# Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

- **Citation:** 2024 INSC 1025
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2024-12-20
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 14807 of 2024
- **Bench:** J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shri-mukund-bhavan-trust-and-ors-v-shrimant-chhatrapati-udayan-raje-pratapsinh-37386
- **Pages:** 37

## Headnote

Whether the High Court erred in affirming the order of the trial Court
dismissing the application filed by the appellants under Order VII
Rule 11(d), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for rejection of plaint
being barred by limitation.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 11(d) - Rejection
of plaint - Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 58-60, 65 - Suit filed
by the Respondent No.1-Plaintiff, if was barred by limitation
and ought to have been rejected at the threshold:
Held: Yes - The right to sue first accrued to the predecessors
of the plaintiff when the properties were brought for sale by
the court - Court auction was held in 1938 and sale deed was
registered in 1952 in favour of the Defendant No.1-appellant in
respect of the suit properties - However, the suit was filed only
in the year 2008, though the plaintiff and his predecessors were
aware of the existence of the said registered sale deed of the suit
properties - Predecessors of the plaintiff never challenged the
sale of property to the Defendant No.1 by court auction and the
subsequent registration of the deeds, despite constructive notice,
as they acceded to the title of the appellant, which cannot now
be questioned by the plaintiff after such long time - Title claim of
the plaintiff was thus, barred by limitation and therefore, the claim
for possession was also barred and consequently, the relief of
recovery of possession was also hopelessly barred by limitation -
Plaintiff did not produce any documentary evidence to show that
he is entitled for the relief of declaration of ownership of the suit
properties except by relying on the government resolutions which
*Author
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lost its force in view of the decree of the Civil Court and subsequent
compromise decrees - The alleged cause of action is a creation
of fiction - Plaintiff was a stranger to the suit properties and the
Defendants were the owners of the suit properties - The plea of
fraud was raised only to overcome the period of limitation - Suit
was hopelessly barred by limitation - Trial Court erroneously
dismissed the application filed by the appellants u/Or.VII, r.11(d) -
High Court erred in affirming the same - Though, limitation is a
mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting the
plaint thereon has to be decided after weighing the evidence on
record however, in cases like the present one, where it is glaring
from the plaint averments that the suit was hopelessly barred
by limitation, the Courts should drive the parties back to the trial
Court - Orders passed by Courts below set aside - Application filed
by the appellants u/Or.VII, r.1(d) of CPC allowed, plaint rejected.
[Paras 14, 19.1, 20, 23, 24, 26]
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - s.3 - Interpretation clause -
"a person is said to have notice" - Presumption u/s.3 - When
comes into operation:
Held: A portion of the property was conveyed by court auction and
registered in the first instance and another portion was conveyed
by a registered sale deed in 1952 - Thus, there was a constructive
notice from the date of registration and the presumption u/s.3 comes
into operation - The possession also rested with the appellant
before several decades, which operates as notice of title. [Para 16]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. XXIII, r.3A - Bar under,
when applicable - Discussed.
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s.31 - When cancellation may be
ordered - Applicability - Discussed.

## Text

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[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1445 : 2024 INSC 1025
Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors.
v.
Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj
Bhonsle and Another
(Civil Appeal No. 14807 of 2024)
20 December 2024
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court erred in affirming the order of the trial Court
dismissing the application filed by the appellants under Order VII
Rule 11(d), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for rejection of plaint
being barred by limitation.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 11(d) - Rejection
of plaint - Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 58-60, 65 - Suit filed
by the Respondent No.1-Plaintiff, if was barred by limitation
and ought to have been rejected at the threshold:
Held: Yes - The right to sue first accrued to the predecessors
of the plaintiff when the properties were brought for sale by
the court - Court auction was held in 1938 and sale deed was
registered in 1952 in favour of the Defendant No.1-appellant in
respect of the suit properties - However, the suit was filed only
in the year 2008, though the plaintiff and his predecessors were
aware of the existence of the said registered sale deed of the suit
properties - Predecessors of the plaintiff never challenged the
sale of property to the Defendant No.1 by court auction and the
subsequent registration of the deeds, despite constructive notice,
as they acceded to the title of the appellant, which cannot now
be questioned by the plaintiff after such long time - Title claim of
the plaintiff was thus, barred by limitation and therefore, the claim
for possession was also barred and consequently, the relief of
recovery of possession was also hopelessly barred by limitation -
Plaintiff did not produce any documentary evidence to show that
he is entitled for the relief of declaration of ownership of the suit
properties except by relying on the government resolutions which
*Author
1446
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Supreme Court Reports
lost its force in view of the decree of the Civil Court and subsequent
compromise decrees - The alleged cause of action is a creation
of fiction - Plaintiff was a stranger to the suit properties and the
Defendants were the owners of the suit properties - The plea of
fraud was raised only to overcome the period of limitation - Suit
was hopelessly barred by limitation - Trial Court erroneously
dismissed the application filed by the appellants u/Or.VII, r.11(d) -
High Court erred in affirming the same - Though, limitation is a
mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting the
plaint thereon has to be decided after weighing the evidence on
record however, in cases like the present one, where it is glaring
from the plaint averments that the suit was hopelessly barred
by limitation, the Courts should drive the parties back to the trial
Court - Orders passed by Courts below set aside - Application filed
by the appellants u/Or.VII, r.1(d) of CPC allowed, plaint rejected.
[Paras 14, 19.1, 20, 23, 24, 26]
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - s.3 - Interpretation clause -
"a person is said to have notice" - Presumption u/s.3 - When
comes into operation:
Held: A portion of the property was conveyed by court auction and
registered in the first instance and another portion was conveyed
by a registered sale deed in 1952 - Thus, there was a constructive
notice from the date of registration and the presumption u/s.3 comes
into operation - The possession also rested with the appellant
before several decades, which operates as notice of title. [Para 16]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. XXIII, r.3A - Bar under,
when applicable - Discussed.
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s.31 - When cancellation may be
ordered - Applicability - Discussed.
Case Law Cited
T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [1978] 1 SCR 742 : (1977) 4
SCC 467 - held applicable.
Satti Paradesi Samadhi & Pillayar Temple v. M. Sankuntala [2014]
9 SCR 221 : (2015) 5 SCC 674; Sajjan Sikaria v. Shakuntala Devi
Mishra (2005) 13 SCC 687; Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra
[2002] Supp. 5 SCR 491 : (2003) 1 SCC 557; Dahiben v. Arvindbhai
Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through legal representatives
[2020] 5 SCR 694 : (2020) 7 SCC 366 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
1447
Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another
562; Prem Singh v. Birbal [2006] Supp. 1 SCR 692 : (2006) 5 SCC
353 : 2006 SCC OnLine SC 522; R.K. Mohd. Ubaidullah v. Hajee
C. Abdul Wahab [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 524 : (2000) 6 SCC 402;
Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar [1968] 2 SCR 797 :
1968 SCC OnLine SC 206 : (1968) 2 SCJ 555 : AIR 1968 SC 956;
Dilboo v. Dhanraji [2000] Supp. 3 SCR 214 : (2000) 7 SCC 702;
Mohd. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa [1995] Supp. 6 SCR 110 :
(1996) 7 SCC 767; Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh [2020] 4 SCR
650 : (2020) 6 SCC 629 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 732 - referred to.
List of Acts
Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Limitation Act, 1963; Transfer of
Property Act, 1882; Specific Relief Act, 1963.
List of Keywords
Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Rejection of
plaint; Plaint barred by limitation; Court auction; Title claim; Claim
for possession; Recovery of possession; Alleged cause of action;
Fiction; Fictional date; Fraud; Registered sale deed; Registered
document; Voidabale transaction; Void transaction; Revenue grant;
Soil grant; Compromise decree; Stranger to the suit properties;
Relief of declaration of ownership; Consequential relief; Inam;
Original sanad; New sanad; Third party; Limitation a mixed question
of fact and law; Suit hopelessly barred by limitation; Constructive
notice; Clever drafting; Illusion of cause of action.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14807 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.04.2016 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in CRA No. 904 of 2014
Appearances for Parties
Amar Dave, Sr. Adv., Parimal Shroff, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi
Agrawala, Ankur Saigal, Ms. S. Lakshmi Iyer, Ms. Nidhi, E. C.
Agrawala, Advs. for the Appellants.
Sunil Fernandes, Sr. Adv., Ms. Nupur Kumar, Ms. Diksha Dadu,
Sachin Patil, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande,
Geo Joseph, Durgesh Gupta, Risvi Muhammed, Advs. for the
Respondents.
1448
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Judgment/Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
R. Mahadevan, J.
1.
Leave granted.
2.
This appeal is filed by the Defendant No.1 viz., Shri Mukund Bhavan
Trust and its trustees, against the Order dated 26th April 2016 passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay1 in the Civil Revision
Application No.904 of 2014, whereby the High Court dismissed
the said application preferred by the appellants challenging the
Order dated 29th April 2009 passed by the 7th Joint Civil Judge,
Senior Division, Pune.2 By the said order, the trial Court rejected
the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of
the Civil Procedure Code, 19083 for rejection of plaint being barred
by limitation.
3.
The Respondent No.1 / plaintiff filed a Special Civil Suit No.133 of
2009 against the appellants and the State of Maharashtra, inter alia
for the following reliefs:
(a) to declare that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit lands
more particularly described in schedule of the plaint;
(b) to declare that other than the Plaintiff, no other person is entitled
to deal with, alienate and create any third-party interest in
respect of suit lands;
(c)
to restrain the appellants / defendants permanently, from in
any manner holding themselves as owners or representing
themselves as owners of the said suit lands;
(d) to declare that the compromise decrees passed in Special
Civil Suit Nos.152/1951 and 1622/1988 and Civil Appeal
No.787/2001, Pune, are void ab-initio, null and void and to set
aside the same;
1
Hereinafter referred to as "the High Court"
2
Hereinafter referred to as "the trial Court"
3
For short, "the CPC"
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another
(e) to direct the appellants / defendants to vacate and hand over
the possession of the suit lands to the Plaintiff.
4.
Pending the aforesaid suit, the appellants took out an application
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC r/w Articles 58, 59 and 65 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, seeking rejection of the plaint as the reliefs
sought in the suit were barred by limitation. The said application
was seriously resisted by the Respondent No.1 / plaintiff by stating
inter alia that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of facts and
law and it has to be adjudicated only in the trial.
5.
The trial Court by order dated 12.10.2009, rejected the aforesaid
application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of
CPC. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants preferred Civil Revision
Application No.731 of 2009 before the High Court, which set aside
the order dated 12.10.2009 and remanded the matter to the trial
Court for considering the application filed under Order VII Rule 11(d)
of CPC afresh.
6.
After remand, the trial Court vide order dated 29.04.2014, rejected
the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d)
of CPC, observing inter alia that the issue of limitation is a mixed
question of law and facts, for which, the parties will have to lead
evidence. Challenging the same, the appellants preferred Civil
Revision Application No. 904 of 2014, which was dismissed by the
High Court, by order dated 26.04.2016 impugned in this appeal.
7.
The learned counsel for the appellants, at the outset, submitted that
on a bare perusal of the averments made in the plaint disclosed that
the reliefs sought in the plaint were barred by limitation. However,
the High Court erroneously dismissed the Civil Revision Application
on the ground that the question of whether the suit is barred by
limitation is for the trial Court to independently decide considering
the evidence led before it by the parties as the limitation is a mixed
question of law and facts which cannot be decided based on the
pleadings alone. Adding further, it is submitted that the High Court
could have examined the maintainability and sustainability of the
revision proceedings initiated by the appellants under Order VII
Rule 11 (d) of CPC.
7.1. Elaborating further, on facts, the learned counsel for the
appellants submitted that the Defendant No.1 - Trust had
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purchased 3/4th share of the suit lands mentioned in the Schedule
in an auction sale conducted by the Civil Court, Pune, in the
year 1938 from the previous Inamdar Gosavis family and the
same was duly registered; and they had also purchased the
remaining 1/4th share in the suit lands in the year 1952 by
another registered sale deed. Till then, the subject lands were
in possession of the Government. Thereafter, the Defendant
No.1 Trust became entitled to the suit lands in pursuance of
the compromise decree dated 05.01.1990 passed in Civil Suit
No.1622 of 1988, and they entered into several agreements
with third parties, who constructed buildings in the suit lands.
While so, without any right, title and interest, the Respondent
No.1 preferred Special Civil Suit No.133 of 2009 claiming
declaration and possession over the suit lands. According to
the learned counsel, the Respondent No.1 by filing the said
suit, has attempted to question the correctness of various
orders passed by several Courts including the order passed by
this Court. These orders date back to the year 1953. Further,
this exercise is done with an oblique motive to set at naught
the orders which have attained finality decades ago and the
respondent No.1/Plaintiff and its predecessors having slept over
the orders which conclusively affirmed the title and ownership
of the appellant Trust over the suit lands, cannot now suddenly
come up with a suit to overturn the effect of the orders in the
guise of there being a fresh cause of action.
7.2. Drawing our attention to paragraphs 34 and 53 of the plaint filed
by the Respondent No.1, the learned counsel for the appellants
submitted that the Respondent No.1 attempted to create an
illusion of a cause of action by erroneously stating that the cause
of action to file the suit arose on 02.03.2007 when he came to
know that his rights over the suit properties have been affected
by the proceedings between the defendants and another. Further,
the Respondent No.1 relied on the pleadings stated in the writ
petition filed by one Dr.F.Wadia, who claims to be in possession
of a portion of the subject lands. The Respondent No.1, in
paragraph 34 of the plaint stated that ".... One Advocate Shri
Godge had appeared in the said matter. The said Advocate
is well acquainted with the plaintiff. The said Advocate, after
reading all the necessary related proceedings, informed the
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another
plaintiff of the mischief committed by the Defendants. The
plaintiff thereafter collected all the necessary information and
documents. The plaintiff then instructed his Advocates to file
the present suit". However, there is no averment as to when the
Respondent No.1 was intimated by Mr.Godge. Thus, the cause
of action alleged by the Respondent No.1 is purely illusory and
has been stated with a view to get over the bar under Order
VII Rule 11(d) of CPC.
7.3. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that
the limitation period for seeking cancellation of an instrument
as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is 3 years from the
date when the existence of document first becomes known to
the plaintiff. In case of registered document, the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge. Accordingly, the
Respondent No.1 and his predecessors are deemed to have
implied notice of the contents of the registered sale deeds and
as per Article 58, the period of limitation to obtain any declaration in the suit commences within 3 years from the date when
right to sue accrues. However, the Respondent No.1 by clever
drafting, attempted to circumvent the provisions of the Limitation
Act. That means, the Respondent No.1 knowing fully well that
a challenge to the registered sale deeds of the years 1938 and
1952 in and by which the Defendant No.1 Trust acquired the title
over the subject lands, would be hopelessly barred by limitation,
has attempted to question the title of the Defendant No.1 Trust
by inventing an imaginary cause of action to sustain his suit.
7.4. The learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that
according to Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the right to
possess immovable property or any interest therein, based on
title, must be asserted within twelve years from the date, when
the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
Admittedly, the Respondent No.1 did not assert any right over
the subject lands prior to the year 2008 or 2009. Consequently,
the relief sought for possession is also barred by the law of
limitation. Ultimately, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1
being stranger, has no locus standi to seek a declaration that
compromise decrees passed in Special Civil Suit Nos.152/1951
and 1622/1988 and Civil appeal No.787/2001 are void ab initio,
null and void and be set aside.
1452
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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7.5. Without properly appreciating all these aspects, the trial Court
erred in rejecting the application filed by the appellants under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC and the same was also affirmed
by the High Court, by the order impugned herein, which will
have to be set aside, according to the learned counsel for the
appellants.
8.
Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 submitted
that in the year 1710, Raja Shahu Chhatrapati, the ancestor of the
Respondent No.1/Plaintiff gave a sanad to Guru Shree Jadhavgir
Gosavi of all the lands mentioned in the Sanad. The said Sanad
gave rights of revenue grant which was hereditary. The said grant
did not confer any titular rights over the land to the Gosavi family.
The descendants of the Gosavi family though not empowered to
create third party rights and interests, created third party rights. Thus,
the said Gosavis who only had Inam grant in their favour entitling
them only to the revenue from the land, had overstepped their
authority and had parted the suit properties to the Defendant No.1
Trust, when they absolutely had no right to sell the suit properties.
It is further submitted that the Defendant No.1 filed Special Civil
Suit No.152/1951 against the State of Bombay and one Sukramgir
Chimangir Gosavi in relation to the lands in village Yerawada, Taluka
Haveli. The Defendant Nos.1 and 2 entered into compromise and
it was agreed between them that the Yerawada Inam Village was
a grant of soil and the Defendant No. 1 was Nivval Dhumaldars of
the village to the extent of 12 anna share. The Respondent No.1 /
Plaintiff was not a party to the said suit and without his knowledge,
the consent decree was obtained clandestinely. Therefore, the said
sale deeds and compromise are not binding on the Respondent
No.1. It is also contended that the parties cannot be permitted to
construct and improve the terms of sanad of the year 1710 in 1950s
to their whims and fancies. In any event, the Court had not given a
determinative finding after adjudication, and hence, the compromise
decree of the Court cannot be put against it.
8.1. Continuing further, the learned counsel for the Respondent
No.1 submitted that the Respondent No.1 specifically stated
in paragraph 39 of the Plaint that the defendants have played
systematic fraud on various courts and without any judicial
pronouncements have usurped the lands under suspicious
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
1453
Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another
compromises arrived at before the Court. Moreover, in paragraph
44 of the Plaint, the Respondent No.1 stated that the compromise
arrived at in the suits filed in District Court, Pune, appears to
be clearly an attempt to deprive the legal rights of the Plaintiff
in respect of the said suit lands.
8.2. It is also submitted that whether the Respondent No.1 is entitled
to declaration as sought for in the Plaint is a matter of trial and
that cannot be gone into at the stage of deciding the application
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC. The Respondent No.1 in
paragraph 53 of the Plaint clearly stated that he had come to
know about the proceedings on 2nd March 2007 only when
he was informed about Civil Application No. 1562/2006 in Writ
Petition No. 3813 of 1996 filed by Dr. F Wadia. The knowledge
of the fact that the Respondent's right in the suit property has
been affected by the proceedings between the Defendants and
another on 2nd March 2007 is the crucial date from which the
clock starts ticking to determine limitation. Thus, well within the
period of limitation, he preferred the Special civil suit against
the appellants and another for declaration and possession of
the suit properties.
8.3. That apart, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the
Respondent No.1 that when an issue requires an inquiry into
the facts, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. To buttress
the same, he placed reliance on the decision in Satti Paradesi
Samadhi & Pillayar Temple v. M. Sankuntala,4 wherein, it was
held that 'the court has no jurisdiction to try a suit on mixed
issues of law and fact as a preliminary issue'.
8.4. Referring to the decision in Sajjan Sikaria v. Shakuntala Devi
Mishra,5 it is submitted by the learned counsel for the Respondent
No.1 that while dealing with an application under Order VII
Rule 11 of CPC, there is no requirement to consider the written
statement filed by the defendant. That apart, in Saleem Bhai v.
State of Maharashtra,6 it was held by this Court that 'a perusal
of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC makes it clear that the relevant
4
(2015) 5 SCC 674
5
(2005) 13 SCC 687
6
(2003) 1 SCC 557
1454
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application
thereunder are the averments in the plaint; the pleas taken
by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly
irrelevant at that stage; and therefore, a direction to file the
written statement without deciding the application under Order
VII Rule 11 of CPC cannot be procedural irregularity touching
the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Court'.
8.5. Considering all these factors, the High Court rightly dismissed
the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d)
of CPC, by observing that the plaint cannot be rejected at the
threshold, as the issue of limitation is a mixed question of facts
and law for which the parties will have to lead evidence. Thus,
according to the learned counsel, there is no requirement to
interfere with the order impugned herein and the appeal filed
by the appellants is liable to be dismissed.
9.
We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel
appearing for both sides and perused the materials available on
record.
10. The subject matter of the present proceedings is qua lands in
S.Nos.14A/1A/1, 144, 145, 95, 90, 129, 191A (part), 160 (Part),
191 (part), 20, 103(part), 120(part), 141, 233, 94(part), 104 and 105
situated in Yerawada, Taluka Haveli, District Pune. The Respondent
No.1 / plaintiff preferred Special Civil Suit No.133 of 2009, for
declaration of his ownership and possession in respect of the suit
properties. Seeking rejecting of the said plaint, the appellants filed
an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC on the ground that
the reliefs sought in the suit were clearly barred by limitation. The
trial Court rejected the application filed by the appellants stating that
the issue of limitation is a mixed question of facts and law, for which,
the parties will have to lead evidence. The revision application filed
by the appellants against the said order of the trial Court, was also
rejected by the High Court, by observing that (i) the plaintiff has
specifically asserted that Gosavis family had no authority to create
third party rights and they were only entitled to revenue grant; (ii)
whether the Plaintiff is entitled to declaration in terms of prayer clauses
(a) and (b) in view of the sale deeds executed in favour of Defendant
No.1, is a matter of trial and that cannot be gone into at the stage
of deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC; and
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
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Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another
(iii) the defendants played a systematic fraud on various courts and
without any judicial pronouncements, usurped the suit lands under
suspicious compromise arrived at before the Court. Feeling aggrieved
and being dissatisfied with the rejection orders of the Courts below,
the appellants are before us with the present appeal.
11. The law applicable for deciding an application filed under Order
VII Rule 11 of CPC7 was outlined by this Court in the decision in
Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through legal
representatives8 and the same read as follows:
"23.1 ...
23.2. The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an
independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is
empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold,
without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a
trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied
that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds
contained in this provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that
if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is
barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not
permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings
in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put
an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time
is not wasted.
7
"11. Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases-
(a)
where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b)
where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to
correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c)
where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently
stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper
within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d)
where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e)
where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f)
where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite
stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the
plaintiff was prevent by any cause of exceptional nature for correction the valuation or supplying the
requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend
such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff."
8
(2020) 7 SCC 366 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 562
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23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi9 this Court held
that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this
provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless,
and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to
waste judicial time of the court, in the following words :
(SCC p.324, para 12)
"12. ...The whole purpose of conferment of
such power is to ensure that a litigation which
is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive
should not be permitted to occupy the time
of the Court, and exercise the mind of the
respondent. The sword of Damocles need not
be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily
without point or purpose. Even if an ordinary
civil litigation, the Court readily exercises the
power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose
any cause of action."
23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a
civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions
enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly
adhered to.
23.6. Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court
to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of
action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint,10 read
in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether
the suit is barred by any law.
23.7. Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of
documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his
suit, which reads as under:
"14.Production of document on which plaintiff
sues or relies.- (1)Where a plaintiff sues upon
a document or relies upon document in his
9
1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC
OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823
10
Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. V. M.V. Sea Success I (2004) 9 SCC 512
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
1457
Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another
possession or power in support of his claim, he
shall enter such documents in a list, and shall
produce it in Court when the plaint is presented
by him and shall, at the same time deliver the
document and a copy thereof, to be filed with
the plaint.
(2)Where any such document is not in the
possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall,
wherever possible, state in whose possession
or power it is.
(3)A document which ought to be produced in
Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented,
or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed
to the plaint but is not produced or entered
accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the
Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at
the hearing of the suit.
(4)Nothing in this rule shall apply to document
produced for the cross examination of the
plaintiff's witnesses, or, handed over to a witness
merely to refresh his memory."
(emphasis supplied)
23.8. Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the
documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be
taken into consideration for deciding the application under
Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the
plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated
as a part of the plaint.
23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the Court
would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are
contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding
whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is
made out.
23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in
the written statement and application for rejection of the
1458
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be
adverted to, or taken into consideration.11
23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order VII
Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are
taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied
upon, would the same result in a decree being passed.
This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I
Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success I which reads as : (SCC
p.562, para 139)
"139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of
action or not is essentially a question of fact.
But whether it does or does not must be found
out from reading the plaint itself. For the said
purpose, the averments made in the plaint in
their entirety must be held to be correct. The
test is as to whether if the averments made in
the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety,
a decree would be passed."
23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co.12 the Court
further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence
or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance,
and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The
plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or
subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima
facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark
upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact.
D.Ramachandran v. R.V.Janakiraman13
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found
that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit,
and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be
justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11
CPC.
23.14. The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be
exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either
11
Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137
12
(2007) 5 SCC 614
13
(1999) 3 SCC 267
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
1459
Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another
before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to
the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held
by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of
Maharashtra.14 The plea that once issues are framed, the
matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this
Court in Azhar Hussain (supra).
23.15. The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in
nature. It states that the plaint "shall" be rejected if any of
the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If
the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause
of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court
has no option, but to reject the plaint.
24. "Cause of action" means every fact which would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order
to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of
material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove
in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit.
24.1. In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam15
this Court held :
"24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact,
which if traversed, it would be necessary for the
plaintiff to prove an order to support his right
to a judgment of the court. In other words, it
is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law
applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to
relief against the defendant. It must include
some act done by the defendant since in the
absence of such an act, no cause of action can
possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual
infringement of the right sued on but includes
all the material facts on which it is founded"
(emphasis supplied)
14
(2003) 1 SCC 557
15
(2005) 10 SCC 51
1460
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
24.2. In T. Arivanandam v. T.V. Satyapal16 this Court held
that while considering an application under Order VII
Rule 11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether
the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something
purely illusory, in the following words: (SCC p. 470, para 5)
"5. ...The learned Munsif must remember that
if on a meaningful - not formal - reading of the
plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless,
in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to
sue, he should exercise his power under Order
VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the
ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if
clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause
of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing ..."
(emphasis supplied)
24.3. Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery
Appellate Tribunal17 this Court held that law cannot permit
clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action.
What is required is that a clear right must be made out
in the plaint.
24.4. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has
created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in
Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal18 held
that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation
will end at the earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant
against any camouflage or suppression, and determine
whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse
of the process of the court.
25. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the
institution of all suits, appeals, and applications. Section
2(j) defines the expression "period of limitation" to mean
the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for
suits, appeals or applications. Section 3 lays down that
16
(1977) 4 SCC 467
17
(1998) 2 SCC 170
18
(2017) 13 SCC 174
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
1461
Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another
every suit instituted after the prescribed period, shall be
dismissed even though limitation may not have been set
up as a defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific
article, then it would fall within the residuary article.
26. Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act,
prescribe the period of limitation for filing a suit where a
declaration is sought, or cancellation of an instrument, or
rescission of a contract, which reads as under :
Description of
suit
Period of
limitation
Time from which
period begins to run
58. To obtain
any other
declaration
Three years
When the right to sue
first accrues
59. To cancel
or set aside an
instrument or
decree or for the
rescission of a
contract
Three years
When the facts
entitling the plaintiff to
have the instrument
or decree cancelled
or set aside or the
contract rescinded
first become known
to him.
The period of limitation prescribed under Articles 58 and
59 of the 1963 Act is three years, which commences from
the date when the right to sue first accrues.
27. In Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India19 this Court
held that the use of the word 'first' between the words
'sue' and 'accrued', would mean that if a suit is based on
multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin
to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues.
That is, if there are successive violations of the right, it
would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit
will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period
of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue
first accrued.
19
(2011) 9 SCC 126
1462
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab
v. Gurdev Singh20 held that the Court must examine the
plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued
to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the
plaint is within time. The words "right to sue" means the
right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The
right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises.
The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the
suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal
threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom
the suit is instituted. Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that
where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to
be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected."
12. As settled in law, when an application to reject the plaint is filed,
the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed therewith
alone are germane. The averments in the application can be taken
into account only to consider whether the case falls within any of
the sub-rules of Order VII Rule 11 by considering the averments in
the plaint. The Court cannot look into the written statement or the
documents filed by the defendants. The Civil Courts including this
Court cannot go into the rival contentions at that stage. Keeping in
mind the legal position, let us examine whether the suit filed by the
Respondent No.1 is barred by limitation, in the light of the averments
contained in the plaint filed by him.
13. The Respondent No.1/Plaintiff claimed title, right and interest over the
suit properties, stating that he is the direct descendent of Chhatrapati
Shivaji Maharaj from the Bhonsale Dynasty and he has inherited
the vast lands all over Maharashtra from his ancestors. He further
stated in his plaint that Raja Shahu Chhatrapati gave only the rights
of revenue grant to Guru Shree Jadhavgir Gosavi and the said
grant did not give any rights in the lands to the Gosavi family and
hence, they had no right to sell the suit properties to the Defendant
No.1. Though the Respondent No.1 relied on the report of the Inam
Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Act XI, 1852,
which stated that the grant enjoyed by the Respondent No.1's
ancestors was only a revenue grant and stated that Gosavis family
20
(1991) 4 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1082
[2024] 12 S.C.R.
1463
Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another
had no authority to create third party rights in the suit lands, the
same was not substantiated with proper pleadings and documents.
It was further stated by the Respondent No.1 that by order dated
17.02.1980, the Government of Maharashtra was pleased to direct
that the Satara Saranjam (Jagir / grant of land) shall be continued
in the name of the Respondent No.1 / plaintiff, but, at that time, he
was a minor. That apart, the Friendship Treaty was continued by
the Government of Maharashtra vide its resolution dated 28.02.1980
and on attaining the age of majority by the plaintiff, the Maharashtra
Government by resolution dated 01.09.1984 continued the said
Saranjam upon the plaintiff. Hence, the Respondent No.1 continues
to be the owner of the suit properties. We are unable to accept these
statements. The averments in the plaint disclose that even prior to
the alleged Resolution dated 28.02.1980, a major portion of the
property (3/4th share) has been conveyed as early as in 1938 through
Court auction and the remaining portion (1/4th share) in 1952. The
plaintiff was a minor in 1980 and by 01.09.1984, he claims to have
become a major. However, he has not stated as to when he was
born. From the averments, it can be presumed that the plaintiff must
have born in 1965/1966 considering the fact that he was declared as
a major in 1984. The above statements in the plaint imply that the
plaintiff was not even born when the property was sold.