# SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK

- **Citation:** [2022] 5 S.C.R. 945
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2022-02-22
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 11397 of 2016
- **Bench:** L. Nageswara Rao, B. R. Gavai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shrikant-g-mantri-v-punjab-national-bank-36477
- **Pages:** 25

## Headnote

Consumer Protection Act, 1986: ss. 2(1)(d), 2(1)(d)(i),
2(1)(d)(ii) - Appellant was a stock-broker by profession - He was
also acting as stock broker for respondent bank - Appellant took
overdraft facility from respondent-bank and also sought
enhancement of the same from time to time in furtherance of his
business as stock broker and for enhancing profit - Whether the
appellant had availed the services of the respondent for 'commercial
purpose' and therefore he was not a consumer as envisaged under
s.2(1)(d) of the Act - Held: Ordinarily, "commercial purpose" is
understood to include manufacturing /industrial activity or
business-to-business transactions between commercial entities and
that the purchase of the good or service should have a close and
direct nexus with a profit-generating activity - What is relevant is
the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction and
as to whether the same was to facilitate some kind of profit
generation for the purchaser and/or their beneficiary - The relations
between the appellant and the respondent was purely "business to
business" relationship - The transactions would clearly come within
the ambit of 'commercial purpose' - Therefore, it cannot be said
that the services were availed exclusively for the purposes of
earning his livelihood by means of self-employment - Appellant was
not consumer under s.2(1)(d) of the Act.
Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993: Object of the
Amendment Act - Held: To enable the consumers, who are selfemployed, to file complaints before the redressal agencies, where
goods bought by them exclusively for earning their livelihood, suffer
from any defect - By the 1993 Amendment Act, insofar as services
are concerned, wherever the word "hires" was used, the same was
substituted by the word "hires or avails of" - By the 1993 Amendment
Act, insofar as s. 2(1)(d)(i) is concerned, an Explanation was
[2022] 5 S.C.R. 945
945
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
946
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 5 S.C.R.
provided to the effect that 'commercial purpose' does not include
use by a consumer of goods bought and used by him exclusively for
the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1.1 Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection
Act,1986 is in two parts. Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act deals
with buying of goods. A person who buys any goods for a
consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and
partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment would
be a consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said
Act. It also includes any user of such goods other than the person
who buys such goods for a consideration, which has been paid
or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system
of deferred payment, when such use is made with the approval of
such person. However, Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act excludes
a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial
purpose. Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the said Act is with respect to hiring
of services. According to it, the term 'consumer' means any
person who hires any services for a consideration, which has been
paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any
system of deferred payment. It also included any beneficiary of
such services other than the person who hires the services as is
provided under Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act. [Paras 24 &
25][957-C-F]
1.2. In order to plug the loopholes and enlarge the scope
of areas covered, the legislature brought certain amendments to
the Act by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993.
One of the objects of the said Act was to enable the consumers,
who are self- employed, to file complaints before the redressal
agencies, where goods bought by them exclusively for earning
their livelihood, suffer from any defect. By the 1993 Amendment
Act, insofar as services are concerned, wherever the word "hires"
was used, the same was substituted by the w

## Text

_Characters 0–39,733 of 58,230. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39733 for what follows._

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
945
SHRIKANT G. MANTRI
v.
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
(Civil Appeal No. 11397 of 2016)
FEBRUARY 22, 2022
[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
Consumer Protection Act, 1986: ss. 2(1)(d), 2(1)(d)(i),
2(1)(d)(ii) - Appellant was a stock-broker by profession - He was
also acting as stock broker for respondent bank - Appellant took
overdraft facility from respondent-bank and also sought
enhancement of the same from time to time in furtherance of his
business as stock broker and for enhancing profit - Whether the
appellant had availed the services of the respondent for 'commercial
purpose' and therefore he was not a consumer as envisaged under
s.2(1)(d) of the Act - Held: Ordinarily, "commercial purpose" is
understood to include manufacturing /industrial activity or
business-to-business transactions between commercial entities and
that the purchase of the good or service should have a close and
direct nexus with a profit-generating activity - What is relevant is
the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction and
as to whether the same was to facilitate some kind of profit
generation for the purchaser and/or their beneficiary - The relations
between the appellant and the respondent was purely "business to
business" relationship - The transactions would clearly come within
the ambit of 'commercial purpose' - Therefore, it cannot be said
that the services were availed exclusively for the purposes of
earning his livelihood by means of self-employment - Appellant was
not consumer under s.2(1)(d) of the Act.
Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993: Object of the
Amendment Act - Held: To enable the consumers, who are selfemployed, to file complaints before the redressal agencies, where
goods bought by them exclusively for earning their livelihood, suffer
from any defect - By the 1993 Amendment Act, insofar as services
are concerned, wherever the word "hires" was used, the same was
substituted by the word "hires or avails of" - By the 1993 Amendment
Act, insofar as s. 2(1)(d)(i) is concerned, an Explanation was
[2022] 5 S.C.R. 945
945
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
946
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 5 S.C.R.
provided to the effect that 'commercial purpose' does not include
use by a consumer of goods bought and used by him exclusively for
the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1.1 Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection
Act,1986 is in two parts. Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act deals
with buying of goods. A person who buys any goods for a
consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and
partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment would
be a consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said
Act. It also includes any user of such goods other than the person
who buys such goods for a consideration, which has been paid
or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system
of deferred payment, when such use is made with the approval of
such person. However, Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act excludes
a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial
purpose. Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the said Act is with respect to hiring
of services. According to it, the term 'consumer' means any
person who hires any services for a consideration, which has been
paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any
system of deferred payment. It also included any beneficiary of
such services other than the person who hires the services as is
provided under Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act. [Paras 24 &
25][957-C-F]
1.2. In order to plug the loopholes and enlarge the scope
of areas covered, the legislature brought certain amendments to
the Act by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993.
One of the objects of the said Act was to enable the consumers,
who are self- employed, to file complaints before the redressal
agencies, where goods bought by them exclusively for earning
their livelihood, suffer from any defect. By the 1993 Amendment
Act, insofar as services are concerned, wherever the word "hires"
was used, the same was substituted by the word "hires or avails
of". By the 1993 Amendment Act, insofar as Section 2(1)(d)(i) is
concerned, an Explanation was provided to the effect that
'commercial purpose' does not include use by a consumer of
goods bought and used by him exclusively for the purpose of
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
947
earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. [Paras 27 &
28][958-A-B, E-F]
1.3 By the 2002 Amendment Act, the legislature has done
two things. Firstly, it has kept the commercial transactions, insofar
as the services are concerned, beyond the ambit of the term
'consumer' and brought it in parity with Section 2(1)(d)(i), wherein
a person, who bought such goods for resale or for any commercial
purpose, was already out of the ambit of the term 'consumer'.
The second thing that the legislature did was that even if a person
availed of the commercial services, if the services availed by him
were exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by
means of self-employment, he would still be a 'consumer' for the
purposes of the said Act. Thus, a person who availed of services
for commercial purpose exclusively for the purposes of earning
his livelihood by means of self- employment was kept out of the
term 'commercial purpose' and brought into the ambit of
'consumer', by bringing him on par with similarly circumstanced
person, who bought and used goods exclusively for the purposes
of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. It could
thus be seen that the legislature's intent is clear. If a person
buys goods for commercial purpose or avails services for
commercial purpose, though ordinarily, he would have been out
of the ambit of the term 'consumer', by virtue of Explanation,
which is now common to both Sections 2(1)(d)(i) and 2(1)(d)(ii),
he would still come within the ambit of the term 'consumer', if
purchase of such goods or availing of such services was
exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means
of self-employment. [Para 31][960-B-F]
2. The question as to whether a transaction is for a
commercial purpose would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. However, ordinarily, "commercial
purpose" is understood to include manufacturing/industrial
activity or business-to-business transactions between commercial
entities; that the purchase of the good or service should have a
close and direct nexus with a profit-generating activity; that the
identity of the person making the purchase or the value of the
transaction is not conclusive for determining the question as to
SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
948
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 5 S.C.R.
whether it is for a commercial purpose or not. What is relevant is
the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction
and as to whether the same was to facilitate some kind of profit
generation for the purchaser and/or their beneficiary. If the
dominant purpose behind purchasing the good or service was for
the personal use and the consumption of the purchaser and/or
their beneficiary, or is otherwise not linked to any commercial
activity, then the question of whether such a purchase was for
the purpose of "generating livelihood by means of
self-employment" need not be looked into. [Para 42][967-D-G]
3. In the present case, the Commission has come to a
finding that the appellant had opened an account with the
respondent-Bank, took overdraft facility to expand his business
profits, and subsequently from time to time the overdraft facility
was enhanced so as to further expand his business and increase
his profits. The relations between the appellant and the
respondent is purely "business to business" relationship. As such,
the transactions would clearly come within the ambit of
'commercial purpose'. It cannot be said that the services were
availed "exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood"
"by means of self-employment". If the interpretation as sought
to be placed by the appellant is to be accepted, then the 'business
to business' disputes would also have to be construed as
consumer disputes, thereby defeating the very purpose of
providing speedy and simple redressal to consumer disputes.
Therefore there is no error in the findings of the Commission.
[Paras 47 and 48][969-B-E]
Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute
(1995) 3 SCC 583 : [1995] 3 SCR 174 - relied on.
Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve
Bank of India (2020) 10 SCC 274 : [2020] SCR 297;
Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Unique Shanti
Developers and Others (2020) 2 SCC 265 : [2019] 14
SCR 563; Paramount Digital Colour Lab and Others
v. AGFA India Private Limited and Others (2018) 14
SCC 81; Sunil Kohli and Another v. Purearth
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
949
Infrastructure Limited (2020) 12 SCC 235; CBI, AHD,
Patna v. Braj Bhushan Prasad and Others (2001) 9
SCC 432 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 627; Cheema
Engineering Services v. Rajan Singh (1997) 1 SCC 131:
[1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 340; Kalpavruksha Charitable
Trust v. Toshniwal Brothers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. and
Another (2000) 1 SCC 512 : [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR
619 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2020] 2 SCR 297
referred to
Para 17
[2019] 14 SCR 563
referred to
Para 17 (i)
(2018) 14 SCC 81
referred to
Para 17 (ii)
(2020) 12 SCC 235
referred to
Para 17 (iii)
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 627
referred to
Para 17 (iv)
[1995] 3 SCR 174
relied on
Para 32
[1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 340
referred to
Para 37
[1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 619
referred to
Para 38
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11397
of 2016.
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.06.2016 of the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in Consumer
Complaint No. 55 of 2006.
Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Ms. Nandini Gore, Ms. Sonia Nigam,
Ms. Neha Khandelwal, Davesh Bhatia, Ms. Damini Bisht, Adith
Deshmukh, M/s Karanjawala & Co., Advs. for the Appellant.
Dushyant Dave, Sr. Adv., Mohit Chaudhary, Ms. Puja Sharma,
Kunal Sachdeva, Chowdhary Zulfikar Ali, Balwinder Singh Suri, Paras
Mithal, Ms. Mahima Ahuja, Nimesh Joshi, Parveen Kumar, Advs. for
the Respondent.
SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 5 S.C.R.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B. R. GAVAI, J.
1. The present appeal filed by the appellant-complainant challenges
the judgment and order dated 1st June, 2016, passed by the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter
referred to as "the Commission") in Consumer Complaint No. 55 of
2006, thereby holding that the appellant-complainant was not a consumer
as envisaged under Section 2(1)(d) of The Consumer Protection Act,
1986 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act"). As such, by the impugned
judgment and order, the complaint of the appellant has been dismissed
being not maintainable.
2. The facts in the present case are not in dispute. The bare
necessary facts for adjudication of the present appeal are as under:
3. The appellant-complainant had opened an account with
erstwhile Nedungadi Bank Limited (hereinafter referred to as "the
erstwhile Bank") in the year 1998. The appellant is a stock-broker by
profession. The appellant had applied for an overdraft facility on
25th April, 1998, in connection with his day-to-day share and stock
transactions. It is not in dispute that the said overdraft facility was
sanctioned by the erstwhile Bank to the appellant-complainant initially
for an amount of Rs.1 crore, for which the appellant-complainant had
pledged certain shares worth more than Rs.1 crore, as security as per
the margin requirements specified by the erstwhile Bank. Subsequently,
in the year 1999, the appellant-complainant applied for enhancement of
the said overdraft facility. The said overdraft facility was enhanced by
the erstwhile Bank from Rs.1 crore to Rs. 5 crore, vide its letter dated
13th December, 1999.
4. Again, in March 2001, the appellant-complainant approached
the erstwhile Bank for temporary increase in the overdraft limit. The
erstwhile Bank, vide its letter dated 17th March, 2001, granted the request
of the appellant and temporarily enhanced the overdraft facility from
Rs.5 crore to Rs.6 crore, for a period of one week.
5. It appears that due to steep fall in the share market, the erstwhile
Bank, vide its letters dated 16th and 17th March, 2001, called upon the
appellant-complainant to pledge additional shares to regularize the
overdraft account. As an additional security, the appellant-complainant
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
951
pledged 37,50,000 equity shares of face value of Rs.10/- of unlisted
company Ansal Hotels Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the said shares")
towards the dues of the Bank, vide his letter dated 30th March, 2001. It
is not in dispute that subsequently, consequent to the merger of Ansal
Hotels Ltd. with ITC Ltd., and the bonus and splitting of ITC shares, the
aforesaid 37,50,000 equity shares of Ansal Hotels Ltd. became equivalent
to 3,75,000 shares of ITC Ltd.
6. It appears that during 2001, the overdraft account of the
appellant-complainant became irregular and as such, the erstwhile Bank
called upon the appellant-complainant to regularise the overdraft account.
As the appellant-complainant was unable to regularise the overdraft
account, the erstwhile Bank, vide letter dated 14th September, 2001, called
upon the appellant-complainant to pay a sum of Rs.600.61 lakhs along
with interest thereon.
7. It is the case of the appellant-complainant that though he had
advised the erstwhile Bank to sell the pledged shares in December, 2001,
so as to close overdraft account, the erstwhile Bank chose not to sell the
said shares at that point of time. It is the case of the appellant-complainant
that the said shares were sold by the erstwhile Bank in November 2002,
when the market value of the said pledged shares was at the lowest,
which resulted in huge loss to the appellant-complainant.
8. After selling a part of the pledged shares for a sum of
Rs.2,69,66,215.79, the respondent Bank, the successor-in-interest of the
erstwhile Bank, filed a Recovery Petition before the Debts Recovery
Tribunal, Mumbai against the appellant-complainant for recovery of the
balance amount due as on 26th December, 2002. The said petition was
decreed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai, vide order dated
26th May, 2004. However, the matter was settled between the parties
and a 'One Time Settlement' ("OTS" for short) was reached between
them on payment of Rs. 2 crore. As such, the respondent-Bank issued a
'No Dues Certificate' dated 14th May, 2005, certifying that no dues were
left outstanding against the overdraft account of the appellant. After the
OTS, the respondent-Bank withdrew the recovery proceedings filed
against the appellant.
9. It is the case of the appellant that since the respondent-Bank
failed to return the said shares to the appellant, he sent a notice on
14th June, 2005 to the respondent-Bank, seeking release of the said shares.
SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 5 S.C.R.
10. It appears that the appellant was also working as a stockbroker of the respondent-Bank. With regard to the transactions with the
appellant in the capacity as a stock-broker, the respondent-Bank had
initiated arbitration proceedings against the appellant before the Arbitration
forum of the Bombay Stock Exchange ('BSE" for short). According to
the appellant, the respondent-Bank failed in the said arbitration
proceedings, which have attained finality.
11. In this background, the appellant filed a complaint before the
Commission, alleging deficiency in services on the part of the respondentBank. The main relief claimed in the said complaint was for a direction
to the respondent-Bank to return 3,75,000 shares of ITC Ltd. (earlier
37,50,000 shares of Ansal Hotel Ltd.) along with dividend and all
accretions thereon.
12. In the said proceedings, on being served with the notice, the
respondent-Bank raised a preliminary objection with regard to
maintainability of the said complaint, on the ground that the appellantcomplainant was not a consumer as envisaged under Section 2(1)(d) of
the said Act. The Commission, by the impugned order, held that the
appellant had availed the services of the respondent-Bank for
'commercial purpose' and as such, he was not a consumer as envisaged
under Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act.
13. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant-complainant has
approached this Court by way of the present appeal.
14. We have heard Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant and Shri Dushyant Dave, learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.
15. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant-complainant, submitted that the appellant had a dual
relationship with the respondent-Bank. In the first capacity, as a consumer,
he had taken the overdraft facility from the respondent-Bank for the
purposes of his self-employment. In the second capacity, he was working
as the stock-broker for the respondent-Bank. The learned Senior Counsel
submitted that with regard to the said relationship, though there were
certain disputes, the claim of the respondent-Bank before the Arbitration
Forum of BSE has been rejected by the BSE Arbitral Tribunal, which
has attained finality.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
953
16. Shri Divan further submits that it is undisputed that the said
shares were pledged with the respondent-Bank only as a security towards
the overdraft facility. He submits that from the letter of the respondentBank dated 14th May, 2005, it is clear that there were no dues outstanding
in the overdraft account of the appellant-complainant, which stood fully
and finally settled through compromise/OTS. He submitted that once
the dues of the respondent-Bank towards the said overdraft facility stood
cleared, there was no reason for the respondent-Bank to have withheld
the said shares. He submitted that though the arbitration proceedings
between the parties had reached finality, the respondent-Bank had illegally
withheld the said shares of the appellant. He submitted that in spite of
repeated requests for return of the said shares, the same were not
returned and as such, the appellant had no option but to file the complaint
under the said Act.
17. Shri Divan submitted that though Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the
said Act, excludes a person who avails of such services for 'any
commercial purpose', the Explanation thereto, which could be construed
as proviso to proviso, would include even such a person if it is shown
that the services availed by him were exclusively for the purposes of
earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. He submitted that
the services of the overdraft facility were taken by the appellant from
the respondent-Bank for the purposes of his business as a stock-broker.
He submitted that since the appellant was engaged in the profession of
stock-broker and since the services of the said overdraft facility were
taken for the appellant's profession as a stock-broker, the services
rendered by the respondent-Bank were exclusively for the purposes of
earning his livelihood. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the appellant
was self-employed as a stock-broker and as such, the services availed
were exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of
self-employment. He relies on the dictionary meaning of the word
'livelihood' as provided in Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition. He
submits that the Commission has grossly erred in giving restricted meaning
to the term 'earning his livelihood by means of self-employment'. Learned
Senior Counsel submits that merely because a person has availed the
services of the Bank for expanding his business, that cannot be a ground
to give a restricted meaning to the said term. Relying on the judgment of
this Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India vs.
Reserve Bank of India1, he submits that the services of the Bank
1 (2020) 10 SCC 274
SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
954
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 5 S.C.R.
provide lifeline for any business, trade or profession. He submits that in
the present era, it is unable for any person to survive without availing the
services of a Bank. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the Commission
has erred in holding that the appellant is not a consumer within the meaning
of Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the said Act. In support of his submissions, he
relied on the following judgments of this Court:
(i)
Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti
Developers and others2;
(ii)
Paramount Digital Colour Lab and others vs. AGFA
India Private Limited and others3;
(iii)
Sunil Kohli and another vs. Purearth Infrastructure
Limited4;
(iv)
CBI, AHD, Patna vs. Braj Bhushan Prasad and others5.
18. Shri Dushyant Dave, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent-Bank, on the contrary, submits that the said
Act is a special statute enacted with the purpose of providing a speedy
and simple redressal to consumer disputes. Shri Dave submits that the
said Act provides a summary procedure so that the consumer disputes
are settled without undue delay. He submitted that if the definition of the
word 'consumer' is expanded, so as to include in it a person who avails
of such services for any commercial purpose, the very purpose of the
said Act would be defeated. He submits that if any commercial dispute
between the service provider and the availer/recipient of the service is
included in the definition of the word 'consumer', it will give rise to
floodgates of complaints. It is submitted that if such an interpretation is
accepted, apart from the same being inconsistent with the provisions of
Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the said Act, it will defeat the very purpose of
providing speedy justice to the consumers. He, therefore, submits that
no interference is warranted in the finding of the Commission and the
appeal deserves to be dismissed.
19. For appreciating the rival submissions, it will be necessary to
refer to Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act, as it exists today, which is as
follows:
2 (2020) 2 SCC 265
3 (2018) 14 SCC 81
4 (2020) 12 SCC 235
5 (2001) 9 SCC 432
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
955
"2. Definition.- (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise
 requires,-
(a) ............................................................
.............................................
(d) "consumer" means any person who,-
(i)
buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid
or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under
any system of deferred payment and includes any user of
such goods other than the person who buys such goods
for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly
promised, or under any system of deferred payment when
such use is made with the approval of such person, but
does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale
or for any commercial purpose; or
(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which
has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised,
or under any system of deferred payment and includes
any beneficiary of such services other than the person
who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid
or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under
any system of deferred payment, when such services are
availed of with the approval of the first mentioned
person but does not include a person who avails of such
services for any commercial purpose;
Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause, "commercial
purpose" does not include use by a person of goods bought
and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for
the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of selfemployment;"
20. The short question, therefore, that would have to be answered
in the present case is, as to whether the services availed by the appellant
from the respondent-Bank would fall within the term 'commercial
purpose'. The other question that would also have to be answered is, as
to whether such services are exclusively availed by the appellant for the
purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment.
SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 5 S.C.R.
21. For considering the said issues, we will also have to examine
the object while enacting the said Act as well as the legislative history as
to how Section 2(1)(d) has come in its present form. The legislature
found that though there were various provisions contained in various
enactments to protect the consumers and provide relief to them, yet it
became necessary to protect the consumers from the exploitation and to
save them from adulterated and sub-standard goods and services and to
safe guard the interests of the consumers. In order to provide for better
protection of the interests of the consumer, the Consumer Protection
Bill was introduced in the Parliament.
22. Perusal of the 'Statement of Objects and Reasons' of the said
Act would show that the said Act seeks to provide for better protection
of the interests of consumers and for that purpose, to make provision for
the establishment of Consumer Councils and other authorities for the
settlement of consumer disputes and for matters connected therewith.
One of the objects for enacting the said Act was the right to be heard
and to be assured that consumers' interests will receive due consideration
at appropriate forums. To provide speedy and simple redressal to
consumer disputes, a quasi-judicial machinery was sought to be set up at
the district, State and Central levels. It will be apposite to refer to the
preamble of the said Act, which reads thus:
"An Act to provide for better protection of the interests of
consumers and for that purpose to make provision for the
establishment of consumer councils and other authorities for the
settlement of consumers' disputes and for matters connected
therewith."
23. The definition of the term 'consumer' as contained in Section
2(1)(d) of the said Act, as it existed in the original enactment of 1986,
reads thus:
"(d) "consumer" means any person who,-
(i)
buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or
promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any
system of deferred payment and includes any user of such
goods other than the person who buys such goods for
consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly
promised, or under any system of deferred payment when
such use is made with the approval of such person, but
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
957
does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale
or for any commercial purpose; or
(ii)
hires any services for a consideration which has been paid
or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under
any system of deferred payment and includes any
beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires
the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly
paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred
payment, when such services are availed of with the
approval of the first mentioned person"
24. It could thus be seen that Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act is in
two parts. Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act deals with buying of goods.
A person who buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid
or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of
deferred payment would be a consumer within the meaning of Section
2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act. It also includes any user of such goods other
than the person who buys such goods for a consideration, which has
been paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any
system of deferred payment, when such use is made with the approval
of such person. However, Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act excludes a
person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose.
25. Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the said Act is with respect to hiring of
services. According to it, the term 'consumer' means any person who
hires any services for a consideration, which has been paid or promised
or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred
payment. It also included any beneficiary of such services other than
the person who hires the services as is provided under Section 2(1)(d)(i)
of the said Act.
26. It could thus be seen that as per the definition of the term
'consumer', under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the said Act, as enacted originally,
even if a person who hires any services for any commercial purpose, he
could still be included in the definition of the term 'consumer'. It is relevant
to note that Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act clearly kept a person who
obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose, out of the
ambit of definition of the term 'consumer'. However, insofar as hiring
of services is concerned, no such provision was made in the original
enactment.
SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
958
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 5 S.C.R.
27. The legislature noticed various deficiencies and inadequacies
in the said Act. Therefore, in order to plug these loopholes and enlarge
the scope of areas covered, the legislature brought certain amendments
to the said Act by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993
(hereinafter referred to as "1993 Amendment Act"). One of the objects
of the said Act was to enable the consumers, who are self-employed, to
file complaints before the redressal agencies, where goods bought by
them exclusively for earning their livelihood, suffer from any defect. By
sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the 1993 Amendment Act, the following
amendments were effected to the definition of the term 'consumer':
"(5) in clause (d),-
(A) in sub-clause (ii), for the word "hires", in both the places
where it occurs, the words "hires or avails of" shall be substituted;
(B) after sub-clause (ii), the following Explanation shall be
inserted at the end, namely:-
'Explanation.- For the purposes of sub-clause (i),
"commercial purpose" does not include use by a consumer of
goods bought and used by him exclusively for the purpose of
earning his livelihood, by means of self-employment';"
28. It could thus be seen that by the 1993 Amendment Act, insofar
as services are concerned, wherever the word "hires" was used, the
same was substituted by the words "hires or avails of". By the said 1993
Amendment Act, insofar as Section 2(1)(d)(i) is concerned, an
Explanation was provided to the effect that 'commercial purpose' does
not include use by a consumer of goods bought and used by him exclusively
for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment.
It could thus be seen that though the original Act of 1986 excluded a
person from the ambit of definition of the term 'consumer' whenever
such purchases were made for commercial purpose; by the Explanation,
which is an exception to an exception, even if a person made purchases
for 'commercial purpose', he was included in the definition of the term
'consumer', if such a person bought and used such goods exclusively
for earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. The legislative
intent is clear, that though the purchases for commercial purposes are
out of the ambit of the definition of the term 'consumer' in the said Act,
if a person buys and uses such goods exclusively for earning his livelihood
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
959
by way of self-employment, he would still be entitled to protection under
the said Act.
29. The legislature further noticed several bottlenecks and
shortcomings in the implementation of various provisions of the said Act
and with a view to achieve quicker disposal of consumer complaints,
and to make the said Act more effective by removing various lacunae,
the legislature amended the said Act by the Consumer Protection
(Amendment) Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as "the 2002 Amendment
Act"). One of the objects for bringing out the 2002 Amendment Act
was "exclusion of services availed for commercial purposes from the
purview of the consumer disputes redressal agencies". It could thus be
seen that the legislature noticed the mischief, that though Section 2(1)(d)(i)
of the said Act kept out of its purview the goods purchased for commercial
purpose, the said restriction was not found in Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the
said Act. As such, in order to bring Section 2(1)(d)(ii) at par with Section
2(1)(d)(i), the following amendment was effected to in clause (d):
"(c) in clause (d),-
(i) in sub-clause (ii), the following words shall be inserted at the
end, namely:-
"but does not include a person who avails of such services
for any commercial purpose";
(ii) for the Explanation, the following Explanation shall be
substituted, namely:-
'Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause,
"commercial purpose" does not include use by a person of goods
bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively
for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of selfemployment';"
30. It could thus be seen that by the 2002 Amendment Act, the
legislature clearly provided that a person, who avails of such services
for any commercial purpose would be beyond the ambit of definition of
the term 'consumer'. The Explanation, which is an exception to an
exception, which earlier excluded a person from the term 'commercial
purpose', if goods were purchased by such a person for the purposes of
earning his livelihood by means of self-employment, was substituted and
the Explanation was made applicable to both clauses (i) and (ii). It can
SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
960
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 5 S.C.R.
thus clearly be seen that by the 2002 Amendment Act, though the
legislature provided that whenever a person avails of services for
commercial purposes, he would not be a consumer; it further clarified
that the 'commercial purpose' does not include use by a person of goods
bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the
purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment.
31. It is thus clear that by the 2002 Amendment Act, the legislature
has done two things. Firstly, it has kept the commercial transactions,
insofar as the services are concerned, beyond the ambit of the term
'consumer' and brought it in parity with Section 2(1)(d)(i), wherein a
person, who bought such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose,
was already out of the ambit of the term 'consumer'. The second thing
that the legislature did was that even if a person availed of the commercial
services, if the services availed by him were exclusively for the purposes
of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment, he would still be
a 'consumer' for the purposes of the said Act. Thus, a person who
availed of services for commercial purpose exclusively for the purposes
of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment was kept out of
the term 'commercial purpose' and brought into the ambit of 'consumer',
by bringing him on par with similarly circumstanced person, who bought
and used goods exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by
means of self-employment. It could thus be seen that the legislature's
intent is clear. If a person buys goods for commercial purpose or avails
services for commercial purpose, though ordinarily, he would have been
out of the ambit of the term 'consumer', by virtue of Explanation, which
is now common to both Sections 2(1)(d)(i) and 2(1)(d)(ii), he would still
come within the ambit of the term 'consumer', if purchase of such goods
or availing of such services was exclusively for the purposes of earning
his livelihood by means of self-employment. With this legislative history
in background, we will have to consider the present case.
32. The purpose of the said Act has been succinctly described by
this Court in the case of Laxmi Engineering Works vs. P.S.G.
Industrial Institute6, which is as under:
"10. A review of the provisions of the Act discloses that the quasijudicial bodies/authorities/agencies created by the Act known as
District Forums, State Commissions and the National Commission
6 (1995) 3 SCC 583
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
961
are not courts though invested with some of the powers of a civil
court. They are quasi-judicial tribunals brought into existence to
render inexpensive and speedy remedies to consumers. It is equally
clear that these forums/commissions were not supposed to supplant
but supplement the existing judicial system. The idea was to provide
an additional forum providing inexpensive and speedy resolution
of disputes arising between consumers and suppliers of goods
and services. The forum so created is uninhibited by the
requirement of court fee or the formal procedures of a court. Any
consumer can go and file a complaint. Complaint need not
necessarily be filed by the complainant himself; any recognized
consumers' association can espouse his cause. Where a large
number of consumers have a similar complaint, one or more can
file a complaint on behalf of all. Even the Central Government
and State Governments can act on his/their behalf. The idea was
to help the consumers get justice and fair treatment in the matter
of goods and services purchased and availed by them in a market
dominated by large trading and manufacturing bodies. Indeed, the
entire Act revolves round the consumer and is designed to protect
his interest. The Act provides for "business-to-consumer" disputes
and not for "business-to-business" disputes. This scheme of the
Act, in our opinion, is relevant to and helps in interpreting the
words that fall for consideration in this appeal."
33. It could thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that the
idea of enacting the said Act was to help the consumers get justice and
fair treatment in the matter of goods and services purchased and availed
by them in a market dominated by large trading and manufacturing bodies.
It has been held that the entire Act revolves round the consumer and is
designed to protect his interest. It provides for "business-to-consumer"
disputes and not for "business-to-business" disputes. It has been held
that forums/commissions provided by the said Act are not supposed to
supplant but supplement the existing judicial system. The idea was to
provide an additional forum providing inexpensive and speedy resolution
of disputes arising between consumers and suppliers of goods and
services.
34. In the case of Laxmi Engineering Works (supra), this Court,
while considering the scope of the definition of the expression 'consumer'
with relation to Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act and the Explanation
added by 1993 Amendment Act, observed thus:
SHRIKANT G. MANTRI v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
[B. R. GAVAI, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
962
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 5 S.C.R.
"11. Now coming back to the definition of the expression
'consumer' in Section 2(d), a consumer means insofar as is
relevant for the purpose of this appeal, (i) a person who buys any
goods for consideration; it is immaterial whether the consideration
is paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or whether
the payment of consideration is deferred; (ii) a person who uses
such goods with the approval of the person who buys such goods
for consideration; (iii) but does not include a person who buys
such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose. The
expression 'resale' is clear enough. Controversy has, however,
arisen with respect to meaning of the expression "commercial
purpose". It is also not defined in the Act.