Volume I,
Ordinance X. Clause 2 of this Ordinance runs as follows :
"2. The following certificates, signed by tlie Principal of
the College/Head of the Department concerned, shall be required from each applicant:-
(a) that the candidate has satisfied him by the production
of tlJe certificate of a competent authority that he
has passed the examinations which qualified him for
admission to the examination; and
(b) tlmt he has attended a regular course of study for the
rprescribed number of academic years.
Certificate (b) will be provisional and can be withdrawn
at any time before the examination if the applicant fails to
attend the prescribed course of lectures before the end of his
term."
1be last part of this s~atute clearly shows that the University could
withdraw the certificate if the applicant had failed to attend the prescribed course of lectures:·· But this could be done only . before the
examination. It is, therefore, manifest that once the appellant was
allowed to take the examination, rightly or wrongly, then the statute
which empowers the University to withdraw the candidature of the
applicant has worked itself out and the applicant cannot be refused
admission subsequently for any infirmity which should have
been
looked into before giving the applicant permission to appear. It was,
however, submitted by Mr. Nandy learned counsel for the respondent
that the names of the candidates wh() were short of percentage were
displayed on the Notice Board of the College and the appellant was
fully aware of the same and yet he did not draw the attention of the
University authorities when he applied for admission to appear in LL.B.
Part II Examination.
Thus the appellant was guilty of committing
serious fraud and was not entitled to any indulgence from this Court.
It appears from the averments made in the counter-affidavit that
according to the procedure prevalent in the College the admission forms
are forwarded by the Head of the Department in December preceding
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 197 6] 2 S.C.R.
the year when the Examination is held.
In the instant case the admission form of the appellant must have been forwarded in December 1971
whereas the examination was to take place in April/May 1972. It is
obvious that during this period of four to five months it was the duty
of the University authprities to scrutinise the · form in order to find
out whether· it was in order. Equally it was the duty of the Head of
the Department of Law before submitting the form to the University
to see that the form complied with all the requirements of law. If
neither the Head of the Department nor the University
authorities
took care to scrutinise the admission form, then the question of the
appellant committing a fraud did not arise. It is well settled that where
a person on whom fraud is committed is i~ a position to discover the
truth by due diligence, fraud is not proved.
It was neither a case of
suggestio falsi, or suppressio veri. The appellant never wrote to the
University authorities that he had attended the prescribed number of
lectures.
There was ample time and opportunity for the University
authorities to have found out the defect. In these circumstances,
therefore, if the University authorities
acquiesced in the infirmities
which the admission form contained and allowed the appellant to appear in Part I Examination in April 1972, then by force of the University Statute the University had no power to withdraw the candidature
of the appellant.
A somewhat similar situation arose in Premji Bhai
Ganesh Bhai Kshatriya v. Vice-Chancellor, Ravishankar
University,
Raipur and others(i1) where a Division Bench of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh observed as follows :
"From the provisions of Ordinance Nos. 19 and 48 it is
clear that the scrutiny as to the requisite attendance of the
candidates is required to be made befoi;e the- admission
cards are issued.
Once the admission cards are issued permitting the candidates to take their examination, there is no
provision in Ordinance No. 19 or Ordinance No. 48 which
would enable the Vice-Chancellor to withdraw the permission.
The discretion having been
clearly
exercised in
favour of the petitioner by permitting him to appear at the
examination, it was not open to the Vice-Chancellor to
withdraw that permission subsequently and to withhold his
result."
We find ourselves in cou;iplete agreement with the reasons given by the
Madhya Pradesh High Court and the view of law taken by the learned
Judges. In these circumstances, therefore, once the appellant was
allowed to appear at the Examination in May 1973, the respo•ndent
had no jurisdiction to cancel his candidature for
th~t examination.
This was not a case where on the undertaking given by a candidate
for fulfilment of a specified condition a provisional admission was
given by the University to appear at the examination which c~uld be
withdrawn at any moment on the non-fulfilment of the aforesaid condition. If this was the situation then the candidate himself would have
contracted out of the statute which was for his benefit and the statute
(1) A.LR. 1967 M. P. 194, 197.
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SHRI KRISHAN v .. KURUKSHETRA UNIV. (Fazal Ali, T.)
729
therefore would not have stood in the way of the University authorities
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in cancelling the candidature of the appellant.
As regards the second point that the order was ·passed mala fide, it.
is difficult to find any evidence of mala {ides in this case. The order
suffers from yet another infirmity. The annexures filed by the appellant and the respondent as also the allegations made in the counteraffidavit clearly show that there were series of parleys and corresponB
dence between the District Education Officer and the respondent in
the course of which the respondent was being persuaded, to the extent
of compulsion, to withdraw the candidature of the appellant because
he had not obtained the permission of his superior officers. Mr. Nandy
appearing for the respondent has not been able to show any provision
in the statutes of the University which required that the candidates
attending the evening law classes who are in service should first get
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the prior permission of their superior officers. We have also perused
the University Statute placed before us by counsel for the appellant and
we do not find any provision which could have afforded justification
for the respondent to cancel the candidature of the appellant on the
ground that he bad not obtained the previous permission of his superior
officers.
Mr. Nandy counsel for the respondent placed great reVance on the
letter written by the appellant to the respondent wherein he undertook
to file the requisite permission or to abide by any other order that may
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be passed by the University authorities. This letter was
obviously
written because the appellant was very anxious to appeal in Part II
Examination and the letter was written in terrorem and in complete
ignorance of his legal dght~. The appellant did not know that there
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was any provision in the University Statute which required that he
should obtain the permission of bis superior officers. But as the respondent was bent on prohibiting him from taking the examination he
had no alternative but to write a letter per force. It is well settled
that any admission made in ignorance of legal rights or under duress
cannot bind the maker of the admission. In these circumstances we
are clearly of the opinion that the letter written by the appellant does
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not put him out of court. If only the University authorities would have
exercised proper diligence and care by scrutinising tlie admission form
when it was sent by the Head of the Department to the University as
far back as December 1971 they could have detected the defects or
infirmities from which the form suffered according to the University
Statute. The Head of the Department of Law was also guilty of dereliction of duty in not scrutinising the admission form of the appellant
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before he forwarded the. same to the University.
Moreover, the stand taken by the respondent that as the appellant
did not get the requisite permission from his superior officers, therefore he was not allowed to appear at the examination, does not merit
consideration, because the impugned order does not mention this
ground at all and it was not open to the respondent to have refused
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admission to the appellant to LL.B. Part III or for that matter to refuse permission to appear at the examination on a ground which was
not mentioned in the impugned order.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
Having gone into the circumstances mentioned above, we are of
the view that the impugned order suffers from errors of law patent on
the face of the record, and in any event this was not a case which should
have been dismissed by the High Court in limine.
·
The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the University
dated June 26, 1973, is hereby quashed by a writ of certjorari. The
respondent is directed to declare the result of LL.B. Part II Examination in which the appellant had appeared on May 19, 1973 and also
to give him an opportunity to appear in the three subjects in which he
had failed in LL.B. Part I Examination, at the next examination which
may be held by the University.
In the peculiar circumstances of this case, however, we leave the
parties to bear their own costs.
P.B.R .
Appeal allowed.
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