# SHUKLA MANSETA INDUSTRIES P'LT. LTD v. THE WORKMEN EMPLOYED UNDER IT

- **Citation:** [1978] 1 S.C.R. 249
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-08-02
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1324 of 1977
- **Bench:** V. R. Krishna Iyer, P. K. Goswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/shukla-manseta-industries-p-lt-ltd-v-the-workmen-employed-under-it-7269
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

249
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-S. 19(2)-Scope of-Eniployers and
e1np/fJyees arrived at se1tlen1ent to be operath·e for three years--Eniployecs gave
11olt'ce of tennination two u1011tlls before the expiry of the period of three yearsVaf it!ity of notice.
A
B
Section 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides that a settlement shall be binding on the parties for such period as is agreed
up-0n
by
them and shall continue to be binding after the expiry of the period until the
C
expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in
writing. of
an
intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of thr, parties to the other
party Of parties to the settlement.
The appellant·employers and the respondent·worker5 agreed that the settlement reached by them in 1970 should be in force for three years till 5th July,
1973.
On May 6, 1973 the workers gave notice terminating the
settlement
after the expiry of two months from the date of notice.
Demands raised by
the workmen on August l, 1973 we.re. referred to an Industrial Tribunal. The
D
employers' preliminary objection that the reference was incompetent since there
~·as no legal and valid termination of the settlement undtr s. 19(2) was rejected
l:Jy the Tribunal.
Dismissing the employers' appeal to this Court
HELD : There is no legal bar to give advance intimation about the intention
to terminate thl.": settlement on the expiry of the agreed period and to start
negotiation for a more favourable settlement immediately thereafter. The only
condition to be fulfilled by such a notice is that the period of two month5 from
the date of notice must end on the expiry of the settlement and not before it.
[255H]
( 1) The policy of the Act is to ban agitations Clver the matters covered by
a settlement or by an award during the period specified under s. 19(2)
and
s. 19(6) respectively. To avoid uncertainty and speculation s. 19 prescribes
-a tenninus a quo and a tenninus ad qutn1.
If in a settlement there is no tin1e
limit agreed upon between the parties the period of operation is a space of
six months from the date of signing of the settlement and will last until the
expiry of two months from the date of receipt of the notice of termination of
the settlement. If the period is fixed it commences from- the date as specified
in the settlement and will theoretically end as agreed upon, but shall continue
to operate under the Jaw until the expiry of the requisite period of two months
by a clear \Vritten notice.
[253C-D]
(2) Jn an industrial matter this Court is not prepared to subject a
notice
under s. 19(2) to thl.": irksome vagaries or tyranny of technicalities of a notice
under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. [256Bl
(3) Notice under s. 19(2) or under s. 19(6) is only for intimation of an
~ntenti~n to terminate a settlement or an award respectively. There is no legal
impediment to give advance intimation of the aforesaid intention provided the
r.ontractual or statutory period of settlement is not thereby affected or curtailed.
J253FJ
Manage111e11t of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. The
l'Vork1nen fl968J I SCR 581; Indian Link Chain Manufactures Ltd v.
Their
'fVork1nen fl972] I SCR 790; National Carbon Co. (India) l.Jd. v. 'i\1, N. Gan.
Judge, Labour Appellale Tribunal & Ors A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 500; Deccan Tile
Works v. Their Workn1en (Tile Fnctorirs Workers' Union,
Sa1nalkot (1960]
2 !.LJ. 298 held inapplicable.
India Reconstruction Corporation Ltd. 1953 L.A.C. 563 (Crtl.) cli:.:approYcd.
5-768SCT/77
E
F
G
H
250
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 1 S.C.R.
A
(4) Section 19(2) does not entitle a party to a settlement to repudiate the
settlement while the same is in operation.
Giving advance notice within the
ambit of the law is not repudiation of the settlement.
[255A]
B.
c
( 5) The appellant's argument that since there is a power in the Government
to i;;xtend the period of_ an a\vard a notice of termination prior to the date of
expiry of the award cannot be conteniplat

## Text

SHUKLA MANSETA INDUSTRIES P'LT. LTD.
v.
THE WORKMEN EMPLOYED UNDER IT
August 2, 1977
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND P. K. GOSWAMI JJ.]
249
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-S. 19(2)-Scope of-Eniployers and
e1np/fJyees arrived at se1tlen1ent to be operath·e for three years--Eniployecs gave
11olt'ce of tennination two u1011tlls before the expiry of the period of three yearsVaf it!ity of notice.
A
B
Section 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides that a settlement shall be binding on the parties for such period as is agreed
up-0n
by
them and shall continue to be binding after the expiry of the period until the
C
expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in
writing. of
an
intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of thr, parties to the other
party Of parties to the settlement.
The appellant·employers and the respondent·worker5 agreed that the settlement reached by them in 1970 should be in force for three years till 5th July,
1973.
On May 6, 1973 the workers gave notice terminating the
settlement
after the expiry of two months from the date of notice.
Demands raised by
the workmen on August l, 1973 we.re. referred to an Industrial Tribunal. The
D
employers' preliminary objection that the reference was incompetent since there
~·as no legal and valid termination of the settlement undtr s. 19(2) was rejected
l:Jy the Tribunal.
Dismissing the employers' appeal to this Court
HELD : There is no legal bar to give advance intimation about the intention
to terminate thl.": settlement on the expiry of the agreed period and to start
negotiation for a more favourable settlement immediately thereafter. The only
condition to be fulfilled by such a notice is that the period of two month5 from
the date of notice must end on the expiry of the settlement and not before it.
[255H]
( 1) The policy of the Act is to ban agitations Clver the matters covered by
a settlement or by an award during the period specified under s. 19(2)
and
s. 19(6) respectively. To avoid uncertainty and speculation s. 19 prescribes
-a tenninus a quo and a tenninus ad qutn1.
If in a settlement there is no tin1e
limit agreed upon between the parties the period of operation is a space of
six months from the date of signing of the settlement and will last until the
expiry of two months from the date of receipt of the notice of termination of
the settlement. If the period is fixed it commences from- the date as specified
in the settlement and will theoretically end as agreed upon, but shall continue
to operate under the Jaw until the expiry of the requisite period of two months
by a clear \Vritten notice.
[253C-D]
(2) Jn an industrial matter this Court is not prepared to subject a
notice
under s. 19(2) to thl.": irksome vagaries or tyranny of technicalities of a notice
under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. [256Bl
(3) Notice under s. 19(2) or under s. 19(6) is only for intimation of an
~ntenti~n to terminate a settlement or an award respectively. There is no legal
impediment to give advance intimation of the aforesaid intention provided the
r.ontractual or statutory period of settlement is not thereby affected or curtailed.
J253FJ
Manage111e11t of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. The
l'Vork1nen fl968J I SCR 581; Indian Link Chain Manufactures Ltd v.
Their
'fVork1nen fl972] I SCR 790; National Carbon Co. (India) l.Jd. v. 'i\1, N. Gan.
Judge, Labour Appellale Tribunal & Ors A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 500; Deccan Tile
Works v. Their Workn1en (Tile Fnctorirs Workers' Union,
Sa1nalkot (1960]
2 !.LJ. 298 held inapplicable.
India Reconstruction Corporation Ltd. 1953 L.A.C. 563 (Crtl.) cli:.:approYcd.
5-768SCT/77
E
F
G
H
250
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 1 S.C.R.
A
(4) Section 19(2) does not entitle a party to a settlement to repudiate the
settlement while the same is in operation.
Giving advance notice within the
ambit of the law is not repudiation of the settlement.
[255A]
B.
c
( 5) The appellant's argument that since there is a power in the Government
to i;;xtend the period of_ an a\vard a notice of termination prior to the date of
expiry of the award cannot be conteniplated under the law and since this is
the position regarding an award, a settlement cannot be treated differently, has
no force.
Even if an advance notice is given in the case of an award, provided
the period of two months expires on the usual expiry of the award permitted
by law and Government in exercise of its power extends the award in a given
case, such a notice '\vould be infructuous and inoperative under the la'\v.
The
extension of the award by the Government in exercise of a statutory
po'\ver
would prevail upon the action of the party to terminate the award by notice.
It is only if a notice under s. 19(2) or 19(6) expires within the period of
o~ration of the a"'ard or settlement, such a notice will be invalid under the
law.
In that event the settlement or the award will continue to be in operation
and any reference by Government
of
a
dispute
during
the
period
of
settlement or an award without the same being terminated under the law \viii
be invalid. [255B-C; GJ
Patna Municipal Corporation v. The Workn1en of Patna Municipal Corpora·
tion & Ors. [1970] Labour Industrial Cases 1236 held inapplicable.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1324 of 1977.
·
Appeal by Special Leave frnm tbe Award dated 22-2-1977 of the
'
D
Industries Tribunal, Maharashtra in Reference (IT) No. 168 of 1974
"-
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G.
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published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette dated the 7th
April, 1977.
I. N. Shroff, for tbe Appellant.
F. D. Damania, P. H. Parekh, Miss Manju Jelley and K. Vasude,
for Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GosWAMl, J.-The short but important question which arises for
decision in this appeal by ·special leave turns on the interpretation of
section 19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (briefly the Act).
Does law require that notice of termination under section 19(2) has
to be given only after the date of expiry of a settlement ? That is the
question.
We are informed that there is no direct authority of this
Court on this point.
There was a settlement between the appellant, M/s. Shukla
Manseta Industries Private Limited (hereinafter to be described as the
employer) and their workmen on Jniy 6, 1970. The settlement came
into force from July 6, 1970 and was to remain in force for a period
of three years, that is, till 5th July, 1973. The workmen through their
union (Shukla Manseta Mazdoor Sangh) gave notice to the employer
on May 6, 1973, terminating the settlement after the expiry of the
period of two months from the date of the notice. Thus under the
terms of the notice the settlement would also have stood terminated
at the instance of the workmen on Jnly 5, 1973, :which was al~o the
date of the expiry of the settlement under the agreed terms.
The workmen thereafter raised certain demands on Angust 1, 1973,
and the State Government, in due course, referred tbe dispute under
section 10(1) (d) of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal by an order
dated June 25, 1974.
SHUKLA MANSETA INDUSTRIES v. WORKMEN (Goswami, J.) 251
The employer took a preliminary objection before the Tribunal
A
that the reference was incompetent and invalid in view of the fact
that there was no legal and valid termination of the settlement in
accordance with the provisions of section 19(2) of the Act.
The
workmen resisted the claim. The Tribunal over-ruled the preliminary
objection and held that the notice was valid and the reference
was
competent. It is against the above order of the Tribunal that the
employer has come to this Court by special leave.
Jl.
We may immediately turn our attention to section 19 of the Act
which reads as follows :-
"19. (I) A settlement shall come into operation on such date
as is agreed upon by the parties to the dispute, and
c
if no date is agreed upon, on the date ou which the
memorandum of the ·settlement is signed by the parties
to the dispute.
(2) Such settlement shall be binding for such period as is
agreed upon by the parties, and if no such period is
agreed upon, for a period of six months from the date
D
on which the memorandum of settlement is signed by
the parties to the dispute, and shall continue to be
binding on the parties after the expiry of the period
aforesaid, until the expiry of two months from the date
on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the parties to
the other party or parties to the settlement.
E
(3) An award shall, subject to the provisions of this section, remain in operation for a period of one year from
the date on which the award becomes en[orccable
under section 17 A :
Provided that the appropriate Government may reduce
F
the said period and fix such period as it thinks fit :
Provided fu,rther that. the appr.opriate Government may,
before. the exprry of_ the said penod, extend the period of
()Per;it1on by any penod not exceedmg one year at a time as
1t thmks fit so, however, that the total period of operation of
any award does not exceed three years from the date on
G
which it came into operation.
(4)
(5)
x
x
x
x
Nothing contai~ed in ?uh-section (3) shall apply to
any award which by its nature, terms or other circumstances does n~t i!llpose, .aft~r it has been given
effect to, any contmmng obhgatwn on the
parties
bound by the award.
H
B
c
D
E
F
G
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252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978] l S.C.R.
( 6) Notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operatioo.
under sub-section (3), the award 'shall continue tG
be binding on the parties until a period of two months
has elapsed from the date on which notice is gi\'ett
by any party bound by the award to the other party
or parties intimating its intention to terminate
t1te
award.
(7) No notice given under sub-section (2) or sub·sectioa
( 6) shall have effect, unless it is given by a party
representing the majority of per'sons bound by the
settlement or award, as the case may be".
We may also note the definition of settlement given und~r >ection
2(p) of the Act :
"2. (p) 'Settlement' means a settlement arrived at in :lie
course of conciliation
proceeding and
include• a
written agreement between the employer and workmen
arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation
proceeding where such agreement has been signed by
the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to an officer
authorised in this behalf by the appropriate GoYCf'.1r'i"··
ment and the conciliation officer".
There is no dispute that the settlement in question comes within
the purview of section 2(p) of the Act.
Under the provisions of sectiDn 19(2) it is clear that a >ettlement
shall be binding for ·such period as is agreed upon by the parties and
if there is no period mentioned in the agreement, for a period of 'ix
months from the date on which the settlement is signed by the parties.
With regard to the period of operation of lhe settlement; section 19 (2)
confers a statutory continuity of the settl.ement even after th~ expiry
of the period agreed upon until the expiry of two months fron\ the
date on which a written notice of the intention to terminate the settlement is given by one party to the other. It is, therefore, clear that
when_ a period is fixed in a ·settlement, the settlement remains in operation for the entire period and also thereafter until one or the other
party gives written intimation of the intention to terminate the settlement and until expiry of two months from the date of such intim.1tion.
The object of the above provision under section 19(2) is to ensure
that once a settlement is arrived at there prevails peace, accord and ·
cordiality between the parties during the period agreed upon and if
the settlement does not require to be altered for some reason or the
other the 'same climate prevails by extension of the settlement by
operation of law.
Section 19 is not a dead end freezing all m:inner of
aspirations of labour or even, may be, sometime, hardship suffered by
the employer on account of a settlement.
There is an optioa gi\'en
to either party to terminate the settlement by a written intimation after
the expiry of two months from the date of such notice. This is in accord
with the policy of settlement of industrial disputes which is tl1e principal
object underlying tbe provisions of the Act.
. SHUKLA· MANSETA INDUSTRIES v. WORKMEN (Goswami, J.) 253
Settlement between employers and workmen, if not duly terminated,
will operate as inviolable conditions of service of workmen. Such
settlements are only step-ups in labour's progressive ascent to the goal
of their ultimate Ideal, namely, a living wage with realisation of other
aspirations including partnership with employer.
How soon that goal
will be reached will depend upon so many factors and other imponderables in the process of the nation's achievement, with cooperation
from all sectors, . public and private, but each party being always alive
to the larger national interest which includes thriving of the industry
of which labour is an integral part.
The policy of the Act is to ban agitations over the matters covered
by a settlement or by an award during the period specified under
·section J 9 (2) and section 19 ( 6) respectively. To avoid uncertainty
and speculation section 19 prescribed a terminus a quo and a t£rminus
ad quem. If in a settlement there is no time limit agreed upon between
the parties the period of operation is a space of six months from the
date of signing of the settlement and will also last until the expiry of
two momhs from the date of receipt of the notice of termination of the
settlement. If the period is fixed it commences from the date as
specified in the settlement and will theoretically end as agreed upon
but shail continue to operate under the law until the expiry of the
requisite period of two months by a clear written notice.
An award under section 19 ( 3) of the Act has a longer period of
operation. to start with, namely, one year from the date of the commencement of the award, which is on the expiry of 30 days from the
date oi publica!ion of the award by the appropriate Government. As
in the Cii5c of a settlement so also under section 19(6) the award continues t(• operate governing the condition's of service until the expiry
of two months from the date of receipt of notice of termination of the.
award. Under the two provisos to sub-section (3) of section 19
Govem;nent has the option to reduce or extend the period of operation
of an award.
This will be, however, always subject to sub-section
(5) of section 19.
Notice under section 19(2) or under section 19(6) is only for
intimation of an intention to terminate a settlement or an award re·spective1y.
There is no legal impediment to give advance intimation
of the aforesaid intention provided the contractual or statutory period
of settlement is not thereby affected or curtailed.
A
B
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It i!: submitted by Mr. Shroff on behalf of the appellant that the
view· taken by the Tribunal is erroneous and he further submits that
there is a decision of another Industrial Tribunal in Maharashtra in
G
his suppo1t again.st the impugned view. He has also referred to two
decisions 1:>f this Court and some decisions of the High Courts but
admits ihat none of these is directly to the point which is raised before
us.
In Management of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk MUls Co. Ltd.
v. The Workmen & Anr.,('l) this Court ha·s held that when there is a
subsisting 1award binding on the parties the Tribunal has no jurisdiction
(l) [1%8] 1 S.C.R. 581.
H
254
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978) 1 S.C.R.
A
to consider the same points in a fresh reference. In that case the
earlier award had not been terminated and, therefore, the reference
was held by this Court to be incompetent. That was a case in which
there was not only a settlement between the parties but also an earlier
award dealing, initer a/ia, with some common items of dispute. While
the settlement was terminated after its expiry by the union, the earlier
award which also had disposed of some of the items of the dispute
B
which were raised but abandoned as a package deal in the subsequent
settlement had not been terminated in accordance with law. Indeed
there wa·s an attempt in that case to show that the earlier award had
been tenninated by a letter dated June 26, 1961 and if so, the award
would have expired on August 26, 1961. Since, however, the settlement disposing of common points of dispute was terminated by a
letter dated August 14, 1961 and thereby the settlement stood termiC
nated 'only on October 14, 1961, the termination of the award by a
letter dated June 26, 1961, during the operation of the settlement was
held to be invalid.
The facts of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk
Miffs' case (supra) are, therefore, entire1y different from those with
which we are concerned in thi's appeal.
D
E
F
The other decision namely, the Indian Link Chain Manufactures
Ltd. v. Their Workmen,(1) is also not directly to the point raised in
this case.
Our attention is drawn to a decision of the Calcutta High Court
in the National Carbon Co. (India) Ltd. v. M. N. Gan, Judge, Labour
Appellate Tribunal and Others,(2 ) wherefrom reading paragraph 13
in the decision, Mr. Shroff sought to derive some assistance. We find
that although the agreement, there, was statutorily continuing after its
expiry on August 26, 1952, notice for terminating the agreement w:as·
given on September 6, 1952 and the High Court rightly accepted the
notice as valid. The High Court also rightly disagreed with the views
of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in India Reconstruction Corporation
Limited(3 ) that an agreement with a fixed period expired by efflux
of the period and was not statutorily continued. "The period aforesaid"
in s. 19 (2) will include not only the contractual period but also the
statutory period of six months.
This decision, therefore, lends no
assistance to Mr. Shroff.
·
Mr. Shroff also relied upon a decision of the Andhra Prade3h High
Court in Deccan Tile Works v. Their Workmen (Tile Factories Workers'
Union, Samalkot) and two othe.rs(<f) which does not at all lead assiStG
ance to his submission. Although the facts are not very clear from.the
. report we find, the High Court has observed that-
.
"obviously the management was not within its rights in
terminating and unilaterally repudiating Ex. A. 1" (the agreement).
(I) (1972) I S.C.R. 790.
(2) A.I .R. 1957 Cal. 500.
(3) (1953) Labour Appeal Cases 563 (Cal.).
(4) [1960] 2 L.L.J. 298.
SHUKLA !llANSETA INDUSTRIES v. WORKMEN (Goswami,/.) 255
.
!
I
Section 19 ( 2) does not entitle a party to a settlement, to repudiate the
settlement while the same is in operation.. Giving · advance notice
within the ambit of the law is not repudiation of the· settlement.
.
Mr. Shroff next submits that section 19(2) should be given tlie
same meaning a·s section· 19 ( 6) sirice both these provisions are on
the same subject dealirig with the period of operation of settlement
and award respectively. It is submitted that so far as an award is
concerned under the .second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 19,
the appropriate Government may extend the period of operation by
any period not exceeding one year at a time subject to a total period
of operation not exceeding three years from the date on which it comes
into operation.
According to counsel since there is a power in the
Government to extend the period of the award a notice of termination
prior to the date of expiry of the award cannot be contemplated under
the law and sirice this is the position regarding an award, a settlement
cannot be treated differently.
We are unable to accede to this submission. Even if an advance notice is given in the case of an award,
provided the period of two nionths expires on the usual expiry of the
award permitted by law and Government in exercise of its power extends the award in a given ·case, ·such a notice would· be infructuous ·
and inoperative under the law. The extension of the award by the
Government in exercise· of statutory power would prevail upon the
action of the party to terminate the award by notice. · -
Mr. Shroff relied upon a decision of the Patna High Court in
Patna Municipal Corporation v. The TV orkmen of Patna Municipal
Corporation and others(') and read .to us the following observation
from that decision :
"A party tci the award cannot terminate it so long it remains operative either during the period of one year or dnring
the extended period under sub-sectiOn (3) of section 19".
We do not read the above observation as ·supporting the submission of counsel that no advance notice can be given to terminate
a settlement or an award provided the. requisite ~eriod of two months
required under section 19(2) expires on the <fate of expiry of the
settlement or award or thereafter. It is only if a notice under section
19(2) or 19(6) expires within the period of operation of the award or
settlement, such a notice will be invalid :under the law. In that event
the settlement or the award will continue to be in operation and any
· reference by Government of a dispute during the period of settlement
or an award without the same being terminated under the law will be
invalid·.
·A
B
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In the instapt case the notice under section· 19(2) wa·s given intimating the intention of the workers to terminate the award on a date
when the agreed period would also expire. To repeat, there is no legal
bar to give advance intimation about the intention to terminate the
settlement on the expiry of the agreed period and to start negotiation
H
for a more favourable settlement im111ediately thereafter.
The only
(I) [1970] Labour Industrial Cases 1236.
A
B
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 1 S.C.R.
condition that has to be fulfilled by such a notice is that the period of
two months from the date of notice must end on the expiry of the
settlement and not before it. In a given case it may be even advantageous to the parties who do not want to continue the ·settlement to
strike a new bargain without loss of time so that unnnecessary bickerings and resultant industrial unrest do not take place. In an industrial
matter we are not prepared to subject a notice under section 19(2) to
the irksome vagaries or tyranny of technicalities of a notice under
'section I 06 of the Transfer of Property Act.
There is, therefore, no substanc(' in the contention that the reference is incompetent and invalid.
The appeal is dismissed with
costs. The Tribunal will try to dispose of the case. expeditiously.
P.B.R .
Appeal dismised.
•