# SIBVGOVIND v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1972] 3 S.C.R. 835
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972-03-14
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1972
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sibvgovind-v-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-5618
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

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SIBVGOVIND
v.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
March 14, 1972
. [A, N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.J
835
Crin1inal trial-Enha11cen1e11t-Enlu1nce11u!nt of sentence by appellate
Court-Principles goi·erning.
A question of scnteno.:: is a matter of di~•cretion. It is well settled
that when cliscreti.on has been properly exercised along accepted judicial
Jines, an appellate court should not interfere to the detriment of an- accused person.
Such interference 'Viii be justified only by strong reasons
\Vhich must be disclosed on the fact of the jud_gimnt.
Jn a matter "f
enhancement there should not be interfen.:ncc wllen the sentence passed
imposes substantial punishment.
Jnterfen!nc.e is only called for when: it
is manifestly inadequate. [839 BJ
Where the trial court after taking into acC:Ount a11 the circumstances
anJ nlso the discr;!pancies in the pro=ecution ·v!Jrsion convicted the appellant to one year's imprisonment under s. 366, Pen:ll Code, and the High
·court in appeal, enhanced the sentence to seven years' im:i.1)risonment.
HEl:D : that the High Court !>ad not noticed a number of facts duly
<:onsidered by the trial court and. therefore, the exercise of the power of
enhancement could not be justified. [839 OJ
Bed Raj v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [19551 2 S. C.R. 583; and
AlamRir & Anr. v. The State of Bihar, L19S9J Supp. I S.C.R. 464,
refernd to.
Nabi Bux mrd Or.r. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, A.l.R. 1972
S .C. 495, distinguished.

## Text

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SIBVGOVIND
v.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
March 14, 1972
. [A, N. GROVER AND M. H. BEG, JJ.J
835
Crin1inal trial-Enha11cen1e11t-Enlu1nce11u!nt of sentence by appellate
Court-Principles goi·erning.
A question of scnteno.:: is a matter of di~•cretion. It is well settled
that when cliscreti.on has been properly exercised along accepted judicial
Jines, an appellate court should not interfere to the detriment of an- accused person.
Such interference 'Viii be justified only by strong reasons
\Vhich must be disclosed on the fact of the jud_gimnt.
Jn a matter "f
enhancement there should not be interfen.:ncc wllen the sentence passed
imposes substantial punishment.
Jnterfen!nc.e is only called for when: it
is manifestly inadequate. [839 BJ
Where the trial court after taking into acC:Ount a11 the circumstances
anJ nlso the discr;!pancies in the pro=ecution ·v!Jrsion convicted the appellant to one year's imprisonment under s. 366, Pen:ll Code, and the High
·court in appeal, enhanced the sentence to seven years' im:i.1)risonment.
HEl:D : that the High Court !>ad not noticed a number of facts duly
<:onsidered by the trial court and. therefore, the exercise of the power of
enhancement could not be justified. [839 OJ
Bed Raj v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [19551 2 S. C.R. 583; and
AlamRir & Anr. v. The State of Bihar, L19S9J Supp. I S.C.R. 464,
refernd to.
Nabi Bux mrd Or.r. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, A.l.R. 1972
S .C. 495, distinguished.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 3
of 1972.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
January 25, 1971 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore
Bench.in Criminal Appeal No. 391 of 1969.
S. K. Gambhir, for the appellant.
G
M. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Cqurt was delivered by
Beg, J, Shiv Govind, the appellant , has obtained SJieelal
Leave to appeal against only that part of the Judgment and order
of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by which his sentence of
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one year's Rigorous 'Im:priSOll!llent, passed by the Additional Sessions' Judge, lnilote, upon " conviction under Section 366 Indian
·Penal Code, was enhanced to seven years' Rigorous Imprisonment
836.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 3 S.C.R.
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and a fine of Rs. 100 / -, and, in default of payment of fine, to three
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months' further rigorous imprisonment.
The appellant,
aged
about 20 yearn at the time of ihe alleged offence of 9th of August,
1969, was the youngest of three persons who were jointly charged
and tried for offence$ punuhable under Section 366 and 354
I.P.C.
....
The prosecution case was : Kumari Seema, a girl below 18
years of age, was offered a lift on his bicycle by the accused,
Kamal Singh, aged 30 ye;irs, while she was returning to her home
from her School on 9th August, 1969.
The girl.hesitated.· But,
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as she reposed confidence in Kamal Singh, whom she looked upon
as her uncle, she accepted the offer.
Kamal .Singh took Kumari
Seema on his bicycle to the Regal Cinema where she part-took of
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some. refreshment ordered by Kamal Singh.
Meanwhile, the
appellant Shiv Govind and the accused Punam, aged 26, arrived
in a car.
Kamal Singh asked Kumari Seema to go with the two
younger men in their car.
Seema refused.
Theo, Kamal Singh
asked her to go on his bicycle to Y ashwant Talkies.
She complied with this request.
At this Cinema, Kamal Singh deposited
his Cycle at the Cycle stand.
The appellant Shiv Govind and his
companion Punam had followed in their car.
The three men
succeeded in persuading Seema, despite her initial refusal, to sit
in the car and to go for a short pleasure trip in it on the definite
assurance that. she will soon be reached home. . After the girl had
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sat in the car she was driven to a place called Mandow, a number
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of miles away from Indore, and was made to alight at a tourist's
bungalow.
There two rooms were engaged by the accused.
Kamal Singh occupied one of the two rooms and the girl was
closeted in the other room with the appellant and his companion
Punam, who.were both drunk.
One of the two youngmen caught
hold of the hands of the girl while the other tried to undress her
with the object of raping her.
Kumari Seema, at this point,
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feigned sudden indisposition. so that the two youngmen had to
bring her out into the gallery for fresh air.
She managed to
escape while the accused went inside to fetch some water for her.
She rushed into the house of one Babula! Kamdar and complained
to:him about the incident. This led to a COlillllunication of information ·Of the offences to the ·Police which went to the tourist's
bungalow and arrested the three accused who were brought to
Police Station Nalcha where a First Information Report was
lodged.
The Trial Court had examined ~
evidence given. in support
of the case stated aoove.
This 4nc1uded modi.cal evidenco on Uie
question·of the age of the girl, beeause, while the prosearticn :alleged that she was below 16 years of age, the acc11Sed pleaded tb8t
she was above 18 years of age.
13vidently, the case of the accused
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SHIV GOVIND V. STATE (Beg, J.)
837
was that Kumari Seema was a consenting party to whatever took
. place.
Although the girl was attending a School, the entry of her
age in the School Register was not disclosed.
Despite some discrepancies in the evidence relating to the age of the girl, the trial
court came to the conclusion that it was between 16 to 19 years.
It relied mainly on expert evidence of Doctors who had used the·
ossification test.
The Trial Court had also noticed the discrepancies between
the prosecution version, as set out above by Kumari Seema in her·
evidence in Court, and the story given out by her in the First
. Information Report where she had stated that she had joined the·
party of the accused at the crossing of Bijasan Road.
The earlier
version· suggested that the girl had herself gone to meet the party
of the accused by appointment.
The consent of the girl was, however, immaterial in view of
the finding of the Trial Court about the age of the girl.
The fact
that she was taken to Mandow, where something happened at 'the
tourist's bungalow which she disapproved of, was corroborated by
the evidence of Babula! Kamdar, and Kailash Sharma, in addition
to the two police constables of Mandow-OUt-post.
The Trial
Court which had the advantage of watching the demeanour of the
girl, had come to the conclusion that, although the girl may have·
tried to improve her version and pretend that she was unwilling to
accompany Kamal Singh, who had come in a car for her according to the first version, yet, the charge under· Sec. 3661.P.C., was
established against each of the three accused and the charge under
Sec. 354 I.P.C. was established against Shiv Govind, appellant,
and his companion Piinam. The three accused were, therefOte,
convicted under Sec. 366, and each was sentenced to one year's
rigorous imprisonment. The two accused Shiv Govind and
Punam were also eoilvicted under Sec. 354 l.P .<:., and sentenced
to four months rigorous. imprisonment, but the two sentences were
ordered to .run concurrently.
When the case came up in appeal to the High ~ourt; a notice
of enhancement of the sentence under Sec, 366 I.P.C. was issued
to each of the three appellants, and· their sentences were enhaDced,
as indicated above, after the appellants had•been heard.
It is only Shiv Govind who has appealed to this Court. Shiv
Govind had also applied under Sec. 561A. Criminal Procedure
Code to the High Court, after the dismissal of his appeal and
enhancement of the sentence by the High Court, claiming the
benefit of Sec. 6 and 11 of the Probation of Offender's Act. B\lt,
this application was rejected by the learned Judge who had
enhanced the stntence passed upon the appellant, although }le
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1972] 3 S.C.R.
found that the report of the Probation Officer about the conduct
of the accused while undergoing the sentence, which was sent for,
was favourable to the appellant. It appears from the two Judgments given by the learned Judge who enhanced the sentence of
.the appellant and who subsequently dismissed the application
under Sec. 56 IA Criminal Procedure Code also, that the view
taken by him was that, having regard to the facts and circumstances and of the case and the offence committed by the appellant,
:the enhanced sentence was deserved by him.
We have, therefore, examined the Judgment of the High Court
under appeal before us in order to discover the special reasons
which induced the learned High Court Judge to differ from the
opinion of the Trial Court about the appropriate sentence to be
imposed upon the appellant
The only reason given by the learn-
.ed Judge for enhancing the sentence was that Kumari Seema had
reposed confidence in Kamal Singh, whom she regarded as an
Unde, so. that she could not expect foul play from
him. The
learned. Judge thought the girl's trust and confidence in l(amal
Singh explained why she did not protest when she was taken in the
car and then made to get down at the tourist's bungalow. It
s.eems, however, from the account of the occurrence given in the
Judgment under appeal, that the learned Judge was shocked by
!he plight of K umari Seema, due to the perfidy of Kamal Sinjh,
and by a -contemplation of the possible consequences to her if she
had not behaved in a .particularly brave and intelligent ma~
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as to escape from her predicament.
The learned Judge mentioned that the girl had risked her life to escape.
We, however,
find. that there was no suggestion in the evidence anywhere that
any threat to the life of Kumari Seema was ~Id out.
There was
no evidence that the girl had seriously struggled to escape or had
raised shouts for help which would have brought people around to
lier aid.
Nor was there any evidence that the accused tried to
obstruct her or to chase her when she escaped from the tourist's
bongalow allegedly by resorting to a ruse.
The High Court was
.so .improssed by the girl's uncorroborated version of· her own
heroism, which did not tally with her first version in the First
Jnfonnation Report, that it overlooked the infinnities in the girl's
.evidence discussed by the trial court. We find the trial court's view
of the whole case to be quite balanced and objective.
We do not
thillk that the severer view of the High Court could be reasonably
j1111ified.
It seems clear to us that the High Coun had overlooked the
principles, laid down 'by this Court repeatedly, which shoUld
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SHIV GOVJND v. STATE (Beg, J.)
839
govern the exercise of powers of the High Court to enhance sentences imposed by trial courts.
Jn Bed Raj v. The State of Uftar
Pradesh(') this Court observed at page 588-589 :-
"'A question of a sentence is a matter of discretion
and it is well settled that when discretion has been properly exercised
along accepted judicial lines,
an
appellate court should not interfere to the detriment of an
accused person except for very strong ·reasons which
must be disclosed on the face of the judgment; See for
example the observations in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab (1954 S.C.R. 146, 156) and Nar Singh v. State of
Uttar Pradesh [1955(1) S.C.R. 238, 241].
In a matter
of enhancement there should not be interference when the
sentence passed imposes substantial punishment.
InterfP.rence is only called for when it is manifestly inade1Juate.
In our opinion, these principles have not been
;Jbserved.
It is impossible to hOld in the circumstances
described that the Sessions Judge did not impose a substantial sentence, and no adequate reason has been
assigned by the learned High Court Judges for considering the sentence manifestly inadequate.
In the circumstances, bearing all the considerations of this case in
mind, we are of opinion that the appeal (which is limited to the question of sentence l should be allowed and
that the sentence imposed by the High Court should be
set aside and that of the Sessions Court restored''.
We think that what was laid down by this Court in Bed Rai's
case (Supra) is fully applicable to the case before us.
We may
also mention the similar views expressed by this Court in Alamgir
& Anr., v. The State of Bihar( 2 ).
We may observe that decision of this Court in Nabi Bux and
Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh("), is distinguishable from
the case before us.
In that case the High Court had enhanced a
sentence having regard to all the facts and circumstances justifying
the enhancement. In the case before us we find that the High
Court had not noticed a number of facts duly considered by the·
trial Court so that the exercise of power of enhancement of the
sentence under Sec. 366 I.P.C. could not be reasonably justified
here.
Consequently, we allow this appeal by setting aside the order
of enhancement of sentence by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
and restore the sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment
(I) [1955] (2) S.C.R. p. 583.
(2)
[1959] Supp. (I) S.C.R. 464.
(J) A.l.R. [1972]S.C. 495.
840
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 3 S.C.R.
passed upon the appelant by the learned Sessions Judge for the
offence under Sec. "366 I.P.C. of which the appellant was convicted.
The concurrent sentence of four months rigorous imprisonment under Sec. 354 I.P.C., which was not interfered with by the
High C~urt, is maintained.
We understand that the appellant has
alfeady undergone more than one year's imprisonment awarded
to him and that he is in jail as his application for bail was rejected.
If this is so, the appellant will be released forthwith unless wanted
in some other case.
K.B.N.
Appeal allowed.
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