# SHRI UMED v. RAJ SINGH & ORS

- **Citation:** [1975] 1 S.C.R. 918
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974-08-28
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 936 of 1973
- **Bench:** D. G. Palekar, P. N. Bhagwatl, R. S. Sarkarja
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shri-umed-v-raj-singh-ors-6269
- **Pages:** 32

## Headnote

Representatian
of the
People
Act (43
of
1951),
s. 123(i)(A)(a)-
B
"Withdraw from beinfl a candidate," if includes "retire fronz contest after last
date of withdrawal of candidature under s. 37."
With respect to the election to the State Legislati\'e Assembly the last date
for filing nominations was fixed on 11th February, 1972, and the last date for
withdrawal of candidature was fixed on 14th February, 1972. The poll was
held on 11th March. 1972 and the appellant. who polled the highest n11u1ber
of votes, was declared elected on 12th ~iarch. The respondent filed an election
petition challenging. the appellant's election alleging that he was guilty of seve·
C
ral corrupt practices. The High Court found thiiJ,t, (1) the appellant comn1itted
a corrupt pr&ctice by hiring anct procuring two jeeps and two trucks for the
free conveyance of electors to and from the polling stations, and (2) that the
appellant committed bribery within the meaning of s. 123 (l)(A)(a) in so far
as he, on March, 10, 1972, made a payment of Rs. 1000 /- to one of the contesting candid.ates, with the object of inducing him to continue to stand as a
candidate at the election and not to withdraw from it, in order to wean away
votes of Harijans and members of backward classes from the respondent; and
D
set aside the appellant's election.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD : ( 1) On the evidence, there was proof of corrupt practice by the
appeUant only in relation to one truck.
There was no acceptable evidence regarding the two jeeps, and, with respect to the other truck, though it was used
for the purpose of conveying electors it could not \Je held, on the evidence that
the appellant or his election agent had procured it for the conveyance of electors.
E
But1on that one single ground of corrupt practice found, the order of the High
""
Couft setting aside the election of the appellant must be confirmed.
[933 E;
934D; 937 A-B; 939 G]
(2) The High Court erred in holding that there was any bribery by the ap·
pellant within the meaning of s. 123 ( 1) (A) (a) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951, with respect to one of the contesting candidates as alleged
by the respondent. It must also be held on the evidence that even if any amount
was paid to that contesting candidate it was not with the object of inducing hin1
F
not to withdraw from the contest.
f929 Fl
(3) Further, s. 123(1)(A)(a) is inapplicable to a situation where a candidates retires from the contest after the date fixed for the withdrawal of Jiis candidature. The words "to withdraw or not to \Vithdraw from being a candidate'
in the clause refer to the stage of withdrawal of candidature under s. 37, and
they do not apply to a situation where a contesting candidate announces that
'11.
he does uot wish to Contest the election or declares his intention to sit down
after the last date· for the withdrawal of candidature under s. 37 is past and~ list
G
of contesting candidates is published under s. 38.
[940 H-941 C; 946 C·F]
(a) The democratic form of Government requires that the election process
•
must remain pure and unsullied.
To secure this various provisions have been
made in the Representation of the People Act, 1951, one of which is s. 123
(l)(A)(a). It must, therefore. be construed so as to suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy. But that does not mean that a construction should be adopted which ignores the plain natural meaning of the words or disregards the
context -end the coUocation in which they occur. The words used by the legis- - H
lature must be construed according to their plain natural meaning, and, in order
to ascertain that true intention of the legislature the court must not only look at
the words used by the legislature but also have regard to the context and the
setting~ in which they occur. The word "context" is used in a vide sense which
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H
UMED V. RAJ SINGH
. 919
requires that all the provisions of the Act which bear· upon the same subject
matter must be read a

## Text

_Characters 0–39,844 of 105,370. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39844 for what follows._

918
SHRI UMED
A
v.
RAJ SINGH & ORS.
August 28, 1974.
[D. G. PALEKAR, P. N. BHAGWATL AND R. S. SARKARJA, JJ.]
Representatian
of the
People
Act (43
of
1951),
s. 123(i)(A)(a)-
B
"Withdraw from beinfl a candidate," if includes "retire fronz contest after last
date of withdrawal of candidature under s. 37."
With respect to the election to the State Legislati\'e Assembly the last date
for filing nominations was fixed on 11th February, 1972, and the last date for
withdrawal of candidature was fixed on 14th February, 1972. The poll was
held on 11th March. 1972 and the appellant. who polled the highest n11u1ber
of votes, was declared elected on 12th ~iarch. The respondent filed an election
petition challenging. the appellant's election alleging that he was guilty of seve·
C
ral corrupt practices. The High Court found thiiJ,t, (1) the appellant comn1itted
a corrupt pr&ctice by hiring anct procuring two jeeps and two trucks for the
free conveyance of electors to and from the polling stations, and (2) that the
appellant committed bribery within the meaning of s. 123 (l)(A)(a) in so far
as he, on March, 10, 1972, made a payment of Rs. 1000 /- to one of the contesting candid.ates, with the object of inducing him to continue to stand as a
candidate at the election and not to withdraw from it, in order to wean away
votes of Harijans and members of backward classes from the respondent; and
D
set aside the appellant's election.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD : ( 1) On the evidence, there was proof of corrupt practice by the
appeUant only in relation to one truck.
There was no acceptable evidence regarding the two jeeps, and, with respect to the other truck, though it was used
for the purpose of conveying electors it could not \Je held, on the evidence that
the appellant or his election agent had procured it for the conveyance of electors.
E
But1on that one single ground of corrupt practice found, the order of the High
""
Couft setting aside the election of the appellant must be confirmed.
[933 E;
934D; 937 A-B; 939 G]
(2) The High Court erred in holding that there was any bribery by the ap·
pellant within the meaning of s. 123 ( 1) (A) (a) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951, with respect to one of the contesting candidates as alleged
by the respondent. It must also be held on the evidence that even if any amount
was paid to that contesting candidate it was not with the object of inducing hin1
F
not to withdraw from the contest.
f929 Fl
(3) Further, s. 123(1)(A)(a) is inapplicable to a situation where a candidates retires from the contest after the date fixed for the withdrawal of Jiis candidature. The words "to withdraw or not to \Vithdraw from being a candidate'
in the clause refer to the stage of withdrawal of candidature under s. 37, and
they do not apply to a situation where a contesting candidate announces that
'11.
he does uot wish to Contest the election or declares his intention to sit down
after the last date· for the withdrawal of candidature under s. 37 is past and~ list
G
of contesting candidates is published under s. 38.
[940 H-941 C; 946 C·F]
(a) The democratic form of Government requires that the election process
•
must remain pure and unsullied.
To secure this various provisions have been
made in the Representation of the People Act, 1951, one of which is s. 123
(l)(A)(a). It must, therefore. be construed so as to suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy. But that does not mean that a construction should be adopted which ignores the plain natural meaning of the words or disregards the
context -end the coUocation in which they occur. The words used by the legis- - H
lature must be construed according to their plain natural meaning, and, in order
to ascertain that true intention of the legislature the court must not only look at
the words used by the legislature but also have regard to the context and the
setting~ in which they occur. The word "context" is used in a vide sense which
A
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c
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E
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H
UMED V. RAJ SINGH
. 919
requires that all the provisions of the Act which bear· upon the same subject
matter must be read as a whole and in their entirety, each throwing light and
illumining the meaning of the other.
[943 F-944 C]
(b) Section 55-A rel8-ting to retirement .from contest, \Vas introduced in the
1951-Act by the Amending Act 27 of 1956. The Amending Act amended s.
123 (i) (a) also, by adding the words "or to retire from contest and the amended
clause provided that, bribery with the object, directly or indirectly, of inducing
a person to stand or not to stand as or to withdraw from being a candidate or
to retire froni contest at an election, shall be deemed to be a corrupt practice.
Section 55A, however, was deleted by the Amendment Act, 58 of 1958.
Since
the provision for retirement from contest was thus deleted ccnsequential changes
were also made iu. s. 123(1) (a) by deleting the words "or to retire from the
contest,'' frotn it.
1946 F-G]
(c) The addition of the words "to retire from the contest in s. 123(1)(a)
after the introduction of s. 55A in the Act shows that the original words "to
withdraw from being a candidate were not regarded as sufficiently comprehensive or wide enough to cover a situation where a contesting candidate retires
from the contest. The court should, as far as possible, construe a statute so as
to avoid tautology or superfluity.
Jt wOuld not, therefore, be right to place a
meaning on the words "to withdraw from being a candidate" which would have
effect of rendering the succeeding words "to retire from contest'' superfluous and
meaningless.
The Court must proceed on the basis that the
words "to retire
from the contest" were deliberately and advisedly introduced by the legislature
with the definite ouroose of adding something which had not been said in the
immediately preceding words and were not intended merely to repeat what was
already enacted there. The words "to withdraw from -being a candidate" could
not therefore. at that stage, be read as applying to an event where a contesting
candidate retires from the contest. And if that was the meaning of those words
then, the subsequent deletion of the words "to retire from the contest" could
not have the effect of adding to or expanding that meaning. [946 F-947 E]
(d) The words "to withdraw from being a candidate" cannot be read in
isolation.
The concept of withdrawal of candidature is already dealt with in
two e_arlier provisions, namely, ss. 30(c) and 37. Section 30(c) speaks of the
last date for withdrawal of candidalure, and how the candidature may be withdrawn on or before the last date, is provided for in s. 37.
It is reasonable to
presume, though the presumption is not of much weight and can be displaced
by the context, that the expression "withdrawal of candidature" is used by the
legislature in all these sections in the same sen'.le. Therefore, in s. 123 also, the
expression must mean withdrawal before the last date fixed for withdrawal of
candidature as con1e1nplated in s. 37.
f946 ,A-Fl
Mills v. Mills (1963) p. 329 and l.R.C. v. Henry Ansbacher & Co., [1963]
A,C. 191. referred to.
(e) Further, the word "withdraw" in the clause does not stand alone. It is
part of a composite expression, "to withdraw from being a candidate." When a
person withdraws from being a candidate, he ceases to be candidate, that is, he
is no more a candidate.
Clau<;e (b) (i) uses the expression "having withdrawn
his candidature'' and Cl. (B) (b) uses the expression "to withdraw his candida·
ture they deno~e the same idea. The only mode' in which. the candidate can
withdraw his candidature and cease to be a candidate is that set out in s. 37.
Until the last date for withdrawal of candidature he ha'-l a locus poenitentiae
and h .. ,.,.~,, withcfraw from being a candidate by giving a notice in writing to that
effect under s. 37; but once that date is past, he becomes a contesting candidate
and he has no choice. No subsequent change of mind can h~lo him to get out
of the fight; and whether he likes it or not, whether he energises himself or not,
whether he actively camoaigns or not, he remains a contesting candidate and
the voter~ can cast their votes for him and even elect him, desoite himself. He
cannot, therefore, cease to be a contesting candidate, and if that b! so, it must
follow a fortiorari that he cann9t withdraw his candidature or withdra\v from
being a candidate, once the last date for withdrawal of candidature under s. 37
i< past.
f945 C-HJ
920
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 1 s.c.R.
(f) The different view taken in Mohd. Yunus Saleem's case (A.I.R. 1974
S.C. 1218) is erroneous and must be overruled.
That case placed emphasis
upon the etymological meaning of the word "withdraw" ignoring its contextual
setting and interreleation with the other provisions of the Act, and without considering the effect of the introduction and deletion of s. 55A.
Even if "withdraw" were etymologically comprehensive enough to connote" retirement from
contest, "retirement from contest" is impossible under the Act after the deletion
of s. 55A. The Court was also impressed by the fact that if the words "to withdraw from being a candidate" were given a restricted meaning confined to the
stage of withdrawal of candidature under s. 37, an absurd position would arise
"where actual \vithdrawal after the time limit by taking bribe will be free from
the vice of corrupt practice whereas that prior to it will not be so."
But the
function of the court is to gather the intention of the legislature from the words
used by rt and it would not be right for the court to attribute an intention to
the legislature, which though not ju.stifled by the language used by it, accords
with what the court cGnceives to be reason and good sense and then bend the
language of the enactment ~o as carry out such presumed intention of the legislature.
For the Court to do so would be to overstep its limits. Factual with~
drawal under the Act has no legal effect. It is no withdrawal at all, because,
the candidate continues to be a contesting candidate and he is as much in the
contest as he \\'as before the announcement. The word "withdrawal", in the con·
text in which it occurs cannot be read in a loose and in exact sense to mean
something which it plainly does not.
[947 H-948 HJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 936 of 1973.
Appeal from the Judgmeut & Order dated the 1st May, 1973 of
the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Election Petition No. 9 of 1972.
Kapil Sibal, S.K. Mehta, M. Qamaruddin and Vinod Dhawan for
the appellant.
A
B
c
D
E.G. Agarawa/a and Anand Swarup, for respondent. No. I.·
E
The Judgment of D. G. Palekar and R. S. Sarkaria, JJ,
was
delivared by Palekar, J., P.N. Bhagwati, J. gave a separate opinion.
PALEKAR J.-This is an appeal filed by one Urned Singh who was
unseated by an Order passed by Narula, J. of the Punjab & Haryana
High CJurt in Election Petition No. 9 of 1972. The election was
to the Haryana Legislative Assembly from the Meham Assembly
Constituency in Rohtak District in the State of Haryana. Four
candidates contested the election. One Raj Singh was set up by
the Ruling Congress Party and he polled 19,042 votes. Chatru was
set up by the Kisan Mazdoor Party and he polled 4,546 votes. The
present appellant Urned Singh stood as an Independent candidate
and p~lle.d 19,654 votes. Another candidate Tale Ram who also stocd
as an Independent candidate poll e 493 votes. Since the appellant
Um~d Singh who was respondent No. 1 in the Election Petition polled
the highest number of votes he was declared elected.
He was declared elected on 12-3-1972 and the Election Petition was filed by
Raj Singh, the Congress candidate on 26-4-1972.
The last date for filing nominations was Jl-2-1972 and the last
date for withdrawal was 14-2-1972. The poll was hekl on Jl-3-1972
aLd as already stated the result was declared on 12-3-1972.
F
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UMED v. RAJ SINGH (Palekar, I.)
921
The Election Petition was filed on the ground that the appellant
Urned Singh was guilty of several corrupt practices. The learned
Judge held that all the alleged corrupt practices had not been proved
but some were. Accordingly, the appellant's election was set aside.
"'' The corrupt practices of which the appellant was held guilty are
as follows :
{I) That the appellant ccmmitted bribny within the meaning
of section 123(I)(A) (a) of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951 in so far as he, on March IO, 1972 made a payment
of Rs. 1,000/- to Chatru-one of the candidates-with
the object of inducing him to continue to stand as a candidate at the election and not to withdraw from the same.
(2) That the appellant committed the corrupt practice within
the contemplation of section 123(5) of the Act by hiring and
procuring the following vehicles for the free conveyance of
electors to and from the polling stations on March II,
1972 between 8.00 A.M. to 5.00 P.M.
(a) Jeep No. PNR 5021 for free conveyance of the voters
to and from the polling Station at Madina from the
interior of the village and from the fields outside the
village.
r
(b) Jeep No. RRK 668 to and from the polling Station at
Sizar from the interior of the village and from the fields
outside the village.
(c) Truck No. RRN 8567 to and from the polling station
at Chandi from village Indergarh where there was no
polling station; and
(d) Truck No. HRR 7101 to and from the polling station at
Seman from village Bedwa where there was no polling
station.
In the present appeal the appellant has challenged these findings
both on facts and law.
Raj Singh, the defeated candidate, who is the principal contestant before us, has not only supported the above findings of the learned
Judge but has also claimed a finding in his favour that the election was
liable to be set aside on the ground that the appellant had committed
the corrupt practice within the contemplation of secticn 123(7) by
obtaining and procuring the assistance of one Dhir Singh, s/o Jcdha
Singh, a member of the Armed Forces of the Union, for the furtherance
of the prospects of his election by actually canvassing support for him
in village Bedwa. The learned Judge recorded a finding against
Raj Singh, but it is contended on his behalf :bat the finding is manifestly against the evidence.
As already stated the learned Judge had to deal with several allegation of corrupt practices.
A large majority of them have been dis-
9 .. 2.2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 1 S.C.R.
counted by him and in his view only 5 of them as mentioned above-had
been satisfactorily established. Undoubtedly the learned judge
had to deal with a case in which the evidence was, for the most part,
suspect and in this respect we can do no better than quote the learned
Judge on the point.
A
B
"It appears to be not only appropriate but necesrnry to give a brief
account of the peculiar background of this case in the light of which
the entire evidence kd by the parties on the various issues has to be
appraised. There exists a some what fluctuating non-official and nonpolitical organisation in Meham Constituency which is known as the
Chaubisee Panchayat or the Chaubisee. Orginally there were 24
villages and the residents of those villages or their repre1entatives u~ed
C
to get together and whatever they decided was called the decision of the
Chaubisee. P.W. 17 Swami Indervesh has told the Court that now
those villages have been split up into more than 24, but still the joint
decision of the representatives of those villages is called the decision
of the Chaubisee. The Moham constituency falls within the area of
the Chaubisee with the exception of possibly some villages which do
not strictly fall within that area. It appears that this traditional nonD
official panchayat has still a good deal of following and its decision in
political matters carries some weight. It is the common case of both
sides that though the respondent (the present appellant) had stocd up
to fight the election in question as an Independent candidate, he had
been adopted as the candidate of the Chaubisee and was fully and
actively supported by the Jan Sangh, the Congress (0) and the Arya
Sabha. Though the Arya Sabha had put up some official candidates
E
in other Constituencies for the election to the Haryana Assemoly
'f
held in March, 1972 and though the respondent (the appellant) was
not their officid candidate, the Arya Sabha had somehow taken it
for granted that the respondent (the appellant), if successful, would
be as good as being their candidate as he was an active and important
member of the Ar1a Sabha. Out of the official candidates of the Arya
Sabha only one succeeded in the election. · The Arya Sabha, however,
F
counted the respondent (the appeliant) also as their successful candidate
and hoped that be would also join the Arya Sabha as he bad been
@lected with their support and efforts. The respondent (the appellant),
after having been elected, frustrated the hopes of the Arya Sabha and
the other opposition parties. When the Arya Sabha staged a dbarna
outside the Haryana Assembly on its opening day, the respondent
(the appellant) did not join the same though he was expected to do so.
G
When the Arya Sabha convened a meeting to felicitate the respor.dent
(the appellant) on his success and made all arrangements for the same
and proclaimed to the public that the respondent (the appellant)
would be honoured in the meeting, the respondent (the appellant)
refused to even Join and attend the m.eting. Not only did the respoP.dent (the appellant) let down the parties which had combined
to make him successful in the election, but he applied for joining the
H
Congress (R). This conduct of the respondent (the appellant) broke
the camel's back and some workers of all the three opposition parties,
that is the Arya Sabha, the Jan Sangh and the Congress (0), combined
•
/
#
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UMED v. RAJ SINGH (Palekar, J.)
92~
to take a revenge by undoing the wrong which appeared to have been
done to them, by helping the petitioner in get ng the respondent (the
apPeJl~nt) unseated if pos~ible by making available to the petitioner
all available material of which those members of the opposition parties
happened to be tn possess10n on account of their having been the
erstwhile supporters of the respondent (the appellant.) The seal with
which some of the active workers of the respondent (the appellant)'
had assisted him in the election was now diverted against the nspondent (the appellant) as soon as those workers were cut to the quick
by the political somersaut taken by the respondent (the
appellant) ..
All those workers of the respondene (the appellant),
therefore.
focussed their fangs on the respondent (the apel!ant) lt is
ill'
these circumstances that there is visible throughout this case
a
regularly organised attempt on the
part of the
respondent's
(appellant's) erstwhile workers to deprive the respondent (the appellant) of the fruits of the Jabour of those workers."
One has to keep these ohservati•ns <'f the Jeuned Judge steadily
before one's mind while appreciat ng the evidence in this case. We
shall proceed now to deal with the six findings challenged before us
in the order mentioned above.
The case with regard to the bribery of candidate Chatru was that
chatru was set up as a candidate by the present appellant in order to
wean away the votes of the Harijans and members of the backward classes from Raj Singh the Congress candidate. There were about 8,000 to
10,000 voteT' in the Constituency belonging to that category and
Chatru, being a member of the backward class, was expected to obtain
the votes of those classes which, it is alleged, used to vote solidly in
favour of the Congress candidate in former elections. Indeed. Chatru
was formally set up as a candidate of the Kisan Mazdor.r Party which
had come into existence in recent years. But since it was impossible
for a member of the backward class to fight an election for want of
funds the appellant, it is alleged, agreed to put him in possession of
sufficient funds to carry on his election campaign. Jn pursuance of
the agreement, it is alleged, he was paid in all Rs. 6,500/- on four
different dates-Rs. 2,000/- on February II, 1972,lRs. 3,0CO/- ov February 14, 1972, Rs. 500/- on March 6. 1972 and Rs. 1,000/- on March
10, 1972. The appellant denied ha·.ing set up Chatru as a candidate
or havinc. paid him any amount at any time and for anv purpose. The
learned Judge did not accept the allegations with regard to com1pt
practice except in respect of Rs. 1,000/- alleged to have been paid on•
the afternoon of Marc! 10, 1972 which was the day previous to the
date of polling. With respect to the sum of Rs. 1,000,'- he recorded·
the finding that Subedar Bharat Singh who was the Election Agent
of the appellant had srnt R;. l.OOli/- in cash on March 10, 1972 to
Chatru through one Balbir Singh, P. W. 5 and that the said amount
was in fact paid to Chatru at Meham with the object of inducing.
Chatru "not to withdraw from the contest."
It is contended on behalf of the appellant firstly, that there was _no
truth in the allegation that the appellant had through his electton
924
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 1 s.c.R.
agent paid any amount to Chatru on March 10,1972, much less with
the object of inducing Chatru not to withdraw from the contest. Secondly, even assuming that the amount was paid, the evidence-which
the appellant described as false-fell far short of proving that the amount
was paid with the object of inducing Chatru not to withdraw from
the contest. It was contended that the learned Judge fell into the error
of treating the expression "withdraw from being a candidate" found
in section 123(1) (A)(a) as synonymous with "withdrawing from the
contest" when the evidence, taken at its worst, disclosed no more than
that Chatru was a little lethargic, for want of funds, in the pursuit
· of his campaign on March 10, 1972 and the payment had been made
with a view to activise him in his campaign. It was contended that
appellant was entitled to a finding in his favour on the two above
questions. In any event, it was further contended on behalf of the appe1lant that there could be, in Jaw, no withdrawal from being a candidate
after the date for withdrawal was long past on 14-2-1972.
A
B
c
While approaching the question of payment of Rs. 1,000/-
on
I 0-3-1972 we cannot ignore the fact that the case was that Chatru
was paid in all Rs. 6,500/- by the appellant for his election purpose
and the learned Judge has disbelieved or, at any rate, not accepted
D
the story with regard to the payment of Rs. 5,500/-.Chatru in his return
of expenses submitted to the Election Commissioner had stated that
the total expenditure incurred by him was Rs. 900/-. It was argued
that it is well-known that candidates do not make a truthful report
about the expenses and, therefore, much significance may not be
attached to the statement submitted to the Election Commissioner.
Be that as it may, we must furthernote that Chatru had been set up as
E
a candidate by the Kisan Mazdoor Party which had set up 15 or 16
candidates in other constituencies, also. Top officials of that Party
and other sympathizers had campaigned for the success of their candidates and it is admitted by Chatru that the campaign was also made
in his behalf in his constituency by his Party. Chatru has given evidence
on behalf of himself as R2Wl but his evidence is completely biased
against the appellant who is supposed to have helped him With funds
F
in his election campaign. If one goes through his evidence one finds
that he has come into the witness box only to prove the case of the
Congress candidate Raj Singh. On the face of it, therefore, his evidence
is very suspect because on his own showing he was wholly hostile to
the appellant in the witness box in spite of his case that the appellant
.,
had helped him in the election campaign by making over Rs. 6,500/-
to him. But if one has to take hirri at his word, it is clear that he must
G
have spent more than Rs. 6,000/- for his electioneering and on the
finding of the learned Judge no more than Rs. 1,000/- should have
"'-
been given to him by the appellant. In that case it is difficult to see
where from Chatru got the balance of the amount to spend on his
campaign. Evidently a sum of Rs. 1,000/- supplied by the appellant
on the eve of the election could not have possibly sustained his electioneering, which had started from the second week of February, 72. ThereH
fore, the story about the payment of Rs. 1,000/- on 10-3-1972 has to
be approached with a good deal of circumspection.
A
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H
•
UMED v. RAJ SINGH (Palekar, ].)
925
It is obvious that the learned Judge would have rejected the evidence
of Chatru with regard to the payment of Rs. 1,000/- also, but the fact
that he found that there was some documentary evidence which supported Chatru's statement. The case is that on the morning of 10-31972 the appellant and his election agent Bharat Singh met him and
enquired from him why he had "turned so lethargic". Chatru says
that he told them that he had exhausted his funds, whereupon they
promised to send him the money. In the afternoon PW. 5 Balbir Singh
came and delivered a sum of Rs. 1,000/- to him and obtained his
signature on a piece of paper. It is this piece of paper and the writing
thereon which has very much impressed the learned Judge and that
appears to be the chief reason why he came to the conclusion that
this amount of Rs. 1,000/- must have been paid on that day. The
piece of paper is Ext. PW. 5/1. There is a writing thereon admittedly
in the hand of Subedar Bharat Sin~h which reads as follows:
"Bhai Chatru, main ap ke pass ek hazar rupia bhej raha hoon,
so aap chunao men mazbooti se datte rahen."
which means that the writer had sent Chatru a sum of Rs. 1,000/- so
that he may stand "steadfastly in the election". Subedar Bharat Singh
who was examined on behalf of the appellant as RI W27 admits that
this was his writing. But he explains that the writing was a fabrication
designed to be used for the purpose of toppling the appellant who
after his election with the help of the Arya Sabha and other Parties
had turned disloyal to bis suppcrters. It appears that in the first week
of April, 72 i.e. the very week in which the new Assembly was to meet,
the appellant decided to join the ruling Congress. Bharat Singh bas
explained that he was so annoyed by the turn-coat activity of the
appellant that he became a party to a conspiracy to create evidence
for the purpose of helping the election petition which was expected to
be filed by Raj Singh. He said that he had not sent any amount with·
any body for payment to Chatru on that day and the whole tbing was
a concoction. The learned Judge was no doubt justified in his severe
criticism of this witness, but we feel that he Jost sight of the caution
which he had himself administered with regard to the appreciation
of the evidence in this case. The fact is well-established that the former
supporters of the appellant had been very much put out by the disloyal activity of the appellant in deciding to join the ruling Congress
Party and the witnesses who appeared in support of the election petition made no secret of the fact that they were after the blood of the
appellant. Therefore, it is not beyond the bounds of probability that
in the first wave of indignation which swept over the' appellant's former
supporters, Bharat Singh who was the election agent of the appe!Jant
and had done considerable work on behalf of the appellant should
have agreed to write something which would be detrimental to the
interests of the appellant in the election petition. The writing on
the very face of its looks extremely artificial. Chatru had stated that
the appellant and . Bharat Singh had seen him earlier that day and
pronused to send him money. So all that Bharat Singh need have done
"'.as to send the money to Chatru with the messanger or taken the mcney
himself to Chatru who was at the time in the same vilhge Meham.
926
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 1 s.c.R.
It was not necessary for him to write at all, much less to say that he
was
sending Rs. 1,000/-
"so that he may stand steadfastly
in the election", an expression which clearly echoes the supposed
requirements of section 123(1)(A)(a). Moreover, it requires considerable credulity to believe that Bharat Singh would send a message
of this nature in writing to Chatru placing in his hands an instrument
capable of boing used to blackmail the appellant should he succeed
in the. election. A piece of writing of this nature in the hands of a
man of the type of Chatru, as we know him, would have been incredible
folly.
Subedar Bharat Singh must have been selected as an election
.agent because of his experience, and we know that the gentleman had
on a former occasion, stood as a candidate to the Lok Sabha election.
It appears to us that the learned Judge has not given sufficient attention to this aspect of the case. He merely went by the writing and
the evidence of Balbir Singh, P.W. 5.
according to whom this .writing
had been handed over alongwith a sum of Rs. 1,000/- by Bharat Singh
to him to be delivered to Chatru, Balbir Singh who is about 30 years
old is admittedly a member of the Arya Sabha. He claims to have
worked in the election of the appellant. He says that Bharat Singh
gave hiin Ext. P.W. 5/1 and also a sum of Rs. 1,000/- to be delivered
to Chatru and his case is that he went to Chatru and gave him the money.
He took his signature on the back of the chit. It is rather interesting
to know that Chatru is illiterate. He doesn't know how to read and
write. He can merely sign. It is neither the case of Chatru nor of
Balbir Singh that the message contained in the writing was read out
to Chatru. NQr ·was his signature taken formally below the writing
to the effect that Chatru had received Rs. J ,000/-.
Now if this story of Balbir Singh were to be believed we should
expect that this document with the signature of Chatru on the reverse
should have gone back to Bharat Singh. But he did not get it back.
Balbir says that he kept it with himself. According to him some
8 or JO days after the election on JJ-3-72 he told about this payment
to one Beg Raj, P.W. 14 who was also a member of the Arya Sabha.
He further says that Beg Raj reminded him that they had done a good
deal of work for the appellant in the election and now he had ·given up
the Arya Sabha and joined the Congress Party. He, therefore, requested Balbir to accompany him to the defeated Congress candidate
R~j Singh to enquire if this information would be of any use to him.
So both of them went to Raj Singh at Rohtak and showed him this
chit Ext. P.W. 5/1. Raj Singh asked for the chit but Balbir told him
that he will not part with it uow, but that he will produce the chit in
court and thus wheu Balbir was examined as Raj Singh's witness he
produced this document in court. One can see the hostility with which
this witness as also the other witness Beg Raj, P.W. 14 pursued the
appellant. Both of them belong to the Arya Sabha which had solidly
supported the appellant in the election and it is easy to see that they
were inclined to leave no stone unturned to see that the appellant
who had succeeded in the election should be defeated in court. That
·the story given by Balbir Singh is patently false is clear from the fact
.that he says that he had ~one with this chit alongwith Beg Raj to
Raj Singh within 8 or JO d2:·s after the election. As a matter of fact
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UMED v. RAJ SINGH (Palekar, ];)
927
this was not at all possible, because at the relevant time the appellant
had not shown his inclination to ioin the Congress Party. He was
waiting for a proper opportunity. The new Ascembly session was
to meet in the first week of April and it is only thereafter that the appellant made his intentions known. In our opinion, neither Chatru
nor Balbir nor Beg Ra.J could be trusted as reliable witnesses in view
of their open hostility to the appellant, and since it is extrerr..ely unlikely
that the Subedar Bharat Singh would place a chit like P.W. 5;1 in the
hand of Chatru prior to the election, we cannot accept the finding
of the learned Judge that the writing was a genuine de cunoent sent by
Bharat Singh on the 10th March, 1972. It is also abrnrd to believe
that Chatru would become "lethargic" in his campaign on the eve of
the election. It is not the case that he did net actively czmpaign fer
himself alongwith his supporters and members of his Party earlier.
One dJes not quite see how a sum of Rs. 1,000/- placed in his hands
m the afternoon of 10-3-72 would give a sudden fillip to his dropping
sp'.rits. He was a member of a Party which had set up 15 or 16 candidates in the field in other constituencies and it is impossible to belieye
that Chatru's spirits scddenly dropped on the 10th March, 1972 for
want of funds.
A crude attempt was further made by another sympathiser of the
Arya Sabha to give added credence to the writing Ext. P.W. 5/J. That
is P.W. JO Munshi Ram. He claims to have run the election office
of the appellant during the election campaign and in the course of his
duties he kept, what is called, a Register which is P.W. 19/1. The
Register describes itself as a "Register of Vehicles-arrive.ls and departure from 28-2-1972 to 15-3-1972". It is true that some entries
have been made with regard to vehicles therein but alongwith them
other memos are also to be seen in some places and there are entries
for some payments also. It was an unpaged book before it was produced in court. It was paged by order of the learned Judge. Pages
39 to 42 relate to entries showing the distributicn cf vcteis lists
and
other
materials to the
workers
of
the appellant.
The
appellant
has accepted
these
.entries as genuine · but
so far as the other entries are concerned they are not accepted by the
appellant. In fact the appellant put forward the case that all the other
entries were fabrications made by Munshi Ram after the election.
We do not think that the appellant is telling the truth in that respect.
Many entries may be quite true but the book cannot be described as
a book kept in the regular course of business. It is kept in a shcddy
manner and most irregule.rly. Many cdd entries have been m~de at
odd places. Some entries and memo, important from our point
of view, have the distinct appearance of interpolations. The book
is not kept continuously. After making some entries on some pages
many pages are left blank and then further entries are made. Then
again long notes and memos in Urdu are entered in a queer fashion
not merely in the reverse order as Urdu books are written but also
after turning the book topsy-turvy. We cannot, therefore, allow this
memorandum book the dignity of a book written in the regular course
of business. No memo or entry made therein can be accepted as
reliable unless the court is satisfied· about the time at which or the
928
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 1 S.C.R.
/
circumstances in which it was made or the contest in which it appears.
We have no doubt at all, though it was denied by witness Munshi
Ram, that he made this book available to the petitioner who prcduced
it alongwith the petition. Some of the entries were deliberately
introduced with a view to help the election petitioner.
Having thus seen that the so-called register P.W. 19/1 is not reliable
in itself we have now to refer to a long entry made therein in Urdu
which seems to have considerably impressed the learned Judge on this
subject of payment of Rs. 1,000/-. This entry is nearly at the other
end of the book at page 94 and when translated in as follows :
"10/3 at about 3.00 p.m. (though) supporters of Raj Singh
started a false propaganda to the effectthat Chatar Singh (Chatru)
has
withdrawn
from the
contest
and
supporter~
of
Chatar Singh should therefore cast their votes carefully (yet)
it does not appeal to reason that Chatar Singh might have thought
of taking such a step even in a dream. It is necessary to contact
Chatar Singh immediately and it is necessary to have a contradiction of this false rumour being proclaimed as soon as possible
from Chatar Singh himself and from his supporters."
The learned Judge bas fallen into the error of thinking that this entry
in the book went a long way in supporting the case of the petitioner
that Chatru must have been contemplating withdrawing from the
contest on the afternoon of 10-3-1972. One does not see why it was
necessary for Munshi Ram to make such ah entry. Munshi Ram
was not directing the election campaign nor "as he giving instructions
as to what was to be done from hour to hour. In fact it was the case
of the election petitioner that Cbatru was contacted tarlier by the
appellant and Bharat Singh-the learned Judge says that this was in
the morning of 10th March, 72, and Chatru had been informed by them
that he will receive the necessary funds so that he may put more vigour
in his election campaign. It is also stated that in the afternoon the
amount of Rs. 1,000/- was delivered to Chatru through Balbir Singh
If that story is true, one does not see the propriety of Munshi Ram
writing such a memo at 3 · 00 p.m. when he himself did not believe the
rumour that Chatru was wanting to withdraw from the contest and was
convinced that that rumour bad been started by the supporters of Raj
Singh falsely. It appears to us that this entry is a suspicious entry
made by Munshi Ram, in all probability, after it was decid<d to make
this note book available to the election petitioner. Jn our opinion,
the learned Judge was not justified in relying upon this memo mad~
in an odd place in the book in a very artificial manner.
Reference was also made to some other evidence on record to show
that since the appellant was very much interested that the backward
class and Harijans votes should not go to Raj Singh, the Congress
candidate, there was considerable force in the allegatioll made by
Chatru that he had been set up by the appellant with a prorniEe of
financial help. In the first place, it must be remembered that Chatru
was set up as a candidate· by tne Kisan Mazdoor Party. It may
be that the appellant would be very happy if a certain block of votes
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UMED \', RAJ 'SINGH (Palekar, J.)
929
is denied to an opposing candidate. The principal contest was between
the Congress candidate and the appellant. It is not the case that
Chatru would have been able to defeat either of them in the election.
At the same time there is no clear· evidence that members of the Sche·
duled castes and backward classes would have voted for the Congress
candidate if there was no backward class candidate. Then again it
B
was difficult to assert that if no Harijan or backward class candidate
was in the field the Harijans and backward class votes would not have
gone to the appellant. For the matter of that, P.W. 30 Mani Ram who
is the res!dent of village Bedwa has stated that there was greater support
for the appellant in his village than for Raj Singh and that actually
voters of all classes in the village including Jats, Harijans and members
of the backward classes supported his candidature. Indeed it is one
C
thing to say that the appellant might have been happy if votes which
were usually cast in favour of the Congress c.0 ndidate were cast in
Chatru's favour and quite another to say that with a view to wean
away the votes from the Congress candidate he had put up a backward
class candidate like Chatru with promise of financial support. The
learned Judge has negatived the payment of Rs. 5,500/· to Chatru
and we have negatived the payment of Rs. 1,000/- to him, in which
D
case the only conclusion is that there was no financial support to Chatru
from the appellant.