# SIDRAMAPPA v. RAJASHEITY AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1970] 3 S.C.R. 319
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-12-09
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, K. S. Hegde
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sidramappa-v-rajasheity-and-ors-4920
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Code of Civil Proc~dure, 1908--0rder 2 rule 2-Suit for reopening
execution proceedings and implettding as legal r~presentative--Subsequent
suit based on title-If barred by Order 2, rule 2.
The appellant applied to the executing court to reopen the execution
proceedings in respect of certain properties and to implead him as the
leg.:! representative of the owner of the properties, claiming that as the
adopted son he was entitled to delivery of possession. The Court dismissed the application holding that his remedy was by way of a separate suit.
Thereupon he filed a s,uit for a declaration that he was entitled to be
impleaded in the execution
proceedings as the legal representative
and
proceed'-with the execution.
The purported cause of action fo-r suit wa5.
the dismissal of the earlier application for impleading in the execution
proceedings.
The suit was dismissed on the ground that it was hit by
s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act inasmuch as it was not one for possession
of the concerned property. Thereafter the appellant filed another suit on
the basis of his title. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground
that the relief in question was barred by Order 2 rule 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
The High Court affirmed.
On the question whether the
plaintiff's daim in respect of the properties was barred by Order 2 rule
2 Code of Civil Procedure,
HELD : The High Court and the trial cotirt proceeded on the erron·
eous basis that the former suit was a suit for a declaration of the appellant's title to the prope'rties in question.
The requirements of Order 2
rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure is that every suit should · include the
whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of a
"cause of action."
'Cause of action' means the 'cause
of action
for
wh'ch the suit was brought'. It cannot be said that the cause of action
on which the present suit was brought is the same as that in the previous
suit. Cause of action is a caiuse of action which gives occasion for and
forms the foundation of the suit. If that cause of action enables a per·
son to ask for a larger and wider relief than that to which he limits his
claim, he cannot afterwards seek to recover the balance by independent
proceedings. [321 G, 322 A.CJ
In the instant case the cause of action on the basis of which the previous suit was brought does not form the foundation of the present suit.
The cause of action mentioned in the earlier suit,
assumin~ the same
afforded a basis for a valid claim, did not enable the plaintiff to ask for
any relief other than those he prayed for in that suit.
In that suit he
could not have claimed the relief which he seeks in this suit. Hence the
trial court and the Hi~h Court were not right in holding that the plaintiff's
suit was barred by Order 2, rule 2, Code dl Civil Procedure. [322 CD]
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1953
of 1969.
320
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 3 S.C.R.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
October 18, 1968 of the Mysore High Court in Regular First
Appeal No. 56 of 1963.
M. C. Chagla and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.
S. V. Gupte, R. V. Pillai, Sadasiv Rao and P. Keshava Pillai,
A
.for respondent No. I.
B
The Judgment of th~ Court was delivered by
Hegde, J.
This is a plaintiff's appeal by special leave.
The
:plaintiff sued for possession of the suit properties on the. basis of
his title.
The suit properties originally belonged to the family
.of one V eerbaswanth Rao Deshmukh. He died in 1892 wifhout
.male issues, leaving behind him his widow Ratnabai and a daughter
by name Lakshmibai.
Ratnabai succeeded to the estate of her
husband. She died in 1924. On her death Lakshmibai became
entitled to the suit properties. But one Parwatibai alias Prayag
Bai took unlawful possession of the suit properties.
Hence
Lakshmibai instituted a suit for their possession in the court of
Sadar Adalath, Gulbarga, against the said Parwatibai
and
obtained a decree.
In execution o

## Text

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319
SIDRAMAPPA
v.
RAJASHEITY AND ORS.
December 9, 1969
(J. C. SHAH AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.J
Code of Civil Proc~dure, 1908--0rder 2 rule 2-Suit for reopening
execution proceedings and implettding as legal r~presentative--Subsequent
suit based on title-If barred by Order 2, rule 2.
The appellant applied to the executing court to reopen the execution
proceedings in respect of certain properties and to implead him as the
leg.:! representative of the owner of the properties, claiming that as the
adopted son he was entitled to delivery of possession. The Court dismissed the application holding that his remedy was by way of a separate suit.
Thereupon he filed a s,uit for a declaration that he was entitled to be
impleaded in the execution
proceedings as the legal representative
and
proceed'-with the execution.
The purported cause of action fo-r suit wa5.
the dismissal of the earlier application for impleading in the execution
proceedings.
The suit was dismissed on the ground that it was hit by
s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act inasmuch as it was not one for possession
of the concerned property. Thereafter the appellant filed another suit on
the basis of his title. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground
that the relief in question was barred by Order 2 rule 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
The High Court affirmed.
On the question whether the
plaintiff's daim in respect of the properties was barred by Order 2 rule
2 Code of Civil Procedure,
HELD : The High Court and the trial cotirt proceeded on the erron·
eous basis that the former suit was a suit for a declaration of the appellant's title to the prope'rties in question.
The requirements of Order 2
rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure is that every suit should · include the
whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of a
"cause of action."
'Cause of action' means the 'cause
of action
for
wh'ch the suit was brought'. It cannot be said that the cause of action
on which the present suit was brought is the same as that in the previous
suit. Cause of action is a caiuse of action which gives occasion for and
forms the foundation of the suit. If that cause of action enables a per·
son to ask for a larger and wider relief than that to which he limits his
claim, he cannot afterwards seek to recover the balance by independent
proceedings. [321 G, 322 A.CJ
In the instant case the cause of action on the basis of which the previous suit was brought does not form the foundation of the present suit.
The cause of action mentioned in the earlier suit,
assumin~ the same
afforded a basis for a valid claim, did not enable the plaintiff to ask for
any relief other than those he prayed for in that suit.
In that suit he
could not have claimed the relief which he seeks in this suit. Hence the
trial court and the Hi~h Court were not right in holding that the plaintiff's
suit was barred by Order 2, rule 2, Code dl Civil Procedure. [322 CD]
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1953
of 1969.
320
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 3 S.C.R.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
October 18, 1968 of the Mysore High Court in Regular First
Appeal No. 56 of 1963.
M. C. Chagla and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.
S. V. Gupte, R. V. Pillai, Sadasiv Rao and P. Keshava Pillai,
A
.for respondent No. I.
B
The Judgment of th~ Court was delivered by
Hegde, J.
This is a plaintiff's appeal by special leave.
The
:plaintiff sued for possession of the suit properties on the. basis of
his title.
The suit properties originally belonged to the family
.of one V eerbaswanth Rao Deshmukh. He died in 1892 wifhout
.male issues, leaving behind him his widow Ratnabai and a daughter
by name Lakshmibai.
Ratnabai succeeded to the estate of her
husband. She died in 1924. On her death Lakshmibai became
entitled to the suit properties. But one Parwatibai alias Prayag
Bai took unlawful possession of the suit properties.
Hence
Lakshmibai instituted a suit for their possession in the court of
Sadar Adalath, Gulbarga, against the said Parwatibai
and
obtained a decree.
In execution of the said decree Lakshmibai
obtained delivery of the lands described in Schedule II to the
plaint. Lakshmibai died in 1948. Sometime thereafter Parwatibai also died. The defendant claiming to be the sister's son of
Veerbaswanth Rao Deshmukh got himself impleaded as the
legal representative of Lakshmibai in the execution proceedings and sought delivery of the lands mentioned in Schedule I
of the plaint. Meanwhile one Vishwanath alleging to be the legal
representative , of Parwatibai got himself impleaded in the execution: proceedings.
Thereafter the defendant and Vishwanath
entered into a compromise in pursuance of which Vishwanath
delivered possession of the lands included in Sch.,ctule I to tl1e
defendant. Sometime thereafter the p)aintiff applied to the court
to reooen the execution oroceedings and implead him· as the legal
representative of Lakshmibai claiming that he is the adopted son
of Lakshmibai.
The executing court dismissed his application
holding that his remedy was by wav of a separate suit. A revision
taken agaimt that order to the Hi2h Court was rejected. Thereafter the nlaintiff filed a suit in the court of Subordinate District
Judae. Bidar, for a declaration that he is entitled to be imnleaded
in the execution proceedings mentioned earlier as the representative of La kshmibai and to proceed with the execution after
setting aside the order made bv the executing court on the basis
of the compromise entered into between the defenchnt and
Vishwanath.
It mav be noted that that wa.s the only relief asked
for in the nlaint. The nurnorted cause of action for the suit was
the dismissal of the plaintiff's application for impleading him in
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SIDRAMAPPA i', RAJASHETTY (Hegde, J.)
32 t
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the execution proceedings. That suit should have been dismi;sed
on the ground that it was not maintainable in law. But strangely
enough it was dismissed on the ground that it was hit by s. 42
of the Specific Relief Act inasmuch as the plaintiff did not sue
for possession of the concerned property.
Thereafter the suit
from which this appeal arises was instituted by the plaintiff on
B
the basis of his title. The trial court dismissed his suit in respect
of the lands mentioned in Schedule I of the plaint on the ground
that the relief in question is barred by Order 2, rule 2, Code of
Civil Procedure.
It decreed the suit for the possession of the
lands mentioned in Schedule II except items 3 and 9.
It also
decreed the plaintiff's claim in respect of the cash amount menC
tioned in the plaint.
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Both the plaintiff and the defendant went up in appeal to the
High Court of Mysore as against the decision of the trial court to
the extent that decision was against them. The High Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Before the trial court and the High Court, there was controversy as regards the truth of adoption pleaded by the plaintiff.
Both the courts have upheld the plaintiff's claim that he was
adopted by the husband of Lakshmibai. That question was not
reopened before us.
Before the High Court, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff
conceded that the plaintiff's suit in respect of items 3 and 9 of
Schedule II of the plaint is barred hy limitation. Hence that
question stands concluded.
The only question that remains for consideration is whether
the High Court and the trial court were right in their conclusions
that the plaintiff's claim in respect of the lands mentioned in
Schedule I of the plaint is barred by Order 2. rule 2, Code of
Civil Procedure.
We are of the opinion that the trial court and the High Court
erred in holding that the plaintiff's suit in respect of the lands
mentioned in plaint Schedule I is barred by Order 2, rule 2, Code
of Civil Procedure.
The suit instituted by the plaintiff in the
court of Subordinate District Judge, Bidar for a declaration that
he is entitled to be impleaded in the execution proceedings as
legal· representative of Lakshmibai and to proceed with the execution proceedings, was as mentioned earlier, a misconceived one.
It was exercise in futility. His remedy was to file a suit for the
possession of the concerned properties on the basis of his title.
The High Court and the trial court proceeded on the erroneous basis that the former suit was a suit for a declaration of
322
SUP!lBME COURT llEPORTS
(1970] 3 S.C.R.
the
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plaintiff's title to the lands mentioned in Schedule I of I.he
plaint. The requirement of Order 2, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure is that every suit should include the whole of the clain1
which the plaintiff is entitled to make in in respect of a cause of
action.
'Cause of action' means the 'cause of action for which
the 'suit was brought'. It cannot be said that the cause of action
on which the present suit was brought is the same as that in the
previous suit.
Cause of action is a cause of action which gives
occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. If that cause
of action enables a person to ask for a larger and wider relief than
that to which he limits bis claim, he cannot afterwards seek to
recover the balance by independent prooeedings-see Mohd •
. Hafiz vs. Mohd. Zakaria(').
As seen earlier the cause of action on the basis of which the
previous suit was brought does not form the foundation of the
present suit. The cause of action mentioned in the earlier suit,
assuming the same afforded a basis for a valid claim, did not
enable the plaintiff to ask for any relief other than those he prayed
for in. that suit. In that suit he could not have claimed the relief
which he seeks in this suit.
Hence the trial court and the High
Court were not right in holding that tile plaintiff's suit is barred
by Order 2, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure.
In view of our above conclusion, we have not thought it
necessary to go into the controversy whether Order 2, rule 2,
Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to a suit under s. 42 of the
Specific Relief Act.
We are unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel
for the appellant that we should allow to the appellant mesne
profits at least from the date of the suit. No claim for mesne
profits was made in the plaint. Therefore we cannot go into that
question in this appeal. For the mesne profits, if any, due to the
plaintiff, he must take separate steps according to Jaw.
In the result this appeal is allowed and the trial court's decree
is modified by including therein the lands mentioned in Schedule I
of the plaint. In other respects the decree of the trial court is
sustained. The appellant will be entitled to his costs both in lhis
Court as well as in the High Court.
Y.P.
Appeal allowed.
(I) (19221 L.R. 49 I.A. 9.
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