# SHRI MAHADEO P AIKAJI KOLHE YAVATMAL v. THE STATE OF BOMBAY

- **Citation:** [1962] 1 S.C.R. 733
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** writ Petitions Nos. 93 and 125 of 1959
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. c. DAS GUPTA, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shri-mahadeo-p-aikaji-kolhe-yavatmal-v-the-state-of-bombay-2073
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Agricultural Land--Amendment of law relating to tenanciesConstitutional validity of enactment-Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kutch Area)
Act, r958
(Bom. 99 of r958).
The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of
the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region
and Kutch Area) Act, 1958, which extended the provisions of
the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment)
Act, 1956, to Vidarbha and Kutch. That Act was declared valid
by this Court in Sri Ram R'!1m Narain Medhi v. The Stale of Bombay, [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 489, and one of the reasons for doing
so was that the lands covered by that Act fell within the definition of the word 'estate' contained in the Bombay Land Revenue
Code, 1879. The lands in question in the present petitions were
situated in .:\rnraoti and Ycotmal and the existing law relating
to land tenures.in force in tho! area was the Madhya Pradesh
Land Revenue Code, 1954·
This Code did not employ the word
..
'estate' and it was contended by the petitioners that the impugned Act was not within the protection of Art. 31A of the
Constitution.
IIeld, that the contention must fail.
Although the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954.
did not employ the word 'estate', the relevant clelmition contained in ss. 2(17) and 2(18) of impugned Act and ss. 2(7), 2(20)
of the Code read with ss. 145 and 146 thereof leaves no manner
J
ol doubt that the lands in the possession of the petitioners were
tenures and in substance an estate.
Since the petitioners held the lands under the State and
paid land revenue for then1, the lands fell within the class of
local equivalents of the word 'estate' as contemplated by Art.
3rA(2)(a) of the Constitution.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
·writ Petitions Nos. 93
and 125 of 1959.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
V. M. Lim.aye, E. Udayarathnam and S.S. Shukla,
fo1 the petitioners.
r96r
April 4.
1961
Shri M ahadeo
Paikaji K olhe
Yavatmal
v.
The State of
Bombay
734
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
R. Ganapathy Iyer and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the
Interveners.
1961.
April 4.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
Gajendragadkar J.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. -These two writ petitions
have been filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution and
they seek to challenge the validity of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 99 of 1958 (hereafter called the Act). The impugned Act in substance
is intended to extend to Vidarbha region and Cutch
area which had then become a part of the Greater BiLingual State of Bombay the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment)
Act, 1956 (Act XIII of 1956). The preamble to the
impugned Act shows that it was intended to amend
the law relating to tenancies of agricultural lands and
sites used for allied purposes in the two areas of the
State of Bombay and to make certain other provisions
in regard to those lands. In extending the provisions
of the earlier Bombay Act XIII of 1956 to the two
areas the legislature has conformed to the pattern set
up by the said earlier Act.
The policy underlying
the Act and the object intended to be achieved by it
are the same and the method adopted in achieving
that object is also the same. The validity of the
earlier Bombay Act (XIII of 1956) was challenged
before this Court in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v.
The State of Bombay (1) but the challenge failed and
the Act was held to be constitutional. One of the
points which arose for decision in that case was whether the impugned Act was protected by Art. 31A(2)(a)
of the Constitution, and the answer to that question depended upon the determination of another issue
which was whether the lands to which the said Act
applied were an "estate" as required by Art. 31A(2)(a).
In dealing with that question this Court held that the
word "estate" as defined by s. 2(5) of the Bomb

## Text

••
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
733
SHRI MAHADEO P AIKAJI KOLHE
YAVATMAL
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS GUPTA and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Agricultural Land--Amendment of law relating to tenanciesConstitutional validity of enactment-Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kutch Area)
Act, r958
(Bom. 99 of r958).
The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of
the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region
and Kutch Area) Act, 1958, which extended the provisions of
the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment)
Act, 1956, to Vidarbha and Kutch. That Act was declared valid
by this Court in Sri Ram R'!1m Narain Medhi v. The Stale of Bombay, [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 489, and one of the reasons for doing
so was that the lands covered by that Act fell within the definition of the word 'estate' contained in the Bombay Land Revenue
Code, 1879. The lands in question in the present petitions were
situated in .:\rnraoti and Ycotmal and the existing law relating
to land tenures.in force in tho! area was the Madhya Pradesh
Land Revenue Code, 1954·
This Code did not employ the word
..
'estate' and it was contended by the petitioners that the impugned Act was not within the protection of Art. 31A of the
Constitution.
IIeld, that the contention must fail.
Although the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954.
did not employ the word 'estate', the relevant clelmition contained in ss. 2(17) and 2(18) of impugned Act and ss. 2(7), 2(20)
of the Code read with ss. 145 and 146 thereof leaves no manner
J
ol doubt that the lands in the possession of the petitioners were
tenures and in substance an estate.
Since the petitioners held the lands under the State and
paid land revenue for then1, the lands fell within the class of
local equivalents of the word 'estate' as contemplated by Art.
3rA(2)(a) of the Constitution.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
·writ Petitions Nos. 93
and 125 of 1959.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
V. M. Lim.aye, E. Udayarathnam and S.S. Shukla,
fo1 the petitioners.
r96r
April 4.
1961
Shri M ahadeo
Paikaji K olhe
Yavatmal
v.
The State of
Bombay
734
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
R. Ganapathy Iyer and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the
Interveners.
1961.
April 4.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
Gajendragadkar J.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. -These two writ petitions
have been filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution and
they seek to challenge the validity of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 99 of 1958 (hereafter called the Act). The impugned Act in substance
is intended to extend to Vidarbha region and Cutch
area which had then become a part of the Greater BiLingual State of Bombay the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment)
Act, 1956 (Act XIII of 1956). The preamble to the
impugned Act shows that it was intended to amend
the law relating to tenancies of agricultural lands and
sites used for allied purposes in the two areas of the
State of Bombay and to make certain other provisions
in regard to those lands. In extending the provisions
of the earlier Bombay Act XIII of 1956 to the two
areas the legislature has conformed to the pattern set
up by the said earlier Act.
The policy underlying
the Act and the object intended to be achieved by it
are the same and the method adopted in achieving
that object is also the same. The validity of the
earlier Bombay Act (XIII of 1956) was challenged
before this Court in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v.
The State of Bombay (1) but the challenge failed and
the Act was held to be constitutional. One of the
points which arose for decision in that case was whether the impugned Act was protected by Art. 31A(2)(a)
of the Constitution, and the answer to that question depended upon the determination of another issue
which was whether the lands to which the said Act
applied were an "estate" as required by Art. 31A(2)(a).
In dealing with that question this Court held that the
word "estate" as defined by s. 2(5) of the Bombay
Land Revenue Code, 1879, clearly applied to the lands
(x) (1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 489.
I
l
•
i ..
..
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
735
covered by the Act and so Art. 31A(2)(a) was applicr96I
able. Having regard to this decision the only point
Shri Mahadeo
which Mr. Limaye attempted to raise before us in Paikaji Iiolhe
support of the two writ pet,itions is that the lands
Yavatmal
belonging to the two petitioners are not an "estate"
v.
within the meaning of Art. 31A(2)(a), and so the imThe State of
pugned Act is outside the protection of Art. 31A. If
Bombay
this contention is not upheld then it is obvious that G . d-dk 1
the writ petitions must fail; if the said contention is a;en raga
ar ·
upheld then of course the other contentions raised by
the two writ petitions against the validity of certain
specific provisions of the Act may fall to be considered.
The two petitioners are Namdeorao Baliramji and
Mahadeo Paikaji Kolhe respectively. The first one
resides at Amraoti and the second at Y eotmal. The
first owns about 80 acres dry lands situated in Amraoti
out of which 43 acres are under his personal cultivation and the rest in the possession of the tenants.
The second petitioner owns about 1168 acres dry lands
situated in Yeotrnal out of which 400 acres are under
his personal cultivation and the rest with the tenants.
The lands in both the cases are charged to the payment of land revenue. The case for both the petitioners is that the lands thus held by them are not an
"estate" within the meaning of Art. 31A(2)(a).
Article 31A(2)(a) provides, inter alia, that the expression "estate" shall in relation to any local area
have the same meaning as that e4pression or its local
equivalent has in the existing law relating to land
tenures in force in that area. The existing local law,
it is cornrnon ground, is the Madhya Pradesh Land
Revenue Code, 1954 (II of 1955), and so it is necessary
to find whether the lands belonging to the petitioners
can be said to be an 'estate' within the meaning of
the said Code.
Before we do so, however, it may be
pertinent to refer to the relevant definitions in the
impugned Act. Section 2(17) of the Act defines land
as meaning, inter alia, land which is used or capable
of being used for agricultural purposes and includes
the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such land.
Section 2(18) defines a land-holder as meaning a
73&
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
'96'
tenure-holder whom the State Government has decShi Mahadeo lared on account of the extent and value of the land
I'aikaji /(o/he or his interests therein to be a land-holder for the
Yavatmal
purposes of this Act.
Now, s. 2(7) of the Madhya
v.
Pradesh Land Revenue Code in question defines a
The State
01 holding as meaning, inter alia, a parcel of land scpaHotnbay
_
rately assessed to land revenue, ands. 2(20) defines a
Gajendragadlm ;. tenure-holder as meaning a person holding from the
State Government as a Bhumiswami or a Bhumidari.
Chapter XII of the Code deals with tenure-holders.
Section 145 provides that there shall be two classes
of tenure-holders of lands held from the State,
namely, Bhumiswami and Bhumidari. Section 146
deals with Bhumiswami. It provides that "every
person who at the coming into force of this Code
belongs to any of the classes specified in clauses
(a) to (f) of the said section shall be called a
Bhumiswami and shall have all the rights and is
subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon
a Bhumiswami by or under this Code".
Amongst
these classes is the class covered by cl. (e) which relates to persons in respect of lands held by them as occupants in Berar. Thus, reading the relevant definitions
along with the provisions of s. 146 of t.he Code it
would follow that the land in the possession of the
Bhumiswami who is a tenure-holder is in substance an
estate. It is true that tho word "estate" as such has
not been employed in the Code, but it must be borne
in mind that Art. 31A(2)(a) refers not only to estate
but also to its local equivalent. It was realised that
in many areas the existing law relating to land tenures may not expressly define an estate as such though
the said areas had their local equivalents described
and defined. That is why the relevant provision of
the Constitution has deliberately used both the
word "estate" as well as its "local equivalent".
The petitioners hold lands under the State and they
pay land revenue for the lands thus held by them.
Therefore, there is no difficulty in holding that under
the existing law relating to land tenures the lands
held by them fall within the class of the 100111 equivalents of the word "estate"
l1S contemplated by
... '
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
737
)
Art. 31A(2)(a). If that is so the contention raised by
r96r
Mr. Limaye that the impugned Act is not protected by
A
31A
Shri !vlahadeo
rt. '
cannot succeed. As we have already indicaPaikaji f{olhe
ted it is not disputed that if Art. 31A applies there
Yavatmal
can be no further challenge to the validity of the imv,
pugned statute.
·1 he State of
The writ petitions accordingly fail and are dismissBomhay
ed with costs, one set of hearing costs.
G .
d
d'
1
Petitions dismissed.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
v.
ABDUL KHADER
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,
K. C. DAS GUPTA and N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Externment Order-Indian citizen going to Pakistan for a
>
short period and coming back with Pakistan passport and Indian
visa, if becomes a foreigner-Conviction for overstaying, if sustain ...
able-Foreigners Act, I946 (r3 of I946), ss. 3(2)(c), 8, 9-Citizenship Act, I955 (LV II of I955), s. 9-Constitution of India, Art.
5(a).
The respondent was born in India in r924 and had lived
there all along till about the end of r954. He had been paying
rent for his shop in India for ten years upto about r958 and his
.,
. family was and had always been in India. At the end of r954
or the beginning of r955 he went to Pakistan from where he
returned on January 20, r955, on a passport granted by the
Pakistan Government which had a visa endorsed on it by the
Indian authorities permitting him to stay in India up to April,
1955, The respondent applied to the Central Government for
extension of the time allowed by the visa but the records did not
show what order, if any, had been made on it.
As the respondent had stayed beyond the time specified in the visa, he was on
September 3, 1957, served with an order made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh under s. 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act,
1946, requiring him to leave India. The order described him
as a Pakistan national. On his failure to comply ,with this order
93
a;en raga 11ar
•
April 4.